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Abstract 
 
 
Using a relational state-society framework, this research examines the relationship between 
land use violations and the urban planning process. This thesis seeks to answer how and 
why land use violations in the non-poor neighbourhoods of Bangalore are produced, 
sustained and contested in spite of the elaborate planning, implementation and 
enforcement mechanisms present in Bangalore.  Land use violations are identified as a key 
geographic site to empirically examine power and politics in urban planning practice in 
Bangalore. Critiquing the simplified representations often used to explain informality and 
illegality in the cities of the developing south as deviation, implementation failure and 
corruption; I propose that violations in Bangalore are an outcome of the planning practice 
rather than a deviation.  In the process, I highlight how particular planning institutional 
systems operate when located in specific socio-political and governance contexts where 
vernacular networks of association transform the ‘governmentalised’ state into one that is 
amenable to specific interests through forging various forms of alliances. Providing 
evidence from ethnography of planning and violation networks in operation, this thesis 
argues that planning practice in Bangalore is inhabited by a variety of public and private 
interest networks. These associational networks, I argue, capture planning power, and 
prevent the possibility of a planning authority.  Various case studies of plan violation, 
planning for violation, neighbourhood activism along with planning practice narratives, 
documents, and court cases form the extensive data set analysed in this thesis.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1. Introduction: The site of planning violations in Bangalore 
On February 23rd 2010, a seven-storied office building named Carlton Towers 
near Old Airport Road in Bangalore went up in flames.  Nine people were killed 
in the fire and sixty were injured, fifteen seriously.  According to various media 
reports (Citizen Matters 2011; Deccan Herald 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d; 
DNA 2010; Hindu 2010; Paramanik 2010; Ravi 2010; Vincent 2011; Vittal 
2010) a number of factors were responsible for the accident and the resultant 
casualties.   
 
It seems the fire exit doors were locked making the escape routes unusable. 
The building was improperly ventilated which otherwise could have diffused 
the effect of smoke.  Many reports indicated that there were no sprinklers, 
underground water tanks or fire exit indicators.  The fire fighters and others 
who had gathered to help with the rescue encouraged the victims to jump from 
the higher floors onto some hand-held bedspreads. Many jumped to their 
death.  
 
It was reported that the building was built deviating from the plans approved 
by the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP)1. For example, the 
building had an entire extra floor and had less than the legally required offsets2 
from the neighbouring properties to enable rescue operations.  After 
completion, the developers did not obtain an occupancy certificate,3 which 
declares the building fit for occupation.  To make matters worse, it was also 
                                                     
1
 The BBMP is the elected local government that oversees the city of Bangalore. See Map 1, p20 and 
Diagram 1, p 138 for the institutional governance setup.  Detailed discussion appears in Chapter 4 
and further discussion follows in this chapter. 
2
 Legally required minimum setbacks from the site boundary to enable fire fighting 
3
 The planning permission process in Bangalore not only requires planning approval for the 
construction of a building/project, but also requires various forms of certification from authorities 
during and after the construction such as a Commencement, Completion and Occupancy Certificates.  
An Occupancy Certificate declares the building fit for occupation. Section 190 of the Karnataka 
Municipalities Act 1964 and Section 310 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act 1976 mandate 
that every person shall obtain a completion and occupancy certificate within one month of the 
completion or erection of a building (GoK 1977, GoK 1964). See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion. 
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reported that the plans of the building were not even available during the fire 
rescue operations (ibid). 
 
Discussions in the media and blogosphere after the incident sought causes and 
attempted to speculate on who was responsible.  Some held that the fire 
department was responsible because they did not enforce the fire safety rules; 
some held that the untrained helpers along with the fire fighters were 
responsible for those who jumped to their deaths; some held that the owners of 
the building were responsible because they constructed the building in 
violation of the fire safety rules, building regulations and planning norms; some 
held that the BBMP was responsible because it did not enforce the building and 
planning regulations; some held that the occupiers were responsible because 
they did not question the callous violation of fire safety norms while living 
there; some held that general public apathy was responsible; and some held the 
system in general responsible (ibid).  The building owners even seem to have 
blamed the authorities for not enforcing the fire safety norms (DNA 2010a, 
2010b; Hindu 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d). 
 
Within days of the accident, and acting in accordance with the Karnataka Police 
Act of 1963, the City Police Commissioner issued a public directive to all the tall 
building owners, residents and neighbourhood associations in Bangalore.  In its 
preamble, the notification claimed that Carlton Tower’s deviation from 
planning and building regulations was responsible for the casualties (Bidari 
2010).  Further, it stated that the owners neither constructed nor maintained 
the building as per the approved plan. This had not only made the building 
unsuitable for the installation and maintenance of fire safety equipment, but 
had also made the fire fighting difficult (ibid).  The Commissioner stated that 
his investigation had found a large number of buildings in Bangalore that were 
constructed deviating from the approved plans.  The deviations specifically 
mentioned in the directive ranged from converting balconies and terraces into 
habitable rooms, to buildings without planning permission and illegal land use 
changes. A large number of buildings were functioning without an occupancy 
certificate. The Police Commissioner’s notification implied that this increases 
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risk and vulnerability.   
 
Therefore, the Commissioner directed the owners, leaseholders, residents and 
occupiers of all buildings over four floors high in Bangalore to check that their 
building was regulation compliant: if the building complied with regulations, he 
directed them to inform the local police inspector; if a building had any 
deviations, the Commissioner directed them to take “immediate steps to ensure 
that the building is modified to confirm to the approved plan, [and fire 
regulations], as early as possible and latest by 30th June, 2010 [within a 
month]” (ibid).4  
 
If this was not possible due to the scale of the deviation  - for example, a 
complete change of use or lack of occupancy certificate -  he directed that,  
“they will take immediate [and] necessary action to vacate the building 
and to maintain the building in a vacant state until they obtain 
Completion Certificate/Occupancy Certificate, as required u/s 190 of The 
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964” (ibid).   
 
The Commissioner expected that  
“[the directive] should be scrupulously and promptly complied with by 
all…. and any person disobeying these directions will be liable for 
prosecution and penalty u/s 112 of The Karnataka Police Act, 1963.  He 
will also be liable for punitive action under Sections 338, 304 (A) and 
304 of the Indian Penal Code in the event of fire mishap in the building” 
(ibid). 
 
This was not an obscure government directive, intended to be forgotten inside 
a file or computer folder in the Commissioner’s office.  It was issued to the 
public through media and local police stations and a copy was forwarded to 
police inspectors of all police stations (including the traffic police stations) in 
Bangalore City for strict enforcement.5  
 
                                                     
4
 Page numbers not available 
5
 Copies were sent to the Director General of Police of Karnataka, the Additional Home Secretary, all 
the assistant commissioners of police (including traffic), the deputy commissioners of police 
(including traffic, crime, intelligence and public relations), the Joint Commissioner of Police Crime, 
and the additional commissioners of police (including administration, law and order). 
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Yet, the editors of Citizen Matters, a local news journal, reported that when, a 
year later, they enquired at the Commissioner’s office about the progress of the 
directive, they received no response.  The chief editor of the journal wrote on 
28th February 2011, that the Commissioner should not have issued a directive 
that “he could not have enforced, making further a mockery of affairs” (Vincent 
2011).  He argued that the Police Commissioner could have at least attended 
the annual memorial event held at the Manipal Hospital near his office to 
express his sympathy, rather than making an empty claim that he could enforce 
the law.   
 
In this chapter, I wish to introduce this dissertation and my research question 
by elaborating on three compellingly curious problematic provoked by the 
discussion above. This will be followed by a brief introduction of planning 
apparatus in Bangalore that reappears with sufficient detail in chapter 4. In 
section 1.3, I briefly outline the complex terrain of violations in Bangalore and 
in Section 1.4 I propose that violations understood as ‘deviation from the Plan’ 
do not sufficiently explain the multiple forms of violations that I confronted in 
Bangalore. To do this, in this section I briefly discuss the current academic 
scholarship on informality, implementation failure and corruption. In section 
1.5, I propose that violation should be conceptualised as outcome of the 
planning practice in Bangalore rather than its deviation and outlines the main 
arguments of this thesis.   
 
1.1. From law enforcement to self-governance 
Carlton Towers was not a slum settlement in Bangalore away from the public 
and official gaze where urban poor residents struggle to settle in the city 
deviating from the planning regulations. Rather, it was a large, shiny office 
building in the middle of the city that housed a well-educated and aware labour 
force who actively participated in the production of the current global economy 
of Bangalore. So the first obvious question is how are the planning, 
implementation and enforcement processes related to the making of Carlton 
Towers a potential and later a successful site of an accident?  
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Secondly, why was the police commissioner unable to enforce his notification, 
instead stops at issuing the public notification? In other words, how does the 
site of violation become a site where the police commissioner becomes 
powerless?   
 
Thirdly, why did he call for self-regulation instead of employing the 
government machinery to inspect and enforce? In other words, why did he ask 
the people to voluntarily inspect, correct or vacate and notify at the local police 
station even though he knew well that the occupants of Carlton Towers, at any 
point till the accident, did not report the various violations in their building to 
any police station or planning authorities.  
 
1.2 Research question 
This thesis examines planning violations in the city of Bangalore, India.  
Planning violations occur when a building, layout or project violates planning 
law, the official planning process, or the Master Plan land-use zoning, density or 
building regulations.  In this dissertation, I examine the violations of land-use 
regulation in particular.  
 
Violations and various forms of illegality and informality have been the subject 
of academic research in urban studies, development and planning research for 
some time.  However, most of this scholarship looks at the illegality and 
informality of the urban poor to the extent that informality in the developing 
south is usually synonymous with urban poor.  This research project aims to 
examine violations, illegality, informality and irregularity beyond the domain of 
the urban poor.  Hence I chose to study violations connected to the non-poor 
neighbourhoods in Bangalore.   My main research question is: 
 
Why and how are land-use violations in the non-poor neighbourhoods of 
Bangalore produced, sustained and contested despite the presence of the 
elaborate planning, implementation and enforcement mechanisms? 
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Though there is a lack of comprehensive and conclusive data about the various 
forms and extent of violations in Bangalore, many senior officials, politicians, 
and activists that I interviewed usually agreed that most buildings in Bangalore 
are a violation of some sort. They estimated that anything from 50% to 75% of 
the entire building stock in Bangalore could have been built deviating from the 
planning norms. In 2005, a local neighbourhood collective identified 87 
buildings that violated the land use norms in their local neighbourhood. This 
was later confirmed by the Municipal Commissioner in the High Court during the 
hearing of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL).6  Not surprisingly then, the 
statement ‘there is no planning in Bangalore’, was the one I heard frequently 
from a large number of people that I spoke to during my field research.  Most 
people perceive that the problems that they encounter during their everyday life 
in Bangalore – traffic congestion, flooding, water shortages, trees falling in the 
rain, land-use and building violations, garbage on street corners and lack of 
adequate infrastructure and services – are due to the lack of planning. 
Incidentally, my experience is also comparable to what James Heitzman notes in 
Networked City (2004), about his research experience in Bangalore between 
1994 and 2001. He writes, 
“While I was conducting field work in Bangalore, I often had to explain to 
someone that I was studying the planning of the city. The response was 
often a look of incredulity, and a response that Bangalore was unplanned, 
or that planning system was chaotic”. (Heitzman 2004: p 283, 284) 
 
 
However, as my institutional mapping demonstrates in Chapter 4, a large 
number of institutions, policies, laws and government officials in Bangalore are 
engaged on an everyday basis in what can be identified as ‘planning the city’.  
For instance, the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act (KTCP Act) 
adopted in 1961 is a comprehensive statutory legal instrument to control land-
use change through preparation of a Master Plan.  The Bangalore Development 
Authority (BDA) was established with the BDA Act in 1976 to plan, implement 
and enforce a land-use plan for Bangalore, develop infrastructure and control 
land-use change in the functional urban region. 
                                                     
6
 This PIL is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.3 
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Three plan documents were prepared in 1984, 1995 and 2005 to steer the 
growth and development of Bangalore. The BBMP, functioning under the 
Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act (KMC Act) 1976, shares the 
responsibility for plan implementation and enforcement along with the BDA in 
addition to their service provision responsibilities.  The Karnataka Industrial 
Areas Development Board (KIADB) and the Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) 
are also engaged in land-use planning.  The Bangalore Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board (BWSSB) manage water and sanitation and the Bangalore 
Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) and the Bangalore Metropolitan 
Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) plans and manages the city’s transportation 
strategy.  In addition to this array of institutions, the Bangalore Metropolitan 
Region Planning Authority (BMRDA) was established in 1985 under the BMRDA 
Act to develop a regional land-use plan, an institutional and spatial 
development strategy and a structural plan for the Bangalore Metropolitan 
Region and to coordinate among the different agencies engaged in varied forms 
of planning in Bangalore.  In parallel, the Urban Development Department 
(UDD), functioning under the supervision of the Karnataka Ministry of Urban 
Development, provides technical advice to all the agencies and ministries 
involved in planning and implementation.  
 
Further, many historians of Bangalore have shown that a lot of ‘planning’ went 
into the making of the city during the British colonial period from 1880’s to the 
1950’s and the three decades after independence - from 1950’s to the 1970’s 
when the BDA and BBMP were instituted (Heitzman 2004; Nair 2005; Srinivas 
2001).7 Heitzman (2004: p283, 284) notes,  
“The city was planned in a great detail throughout the twentieth century, 
bringing together a series of models bequeathed by a deep historical 
heritage and the master/structural plans initially influenced by the 
British Experience”. 
 
Therefore, the scale of violations in the city of Bangalore is a paradox given the 
historic precedent as well as the presence of a number of authorities of 
planning, laws and acts, practice protocols and practitioners. The central 
                                                     
7
 A brief outline of the planning history of Bangalore is presented in the Appendix 2. 
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question of my research therefore engages with this paradox. The main 
research question is examined through the following set of sub questions:   
 
1. What are the different forms of violations and their contestations in the non-poor 
neighbourhoods of Bangalore?  
2. What are the various processes and practices through which these violations are 
produced, sustained and contested, and who are the various actors?  
 
1.3 Understanding planning violations : Violations and everyday life  
Deviation is the norm when it comes to planning regulations in Bangalore.  
Encountering different forms of violations directly or indirectly is part of 
everyday life that it is almost invisible and a large number of people have 
become in some way stakeholders to that order (ALF 2006, Nair 2005).  The 
large number of stakeholders involved also means that planning irregularity has 
become a political question, beyond the simple enforcement of law and order.   
 
A large part of the economy, housing and many forms of everyday habitation in 
Bangalore are constituted by different forms of violation of the planning laws.  
Everyday violations include: dumping garbage at the street corner; draining 
domestic and commercial waste into the storm water drains; landscaping and 
enclosing the pavement as one’s front garden; building temples and shrines on 
the pavement; breaking traffic rules; not stopping at pedestrian crossing, 
exceeding noise limits during festivals; buildings that do not follow regulations 
on offsets, density, height, land-use, building use, fire safety; and buildings that 
don’t even apply for planning permission. Illegal land-use conversion, for 
example from residential to commercial or industrial use or vice versa, or 
property development on agricultural land without official permission, and 
encroachments into green belt and protected environmental areas such as 
lakes, wetlands and parks are very common. Various parts of the city that 
people engage with on an everyday basis are very much part of this order. 
These include street markets, high streets, the doctors’ clinic, workplaces, 
temples, apartment blocks, parking lots, the weekend resorts, computer centres, 
hardware shops, local stores, corner tea shops, gentlemen’s clubs, internet 
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service providers, the dry cleaner’s, the marriage halls, the nursery schools or  
shopping malls. There are illegal high streets, large business establishments, 
offices and upmarket residential complexes, hotels and resorts, and large 
religious establishments. Even the government violates its own land-use plan.  
 
Such a state of affairs is a challenge to the popular and common scholastic 
imagination of informality and illegality as the domains of the urban poor in the 
global south.  The scale, variety and omnipresence of violations and illegalities 
in Bangalore mean that various scholars who examine the city from a variety of 
perspectives confront violations during their research in different ways.  For 
instance, Srinivas (2001) describes the many violations and conversions of 
large lakes and water tanks into stadia, shopping malls, bus stands, residential 
estates,  and sports complexes and their impact on the cultural, ritual and civic 
life of Bangalore.  Heitzman (2004) describes the various forms of illegal 
conversion of farmland, parks and water tanks for residential and sports 
complexes and industrial parks while discussing the role of various 
institutional arrangements in the emergence of Bangalore as a networked city 
in the global informational economy.  Nair (2005) discusses the various forms 
of violation and state illegality in Bangalore while analysing the role of law, 
master planning and the politics of spatial imagination that contributed to the 
various transformations and the “Promise of Bangalore’s twentieth century” 
(ibid). For example, she mentions the thousands of shrines and temples that 
encroach on footpaths and exclude pedestrians. She notes that, “These shrines 
exist everywhere; the official home of [the] chief minister opens onto a road 
that sports an illegal shrine” (Nair 2005: p.155).  Such shrines sometimes even 
develop into large-scale projects over time, one example being Kemp Fort, a 
commercial building and children’s play equipment warehouse (ibid).  Further, 
Nair (2005) notes that,  
“[In] 1997, [the] court appointed commissioner investigating public 
interest petition filed against Bangalore Development Authority found 
green belt full of stone walled compounds, enclosing potential cities. 
There were 336 layouts, 13 resorts, 42 crushers and quarries” (ibid: 
p.160). 
 
Benjamin (2000, 2008) and Benjamin and Raman (2011) write about many 
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forms of illegalities and violations while defending the occupancy urbanism of 
informal economies, political clientelism of the urban poor and land politics in 
Bangalore. Rosario (2006) and Rosario and Laing (2006) describes a range of 
illegalities and violations while examining the role of law in recent urban 
transformations.  Goldman (2010) encounters violations and illegalities while 
researching land speculation and Rangnathan et al (2009) while analysing the 
question of water in peri-urban Bangalore.  D’zouza and Nagendra (2011) and 
Sundaresan (2011) encounter violations while examining the environmental 
and political ecology of lakes and urban public commons in Bangalore.  It is not 
therefore surprising that violations occupy a prominent position in academic, 
media, legal and political discourses on Bangalore.   
 
The precise impacts of violations are thought to be too varied and complex to 
analyze. Reclamation and encroachment of lakes, wetlands and green areas 
contribute to flooding as well as affecting the bio-diversity and microclimate. 
Indiscriminate land-use changes contribute to a lack of control over road traffic 
volume. Higher-than-regulated-for density and deviant land-uses might be 
contributing to the skyrocketing land prices and much skewed land markets. 
There are impacts on urban services such as parking, water, electricity, 
drainage and sewerage capacities. Moreover, neighbourhood disputes 
contribute to a large number of court cases and disputed land parcels. 
 
1.3.1 Violations across history and geography 
One explanation for violations that I encountered frequently during my 
fieldwork is that the growth in Bangalore after the mid-1990s liberalisation and 
the subsequent Information Technology boom “took everyone by surprise”, 
especially the planning system.  According to this explanation, a large number of 
violations occur where the Information Technology sector based growth is 
concentrated to accommodate demand for housing, office space and spill over 
activities, especially in southern and south eastern Bangalore. 8   
 
                                                     
8
 Map 2 p144. 
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However, as Heitzman (2004) and Nair (2005) demonstrate, violations in 
Bangalore are spread across the history and geography of the city.  Heitzman 
(ibid, p.57) draws from various documentation that,  
“If one counted all the unauthorized constructions that had come up by 
the mid-1980s, there were about 150,000; housing nearly one-fifth of the 
population of the agglomeration without official approval and without 
officially planned utilities or roads”. 
 
Similarly, Nair (2005, p.128) notes that,  
“from the late 1950s, unauthorized construction compensated for the 
poor provision of public housing for workers and that there were about 
23,000 such structures on agricultural land in and around the city and 
unauthorized layouts emerged as a category in the reports of the 
Bangalore city corporation in the 1950s”.  
 
These were/are called revenue sites and are illegal according to the planning law 
and the land-use plan.9 It seems that revenue site holders had formed 
associations in order to press for the regularization of their illegal status as far 
back as 1967.  So violations were understood to have helped to address housing 
shortages caused due to unviable planning laws (Benjamin 2000; Heitzman 
2001; Nair 2005; Srinivas 2001,) civic amenity problems (for example, 
availability of land for sports complexes or marriage halls) and state 
inefficiencies. However, such violations occurred at every stage of the city’s 
sectoral growth: for example in the 1950s and 1960s if it addressed the needs of 
the industrial worker, in the 1970s and 1980s it addressed the needs of the 
public sector employee, the office workers and the students; and in the 1990s 
and 2000s it seemed to have helped the demands of the IT crowd.     
 
Violations in Bangalore are also distributed across the urban geography and 
among various social groups.  Nair (ibid) takes a tour of violations in the 
industrial areas in the north and west, of the slums within the city and in the 
peripheries, of the numerous erstwhile village lands that are trapped inside the 
BDA housing layouts in the city, in the green belt around the city, and in the new 
Information Technology enclaves in the south and southeast.  Surveys by the 
                                                     
9
 Drawing from articles in the Deccan Herald newspaper dated 15 may 1967 and 6 Jan 1968, Nair 
(2005) notes that about 100,000 revenue householders met at a meeting in 1967. Detailed discussion 
on the revenue layouts appear in Chapter 5.3.2.2  
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BDA in 2001 identified that 70 out of 132 violations identified in Koramangala (a 
wealthier neighbourhood) were land-use violations by Information Technology 
companies working in areas designated for residential use.  There was also a 
case of an IT company that had encroached public land (ibid). 10  Moreover, as 
mentioned above, the state actors themselves were seen violating planning 
regulations, by building, for example, on lakes and water bodies, parks, and also 
by granting planning permission to projects that were in violation, or by 
regularising the violations.11  
 
1.3.2 Violations as a site of law making 
The critical mass of planning violations is so high that the government comes up 
frequently with regularization laws to regularize unauthorised buildings and 
layouts.  The first regularization bill was introduced in 1991 and the latest in 
2007, even though exemptions and regularizations on a case-by-case basis have 
been a common practice throughout the last six decades.12  The 2007 bill also 
coincides with the adoption of mixed land use as a land-use strategy in the most 
recent Master plan of 2005-2016.  The authorities argued that since the ground 
reality of land use distribution was highly mixed, it was a more appropriate 
regime than a rigid separation of land uses. Further, irregularities with certain 
characteristics were either exempted or routinely regularized. When illegal 
properties are sold, land dealers, developers and individual property owners 
convince their clients that they can always regularize the violation after the 
purchase. Such routine regularization has saved many illegal buildings and 
developments from demolition.   
 
1.3.3 Violations and local contestation 
The site of violation is not only a site of popular support but also a site of 
neighbourhood contest and mobilization. This is due to the various adverse 
impacts such violations cause: flooding, traffic congestion, parking problems and 
safety.  Currently, a number of new neighbourhood planning collectives, along 
with NGOs and community organizations, have mobilized against planning 
                                                     
10
 The case of Indya.com is mentioned in Nair (2005, p.135). 
11
 Specific case based discussions appear on Chapter 5. 
12
 See Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3 for a detailed discussion. 
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violations through the courts, political networks and public campaigns. These 
collectives argue, for example, that the strained parking provision and water and 
electricity supply, and additional noise, makes it difficult for the residents to go 
about their normal activities, even inside their own homes. They are not only 
disappointed by the failures of respective authorities for allowing irregular uses 
in the first place but are also fighting in court against the abovementioned 
regularization drive.  They want planning authorities to enforce the rule of law, 
that is, to implement land-use zoning and building regulations. Many have even 
moved beyond the call for the rule of law to engage with the planning system 
and have begun to redraft the planning frameworks, in other words to redraft 
the rule of law itself.  
 
1.4Planning and violations  
How are we to understand the violations, as profiled above in Bangalore? 
Planning violations have been a topic of research in urban studies and planning 
for about four decades now. However in this dissertation, I will argue that the 
approaches that dominate this literature - informality, implementation failure, 
and corruption - are grossly insufficient frameworks to explain the scale and 
pervasiveness of the phenomenon in Bangalore.  
 
Studies of urban informality have been dominated by scholarship on the 
informal sector from developing countries, i.e. mainly on squatters, street 
vendors and slum residents. They argue that planning frameworks fail to plan 
for the urban poor and this results in illegality because poor people only 
manage to survive in cities by living outside of the formal planning system by 
using their electoral capital. Within this approach, violations are understood as 
something outside the plan, the planning system, planning practice and the 
planning regime. Different versions of this debate present violations as 
resistance, subversion, politics of the subalterns against their exclusion, or even 
as examples of the entrepreneurship of the poor (Benjamin 2000; Chatterjee 
2004; Scott 1985; Sotto 1989, 2001). Even though most of this scholarship has 
contributed immensely to understand the struggles and lives of poor people to 
carve out their own spaces of survival in opposition to the state and the rule of 
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law, it has been of little help when it comes to understanding the violations as 
described above. For example, it does not address violations present among rich 
and middle-class neighbourhoods, or those within the governance process 
itself.  By locating planning and the rule of law as the formal process against 
which the violations are conceptualized and theorized, most studies on 
violations and informality have paid insufficient attention to the political 
process of governance that becomes the context within which there is any 
possibility of informality.  Moreover such scholarship has been of little 
assistance when it comes to understanding how the planning process itself 
becomes entangled in its violation.  
 
Similarly, failure to implement Master Plans is a common complaint of urban 
planners in India (ITPI 2004; Verma 2002). Within this tradition of scholarship 
usually seen in studies of state and governance and of public administration, 
violations are seen as being caused by insufficient institutional linkages for 
effective implementation, struggles between multiple institutions or an 
inappropriate plan where evaluation lessons from the previous plan have not 
been incorporated (Das 1981; Das 2007; Jain 2003, 2007, 2008; Kirby 1996; 
Routra 1993; Thiruppugazh 2008). The concept of the violation is viewed as an 
input-output problem or a problem of coordination or state capacity.  This 
perspective assumes the existence of an implementable plan and a non-
implementable plan and that the secret for successful implementation is to get 
the plan right, with better co-ordination between the implementing institutions 
and appropriate budget allocation (broadly represented as institutional 
capacity). Given that the geography of habitation in cities is regulated, such 
sustained violations are indeed the non-enforcement of the law. The task of this 
research project is to zoom in and find out how these are produced and 
connected with violations in the processes of planning and governance. These 
include violations of enforcement actions, violations of office hours in 
government offices, violations of protocols and procedures in the allocation of 
land, violations of terms of reference of one’s service, violations of public interest 
when evoking the land acquisition act.  Such violations of public service 
protocols, procedures and rules of practicing governance cannot merely have as 
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their object the rule of law, but also the making of rules and plans that violate 
public interest criteria. Public institutions in Bangalore are known to violate 
planning rules and protocols while building their own projects or while making 
plans.  Government officials in Bangalore have been identified as actively 
involved in the production of many of the violations, as I will demonstrate in the 
subsequent chapters.  Planning and administration laws are routinely violated 
while making the plan itself.  Moreover, there are sections within the planning 
law in Bangalore that enables its own exceptions. Therefore, the suggestion that 
violations are implementation failures only restates the problem in different 
words. Violations and implementation failures are just two sides of the same 
coin. Similarly, violation is also ascribed to the corrupt practices of public 
officials who take bribes or favours for not performing their roles.  However, 
conceived within a framework of an expectation of how formal structures and 
processes of public administration should ideally operate, this framework, like 
the previous one, suffers from its naïve approach towards everyday politics, and 
becomes analytically less helpful. In the following section, I shall outline the main 
conceptual tools that will be used to develop an analytical framework in this 
dissertation to explain the connection between planning process and violations 
in Bangalore. 
 
1.5Planning in Vernacular Governance – Main arguments and the 
dissertation outline. 
In this dissertation, I propose to understand the geography of planning 
violations as geography of confluence of everyday living, neighbourhood 
mobilizations, planning and governing in Bangalore. Examining violations can 
reveal how the practices of state, planning and society are embedded in each 
other. That is, I argue that a violation is a site, for instance, where the accident 
meets the casualty, where the commissioner meets his powerlessness, where 
the rule of law meets its context and a resident meets his/her neighbour, where 
the deviations of regulators meet the deviations by the regulated. When Carlton 
Towers burned and nine people died, it revealed a number of these 
confluences. The building owner blamed the officials for not inspecting; the 
officials blamed the building owner for not following rules; and citizen blogs 
30 
 
blamed the people who ran offices inside a property that did not have an 
Occupancy Certificate and the fire doors of which were locked. Violations are 
sites where casualties, flooding, traffic congestion, water scarcity, fire hazards, 
neighbourhood conflicts, resistance, greed and, above all, the planning process 
can be examined. Instead of defining the Plan and violations in oppositional 
terms, this dissertation uses land-use violations as sites to examine the culture 
of land-use planning practice. Violations of the plan, exemptions and 
regularization of the violations, changes to the land-use strategy in the new 
Master plan to accommodate pressures and the many types of local contest 
form, I shall argue, an integral part of the planning practice within the culture 
of governance in Bangalore.  
 
To answer the research question therefore, this argument is elaborated in this 
dissertation as follows.   
 
This thesis proposes that violations are an appropriate case to understand how 
planning processes operate within what I call the vernacular governance.  
Vernacular governance is a concept that resonates with ideas such as 
‘vernacular feet of clay’ from Kaviraj (1999), ‘micro politics of the local’ in the 
work of Corbridge et al (2005), ‘private’ and ‘shadow states’ identified by 
Harris-White (2003), and ‘blurred boundaries’ and the ‘embedded state’ in the 
anthropological studies of the Indian state (Fuller and Benei 2001; Gupta 1995; 
Sharma and Gupta 2005). Using a theoretical framework from governance 
networks that conceptualizes governance outcomes as the result of the 
involvement of a variety of actors from both within and outside the 
government, I argue that violations in Bangalore should be understood as the 
outcome of a networked planning practice and are a useful geographic and 
policy site to understand the politics of planning practice. Through such 
arguments, I do not question the potential role of the state as a location for 
empowerment or delivery of justice; this research is mainly concerned with 
explaining how and why the sites of violations emerge in Bangalore amidst the 
large number of formal institutional frameworks of planning and urban 
governance. To develop such a conceptual framework, this dissertation builds 
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on a wide range of literature, including theories on policy implementation, 
anthropologies of the everyday state and governance networks which look at 
how state processes function when embedded within particular socio-cultural 
and political contexts. In Chapter 2, I review this literature and outline this 
conceptual and theoretical framework. 
 
Methodologically, I have conducted this research mainly based on a wealthy 
neighbourhood named Koramangala in Bangalore. Within Koramangala,13 I 
have selected specific projects that can anchor the problem of production, 
sustenance and contest of violations, revealing the specific modalities through 
which such projects and processes came into being.  My foci within 
Koramangala include residential projects, lake encroachments, property 
litigation, conflicts and negotiations over urban commons and the working 
process of resident collectives as well as their negotiations and struggles. In 
Chapter 3, I detail this methodology, while also drawing from a wide range of 
literature on methodology to discuss my research motivations, rationale and 
strategies for case selection, process of theorisation, and the specific details of 
what I call ethnography of planning networks, including issues of 
insider/outsider, reflexivity, scope and research ethics. In this chapter, I also 
discuss how the various case studies were identified and connected with each 
other during analysis, including projects, court cases, neighbourhood activism, 
and policies and planning process. 
 
Chapter 4 maps the official apparatus that controls and regulates the land use 
change, i.e. the institutional architecture, planning policy and legal setup, 
planning instruments, practitioners and the procedures of practice. This 
chapter aims to present the formal system of land use control as it currently 
exists in Bangalore, and problematizes the extensive violation as a paradox. In 
the analytical chapters that follow, this discussion will be drawn out while 
examining how this system is put into practice.  Data for the chapter is derived 
from analysis of policy documents and laws and acts as well as from interviews 
with practitioners. 
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 Map 5 p171 
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 In chapters 5 and 6, I examine in detail how violations are produced, sustained 
and contested by zooming in on the actors and processes. Here, I will show how 
the planning process operates through informal associational networks rather 
than the structure of administrative bureaucracy that is outlined in Chapter 4. 
Considering the violations as a geographic site to examine planning process 
reveal that planning is dependent on the actions of a large network of people in 
various forms of associational relationships located within and outside the 
government.  
 
In Chapter 5, Planning in vernacular governance – Land Use Planning and 
Private Interest Networks, I show that planning practice in Bangalore is actually 
characterized by many micro informal negotiations circumventing or using the 
formal planning system. Critiquing the literature on informality and developing 
it to deploy the notion of culture of governance, I argue that land-use violations 
are an outcome of many micro negotiations that occur within the practice of 
vernacular governance. In this chapter, I demonstrate how planning practice is 
connected directly and indirectly to the violations through developing two 
categories: plan violations and planning for violations.  ‘Plan violations’ analyze 
the actors and various procedures involved in the processes of violating the 
plan.  ‘Planning for violations’ analyzes how plan-making responds to violations 
and makes them legal by such means as converting mixed-up land-use areas 
into mixed-use zones or adopting regularization schemes to save the illegal 
constructions from lawsuits.  I call such strategies appropriate governance, 
while the methods of using legal and administrative means to achieve 
violations I term as appropriating governance.  ‘Plan violations’ and ‘planning 
for violations’ together demonstrate the planning networks that produce 
private interest outcomes in Bangalore. 
 
In Chapter 6  From partners in crime to mutual surveillance: Planning and ‘Public 
Interest Networks’, I discuss the emergent planning collectives that strive to 
transform the private interest planning practice in Bangalore into a practice 
that produces public interest outcomes, whilst operating within the vernacular. 
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In the chapter, I demonstrate how a variety of neighbourhood collectives work 
using Public Interest Litigation (PIL), political pressure, public debates and 
multiple media negotiations, and look at how they learn and manage to engage 
in the planning and political system for what they think are public interest 
outcomes. Presenting detailed case studies of local collectives, I argue that 
regulatory planning practice is better understood as the result of various micro 
negotiations and mutual surveillances within society rather than the outcome 
of a static simplified institutional design of the state apparatus. This chapter 
also proposes to rethink the way urban social activism in non-poor urban India 
is classified as ‘middle class’, ‘elite’ or ‘corporate activism’. I argue that the 
geography of planning activism in Bangalore is inhabited by a variety of 
interest groups with very different agendas. 
 
In Chapter7, Anarchy and authority – Planning Power in Vernacular Governance, 
I analyze how planning power and authority operate in Bangalore.  Drawing 
from the theories on power in governance networks, and by conceptualizing 
regulatory planning as a means of exercising power for the control of social 
production of the urban landscape, and violations as a site of its negation, I will 
show how planning power operates within the vernacular governance 
networks of Bangalore.    Drawing from the relational notion of power (Latour 
1986) and micro politics of power (Foucault 2000) reviewed in Chapter 2, I 
argue that planning power in Bangalore is better understood as being widely 
distributed among a range of actors in society rather than concentrated in the 
institutional system of planning and administration as might be expected in the 
design of the comprehensive land-use planning system. I demonstrate that the 
many forms of political negotiation are sites of planning power at different 
levels within the socio-institutional networks that operate in the culture of 
vernacular governance.   Further, I also examine the role of consent and 
coercion in understanding regulatory planning in complex democratic contexts. 
I argue that regulatory planning depends a lot on the consent of the governed, 
on the governing ideology and on a tacit agreement to engage in mutual 
surveillance within society, and that these are important lessons for the 
institutional design of a planning process.  
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Chapter 8, Conclusion summarises the research findings and my main 
contributions to the field. In particular I elaborate the implications of my 
research findings on planning reform in India and the importance of empirical 
studies of planning practice for the development of planning theory. Further, in 
this chapter, I also examine the implications of my research findings for 
studying the state and governance in India.  
 
1.6 Conclusion   
Planning and administration in Bangalore is a result of a century of evolution 
influenced by local and government elites, state-led modernisation imperatives 
and ideologies, British and other epistemic influences, and various 
contingencies, for example, “housing the [industrial] worker” as Nair puts it 
(Nair 2005). Examining the current planning practice through the lens of 
violations, this thesis will demonstrate how everyday politics operate through 
planning practice and in particular how planning power operates within the 
current culture of governance. Locating planning practice as embedded within 
the administrative bureaucratic ensemble and democratic political culture of 
the local and regional state government, and conceptualizing violations as a 
confluence of this interaction, I argue that planning power is active at various 
levels of the governance networks instead of being hierarchically distributed in 
the political and administrative apparatus of urban governance. Therefore, I 
propose that planning theory should take into serious consideration the culture 
of governance within which various planning systems are embedded or 
developed. Further, I propose that this experience compels us to re-examine 
how we theorize state and public authority in India.  
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual approach and theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I presented the paradox of pervasive and persistent 
planning violations in Bangalore in the context of the institutional structure of 
planning, i.e. the planning organizations, planning policy and laws, regularly 
updated land-use planning instruments and the elaborate implementation and 
enforcement framework. Violations as a conspicuous, dynamic and active site 
where low levels of enforcement actions, high levels of politics of regularization 
and many forms of neighbourhood contestation converged encouraged me to 
ask the following question:   
 
Why, and how, are land-use violations in the non-poor neighbourhoods of 
Bangalore produced, sustained and contested despite the presence of the 
elaborate planning implementation and enforcement mechanisms? 
 
In asking this question, this dissertation seeks to uncover the relationship 
between violations and the planning processes. The term violation is adopted 
from the field as a category used in the everyday policy, activist and public 
discourse. As mentioned in the example of Carlton Towers in Chapter 1, the 
term violations implies violating some sort of planning norm. In this research, I 
focus specifically on violations of land-use planning regulations.   
 
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss and outline how to conceptualize 
the violations. Defined functionally, every land-use violation is a deviation from 
the zonal land-use plan. However, as I realized in the process of this research, 
violations conceptualized as a deviation from an existing plan document 
inadequately grasps the complexity of the problem as it constructs the plan and 
its violation as oppositional categories. Such a conceptualization misses out on 
the politics within the very planning process itself. I discovered that violations 
offer a rich ethnographic site to examine the politics of planning practice in 
Bangalore. Even though this research has examined how exactly people violate 
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planning norms and how the plan implementation processes work, I emphasize 
the space of interaction between planning processes and the social and political 
context within which it occurs.  
 
In this chapter, I outline the conceptual and theoretical frameworks employed 
to examine violations as a domain of state-society interaction. Using these 
frameworks for analysis, I will show how violations result from the various 
associational networks that inhabit the land-use planning process in Bangalore.   
 
The analysis presented here involves a series of conceptual shifts to move 
beyond a functional explanation of violations. First and fundamental to this 
approach is the move from the category of the state to that of governance.  
Governance is conceptualized as that which occurs at the spaces of interaction 
between various actors in the state and society rather than conducted by a 
monolithic and powerful state. The second conceptual shift involves moving 
beyond the understanding of planning as decision-making to the examination of 
the connections between planning practices and their outcomes. The third shift 
that follows from this understands violation as the outcome of planning practice 
rather than a deviation from the plan.   
 
These arguments are organized in this chapter as follows. In Section 2.2 I begin 
with a critical review of the key approaches that currently exist in the 
scholarship which conceptualizes violations as deviations of the sovereign 
power of the state (in particular, informality, implementation failure and 
corruption). I argue that such conceptualizations are highly inadequate owing 
to their assumptions about the formal state. Further in Section 2.3, I examine 
the complexity of studying the state by reviewing literature from political 
analysis and anthropology of the everyday state and I propose to think about 
culture of governance. This is followed by Section 2.4 where I develop a new 
language called Vernacular Governance building on concepts of governance, 
network governance, political society and the vernacular. This language 
attempts to account for the role of various local networks and processes that 
define the space and shape of governance. Following this, in Section 2.5, I argue 
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that violations should be understood as an outcome of the planning practice 
rather than its deviation. Section 2.6 develops an analytical framework to 
examine private and public interest networks within the planning practice and 
outlines the analytical framework to examine planning power. 
  
2.2 Violations as deviations: informality, implementation failure 
and corruption 
 
Land-use violations have been examined in a variety of ways in urban studies, 
development studies, urban governance and planning studies. Existing 
scholarship can be categorised into three broad approaches, each of which is 
discussed in this section. The first conceptualizes violations as informality, 
illegality or irregularity; the second as an implementation failure and the third as 
instances of corruption. I provide a critical review of this scholarship below and 
examine their limits in explaining violations. In doing so, I argue that these 
approaches conceive violations within the informal-formal or state-society 
dualism and also take for granted the notion of the state as a macro, abstract, 
public, hierarchical and powerful entity capable of governing a complex society.  
 
2.2.1 Violation as informality, illegality, irregularity 
Spaces and practices of violation have been explained in a variety of ways by 
researchers of informality, illegality and irregularity over the last six decades in 
development studies, urban studies, planning and geography. They have 
developed a range of conceptual categories by conducting research on diverse 
empirical contexts and social groups. Examples include informality as self-help 
and entrepreneurship from Peru (Soto 1989, 2001; Turner1969, 1972, 1976) 
informal sector from Kenya (Hart 1973), insurgent citizenship from Sao Paulo 
(Holston 1998, 2008), street politics from Iran and quiet rebels from Cairo 
(Bayat 2000), extra-legal from Egypt (Soliman 2004, 2007), occupancy urbanism 
from Delhi and Bangalore (Benjamin 2007, 2008), idiom of planning and state of 
exception from Calcutta (Roy 2005, 2009) and meshwork practices from Mumbai 
(McFarlane 2012). Three broad ideas can be identified:   
 1.  Informality as a sector deviating from the formal  
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2.  Informality as a state of exception – as a state strategy 
3.  Informality as a practice. 
 
2.2.1.1The Informal Sector 
Looking particularly at cities in the global south, scholarship on urban 
informality has been dominated until recently by studies on the spaces and 
practices of the informals. These are mainly squatters, street vendors, slum 
residents and informal labour, usually represented as the informal sector 
(McFarlane 2012; Roy and AlSayyad 2004). This scholarship predominantly 
examines how the urban poor of developing countries manage to make a living 
through informal labour markets, settle in illegal squats and slums, and obtain 
services through informal political relationships, as well as examining how the 
state manages them. 
 
McFarlane argues that such trends in scholarship can be seen as guided by ideas 
that are territorial, organizational, governmental and negotiatory (McFarlane 
2012a, 2012b). As early as 1989, Castells et al (Castells et al 1989) argued that 
the informal economy is not a set of survival activities performed by destitute 
people on the margins of society; nor is it a euphemism for poverty, but rather a 
specific form of relationships of production (ibid, p.12). Nonetheless, 
subsequent studies, particularly those that dealt with developing countries, 
continued to focus on the life of poor people in its crowded cities. Many scholars 
working within and even critical of this development tradition continued to 
examine the sites and practices of planning violations by the urban poor.14 They 
have produced knowledge on, for example, the entrepreneurship of the poor 
(Hart 1973, Sotto 1989, 2001; Turner 1969, 1972, 1976), the exercise of state 
power on the poor (Bhaviskar 2003, Ghertner 2010 2011), the marginalisation 
of the poor (Benjamin 2000, 2004; Benjamin and Raman 2001) the production 
of citizenship (Holtson 1998), practices of resistance (Chatterjee 2004, Scott 
                                                     
14
 Dominant development scholarship as developed in the academies in the West was primarily 
concerned with the questions of economic development and poverty in the developing south.  
Therefore, within that frame, the academic gaze had been dominated by questions of state 
accumulation, the relationship between state, market and civil society and the role of formal 
institutions of the state. Prominent scholarship –even the critical ones have revolved around studying 
the poor people in the global south. 
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1985), global solidarities of localities (Appadurai 2000, 2001; Satterthwaite 
2001, 2008) and self-help (Turner 1969, 1972, 1976). Such studies argue that 
planning documents and formal frameworks fail to plan for the urban poor and 
this result in violations and illegalities. They demonstrate how the urban poor 
manage to survive in cities by subverting the exclusionary state apparatus using 
their communal and political capital. Violation, in this framework, is understood 
as something outside the plan, the planning system, planning practice and the 
planning regime. Violations are the domain of the urban poor and plan and 
planning are the domains of others: the working class, the middle class, the rich 
and the elite. The poor accordingly live in the geography of violation and the 
non-poor live in the geography of the plan.   
 
Even though such studies help us to understand how poor people proactively 
organize conditions to live in cities and how they access services and 
entitlements from the state using social and political capital, their fundamental 
conceptualization of violation as a deviation from the formal, the legal and the 
regular locates violation not only outside of state and planning but also restricts 
it to a domain of the poor. It has been amply demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, and more discussion on this will be presented in the forthcoming 
chapters that violation in Bangalore and in many Indian cities is not just the 
domain of the poor and not just a problem that can be understood outside of the 
state and formal planning.15 
 
 
2.2.1.2Informality and the state of exception  
The second turn in informality studies emerged when the practice of 
informality, particularly in relation to planning violations, was also recognized 
as a domain of the lower middle class, the middle class as well as the rich people 
in developing countries (Ghertner 2010, 2011; Hassan 2004; Holston 1998, 
2008; Roy 2002; Roy and Alsayyad 2004; Soliman 2007, Ward 2004). Many of 
these authors looked at the changing forms of production of informality in the 
                                                     
15
 In the case of Delhi, See, “Court questions sealing relief law”, Down to Earth, April 15, 2012, 
available from http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/court-questions-sealing-relief-law 
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developing South within the context of globalisation and liberalisation.   
 
Drawing from Agamben (2005), Roy (2009) conceptualizes informality as 
occurring in spaces of exception.  She argues that informality is not synonymous 
with poverty and it is a not a state of un-regulation; instead it is a state of de-
regulation. Contrary to the previous conceptualization where informality is 
conceived as a deviation from planning and located outside institutionalized 
regulation as Portes et al (1989) argued, Roy (2009) posits that informality 
should be conceptualized as a characteristic style of planning in the global South. 
For Roy, it is the informality of the state from above; it is not just resistance or 
subversion; it is a strategy of the structural state power exercised based on the 
logic of the state of exception. It is argued that the neo-liberal state suspends its 
own rules and regulations in order to establish its sovereign authority upon the 
population. Using the Indian state as a proxy to the global South, she argues that 
the state establishes its sovereign capability not only through mapping 
(formality) but also through un-mapping (informality).  Such territorial 
flexibilities, it is argued, allows the state to wield considerable power. Here, 
informality is considered as a strategy of the sovereign state power (Roy, 2005 
2009).16   
 
2.2.1.3Informality as a practice 
Even though not in direct critical engagement with the state of exception 
approach, McFarlane (2012), using a conceptual framework of the meshwork, 
argues that informality and formality can be understood as forms of practices 
that relate to each other in a variety of forms.  He states,  
“From this perspective, rather than viewing informality and formality as 
fixed categories, or as mutually exclusive, the two appear as lines of 
changing practice and movement, taking place not above or in advance of 
urban life, but within its unfolding”  (McFarlane 2012, p.101).   
 
                                                     
16Roy and Alssayad’s project, as described in their 2004 book on informality, focuses on the 
relationship between state and informality within the context of globalisation and liberalisation. This 
is the main analytical task undertaken in the subsequent essays on informality that Roy develops. 
Since then a range of literature has emerged that adopts this framework. For example, Ghertner 
examines how the neo-liberal state in Delhi approaches the informality of the urban poor in a different 
manner to that of the rich (Ghertner 2010, 2011). 
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He asserts that people, officials, residents and so on move between the informal 
and the formal quite seamlessly in cities not only over the course of their lives, 
but even within a day, and that what is important is to examine the various 
forms of relationships between the formal and the informal. He argues that in 
the progress of urban life, people construct, compose, collaborate and speculate 
on different forms of relationship between formal and informal domains. In that 
process, urban life emerges as a collection of networks and relationships that 
form the meshwork of urban life (McFarlane 2012; McFarlane and Waibel 
2012). 
  
Discussion and Critique of informality: Various forms of violation conducted by 
actors across social groups and even by the state challenges the conception of 
violation as deviation or as the domain of the urban poor. The various instances 
of powerlessness of state actors (the example of Carlton Towers and the Police 
Commissioner’s lack of power) and historical continuity of this powerlessness 
in Bangalore challenge the conception of planning as an exercise of state power 
under neo-liberal developmentalism, and render it unhelpful in explaining the 
violations that I described in Bangalore. I argue that the conceptualizations of 
the state as a monolithic and powerful actor (or not an actor at all in the case of 
McFarlane’s meshwork practices) and of planning as a top-down activity remain 
a key feature and weakness in the abovementioned analytical trends in 
informality. Though it is a new step in theorising informality, the notion of 
informality as a practice in the construction and composition of urban life is not 
very helpful for a detailed analysis of violations. However, it is a useful 
conceptual reference point and through my own analysis using different 
conceptualizations of the state, governance and planning processes, I will show 
how it is connected to the politics of planning practice.  
 
Many of these studies sometimes do include the caveat that the state is a realm 
of multiple institutions. However, their authors seldom examine the implication 
of such a caveat on the notion of the state itself, the characteristics of which they 
seem to be interested in exploring, especially the discourse of informality, only 
as a strategy of the neo-liberal state.  Even though this scholarship is empirically 
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very rich, its emphasis on the dualism between the informal and the formal fails 
to lead to an in-depth examination of the process of planning itself within the 
context of empirical realities. However, as the empirical chapters of this 
research will demonstrate, I do take cues from a number of the discussions 
above and critically reinterpret them in the process of explaining violations in 
Bangalore. 
 
In the next section I review the usefulness of conceptualizing violations as 
implementation failure.   
 
2.2.2 Violation as implementation failure 
The failure of Master plan implementation is one of the common complaints of 
urban planners in India (ITPI 2004). The implementation gap is so large that in 
2009 the National Ministry of Urban Development instructed some academic 
institutions to lead a process of rethinking the usefulness of a Master Plan as an 
instrument to organize the rapid urbanization of the cities and regions.17 
 
In the studies on the state, government, public policy and public administration, 
violations are commonly explained as the result of insufficient institutional 
linkages for effective implementation, gaps between multiple institutions, 
resource constraints or an inappropriate plan (Das 1981; Das 2007; ITPI 2004; 
Jain 2003, 2008; Kirby 1996; Routray 1993; Tiruppugazh 2008). Within this 
framework, there are assumptions that there is an implementable plan and a 
non-implementable plan, and that the secret to implementation success 
involves getting the plan right, improving co-ordination between the 
institutions of implementation, increasing resources, finding the appropriate 
budget for allocation and identifying the right level of government organization 
to be in control. Implementation success therefore, is usually represented as a 
                                                     
17
 The ‘Beyond the Master Plan’ conference was held in different parts of the country in 2009 
sponsored by the Ministry of Urban Development, Govt of India. I was present at one of the 
concluding sessions in Delhi and many senior planners in the country asserted that the Master Plan is 
an effective instrument and that the real problem is the failure to implement it and that the main factor 
behind implementation failure was institutional incoherence and the non-availability of adequate 
resources. 
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question of institutional capacity and appropriateness18 (Alfasi 2006; Brody and 
Highfield 2005; Laurian et al 2004a, 2004b; Sabatier 1986; Seasons 2003).   
 
In this context, violations are then understood as a technical problem: problems 
with the plan, the planning system and the structure of administrative machine 
that need fixing from time to time. Accordingly, they suggest that the problems 
can be prevented or fixed by improving coordination and monitoring, 
improving institutional linkages, promoting decentralisation, and the 
streamlining of administration process, or the removal of red tape. Stallmeyer 
(2011), for instance, asserts that a lack of better coordination resulted in the 
illegal reclamation of lakes in certain neighbourhoods of Bangalore. The state’s 
capacity (knowledge, resources, technology, and attitude) and the right policy 
and plan in the correct format are proposed in order to check violations by 
improving planning and administrative inefficiency.   
 
Such representations, not surprisingly, often result in attempts to get the 
institutions right, with higher levels of accountability, transparency, and 
hierarchy in the hope that it will result in higher implementation efficiency and 
better enforcement of the rule of law. So, influenced by such a premise, many 
international aid agency-funded projects are being implemented at various 
state and local government levels in India to achieve good governance, 
integrated sustainable urban governance, institutional capacity and improved 
accountability.  (UNDP 2005, Rao and Bird 2011)  
 
Critique of Implementation failure: How do we understand implementation 
failure? Wildavsky argues that implementation is a very elusive subject of 
inquiry and that implementation research depends on what exactly one is 
interested in explaining at any point in time (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). In 
his brilliant essay “If planning is everything, maybe it’s nothing,” Wildavsky 
(1973) reminds us that one cannot have unreasonable expectations of planning 
and planners and categorically construct notions of planning failures. To him it 
is not surprising then that planning fails. He states, “If formal planning fails not 
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merely in one nation at a time, but virtually [in] all nations all the time, the 
defects are unlikely to be found in the maladroit or untalented planners” 
(Wildavsky 1973, p.153). Faludi and Alexander corroborate the point by 
referring to various forms of plan implementation failures across the world 
(Alexander and Faludi 1989).  According to Wildavsky (ibid), integral to the 
idea of planning as future control involves a wide range of questions related to 
the role of causative theory, power, adaptation, process, political or other forms 
of intentions, rationality, etc. that makes the immense responsibility that is 
often expected from planning almost impossible. He argues that this makes 
planning a kind of faith - “planning is not so much a subject for social scientists 
as for the theologian” (Wildavsky 1973, p.153) - and hypothesises that failures 
are integral to the very nature of the expectation. He proposes that instead, 
planning failures might have to be understood as the way society works in 
particular places and in particular conditions and as a “function of society’s 
ability to control its future”(ibid, p.153). 
 
I argue that conceptualizing violations as implementation failure reveals a naïve 
approach about the political agency of the people involved in governing and is 
also normative in their approach about the idea of the state.  Violations are of 
course implementation failures, if by failure we mean failure of the state 
authorities and concerned officials to implement land-use regulations. 
However, describing violations as an implementation problem is only restating 
the obvious in a different way. I posit that they are two sides of the same coin. It 
is important to recognize that there is an expectation about planning and 
implementation that produces this representation of failure. I argue in the 
following sections that the idea of implementation failure comes out of 
particular assumptions about the nature of the state, of bureaucracy and of 
policy, crucially the expectation that the implementation process is something 
that operates only within the domain of watertight government machinery. The 
common implementation failure framework ignores the complexities of the 
practice of social governance, which is a result of multiple modes of socio-
political interaction between actors inside and outside government.   
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In the following section I review the usefulness of conceptualizing violations as 
corruption.   
 
2.2.3 Violation as corruption 
Corruption is a very slippery concept to define and to become analytically 
useful in the context of violations (Gupta 2012; Haller and Shore 2005; 
Roberston 2006). Still, it enjoys a robust presence in the everyday social 
perception of governance in Bangalore and beyond, as well as in academic 
scholarship on public administration, planning and governance. Definitions of 
corruption often involve the relationship between the notion of self-interested 
human beings and the notion of public office and are identified as the use of 
public office for private benefit (Heidenheimer 1989).19  Such a portrayal 
presumes the notion of proper behaviour by the public officeholder in 
accordance with the rule of law and expectations of conduct in public office.  
Williams (1999) states, “the public office and public interest definitions of 
corruption share the understanding that the common good is best served when 
officials adhere to the formal duties of public roles” (p.506). This means that not 
only procedural adherence but also the moral implications of one’s action are 
invoked in the definitions of corruption.  
 
However, not all rules and regulations may be just or always represent notions 
of the common good from all perspectives. Norms and the notion of public 
interest may vary according to time, place and the observer - for example, 
political activism often involves campaigns for changing the rules. Therefore, 
adherence to rules while in public office can become an unhelpful framework 
when categorising an action or a person as corrupt.  
  
                                                     
19
 Heidenheimer (1989) on his handbook of political corruption notes: “The largest group of social 
scientists follows the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) definition and relates their definitions of 
corruption essentially to concepts concerning the duties of the public office. A smaller group develop 
definitions that are primarily related to demand, supply and exchange concepts derived from 
economic theory; while a third group discuss corruption more with regard to the concept of public 
interest” (p.8). Citing the definition of corruption by several key authors in the two volumes, like 
(Bayley (1989), Nye (1989), Klaveeran (1989), Leff (1989) and Friedrich (1989), Heidenheimer notes 
that public interest is a very subjective concept and hence what is considered corrupt or not is open to 
interpretation of the observer. (Heidenheimer (1989), p.7, 8, 9, 10) 
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Relying on the concept of self-interested agents, the principal-agent framework 
models corruption as a problem that occurs when an agent, who is contracted 
by a principal to act on their behalf, behaves in the agent’s own interest, deviant 
from the contract under which they were initially appointed by their principals 
(2000a, 2000b, 2000c). Williams (ibid) adds that often this relation has another 
party to it: the clients. Even though a principal can be understood as the higher 
political authority (or state) and the agent as the administrative bureaucracy 
(the public servants) one has to understand the people as the ultimate clients.  
Whenever the principal might want the agent to act in ways that are not 
formally agreed to in the contract, as frequently happens in political and 
administrative organizations, this makes the position of the agent more 
complicated than can be categorised simply as corruption. This is because the 
agent’s notion of public interest could correspond to the larger principality (i.e. 
the people or an abstract idea of the state or public interest). This means that 
there could be conflict between the expectations of the two principals or 
between the principals and clients, placed on the agent.  Identifying which of 
these expectations the agents should comply with becomes a complicated task. 
These problems challenge the usefulness of corruption as an analytical tool.  
 
Moving away from the public office-based explanation, another 
conceptualization of corruption is described as when an agent engages in rent 
seeking. Rents are monies that can be made due to the location of the actor in 
charge of any monopoly (ibid). Understanding the state and bureaucratic 
administrative relations as an organizational structure, and planning 
permission and regulations as a state monopoly, it is possible, for instance, to 
foresee violation as being produced through rent seeking. However, like the 
principal-agent framework, the rent-seeking framework also considers 
structure, hierarchy and operational regulations in organizations in general 
assuming neat organizational settings.  
 
Critique of corruption: In operations of political government, neat 
organizational settings are not available for analysis to identify distinctly the 
principal, agent and clients. As Williams (1999, 2000a) argues, the idea of 
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corruption presupposes the very possibility of a neatly performing public 
official, state, society and economy according to rules and norms, thereby 
underplaying the idea of politics. He notes, “The public office and public interest 
notions of corruption appear to rest on the existence of settled, agreed political 
orders” (Williams 1999, p.510), which assumes a neat division between the 
state, society and economy and legitimate interaction between them. As 
Williams states, “much of the debate about defining corruption is really about 
competing conceptions of the nature of politics” (1999, p.516). Further as Gupta 
notes, “often such a view of corruption is built on the model of the Weberian 
bureaucrat, that is, the role fulfilling, disinterested professional occupying a 
particular location in an organizational structure based solely on professional 
competence and merit” (Gupta 2012, p.81). 
 
Moreover, there is also a presupposition that agents or public officials can act in 
ways that they decide always, without appreciating the complexity of the 
institutional and interactive context of practicing governance.  For example, in 
his very fine-grained analysis of canal irrigation in south India, Robert Wade 
(1982, 1985) revealed how even if certain engineers and officers wanted to opt 
out of the corrupt practices, they could not because different forms of 
disciplining were in practice, including transfers and appointments. 20 
Demonstrating how canal irrigation is more about human relations than about 
rational engineering of the canals - as one of his interviewees put it, “Water 
management is 25 per cent water and 75 per cent people” (Wade 1982, p.309) - 
he showed how the networks of engineers, ministers, members of the legislative 
assembly, local contractors, farmers and secretaries run an interlinked 
governance process.  Even though this process is closely connected to the 
official process, it is fundamentally different from the expected outcomes.  The 
rules that would enable the water to flow to the agricultural fields have more to 
do with how these networks of governance operate rather than technologies of 
canal engineering, administrative structures and representational politics taken 
separately. Canal irrigation is the result of how governance networks and the 
rules of local processes operate.   
                                                     
20
 This is a field work was conducted long before the dawn of the neo-liberal state in India. 
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Violation is indeed a site of corruption when understood in legal terms, in 
public office terms, in principal-agent terms and in rent-seeking terms, all at the 
same time. However, explaining the site of violation and its relationship with 
planning require a more innovative framework than corruption. For instance, 
the relationship of violations with regularization, neighbourhood mobilisation 
and popular demand challenges the use of such exclusive analytical 
frameworks. Violation as a site - for instance of neighbourhood contestation or 
of the police superior’s powerlessness - will be insufficiently examined through 
the analysis of corruption. Even as a site where different kinds of corrupt 
practice can be identified, violation offers an opportunity to understand the 
culture and politics in the planning process. In the following section, I attempt 
to outline such a framework that would enable a reconceptualization of 
violation. 
 
2.2.4 Interim conclusion 
To recap, I argued that the three frameworks discussed above: - informality, 
implementation failure and corruption, even though might be useful to 
understand the state or society side of social governance, they are insufficient to 
understand violations as produced at the site of state-society interaction. The 
informality-irregularity-illegality approach is either preoccupied with how the 
urban poor subvert the formal, regular and legal in enabling a livelihood, or how 
the neo-liberal state exercise its control over a population through establishing 
states of exception. The implementation discourse concentrates on the state and 
bureaucratic side of the problem. And the corruption framework functions 
within a particular imagination about the operation of public administration. In 
the following sections, I propose a conceptual shift from this state-society 
dualism and attempt to develop a framework for analysis that conceptualizes 
the space of the formal state itself as a space of multiple negotiations and 
contest embedded in local social relations. 
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2.3 Re-conceptualizing violation 
Reconceptualization of violations as necessitated in the case of Bangalore, I 
argue, involves an appropriate conceptualization of planning and state. Peter 
Hall argues that the roots of modern town planning go back to the anarchist 
response to the difficult living conditions that emerged during industrialisation 
(Hall 2002).  Since then, various epistemologies and local contingencies have 
been instrumental in shaping urban planning frameworks in different parts of 
the world. However, the one common feature across these varied geographies is 
that planning became a formal institutional practice in most parts of the world 
when state governments enacted planning laws that gave them the legitimate 
right and duty to propose, control or intervene in urban areas. The variety of 
concerns that guide modern land-use planning processes include protection of 
the environment, steering economic and population growth, ensuring the 
quality of life by controlling density and typology, preventing negative 
externalities, promoting economic development, equitable distribution, 
sanitation, provision of affordable housing, open spaces and so on. Private 
property and the private sector-led property development process also 
increased the relevance of controlling urban land use through zoning 
regulations to manage the urban transformation. To this end, planning became 
a statutory activity with planning acts and laws and legal institutional 
infrastructure to support the policy decisions made by the executive, endorsed 
by the legislature and implemented through the planning and administrative 
apparatuses of the state. A large number of epistemologies and accordingly 
different practice cultures can be seen in different parts of the world that are 
normally referred to as modern town planning (Sanyal 2005a). Friedmann, for 
example, points out how the social reform tradition in planning philosophy 
emphasized the role of the state in societal guidance even though the various 
models ranged from comprehensive planning, disjointed instrumentalism, 
piecemeal social engineering, local or centralised planning. He notes, “those 
writing in this tradition regard planning as a scientific endeavour, [and] 
advocate[d] a strong role for the state, which they understood to have both 
mediating and authoritative functions (Friedmann 1987, p.76/77, emphasis in 
original). As the function of the state, once the plan is made with the help of 
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experts and accepted by the state, its implementation is to be carried out 
through the executive and its hierarchical bureaucratic processes. Planning thus 
came to be understood as an arm of the modern nation state (Robinson 1995 
p.27; Yiftachel 1998, 2002).   
 
Various theories of the state influenced the ways in which planning has been 
theorized. For example, when the state is conceptualized as a location for class 
struggle or as the space of the bourgeoisie, planning is also identified as a space 
for class struggle or as a practice that aids bourgeois or elite interests through 
the protection of private property. When the notion of the state is replaced by 
governmentality, planning is conceptualized as the means by which surveillance 
and social control is exercised. Similarly, state theories using the concept of 
neo-liberalism portray planning as one of the instrumental processes that aids 
private accumulation instead of enabling the public interest, and sovereign-
state theories portray planning as the tool of that sovereign.  
 
What is striking in these representations is that the state is seen as a monolithic 
and unitary agency that is capable of intervening in markets and regulating 
social behaviour. The state occupies a mystic invisible form, similar to the idea 
of the invisible hand of markets. For example Scott’s (1998) seminal work on the 
authoritarian high modernist state argues that the benevolent state turns into 
some kind of monster against its people due to its high modernist ideology. 
Even though the state wants to be beneficial, it invariably ends up authoritarian 
to its subjects and planning becomes one of the arms of the state that works as 
the state wants. Such studies extend the particular conceptualizations of the 
state to the case of planning practice.  Similarly we have studies of the nature of 
planning in a developmental state (Roy 2002, 2009), a state under Thatcherism 
(Thornley 1991), and a high modernist state (Scott 1998). 
 
But what is the nature of the state and how does one study the democratic 
state?  Is the state available and amenable for analysis? If we look closely at the 
performance of institutions that collectively represent the state, we can see that 
the monolithic idea of the state acting as a unified whole is a misrepresentation.  
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The legislature, the executive and the judiciary are not always in sync: the 
different institutions that form each of those horizontals within the collective 
state also act in discordance. In India, one can point out innumerable such 
instances.21 Moreover, different levels of government may even work against 
each other due to political realities. A monolithic idea of the state where all its 
constituents are collapsed into one identity is not a realist representation of the 
way government institutions form as a collective in many countries. It also 
cannot be the basis on which the outcomes of governance and the practice of 
politics can be explained.   
 
Statutory Land use control is indeed the domain of the state and it is a practice 
that reveals the nature of the state. However, I argue that the conceptualization 
of state and planning should involve an examination of how this control process 
works in particular places at particular times. Conceptualizing violations 
therefore involves conceptualizing how governance works in particular 
contexts and how planning power is exercised or operated in these contexts. 
For this, given the challenges posed by the case of violations in Bangalore, I 
propose to move beyond a monolithic conception of a powerful state and 
planning. In the following section, I build upon a range of literature that enables 
this task.  
 
2.3.1 From ‘the state’ to ‘governmentality’ to ‘culture of governance’ (State 
in practice) 
 
2.3.1.1 The state 
Many scholars of the state, politics, political sociology and development have 
addressed the question of the state squarely (Abrams 1988; Bourdieu 1999; 
Foucault 1986; Fuller and Benei 2001; Migdal 2001, 1988; Mitchell 1991, 1999, 
2000; Sharma and Gupta 2006; Steinmetz 1999; Tilly 1999). They propose to 
move beyond any representation of the state as coherent and distinct from 
society, towards analysing the processes of government and political practice or 
                                                     
21
 For example, when the public works department acts against the land-use regulations of the 
planning department 
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examining the state within the context of its non-coherence and blurred 
boundaries.   
 
Dean (2009) for instance argues that the state is a collection of multiple 
institutions that does not necessarily operate in any particularly coherent form 
in the exercise of power.  Similarly, Dunsire (1978) posits that the hierarchical 
bureaucracy that operates as a command-and-control format is a myth and that 
the public administration process is best understood as an aggregative process 
i.e. the total sum of the collection of institutional actors.  
  
Abrams (1988) asserts that “the state is not the reality which stands behind the 
mask of political practice; it is itself the mask which prevents our seeing 
political practice as it is” (ibid, p 59).  For him, the state is a practice and not an 
apparatus (p 65). It does not exist and is only an illusion, an ideology. He argues 
that the state should be abandoned as a material object of study and that it 
should be understood as an ideological project (p 76). 22  He calls for an analysis 
of the relation between the state system and the state idea (ibid). 
 
Moving further away from the focus on the state, authors such as Steinmetz 
(1999) propose to study political culture, while Tilly (1999) calls for a relational 
analysis of the political process. However, Mitchell (1991, 1999, 2000) posits 
that even though the state’s boundary with society appears elusive, porous and 
mobile, it is in exploring both this uncertain boundary and the distinction 
between state and society as an important characteristic of modern political 
order that one would be able to examine the nature of the state.23 He proposes 
therefore to study the political processes at the spaces of interaction, which 
                                                     
22
 Abrams refers to Miliband (1969), who called for analysis of the state as an ‘institutionalized 
political power’, and from Radcliffe-Brown (1950) who in his “African Political Systems” called for 
the idea of the state to be omitted from social analysis and replaced by employing the concept of 
government and politics. 
23
 Mitchell asserts that the customary Weberian definition of the state (an organization distinct from 
society that claims a monopoly within a fixed territory over the legitimate use of violence) is only a 
residual characterisation. It does not tell us the actual contours of this (p 82). He argues that one 
should neither abandon the idea of the state for the political system, nor reconstruct the state’. In the 
political systems approach, he notes, everything becomes a subject and domain of politics - the 
churches, schools and so on. Therefore, the problem that began to address the boundary of the state 
and society encountered another type of boundary problem. 
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create the effect of the state. Similarly, Migdal questions the ideal type of 
Weberian state as a goal-oriented association that holds a monopoly of violence 
over a territory and its population and is capable of generating coercive 
behaviour through means of legitimate domination and a rule of law (Migdal 
2001). Instead, he suggests that actual states are marked by both the mirage of 
coherency and the incoherency of actual practices. Embedding the practices of 
the state in the conflicts and groups of society, he argues that a single theory of 
state practice cannot be developed because the various alliances that social and 
state actors engage in can transform the state and define the outcomes. By 
emphasising a process-oriented approach to understanding state-society 
relations, he conceptualizes society as a web rather than a pyramid with the 
state as a ruling mechanism at the top.  This brings us to the next 
conceptualization of institutionalized rule, proposed by Michael Foucault. 
 
2.3.1.2 Governmentality  
Foucault (1986, 2000) proposes that while studying how power is exercised in 
society one has to study the state by cutting off the head of the king (i.e. the 
sovereign). He argues that one should study the various epistemic discourses, 
rationalities and institutional practices that enable the exercise of power and 
control in society. To this end, he shows how Bentham’s panopticon project, 
theories of disease and discourses on morality can be understood as 
rationalities and technologies of rule. Foucault’s work demonstrates that social 
governance happens through the capillary movement of power within the social 
discourses and practices rather than the control exercised by a monolithic and 
coherent powerful state apparatus, even though he further shows how the 
governmentalisation of the state is enabled through the adoption of these 
rationalities anf technologies within the practice of the state (Burchell et al 
1991; Foucault 1980, 1986, 2000). 
 
The Foucauldian framework definitely enables an analysis that moves beyond 
the notion of an all-powerful, monolithic sovereign state to the idea of 
governance of rule through the widely distributed social practices that conform 
to particular rationalities, discourses, epistemologies, procedures and processes 
54 
 
of control, external to the realm of the state. But exactly what happens to the 
processes of governmentality when applied in practice in particular social 
contexts?  In other words, what form does the practice of governmentality take 
in real contexts when it comes to the exercise of power and control? How do 
certain political rationalities - for example, controlling land use change or the 
control of environmental change or urban growth actually touch the ground? 
Examining violations in Bangalore, I argue, can give insight into these questions. 
In the next section, I will review some literature that would enable a conceptual 
framework to analyze the actual practice of the apparatuses of governmentality 
in particular socio-political contexts.   
 
2.3.1.3 Cultures of governance 
Scholars working more ethnographically have proposed to examine the practice 
of the state as embedded in the society in order to understand how bureaucracy 
actually works or how governmentality frameworks become transformed. Such 
embeddedness enables them to examine the state as being in constant 
engagement with many actors outside the otherwise bounded notion of the 
state.  Empirical studies on India have been particularly instructive in revealing 
the various forms of complex interactions between the state and society, 
thereby rendering the idea of an authoritative bounded state a fiction.   
 
Writing on politics in India, Kaviraj (1999) and Saberwal (1996) argue that the 
modernist notion of the state did not take root in India because it rests on 
vernacular feet of clay (Kaviraj 1999).  They argue that the clean, functional 
state that were to be established after the Independence of India functioned in 
practice by embedding itself within vernacular systems of practice in society 
such as caste, class and various other aspects that define social relations. 
 
Explaining why Indian democracy is generating a crisis of governability, Kholi 
(1990), drawing from Migdal (1988)24, argues that one should resort to a political 
explanation for this phenomenon. He posits that India is a weak state caused by a 
                                                     
24
 Migdal asserts that weak states are a consequence of the different local accommodations that the 
central organizing authority ends up doing during the process of governing.  
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crisis in authority created by the competition between India’s successive political 
regimes to gain control over localities bypassing the regional governments and 
other intermediary institutions. While this enabled politicians at the top to get the 
support of local people and accommodate their needs, this also resulted in the 
weakening of policy implementation institutions.   
 
Similarly, Pritchett (2009) calls for a new category while describing the lack of 
any coherent structure of the Indian state. He argues, 
“India is today a flailing state---a nation-state in which the head, that is the 
elite institutions at the national (and in some states) level remain sound and 
functional but that this head is no longer reliably connected via nerves and 
sinews to its own limbs. In many parts of India, in many sectors the 
everyday actions of the field level agents of the state – policemen, engineers, 
teachers, health workers, are increasingly beyond the control of the 
administration at the national or state level” (p.4). 
 
Writing on the various development and administrative practices of the Indian 
state from the Public Distribution System to public bus route allocation, Barbara 
Harris-White (2004) argues that the idea of the local state is best understood as 
a kind of informal state in operation. Through a variety of case studies she 
demonstrates that the boundary between the “state and intermediate classes, 
between officials of the state and a very large shadow state, between social 
identities and state roles” (p77) in India is porous and blurred and shows how 
the informal state and informal markets in fact create each other. She argues 
that officials in bureaucracy can be classified as self-employed, because they 
“earn a fee from the provision of their services” (pp-45) in the form of bribes 
and through the “private sale of state goods such as licenses and sanctions”. She 
concludes that there is a “private status state in which officials bring into active 
play their social identities derived from outside state, and private interest 
shadow state - where large proportion of society gains livelihoods dependent on 
the form of the state than is employed directly by the state” [emphasis original]  
(p.100). Referring to Bhagwati (1993, p.329), she notes that on the ground 
“policy is frequently emasculated through the indirect power of quiet sabotage 
and everyday forms of resistance by the local power groups” and “implementing 
and regulatory agencies may be captured to establish the unplanned” (p54).  In 
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this process, she concludes referring to Kaviraj (1999), “policy may be 
transformed out of all recognition” (p54) through the politics of policy 
implementation. 
 
Literature on the anthropology of the everyday state in India examines this 
embedded-ness further. Fuller and Benei (2001) and Sharma and Gupta (2006), 
for example, assess how the Indian state can be best understood as embedded 
in the cultural context than as performing the functions of an ideal democratic 
state isolated from everyday society and operating through a Weberian 
administrative system. Instead of viewing the state as a pre-constituted 
institution that is capable of performing certain functions, Gupta encourages us 
to view states as “culturally embedded and discursively constructed ensembles” 
(p27). Gupta asks us to look at the everyday practices, encounters, the public 
representations and performances that produce the state. He posits that how 
the state works is actually negotiated at the local level of administration.25 
 
Similarly, Corbridge et al (2005) examine in particular how the state in India is 
seen by poor people in north-eastern India. They show how the state is 
experienced by poor people in the form of the engineer, the Block Development 
Officer, the Panchayat Member and so on.  Most people, they argue, more often 
interact within the street-level network of the governance system than with the 
higher up state and its immense structure. They argue that the Indian state is 
actually performed through the various forms of quotidian networks of 
association at the local level.  The technologies of rule are usually transformed 
by local actors at the local level through interpretation. Their interpretations 
are often beyond the recognition of the higher policymakers. They draw our 
attention to the fact that people see the state within their everyday social 
networks and not as a state in itself and how these micro-operations often 
                                                     
25
 Such an approach, he argues, raises fundamental substantive and methodological questions.  
Substantively, it allows the state to be disaggregated by focusing on different bureaucracies without 
prejudging their unity of coherence.  It also enables one to problematise the relationship between the 
translocality of the state and the necessarily localised offices, institutions and practices in which it is 
instantiated (p212).  Methodologically, it raises the concern about how one applies ethnographic 
methods when the aim is to understand the workings of a trans-local institution that is made visible in 
local practices. 
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transform the macro-characteristics of the formal state. They argue that, 
“government officers will find it hard to behave like a weberian bureaucrat 
when they lack the support of a weberian bureaucracy” (p152). 
 
These studies are particularly instructive for understanding the relational 
dimension of the state: showing that the state, as an ensemble of governance, 
operates through people, policies, institutions and performance procedures that 
are embedded in local social and political networks. Important in these 
accounts is the idea that the categories of the state and government become 
insufficient in understanding how governing works in India. That these 
accounts show that the boundary between the state and the society is blurred, 
public officials are self-employed as service providers, the head is not in control 
of its own limbs and the everyday state is discursively constructed through local 
social networks calls for a renewed understanding of how governing actually 
works in India.   Further, these accounts also draw our attention to the various 
processes and wide networks of actors both inside and outside government that 
influence the everyday space of governing in India using both governmental 
technologies of rule and other means.   
 
What kind of language could reasonably capture the complex, socially 
embedded, political dynamics in the sphere of governing, where processes and 
outcomes are shaped by a range of networked actors inside and outside the 
government? In the next section I develop a language that comes closer to the 
ideas reviewed here based on the fieldwork and research experience on 
planning violations in Bangalore.  
 
2.4. Governance networks: towards an understanding of Vernacular 
Governance 
In this dissertation, I propose that planning practice in Bangalore examined 
through the lens of violations can be termed as ‘Vernacular Governance’. This 
conceptual language attempts to portray how governing processes and 
outcomes are deeply influenced by the interests of various local and regional 
networks that occupy the space of governing. To build this, I shall draw 
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inspiration from three specific strands of existing scholarship to develop this 
language. 
 
Through an impressive critique of the norm-deviation structure intrinsic to the 
modern liberal theory of government and to elaborate on his notion of political 
society, Chatterjee (2011) in his Lineages of political society, argues that political 
society is the domain of democracy as the civil society was of modernity. 
Chatterjee (2004) argues that poor people in India operate through political 
society, the essence of which as Corbridge et al (2005) translate as, 
“the loose community of recognized political parties and their 
operatives, local political brokers and councillors, lower level public 
servants, [who] act as the bridge between the government and public in 
a manner that often refuses the optimism of civil society models” 
(Corbridge et al 2005, p.189).  
 
Chatterjee argues that, 
“what we need is a different conceptualization of the subject of political 
practice –neither as abstract and unencumbered individual selves, nor as 
manipulable objects of governmental policy, but rather as concrete 
selves necessarily acting within multiple networks of collective 
obligations and solidarities to work out strategies of coping with, 
resisting, or using to their advantage the vast array of technologies 
power deployed by the modern state” (Chatterjee 2011, p207). 
 
The proposal to develop a new conceptual language of political practice that 
adequately represents the multiple networks of collective obligations and 
solidarities working towards optimising their advantage is striking and 
important. However, Chatterjee’s interest emerging from his subaltern studies 
background is to appropriately theorize the domain of the subversive subject of 
political practice against the state of modern liberal theory and the 
governmental technologies of power. It is no surprising therefore that his 
empirical cases always focus on either the rural or urban poor in India. This can 
also be seen in the inspiring work of Benjamin (2001, 2005, 2007, 2008) who 
argues that the informal coalition of the urban poor and local level politicians 
and bureaucracy in India can be understood as a porous bureaucracy, and these 
networks in fact democratise the exclusionary state. Like Chatterjee, Benjamin, 
is also concerned about the pervasive and consistent capabilities of the urban 
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poor to engage with lower level bureaucracy, local government, and local 
politicians through political and extra-legal processes (such as vote banks) in 
order to access services while subverting the exclusive and elitist state which 
legitimises citizenship in urban India based on property ownership.  
 
While Chatterjee’s proposition to reconceptualize the social domain in popular 
democratic contexts as political society that negotiates between the state and 
the category of population through the domain of political relations is 
conceptually very powerful and inspirational, perhaps his interest in theorising 
the domain between the state and the population means that the state always 
appears as an abstract monolithic category. Further, Chatterjee is unhelpful 
when it comes to identifying a new language to conceptualize the practice of 
governing that emerges from the embeddedness of the many everyday practices 
of the modern state within the local socio-political context and emergent 
requirements. Similarly, Benjamin’s conceptualization of porous bureaucracy 
also limits itself to the alliances between poor people and local level 
government against the exclusionary state higher up somewhere rather than 
attempting to develop a language to portray governance. What is further 
striking is that even though many authors cited above recognize the influence of 
what they describe as networks in the space of governing, there is seldom an 
attempt to qualify that network, or even explain what they mean by network.   
 
A vast array of literature has been developed on networks in the last five 
decades in social science in the field of social network analysis (SNA) and more 
recently in actor network theory (ANT). In this scholarship, particularly in the 
social network tradition, a network is defined either based on a specific tie, for 
example, friendship, or a social group who relate with each other to form a 
social group (aka social network) (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell 2011). While the 
SNA maps social actors (those who have some social identity) who form the 
network in any arena of social life under examination, ANT arrives at the 
description of the composition of the social after identifying the actors involved 
in the network. Even though ANT differs from SNA through recognizing both 
human as well as non-human actors as actants (Mutzel 2009; Thompson 2003) 
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both the approaches use network as a perspective, a metaphor or a paradigm 
that could enable the identification of interconnectedness or ties (mostly 
represented in sociograms in which actors are nodes connected with lines to 
denote relationships, and which explain social process or outcomes, in the case 
of SNA, or describe how actants collectively produce outcomes as a 
consequence of the networks, in the case of ANT) (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell 
2011; Marin and Wellman2011; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott and 
Carrington 2011).26 Methodologically, both these approaches undertake 
extensive mapping of the network to identify form (for example, clustering 
patterns) of the network or their content (social structure in the case of SNA) or 
consequence (ANT).  
 
Drawing from the networks approach (mainly the social network approach), a 
range of scholarship has emerged in the past two decades that examines how 
the involvement of a range of collective or individual actors both inside as well 
as outside the space of the government influences the policy process. The 
languages that are commonly used in such studies are policy networks and 
policy communities to describe the network that inhabits the space of governing 
or that influences the policy outcome. This recognition of the limited role of the 
state due to the involvement of a diverse range of actors in policy making and 
implementation arena is also reflected in the language of governance.  
 
Governance has emerged as a conceptual framework in the study of the state 
                                                     
26
 This research process didn’t begin with ideas from either SNA or ANT. Therefore, I did not 
undertake an extensive mapping of networks during the fieldwork nor do I employ methods or 
analytical techniques from either SNA or ANT. Therefore the words associational networks or 
networks used here do not refer to the specific analytical implications of either ANT or SNA. 
However, the various ways in which different actors interact with each other during the practice of 
planning, implementation and enforcement process was identified in the fieldwork and examined 
further during the analysis phase. These interactions often define the outcomes of planning and 
governance process in Bangalore by forming enduring local networks, processes and procedures. In 
the sense the word network used in this dissertation is more conceptual and instrumental rather than 
methodological as in the case of ANT and SNA. I do not present any detailed identification of nodes 
or patterns that would enable a formal analysis of clusters, its content or identification of actants and 
so on. To some extent through the examination of violations, I do identify the different forms of local 
relationship between social actors that form a network occupying the practice of planning. From that 
perspective, violations do present itself with a strong potential for a detailed network analysis based 
on SNA or even ANT given that there is an important role for laws and acts, documents, procedures 
and material records in the production of violation. This endeavor is not within the scope of this 
research and is left to future research.  
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and public administration in industrialised countries during the past two 
decades in the context of what is often referred to as the hollowed-out state 
(Klijn 2008; Kooiman 2003, Stoker 1998, Pierre 2000; Rhodes 1995, 1997, 
2000) and the involvement of a variety of actors within the space of governing. 
Writing about the British government, Rhodes (1994, 1997) argues that his use 
of the phrase refers to the increased fragmentation and decreased coordination, 
eroding accountability, increasing capacity of government to manufacture social 
disasters and decline of central capability in the space of governing. The phrase, 
he asserts, refers to whatever has happened to the conventional idea of a 
capable state in the context of increasing privatization, the presence of alternate 
service delivery agencies, the influence of the European Union (and other 
international agencies) and the limited discretion of civil servants due to the 
new public management practices being adopted in government. He argues that 
governance is,  
“Not a choice between centralisation and decentralisation. It is about 
regulating relationship in complex systems. There is no simple 
ideological choice between planning and markets. There are many forms 
of service delivery and we need to identify the conditions under which 
they work” (Rhodes 1997, p.131).  
 
He suggests that this hollowing out is not the minimalist state of Thatcherite 
aims, but it is about identifying alternate means to “simple-minded nostrums of 
free markets and national plans” (Ibid, p.110). Similarly, Stoker (1998) states 
that, 
“Governance refers to the development of governing styles in which 
boundaries between and within public and private sectors has become 
blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms 
which don’t rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions on 
government” (ibid page 17).  
 
He further asserts that the value of a governance framework resides “in its 
capacity to provide a framework for understanding processes of governing” 
(ibid p.18).  He agrees with Judge et al (1995, p.3) that “such conceptual 
frameworks provide a language and frame of reference through which reality 
can be examined and lead theorists to ask questions that might not otherwise 
occur” (ibid, page 17). 
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Governance is increasingly used as a conceptual approach that recognizes the 
presence of a wide range of actors in the space of governing. The role of the 
state varies according to the policy arena and the problem of investigation and 
the conceptual approach adopted by various authors. So, in the political 
economy approach, for instance, the state is conceived as having a role in 
steering multiple agencies and institutions during the process of governing. 
Therefore, Jessop develops a strategic-relational approach recognising the 
complex relationship between structure, agency and strategy (Jessop 2007). In 
the case of studies on private governance networks, the networks become the 
institutional setting within which the actors act, and they are not necessarily 
accountable to the government (Kooiman 2003). Kooiman (ibid), for example, 
distinguishes governing from governance. According to him, governing can be 
considered, 
“as the totality of interactions, in which public as well as private actors 
participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal 
opportunities, attending to institutions as contexts for these governing 
interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all those 
activities” (ibid, page 4).  
 
By way of contrast, governance refers to “the totality of theoretical conceptions 
on governing” (ibid, page 4).   
 
Further, he uses the term socio-political governance, defined as “an analytical 
and normative perspective on any societal governance that is collective” (ibid, 
p.5, emphasis in original). Collective, for him, is when public, private and market 
actors look at the governing responsibilities as a shared set of activity. Hence, 
he argues that the space of governing involves activities that are self-governing, 
co-governing and hierarchical governing. Socio-political governance, he states, 
is a space of interactive governance, which attempts to move beyond the notion 
of the state as a central governing actor to how governance happens in the 
context of state-society relations (ibid, page 5). He argues that mutuality is a 
central aspect of interaction in which the interacting parties influence each 
other even though respecting each other’s centre of autonomy “as a point from 
which the co-activity of the others emanate” (p.211). He proposes 
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interdependence and interpenetration as two dimensions of interaction: 
“Interdependence is more than exchange; it is deeper and it must also be 
distinguished from input output relations. It refers to the constitution and 
reconstitution of actors or entities” (ibid, page 211). Using this interaction 
perspective, Kooiman (2003) defines political society as the link between the 
state and civil society. He argues that “political society can be seen as a sphere 
of actors and institutions mediating articulating and institutionalising the 
relation between the state and civil society”27. He asserts that political society is 
related to democratisation while civil society is related to liberalisation, and 
that the state, civil society and political society together form public life and 
should be analyzed closely (ibid, page 216).   
 
The importance of recognising the influence of multiple actors in the space of 
governing had been recognized in the seminal work of Dahl on urban politics in 
New Haven more than five decades ago. By asking ‘who governs in New Haven?’ 
Dahl argued that the interests of a very large number of actors are reflected in 
the governance priorities in both direct and indirect ways (Dahl 1961). Thus, he 
proposed a critique of elite theory and political machines theory, which argued 
for the dominating role of select elites in policymaking. The pluralists inspired 
by Dahl argued that power is much more dispersed and the policymaking arena 
is not exclusively a domain of select few; instead, a variety of interest groups are 
represented according to the particular policy area under investigation. 
Further, in the attempt to bring together the structuralist and pluralist schools, 
Stone’s (1989, 1993, 2005) regime theory focused on explaining the different 
forms of government and business coalitions in policy decisions and the 
delivery of projects by giving agency to the range of governing actors (Stone 
2005 , Judge et al 1998). Stoker (2000) states that, “Governance has become a 
problematic activity” due to social complexity, the low coherence in political 
society and differential distribution of “resources between public and private 
actors” (ibid, p.95). Hence, the emergence of regimes and different forms of 
coalitions can be seen around the world. He describes coalitions and regimes 
thus:  
                                                     
27
 Different from the conceptualization by Partha Chatterjee’s where it is in opposition to the State.  
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“Regimes are informal yet stable coalitions, with access to institutional 
resources that have a sustained role in making governing decisions.  
Regimes are likely to draw on both public and private sectors. A regime 
is not only about aggregating resources, but it includes the blending of 
capacities around potentially shared purposes of various sectors of the 
community.28 The crucial role of governing coalitions or regimes is to 
blend capacities between governmental and non-governmental actors in 
order to achieve a governing task” (ibid, page 96).   
 
He argues that the blending of capacities gives the regime its power. Regimes 
are not always stable; they are prone to change and potential decay. The 
development of a regime in a context is a very difficult task; hence, stable 
regimes are more tightly knit and are more likely to persist than loose 
coalitions.   
 
It can be seen that the concept of governance is employed with a wide range of 
intentions: to empirically explain certain governance outcomes; to provide a 
normative account of the process of governing; and to identify the various 
coalitions and regimes in any arena specific of governance. By recognising the 
various influences in the sphere of governing, governance thus offers a language 
that does not take for granted the idea that the state is the domain where all 
matters related to governing resides. Even though the context in which the 
concept emerged was that of Western industrialised nations where relatively 
stable states had been in operation until the hollowing out or the emergence of 
multiple actors, it has been also used by scholars working in the developing 
South, where historically fewer opportunities existed for the stabilisation of a 
modern liberal democratic state. For example, in many parts of Africa, scholars 
argue that the role of the formal state in everyday governance is minimal, 
contested and occupied by various informal systems of social governance and 
that often the state acts alongside other forms of informal organizations to 
exercise authority and deliver services (Meager 2012, Oliver De Sardan 2008, 
1999, 2011). To describe such forms of rule and to represent the everyday 
                                                     
28
 Referring here to Clarence Stone’s paper - Urban regime analysis: Theory, service provision, and 
cross-national considerations. Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for 
Political Research, Bern, Switzerland, February 27-March 4 1997. 
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operations of African states, De Sardan (ibid), for instance, uses the term “real 
governance” and Meagher (ibid) uses the term “hybrid governance”. 
 
In this dissertation, I deploy the language of governance to denote the wide 
range of collective actors and networks involved in the sphere of governing. 
Further, drawing inspiration from Chatterjee as well as the studies cited above 
that recognizes the robust influence of complex local relations and strategies on 
governance outcomes in India; I propose to conceptualize the specific practice 
of governance that emerges out of this embeddedness as vernacular 
governance.  
 
The Oxford English dictionary defines vernacular as pertaining to the 
local/regional, ordinary, domestic or of a specific group engaging in a specific 
activity. 29 Thus the language of the vernacular enables me to portray the 
specific ways in which universal categories, such as governance, the state, 
planning or bureaucracy, are appropriated or translated into any local context. 
Levitt and Merry (2009) uses vernacularization to describe “the process of 
appropriation and local adoption of globally generated ideas and strategies” 
(ibid, p.441), of women’s rights in Peru, China, India and the United States, 
while Hansen (1996) uses it to show how the local Shiv Sena – BJP 30 political 
coalition in Maharashtra translated the broad communal Hindutva 31 discourse 
to reflect local social and political realities and how they captured political 
power in that state. Similarly, Michelutti (2007, 2008) uses it to mean “the ways 
in which values and practices of democracy become embedded in particular 
cultural and social practices (p.2) of Yadavas32 in Mathura which in turn 
influences the shape and form of national politics (Gregory 2009, p.867). Merry 
(2009) similarly uses the term vernacular to denote the “local context of power 
and meaning” (ibid, p.1) while arguing that international human rights ideas 
can be effective only when translated into local terms. 
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 http://oxforddictionaries.com 
30
 Shiv Sena and BJP (Bharatiya Janatha Party) are national political parties in India 
31
 Hindu religious nationalism  
32
 A caste group in North India 
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The anthropologists’ uses of the term vernacular, as cited above, refer to local 
traditional structures like caste and community or things that are indigenous. 
While using vernacular here, I propose to move beyond referring to such 
traditional social structures to encompass the various forms of specific local 
socio-political realities within which practices of governance take place. 
Sometimes these relations are connected to ‘traditional’ structures like caste, 
while most times they are complex combinations of political affiliations, 
business networks, social class, family and friendship ties, neighbourhood 
groups, or even regimes and coalitions that enables the trading of public office 
privileges.33 By vernacular, I not only intend to portray the range of actors 
involved in governing, but also the process of appropriation and adaptation of 
universal categories of law and structures and process of rule. Therefore 
Vernacular governance as used here represents the idea that the mechanisms of 
social governance in practice take very specific forms in their rationalities, 
technologies, actors and processes in particular places with or without any 
relation with the governing structures and processes of the modern nation 
state. While it is important to see how the state and governmentality operate as 
discourses and expectations, it is through studying what kind of specific 
governance processes and practices result in which outcomes in particular 
places that we will get closer to understanding how social governance actually 
operates in particular socio-cultural and political contexts.  
 
I argue that violations should be conceptualized as the outcome of the way land-
use planning practice operates as vernacular governance. Such an approach 
attempts to moves beyond just focusing on policy or plan making to the practice 
of governance.  The various context dependent networks, their actors, their 
rules, characteristics and activities will then present themselves for analysis in 
the arena of plan making, implementation and enforcement.   
 
This move from the state to governance also necessitates a reconceptualization 
of planning from a linear and simple policy-implementation dichotomy. Further, 
                                                     
33
 Especially the question of land and politics in Karnataka and Bangalore are deeply embedded in the 
traditional caste structures; however that dimension is beyond the scope of this phase of the research. 
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it also necessitates a reconceptualization of planning power from being 
concentrated in the space of the state to that of the various coalitions and 
networks. Therefore in the following sections, I develop an analytical 
framework that would enable the examination of planning practice based on 
practice and outcomes.   
 
2.5 From planning as decision making to planning practice and outcomes  
Central to the question of the relationship between planning and violation are the 
questions of what planning is, who does it and how planning processes can be 
researched? Is planning whatever the planners do or is it what different institutions 
in the government do or is it whichever processes that produce planning 
outcomes?  Even though empirical studies on planning have provided a context to 
move beyond the theorisation of planning based on normative concerns towards 
examining how planning in particular places works in real practice, this scholarship 
is also mostly dominated by studies of decision-making process. For example, using 
a neo-Weberian approach, Low (1991) studies the activities of planning institutions 
within the state giving them a kind of relative autonomy and the power of agency. 
Similarly, Healy (1988) studies the planning system in the UK to understand how 
the system faces up to the new challenges posed by a variety of factors. The 
planning system in this case is not equated with a homogenous and monolithic idea 
of the state; instead she attempts to identify how the system “has been adapting to 
changing priorities of national and local governments and development 
consequences” (Healey 1997, p.187; Vigar et al 2000). Such an approach involves 
the study of institutions, instruments and implementation practices. This also 
involves the study of particular actors within these institutions and their practices 
as much as the inter-relationships.   
 
Even though here one moves beyond the idea of a monolithic state, the 
shortcoming of this approach is that it concentrates only on the decision side 
(Friedmann 1987, 2003). The neo-Weberian approach has definitely helped to 
overcome the idea of the monolithic state by including the multiple planning 
institutions within the space of government and politics. However, whatever has 
been studied as planning has remained within the realm of the government and 
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administrative and techno-bureaucracy. This preoccupation, I argue, is due to the 
idea that studying governance has been equated with studying decision-making in 
government institutions, and that planning was conceptualized only as a practice 
within the planning institution engaged in by planners. I assert that this is because 
these studies work within the framework of the policy–implementation dichotomy; 
that is, policy is something to be formulated at the top and later to be implemented 
through the hierarchies of the public administration bureaucracy.   
 
However, there have been many attempts to move beyond studying planning as 
decision-making by using a policy process framework that is mainly inspired by the 
work of Wildavsky who conceived implementation as policy evolution in context 
(Pressman J L and A Wildavsky 1973). Referring to the top-down and bottom-up 
traditions in implementation research and distinguishing between conformance-
based and performance-based research on plan implementation, Alexander and 
Faludi (1989) assert that what is important to research is how particular planning 
and implementation processes have helped achieve the objectives of the plan or 
policy. They argue that dogmatically adhering to the plan during implementation is 
not very useful in achieving the objectives of the plan, because a plan or a policy is a 
static document and is non-responsive to the context and dynamic changes. It is 
important, they say, to look at how planning practice works to achieve the 
objectives of policy. Thus, they call for studying processes that resulted in 
particular outcomes. 
 
Individual actors within the planning system are given significance as active agents 
who are enacting or performing planning. Rules and regulations do not 
automatically translate into results in this approach, but need to be performed.  
Therefore, the way the planners act within the institutional context while 
implementing the plan becomes important. This approach is also related to the 
seminal work of Lipsky who argued that the realisation of policy goals has to do 
with what the street-level bureaucrat actually does at the street level (Lipsky 1983). 
The discretionary capacity of the street-level bureaucrat becomes an important 
issue when policy is seen as being made as it is implemented (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1973). Implementation studies in this format are not distinct from the 
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studies of planning. While the top-down school consider policy and implementation 
as a staged linearity, the bottom-up school question this and argues that a policy is 
only a starting point in the policy process and that researchers should concentrate 
on how policy practices are related to outcomes (Barret and Fudge 1981; 
Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, 1989; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier 
1986). 
 
Even though this policy process approach has helped to move beyond the top-down 
policy-implementation dichotomy to appreciate planning and policy as a continual 
process and integrate the practice of horizontal and vertical actors within 
government, it remains largely isolated from the interaction space of governance.  
Furthermore, whatever that is studied as planning under this approach stays 
within the realm of government and administrative and techno-bureaucracy. I 
argue that this preoccupation is due to the idea that governance is carried out by 
government institutions only and that planning is to be understood as a practice 
within the planning institution engaged in by planners. 
 
Extending this argument further becomes important in identifying violation as a 
site of interaction between multiple actors and governance process. In a context 
where the boundaries are blurred between the state and society, and where the 
idea of control within the state itself is minimal, processes that may lead to 
outcomes do not necessarily have to exist only within the space of government.  In 
this dissertation, I will examine planning processes connecting them to their 
specific outcomes.  I propose that planning outcomes should be studied as the 
result of the actions of a range of different actors that occupy and engage in the 
space of vernacular governance.   
 
2.6 Re-conceptualizing planning and violations: from violations as plan 
deviations to violations as outcomes of planning practice 
The review and analysis of literature on the state and on planning process has 
been conducted here to argue that violations should be seen not as deviations 
from plans, but rather as the outcomes of planning processes that operate as 
vernacular governance. This thesis will reveal the various actors inside and 
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outside government, governance arrangements, protocols and practices that 
produce violations. Planning processes that produce, sustain and contest 
violations form the networks of vernacular governance. Of course, outcomes 
can be the result of a number of things, and not all of them can be equated to 
planning whether understood as practice or as process. Planning indeed refers 
to the act of preparing, policymaking, implementing and controlling or the 
steering of events. Therefore, when I propose to understand violations and their 
connection with planning processes and practices, I mean the practices that 
involve planning law, policies, apparatuses, instruments, institutions, protocols 
and procedures of the planning system. Conceptual approaches from studies of 
governance networks enable us to move beyond seeing the state and 
government as the main domains of enacting governance to examining the 
practices of multiple actors within and outside the government in the analysis 
of governance outcomes. I elaborate on three analytical frames to understand 
how planning practice and violations are embedded in each other in the case of 
Bangalore, and which enables me to answer the research question posed at the 
beginning of this chapter.   
 
2.6.1 Planning, public interest and private interest networks   
Planning’s ethic and epistemology revolves around the idea of public interest, 
whether in its legitimisation as a state practice, as a normative ethic that guides 
epistemologies or as a framework that enables any substantive evaluation  
(Alexander 2002). Modernist state-led urban land-use planning was premised 
on the idea of providing larger benefits to society, “which are in everyone’s 
interest to have but in no one’s interest to provide” (Campbell and Marshall 
2002, p.182).  State intervention in land through various instruments of 
restriction and promotion were premised on such broad principle of public 
interest. Comprehensive land-use planning was conceived within this context of 
state practice to provide a broad framework of spatial organization that would 
unite and co-ordinate specific actors, institutions and their activities towards 
predefined public interest criteria as well as provide an evaluative framework 
(Althusher 1965; Moroni 2004). Moroni (ibid) notes that the rational and 
comprehensive planning approaches are premised on the idea that there is a 
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collective public interest, which can be achieved by state intervention in the 
operation of markets, seen as the domain of private interest. 
 
As the key normative, epistemological and instrumentalist criteria of planning 
theory and practice, public interest has undergone the maximum critique and 
re-conceptualization during the critical evaluation of planning in the second half 
of the previous century. Is public interest the interest of the public (of the state, 
any public authority, community) or interest that is public in nature, or is it an 
outcome that is the result of the processes of public engagement ? (Alexander 
2002).  Who is the public and what is the nature of the interest and how does 
one arrive at defining it? 
 
Utilitarianism conceived public interest as the aggregate interests of individual 
preferences but this was limited by the critique that individuals might not 
always be in a position to identify what is of maximum utility for them. This 
might require a specialist to identify it for them. Statists and old-
institutionalists conceived public interest as the decision of the legislature 
formed under representative democracy, or the interest of an institution that 
represents the people’s interest. However, the state was critiqued as an 
institution that represents the majority and dominant interests in society; 
within such a context only the preference of the rulers and their supporters 
might be represented in the name of public interest. To move beyond such 
relativism, liberal approaches defined public interest based on specific 
universal substantive criteria. But critics argued that in a society made up of 
various conflicting groups holding a range of conflicting values, how could a 
particular substantive notion of public interest (for example, justice) be 
developed? Moving beyond an approach that involves defining the specific 
contents as well as specific actors who will define the public interest criteria, 
the enthusiasts for deliberative democracy asserted that public interest is that 
which is arrived at through the process of deliberate political dialogue and 
participation in the process of democratic decision-making. However, critics 
countered that the existing unequal power structures, various forms of 
exclusions and mutually conflicting rationalities in society could mean that an 
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even platform for participation is unavailable (Alexander 2002; Campbell and 
Marshall 2002; Moroni 2004). 
 
Various versions of planning and urban theory and practice have emerged out 
of these diverse critiques of public interest criteria in planning. For instance, 
Davidoff  (1965) posits that the role of planners is not to represent any abstract 
idea of general public interest, but instead they should work as advocates for 
specific interest groups. This kind of planning was known as advocacy planning.   
 
Similarly, a large body of urban studies scholarship on India argues that in the 
age of the neo-liberalism, the city and its public spaces are being produced in 
the image of the rich, the corporate and the middle class, and that through that 
process the urban poor are becomes an unclassified category who occupy very 
little space in public consciousness; their interests, rather than being seen as 
public, are construed as public nuisance (Ghertner 2010, 2011, 2012). This 
follows from a range of scholarship that critiqued planning as a practice that 
enables exclusive collectives (for example, of property-owning individuals or 
capitalists) (Chatterjee 2004; Harvey 1973, 1978).  This is also reflected in the 
work of other scholars who write on urban planning in India (Arabindoo 2005, 
2010; Baviskar 2003, 2002) who portray many forms of local residential 
associational activism as bourgeois environmentalism. In this line, the middle 
class engages with the state to achieve what they consider as valuable for their 
neighbourhoods - trees, roads, heritage, lakes and so on - which are supposedly 
of interest to the middle class and the elite only. Chatterjee (2004) argues that 
such activism belongs to the domain of the civil society, and this typically 
involves engaging with the legitimate routes of formal democratic state: the 
courts, administration and the law. It is argued that such imaginations of the 
city results in the bourgeoisification of Indian cities. Further, It is argued that 
such elite involvement in governance has reduced the space for the poor, and 
results in their mass eviction. Ghertner (2011) calls this the gentrification of the 
state space. He argues that through specific platforms like the Bhagidari34 in 
                                                     
34
 In the Bhagidari scheme, the Delhi state invited property-owning individuals to participate in 
planning decision-making. 
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Delhi, where the state invites the property owning middle class neighbourhood 
actors to participate in local level decision making about urban services, the 
higher level state actors - both politicians and bureaucrats – make the lower 
level administrators more accountable to the higher level administrators and to 
the middle class neighbourhood groups. This, it is argued, makes the lower level 
politicians and administrators less powerful to circumvent the rules and engage 
with vote bank politics. So, Ghertner (ibid) argues that the state and (not just 
the middle class) play a vital role in bourgeoisification of Indian cities. Ghertner 
(ibid) draws from Kaviraj (1999) who argues that the middle class and higher 
level state actors form part of a cultural modernist collective, quite different 
from the vernacular frameworks with which the lower level administration of 
local government and local politicians and poor people collaborate. For 
example, Ghertner (2010, 2011) shows how courts interpret illegality based on 
aesthetics rather than the rule of law; he shows that the slums and squatters are 
evicted while the posh illegalities in Delhi are regularized.  
 
However, when multiple actors engage in the broad sphere of planning without 
any single agenda, ideology or substantive content dominating the varied 
processes, such categorical essentialisation of planning becomes challengeable. 
When governance outcomes are a result of vernacular governance networks 
(which stem from a variety of interactions between a range of actors and 
rationalities located inside and outside government embedded in the local 
socio-political relations and emergent contingencies) and where the state is 
embedded in various socio-political relations, I argue that both public and 
private interest outcomes can only be identified as a result of governance 
process in particular spheres of governing (or problems under investigation). In 
other words, adhering to rules, the involvement of public actors and adopting 
constitutional processes do not necessarily produce outcomes that are 
automatically of public or private interest. Considering planning practice as 
vernacular governance, this dissertation then, examines how rules, actors and 
procedures interact to produce specific consequences that can be categorised as 
public or private.  Two empirical chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) are organized in 
this dissertation around this analytical framework.   
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2.6.2 Planning power in governance networks 
As discussed before, the conceptualization of how power operates in the sphere 
of governing will vary considerably based on the way governing is 
conceptualized. The conventional idea of the consolidated democratic state 
operating bureaucratically through its verticals - the legislative, executive and 
judiciary - may give an illusion of power operating in a top-down hierarchy.  In 
the Benthamian and Weberian notions of bureaucracy, conceived as a top-down 
pyramidal hierarchy, power operates linearly from top to the bottom (Dunsire 
1978). Through the different practice procedures, reporting structure, salaried 
employees, surveillance and so on, a command taken at the top travels to the 
bottom for implementation and enforcement. It is seen as a command-control 
function.  Such is the idea of power in the policy–implementation linearity and 
legislature–executive-judiciary institutional epistemology of governing. 
    
Similar idea of power is also visible in the writings of those who attempt to 
theorize a structural category of an all-powerful sovereign state. As discussed 
before, drawing from her fieldwork in Calcutta, and framing informality as an 
analytical category beyond the informal sector, Roy argues that informality 
should be seen as an idiom, based on which the Indian State operates.  Drawing 
from Agamben (2005), Roy goes on to argue that this informality is akin to a 
state of exemption that enables the state to maintain its sovereignty and power, 
exempting itself when required from its own rules and regulations. This 
generalisation of a macro category of state power inducted from the analysis of 
informality is deeply questionable even within the context of Calcutta. For about 
four decades, and until recently, the communist party ruled the state of West 
Bengal, of which Calcutta is the capital. The party networks have been 
occupying the state apparatus and engaging in practices that support the 
interests of party networks. Roy seems to be portraying this politics of 
patronage as manifestation of state sovereignty. Similarly, Gururani (2012) 
argues that the planning of Gurgaon that was enabled through many complex 
political networks can be understood as a regime of “flexible planning”.  Even 
though she mentions that “[in] the shifting and emerging networks of power, 
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the analysis of flexible planning necessarily exceeds the domain of the state”, 35 
broadly, the paper follows in the footsteps of Roy to argue that flexibility is a 
strategy of the state power. Desai (2012) also uses the notion of “flexible 
governance” to argue that through flexible governance regimes, the state 
devises strategies to evict the urban poor in Ahmedabad.   
 
Moving beyond conceptualizing the state and the bureaucratic hierarchy as a 
structural category where power resides, those who studied the policy in 
practice very closely - through examining policy, planning and bureaucracy as a 
process where the agents are more active - challenged this top-down linearity 
and argued that power actually flow from the bottom-up within the institutional 
structure. As mentioned before, Dunsire (1978) argues that governing within 
bureaucracy occurs only through consent; power is not what the official at the 
top exercises on the official below him/her. Instead it is to be understood as 
something consented to by the lower official. He asserts that bureaucracy can 
only be understood as an authority where the officials in the hierarchy have 
authority to command. However, this does not mean that he or she will always 
have power.  Power in authority emerges, in his argument, out of consent.   
 
Most scholars of power recognize that the main conceptual typology of power 
relations in society revolves around three specific approaches regarding the 
conditions of social relations under which domination or control is exercised 
(Clegg and Haugaard 2009; Haugaard 2002; Lukes 2004; Westwood 2002; 
Wrong 1995).  
 
The first conceptualization distinguishes between power to and power over. 
Those working with power to frameworks assume that an actor A is powerful 
and has power if actor A has power to (legitimate or otherwise- if actor A is in 
any position of power) dominate others in society.  Those working with power 
over frameworks argued that it is not a sufficient condition. In other words, 
until the social actors allow themselves to be dominated, one cannot argue that 
actor A is powerful and has power and that only through an analysis of the 
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practice of power, can one sufficiently examine if A actually has power over 
other actors.  
 
This is further qualified in the second approach, that is, if power relations 
should be understood as something that happens under conditions of conflict or 
consensus. Critiquing the concepts of power proposed by Parsons, Arendt, 
Gramsci and others belonging to the consensual approach, Lukes, for example, 
argues that consensual (or hegemonic) relations are not relations of power. 
Instead, relations of power should involve domination under conditions of 
conflict and coercion (Lukes 2004). He critiques Dahl’s (1961) method of 
examining the decision-making arena as behaviouralist, and argues that the very 
act of setting the agenda of decision-making is itself an aspect of power 
relations.  He proposes a third approach in which power relations are also 
structural and historical. However, what Lukes misses in his discussion is that 
decisions do not necessarily translate into reality even if the decisions were 
made by people who are located in structural positions of power; a policy is 
only a document that has no importance if it is not implemented. Therefore, 
examining power only in decision-making arenas will paint a partial or 
inaccurate portrait of power as it actually operates in particular situations. The 
analysis of power in an arena where various actors at different levels in a range 
of associational relations exercise their influence through planning practice 
directly or indirectly should also involve the arena of implementation and 
enforcement. 
 
In a Foucauldian framework, where one moves from a consolidated idea of the 
state as the agent of governing to governmentality and technologies of rule, 
power is seen to be dynamic: it circulates within society among various actors. 
Foucault identifies individuals as not just subjects of power but as agents of its 
exercise. He suggests,  
“Power must be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as 
something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never 
localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as 
a commodity or a piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised 
through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate 
between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
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undergoing and exercising power. They are not only its inert or 
consenting targets; they are always also the elements of its articulation. 
In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power not its points of 
application” (Foucault, 1980, p98). 
 
Foucault’s elaborations on the concepts of power and control (Foucault 2000) 
recognize the adoption of the various epistemologies and discourses by social 
actors into their moral and epistemological consciousness, thereby becoming 
the very agents of its circulation. Using such a framework, Chatterjee (1996) 
shows how various notions of morality and articulations of good aesthetics (for 
example, good literature) developed in twentieth century colonial Bengal 
through the activities of certain elite cultural activists and scholars who 
adopted it from colonialist discourse and how that influenced the development 
of a variety of texts and cultural production (i.e. art, media, etc.) during and 
after  the colonial period. Such a framework goes further in recognising the role 
of some form of consent in the circulation of power through discourses and the 
role of consenting individuals in its exercise.   
 
However, a number of scholars who use a Foucauldian framework to study 
planning work with the idea of governing population and represent power as 
being exercised upon an abstract idea of population and/or space (Huxley 2006, 
2007; Legg 2007; Robinson 1995; Scott 1998; Yiftachel 1998, 2000, 2002). They 
neglect how power in fact operates, how the practice of governmentality in fact 
operates in the practice of social governance and in that context how the 
exercise of power actually works. In other words, they do not ask what the 
circulation of power looks like when versions of governmentality are in 
practice, what the roles of dissent and consent are, and under what conditions 
are power and control exercised, by whom and in what context?  
 
So when people are agents in the exercise of power, how does power operate in 
everyday social governance? How is the idea of power exercised in governing 
(even as multiple institutions and processes) if one considers governing as an 
interactive process where various networks inhabit the sphere of governance?  
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Governance networks studies argue that power is fragmented and operates in a 
very contingent fashion. Stoker (1998), for example, states,  
“Power dependence implies that organizations committed to collective 
action are dependent on other organizations; in order to achieve goals 
organizations have to exchange resources and negotiate common 
purposes, the outcome of exchange is determined not only by the 
resources of the participants but also by the rules of the game and the 
context of exchange”  (p.22). 
 
Drawing from an interdependence approach from regime theory and examining 
the informal networks and the various ad-hoc political coalitions involved in the 
urban development processes in Pune, Sami (2012) argues that “power in 
Indian cities is fragmented” (ibid, p.10) and that many forms of coalitions fill 
what she calls “the power vacuum”. This power vacuum, she argues, creates the 
need for collaboration and co-operation thereby distributing the power among 
a wide range of actors and groups, from the petty bourgeoisie to the new middle 
class.36 
  
This interdependence of actors in the exercise of power is conceptually 
exemplified in Latour’s (1986) proposition that is analytically very useful. 
“When an actor simply has power nothing happens and s/he is 
powerless; when, on the other hand, an actor exerts power it is others 
who perform the action. It appears that power is not something one can 
possess – indeed it must be treated as a consequence rather than as a 
cause of action”.   
 
He continues, “a command, if it is successful, results from the actions of a chain 
of agents each of whom translates it in accordance with his/her own projects” 
(p264).37 
 
Therefore, power can be studied only as a consequence of actions and not as 
something that automatically resides in any particular place due to the location 
of a particular actor. If land use planning is understood as social control and, 
                                                     
36
 This is one of the rare voices in the studies of Indian urbanism/ planning that takes such a view 
about power.  
37
 Latour notes, “History is full of people who, because they believed social scientists and deemed 
power to be something you can possess and capitalize, gave orders no one obeyed” (Latour, 1986, 
p.265). 
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particularly, if regulating land use is understood as the ability to control land-
use changes in the city, then violations are the sites where such power becomes 
contested or consented to and can be examined as a consequence. Hence, such a 
framework is used for analysing planning power as it operates in the vernacular 
governance networks in Bangalore. Chapter 7 in this dissertation examines the 
problem of violations and planning power in Bangalore conceptualized within 
this framework.   
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In Bangalore, like most other large cities in India, a well-articulated planning 
institutional apparatus exists to plan, manage and control urbanization and 
change. This formal institutional apparatus is intricately linked to the three 
foundational institutions of the democratic state - the legislative, executive and 
the judiciary - and performed through its intricate embeddings within the 
administrative bureaucracy. 38 This administrative apparatus is instituted in 
state-based laws, performance procedures, and implementation and 
enforcement frameworks. 
  
Planning in Bangalore, like most other urban planning regimes elsewhere, is 
usually represented as a state project with power to control urban change and 
development. Operation of the state apparatus of course cannot be perfect given 
the complexities of the real world, and the procedures of performing the state 
and minor deviations in the state’s ability to control urban change could be 
considered as deviations from the norm. However, as stated in Chapter 1, 
planning violations in Bangalore do not in any way represent a minor deviation; 
instead, the sheer scale of their abundance calls for a re-conceptualized 
understanding of their relationship with planning, urban governance, state and 
society.   
 
In this chapter I argued that explaining violations based on informality, 
implementation failure and corruption are primarily conceptualized using ideas 
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 A detailed description of this planning system forms the bulk of Chapter 4.   
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that the state is the single most powerful planner, policy is made in the 
legislature, implementation and enforcement are administrative practices that 
follow policy in a stage wise linearity, and assumptions about the seamless 
operation of a top-down bureaucracy. I proposed that due to such assumptions, 
violations come to be conceptualized as deviations from a norm, an example of 
which is the plan or planning law.  
 
Instead, conceptualizing governance as a result of the interaction between 
actors across the social sphere in various forms of associational relations, I 
argued that the sites of violations in Bangalore should be understood as the 
outcome of the land-use planning practice rather than its deviation. For this 
purpose, I reviewed in this chapter a wide range of literature that proposes to 
move beyond the monolithic conceptualization of the state towards 
understanding governance at the spaces of interaction of the state and the 
society and policy and planning practice beyond just decision-making 
connecting to outcomes. Further, by conceptualizing governance processes and 
practices in particular places as vernacular governance, I proposed that 
violations shall be examined as a geographic site to understand the politics of 
planning in Bangalore.  More specifically, I proposed to examine how the 
different networks that inhabit the sphere of land-use planning practice in 
Bangalore influence the specific outcomes that are connected to violations.   
 
The categorisation of public and private interest networks based on the nature 
of the outcome is being proposed for analysis resonating with the public 
interest criteria of planning. I proposed that violations can be understood as a 
function of how planning power operates across these networks. Thus this 
dissertation will empirically answer the research question posed at the 
beginning of this chapter through an analysis of how various actors from within 
and outside government who form the planning networks in Bangalore 
produce, sustain and contest the geography of violations.  In the next chapter, I 
will elaborate the research design and methodology.   
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the conceptual and theoretical directions 
within which violations in Bangalore will be analyzed in this dissertation. It was 
proposed that violations will be understood as the outcome of a planning 
practice operating within the culture of governance where the boundary 
between the state and society is blurred and characterized by various forms of 
governance networks.   
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the details of the research design, including the 
process of ethnographic fieldwork and analysis. After a brief discussion in the 
following section about how the research questions informed the research 
process, the rest of this chapter will be structured using specific methodological 
concerns. Firstly, in the section titled Motivation, situated-ness, reflexivity and 
insider-outsider status, I will elaborate the significance of my identity as a native 
planner in the selection of the research problem, the geography of this research 
and its conceptualization. Secondly, I will discuss the process through which the 
conceptual and theoretical framework developed and how that enabled the 
identification of specific cases for analysis. This section will further elaborate 
how the field work process influenced the conceptualization of the research 
problem; in particular, how violations and planning as intricately 
interconnected practices. Thirdly, I will discuss the techniques adopted and the 
problems encountered during the identification, access, collection and the 
analysis of the data. This is followed by a section on research ethics where I will 
elaborate on the specific ethical issues pertaining to this research and the ways 
in which this dissertation deals with the problem of confidentiality and privacy 
of the interviewees.  
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3.2 Research question and research process 
The main research question, as stated in the previous chapter is:  
Why and how are land-use violations in non-poor neighbourhoods of 
Bangalore produced, sustained and contested despite the presence of the 
elaborate mechanisms for planning, implementation and enforcement? 
 
Unpacking this question methodologically involved mainly three tasks: 
1. Identification of an appropriate neighbourhood where there are specific 
researchable cases; 
2. Examination of how and under what conditions violations are produced, 
sustained and contested; 
3. Examining the way violations are connected to planning practice.   
 
Gaining an insight into the practices of planning and violations involved 
identifying the various actors involved in the process and the exact kinds of 
practices adopted. Hence, this research process had to be a detailed case-based 
ethnography of planning and violation. The main research question was broken 
down for different sets of actors. This involved identifying particular sites of 
violations within the neighbourhood as well as different policy and planning 
contexts within which the problem of violations could be examined. The diverse 
practices involved required varied forms of data collection methods. So, after 
locating these specific sites and projects, the following three questions were 
examined: 
 
1.  What are the various forms of land-use violations in the selected non-poor 
neighbourhood of Bangalore?  
2.  What are the various mechanisms used to control land-use change and how 
do they operate?  
3.  How are these violations produced, sustained and contested? Who are the 
various actors and what are the processes involved? How do they operate and 
what is their rationale? 
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This research process did not follow the linearity of a hypothetico-deductive 
model: it did not proceed with a theoretical hypothesis, a representative case 
study and a search for analytical fitness (Flyvbjerg 2001, 2006; Gerring 2004; 
Mukhija 2010; Ragin and Becker 1993; Small 2009).I started with the field of 
Bangalore and the problem of violations in non-poor neighbourhoods of 
Bangalore; this then extended to the theoretical problems of planning and 
governance in India, which directed the identification of specific cases for 
detailed examination and analysis. The problem-based ethnography enabled 
both the identification of conceptual directions and appropriate cases. So, the 
conceptual approaches in this research developed as a result of constant 
interaction between the realities encountered during the ethnography in the 
field, the tacit and intuitive reflexivity of the researcher and critical engagement 
with various theoretical approaches in planning, public policy and governance. 
 
This had its effects both on the structure of the research process (i.e. on the time 
spent to collect data in the field) and on the ways the theoretical framework 
developed. This impact could be seen in the form of adopting a split fieldwork 
method, where I spent two phases in the field separated by a long period of 
analysis at the research desk searching for specific conceptual framing. In the 
case of theory, this impact was reflected in both how concepts emerged in the 
field and how these concepts were developed further at the research desk. 
Thus, the time spent in the field as well as at the research desk has contributed 
to both the development of theoretical approaches and case selection. 
 
My field research started with a two-week reconnaissance visit conducted in 
December 2007, during which I examined the relevance and the significance of 
the problem of violations in Bangalore. Later, I spent fourteen months in the 
field, staying in one of the complex revenue layout/urban villages in Bangalore 
named Sultanpalya, located not far from important government offices. These 
fourteen months were divided into two phases. The first lasted for six months 
from February 2009 to July 2009. During this phase, I looked at the broad 
canvass of violations and the planning process.  After the first phase, I spent 
about six months conducting desk research at the LSE from August 2009 to 
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January 2010 examining and analyzing the data, identifying conceptual and 
theoretical questions raised by the data as well as identifying specific projects 
and cases on which to focus during the second phase. The second phase lasted 
for eight months from January 2010 to September 2010. During this phase, I 
spent most of my time focusing on the specific cases, the practices of planning, 
violations and neighbourhood activism based on the case study sites.  
 
Land-use violation is a confluence of complex interactions between a wide set of 
actors working with legal, illegal and extra-legal methods engaging constantly 
with the planning system.  Hence, tracking the operation of this complex 
network required me to be very open and eclectic in designing my data 
collection method.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, more than seven institutions in 
one way or another engage in land-use planning activities in Bangalore. Extra 
government bodies, semi-government organizations, intermediaries, NGOs, 
community organizations and many individuals engage in various ways with 
planning, violations and illegalities. Hence, data for this research was acquired 
from a variety of sources: policy documents; the plan-making process; the 
implementation and enforcement process; court cases and judgments; 
practices; perceptions; impressions of planners and activists; contested politics; 
conflicts and resolution of particular projects; and problems and details of 
community activism.     
 
A wide range of techniques were used to collect the data. This included semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, open-ended interviews and 
document analysis. Altogether 120 people were approached for interview, out 
of which 108 people took part in a detailed one-to-one meeting. Interviewees 
comprised thirty local neighbourhood activists and ten non-activist residents in 
the wider Koramangala neighbourhood, eight prominent NGO activists, 
nineteen planners, eleven planning consultants, 21 bureaucrats and public 
officials, seven prominent politicians, nine academics and researchers, seven 
real estate agents, consultants and property developers, four senior 
government advisors, six judges and senior lawyers, and two journalists. In 
addition to these meetings, I also had the opportunity to talk to a number of 
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people in various neighbourhood meetings, activist collectives, academic 
seminars and official and friendly gatherings. For the specific case study 
projects, I had discussions with individuals as well as groups. A number of these 
discussions were conducted through multiple meetings at various occasions 
spread over the 14 months.  Many people whom I interviewed have more than 
one role; for example, as a bureaucrat and a resident, or as an activist and a 
resident. Sometimes my interviewees invited their friends and colleagues to 
join us during the meetings, and this provided me with a wider perspective as 
well as multiple examples. One local activist, two NGO representatives and four 
public officials declined to meet me after reading and listening to the broad 
outline of the topic that I wanted to discuss with them. A detailed list of 
interviewees without their identities is included in Appendix 1.   
 
In the following section I will discuss the significance of being a native 
researcher in the field. I pay particular attention to my identity as an Indian 
who had participated in many complex political processes for about twenty 
years before this research process began and as an urban designer and planner 
who had worked in various projects in different parts of the country. 39 
 
3.3 Motivations, situated-ness, reflexivity and insider-outsider 
status 
Even though this research began with the problem of violations and Bangalore, 
it can also be said that it began with the subject of politics in land-use planning.    
As a planner who was trained and had worked in India for more than a decade, I 
had witnessed the institutional framework, practice protocols, instruments and 
procedures of the planning system in general as well as its everyday practices in 
many parts of the country. During my work, I encountered an everyday practice 
of planning similar to what Flyvbjerg (1998, 2002, 2006) had observed in 
Denmark. Flyvbjerg (2006) notes that in the boardroom of the planners of 
Aalborg in Denmark, he discovered that one could not find the ideal 
representative democratic theory in practice; instead, planning involved the 
                                                     
39
 I was a student political activist in Kerala between 1988 and 1996 and had also worked as a 
consultant for Urban Design and Planning projects from 1997. 
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negotiation of many illicit deals.40  This was very different from the various 
normative and idealised theories of the planning system in which I was trained.  
As a member of the planner community, these deviations were understood as 
rules of the game. There was not anything strange; it was usually understood as 
the difference between academy and practice. Many a project’s processes – e.g. 
on eco-tourism, heritage conservation, urban poverty alleviation, area planning 
– witnessed many random turns that baffled me, the naïve public interest-
oriented practitioner that I was.  The usual line of consolation to which we 
resorted was that these were ‘implementation failures’. Such implementation 
failures were all around us in the form of broken sidewalks, clogged and 
overflowing drains, reclaimed wetlands, un-built roads, underdeveloped parks 
and playgrounds and abandoned or collapsed public housing, deteriorating 
heritage stock and so on. As planning consultants, many of us reminded 
ourselves that our job was to advise decision makers on plans and policies. 
Implementation and enforcement was a matter of political will and 
administrative efficiency and planners were not expected to do much about it.  
However, complex turns in direction on projects and the many repeated 
experiences of implementation failures made me reflect on these everyday 
realities, to move beyond naïve representations and appreciate the politics in 
planning.  One of the main questions that I found myself asking was: what is 
planning used for?  That is, who uses planning in what way and for what purpose?  
 
The planning enterprise in India, like most planning regimes, consists of various 
planning instruments developed and implemented through the state’s political, 
legal and administrative bureaucracies. However, this planning system seldom 
functioned in any structured manner. In India, the practice of planning is 
frequently connected with transfers and postings, a nice-looking media item 
with a photo shoot, imminent elections, land speculation, political patronage, 
                                                     
40
 He notes “here I found a highly undemocratic, semi-institutionalized way of making decisions, 
where leaders of the business community and of the city government had formed a secret council, 
which effectively replaced the democratically elected city council as the place where important 
decisions on urban politics and planning were made.  My colleagues in the third world nations, who 
appear to hold fewer illusions about markets and democracy than academies in the first world, get a 
good laugh when I tell my Aalborg stories.  They see that after all, we in the north are not so different; 
we are the third world too” (Flvybjerg, 2006, p.228). 
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contradictory policies, etc. I constantly found myself asking: how should one 
account for the way planning is practiced? 41 This research is therefore 
influenced by this situated-ness and my experiences of the various ways in 
which everyday politics operate through the practice of planning in India.   
 
Hence, rather than a neutral observer making universal claims, this research 
process, from the beginning recognized the strength of this situated-ness as a 
resourceful intervention in producing knowledge about planning and violations 
in India. Even though many argue that displacement is central in the process of 
ethnography and that the idea of a native ethnography is oxymoronic, there are 
others who argue that insider-ness can be effectively deployed to enable the 
production of a situated knowledge through a reflexive engagement (Bunzl 
2004; Bourdieu 2003; Haraway 1988; Rose 1997). Instead of moving away from 
this subjective position or entirely view the world from it, I took the position 
that a reflexive examination of violations would enable a contextually relevant 
explanation. While the researcher should be open to counter-intuitiveness, 
remain truthful to the data and develop some generalizing propositions, the 
tacit understanding embedded in the researcher is an important resource that 
can contribute immensely to, rather than impede, the production of locally 
relevant knowledge.  
 
But what is the nature of this situated-ness? The debate on the insider-outsider 
status has come a long way from the understanding of insider and outsider as 
two exclusive domains to an understanding that, all of us are simultaneous 
insiders and outsiders in any arena of examination. Rose (1997), while 
recognizing the importance of situating knowledge, also argues that there can 
be varied forms of situated-ness according to the multiple identities that all of 
us possess as social beings and as researchers; accordingly the reflexivity can 
occur in diverse ways. Similarly, Woodward (2008) asserts that knowledge is in 
fact generated out of an interrogation of situated-ness, i.e. one’s insider-outsider 
status, rather than simply acknowledging situated-ness or identifying oneself as 
                                                     
41 When I say “planning”, I mean the planning system, the planning idea and the planning process.  
Planners, politicians and bureaucrats through their practice interact with the system, with sets of ideas 
and with processes and make plans, policies and planning laws, and implement and enforce them. 
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an insider; so it is argued that insider-ness is neither achieved nor ascribed, but 
rather it is a process of an on-going evaluation (Labaree 2002; Taylor 2011).  
Various forms of insider-ness can occur due to the researcher’s biographical 
profile, political activities, research agendas and the relationship with the 
community of study. However, a research process demands moving in and out 
of the positional boundaries to enable a reflexive examination. It is in the 
interrogation of these positionalities that epistemological directions develop 
(Labaree 2002). I contend that it is from a situated, yet reflexive examination of 
the empirical problems in the field that new epistemologies will emerge from 
the new geographies of the South.  
 
Therefore, to me, the field - Bangalore - was simultaneously familiar and 
strange. As a planner I was quite familiar with the planning system, the 
institutional framework and practice protocols and procedures generally in 
operation in India along with the negotiations in everyday politics. However, I 
was quite unfamiliar with the particular modalities of how exactly various 
social and political actors engaged with planning in Bangalore, even though I 
had the experience of witnessing it in other parts of India.42  I wanted to study a 
region where my preoccupations and insider knowledge of how politics 
operated would have minimum influence. So I chose Bangalore because I had 
neither studied Bangalore formally nor lived there. Furthermore, being a South 
Indian, Bangalore was an approachable landscape in terms of language, culture 
and codes of communication compared to other large cities further north. I 
could speak three of the five main languages used in Bangalore.  So a reflexive 
deployment of my familiarity enabled me to access the right people, as well as 
to ask new questions. These included questions about the experience of the 
master planners during the current Master Planning process, the ways in which 
the regularization bill and land ownership could be connected to violations, the 
specific ways in which neighbourhood collectives operate and so on. This 
enabled me to move beyond a typical planner’s conceptualization of violation as 
implementation failure and lack of political will and the discourses of 
corruption. 
                                                     
42
 In Ahmedabad in the state of Gujarat and across the state of Kerala  
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Further, Bangalore has been a focus for geography for contemporary urban and 
development scholarship from a variety of perspectives. Many scholars have 
written about Bangalore, examining its role as a node within the new age 
informational economy networks in India: the role of state in science, 
technology and industrial policy; conditions of labour; transformations in urban 
geography and architecture; and accumulation of global capital (Hietzman 
1999a, 1999b, 2004; Nair 2005; Parthasarathy 2000; Searle 2010; Sotarauta 
and Srinivas 2006; Stallmeyer 2011; Upadhya et al 2009). Nair (2005) and 
Srinivas (2001), for example, have written about Bangalore’s imagined and real 
transformations and the impacts of these on the internal socio-political and 
cultural landscapes. A number of scholars have also recently examined the 
many forms of elite and corporate involvement in the governance arena as well 
as the many forms of middle class and neighbourhood activism (Ghosh 2005, 
2006a, 2006b; Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2009; Harris 2005, 2007). Goldman 
(2010) examines the emergent land politics, accumulation of speculative capital 
and how this influences the urban geography. Bangalore, along with Delhi, had 
been an important site where the ideas on occupancy urbanism and how the 
urban poor and street vendors construct their livelihoods by deploying their 
local political networks (Benjamin 2000; 2007, 2008) were developed. Others 
have written about the impact of current transformations on various resources 
and public commons such as trees, lakes and water (Dittirich 2007; D’Souza and 
Nagendra 2006, 2011; Ranganathan et al 2009). 
 
A critical examination of planning practice is a conspicuous absence in much of 
this scholarship. It is not that these scholars have not touched upon planning; 
they have indeed, but within the context of their main object of examination, i.e. 
street vendors, land speculation, development of the informational economy, 
gender and the environment. How planning practice can be understood in 
relation to its own violation is seldom examined.43   
 
                                                     
43 Nair [2005] is an exception where she portrays planning as negating various terrains of forces when 
discussing the relationship between the map, the territory, the state and illegalities.    
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Further, the rapid transformations that the city was then going through also 
made Bangalore a relevant site for the empirical research on planning practice. 
The city was experiencing a surge in the accumulation of capital, rapid changes 
in the urban geography, population and economic growth, and high levels of 
neighbourhood, urban poor, elite, middle class and corporate activism. These 
shifts are integrally connected with the practice of planning due to the 
pressures on land, infrastructure provision and services, behavioural control 
and institutional culture of administration. Moreover, Bangalore has an 
institutionalized planning system, planning laws, planning instruments, 
procedures and protocols and professionally trained planning practitioners, 
which together can be seen as broadly representative of the planning system in 
most parts of India, especially in the large cities.  
 
In the following section I will discuss how conceptual directions used in this 
dissertation emerged during the research process while examining violations. 
 
3.4 From problem-based ethnography to theory and cases 
 
3.4.1 The problem  
Planning violations are familiar phenomena for most practicing architects and 
planners in India.  Clients often demand designs that are higher than the 
permissible floor area ratio and sometimes beyond the permissible boundary 
offsets. However, I encountered violations as a potential research problem to 
examine politics in the planning practice during a conversation with an NGO 
activist in Bangalore whose work aims to improve accountability, fiscal 
responsibility and institutional capacity of the state and planning. This occurred 
during the reconnaissance fieldwork in Bangalore I conducted within a couple 
of months after starting my PhD.   
 
During this initial visit, I interviewed a number of government planners and 
NGO activists. The above-mentioned activist asserted that violations are a result 
of the weak capacity of the planning department in Bangalore; i.e. their inability 
to make plans that can be implemented and enforced. In contrast, a number of 
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government planners I interviewed argued that there was enough capacity in 
the government to make appropriate plans and that the plans they made were 
scientific. Violations, they argued, were the result of the lack of political will to 
implement and enforce the plan and the lack of a general awareness among the 
people of Bangalore along with increasing greed in society.44  Moreover, they 
argued that the IT-led growth in Bangalore after the mid-1990s took everyone, 
particularly the planning system, by surprise. Neighbourhoods like 
Koramangala and Indiranagar in the southeast of the city45 where Information 
Technology companies operated initially were en-route to the large Information 
Technology parks. These neighbourhoods unsurprisingly became not only the 
centre of the land-use and building violation controversy but also sites of local 
resistance. The 2005-06 new draft Master Plan for Bangalore proposed to relax 
the rigid land-use classifications. It proposed a range of new instruments such 
as mixed land use and mutation corridors, which implied a fundamental shift in 
the strategy of land-use distribution in the city. Along with this in 2006, the 
government initially proposed the regularization scheme to legalize many land-
use and building violations. 46  
 
While the policy, planning, and administrative ensemble in Bangalore proposed 
fundamental transformations to the land-use regimes, many resident collectives 
emerged in various parts of the city to challenge these transformations, 
particularly in relatively wealthy and planned neighbourhoods such as 
Koramangala and Indiranagar. Through my discussions with various public 
officials and NGO activists during my first reconnaissance field visit I came to 
know that a neighbourhood residents’ collective in Koramangala, named 
Koramangala Initiative (KI), were challenging illegal land-use changes in their 
neighbourhood. A larger collective named the Citizens Action Forum (CAF), 
comprising of the various Residents Welfare Associations (RWA) and other 
                                                     
44
 A large number of variables are usually perceived as being associated with violations: greed, 
political will, an inappropriate plan, corruption of local engineers and higher-level planners and 
administrators, regulating the use of private property as an unfeasible idea, general awareness of the 
public, political interference during enforcement, higher land values, unexpected and rapid growth, 
direct political and administrative corruption and so on. 
45
 Map 5. P171; Map 6 p172 
46
 More detailed discussion in Chapter 5 
92 
 
organizations was challenging both the regularization drive and the new Master 
Plan. I became convinced that land-use violations as a site for the simultaneous 
denial and restoration of planning and the rule of law was an ideal site to 
examine land-use planning politics in Bangalore. Violations were the site of 
planning and deviation simultaneously, of illegality, of regularization and mixed 
use, of resistance and social movements. Higher levels of violations and the 
robust residence activism against violations convinced me to begin examining 
the problem using cases from Koramangala that also happens to be a wealthier 
neighbourhood. In the following section I will discuss how the specific 
characteristics of the site of violations that I identified contributed to the 
conceptual framing within a notion of culture of governance.  
 
3.4.2  Discovering culture of governance and emergence of conceptual 
directions  
Debates around the role of theory in ethnography has divided ethnographic 
method into mainly two camps: as Wacquant puts it “from theory to fiction, 
from explanatory and interpretation to observer concept and native percept”, 
(Wacquant 2003, p.4, 5). Theory-informed ethnography on the one hand posits 
that ethnographic sites are to be used to reveal the macro structures and 
processes by moving outwards from the field. Theory-generating or even 
theory-negating ethnography, on the other hand, aims to develop locally 
specific thick descriptions about the micro context of the field. So, Wacquant 
takes the position that there is no such thing as ethnography that is not guided 
by theory (Wacquant 2002). Similarly, critiquing the thick description of the 
specific locale and the narcissist reflexivity of auto-ethnography, Bourdieu 
(2003) calls for a reflexivity based on the objectivation of the subject of 
objectivation, wherein the generation of knowledge from the field interacts with 
both the personal identity and location of the researcher in the intellectual field 
(Bourdieu 2003; Wacquant 2002, 2003). These authors both question the 
possibility of a totally grounded approach to theory construction, isolated thick 
descriptions and the traditions of auto-ethnography. Timmer and Tavery, 
however, contrast theory-driven ethnography with Grounded Theory (GT) 
approaches. They argue that “field workers in Grounded Theory approach take 
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their theoretical clues from the ethnos - the lived experience of a people as 
bounded by various structures and processes” (emphasis original). Referencing 
the GT approach to epistemology, they believe “theories grounded in 
substantive areas could lead to formal theories of social life” (Tavory and 
Timmermans 2009, p.245).   
 
Instead of taking such extreme positions, many others call for a mutually 
constituting role where theory and ethnography sharpen and ground each other 
(Snow et al 2003, Anderson 2009). Michael Burawoy (1991, 1998, 2000) for 
instance, proposes an extended case method for what he calls a global 
ethnography.  He asserts that the local cannot be studied as local places, but 
only as places of interconnectedness in which the researcher moves “from 
specific small observations in their ethnographic field towards outside to wider 
problems and larger structures within which the subject is contained or 
constrained in their practices” (Burawoy 2000, p.5). Likewise, many authors 
have proposed to move beyond the idea of a bounded field, towards the notion 
of a field that is interconnected and shifting (Appadurai 1997; Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997). Gupta and Ferguson posit that “the field is not just a parochial 
local place, but a place [that] has its connected links and networks with the 
outer world and its interests. A field is thus a meeting point” (ibid, p.39). They 
believe that an ethnographer, during fieldwork should not only engage in direct 
observations, but also work with government documents and various other 
forms of material that could illuminate the field.  They argue:  
“The political task [of an anthropologist] not as sharing knowledge with 
those who lack it, but forging links between different knowledge that are 
possible from different locations and tracing lines of possible alliance 
and common purpose between them.  In the sense we view research area 
less as a field for the collection of data than as a site for strategic 
intervention.” (ibid, p.39) 
 
I contend that whether theory is discovered (from the field), extended (from 
one substantive field to another) or refined (tested or reformed) in 
ethnography, theory and ethnography can mutually inform each other while 
connecting local places to wider geographies and epistemologies. Given the 
current debates and interest to move beyond the western hegemonic paradigms 
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and trajectories of theory that dominate the current research culture in urban 
studies, planning and human geography, I was keen to explore the possibility of 
a contextually relevant approach to the research question that could make 
sense of the conditions of urban living in the South (Robinson 2006; Roy 2009). 
To that end, I adopted the approach of working in the field with theoretical 
sensitivity rather than using any particular theoretical frame or hypothesis that 
would inform my fieldwork and direct data collection. Before I went to the field, 
I sensitized myself to the main theoretical approaches to urban politics, urban 
planning and violations in India and elsewhere. Before the first phase of the 
fieldwork, my research proposal identified the importance of locating the 
problem within the implementation and policy process instead of just decision-
making. I examined the elitist, middle class, pluralist and regime approaches to 
studying urban politics and planning as well as the subaltern and post-
developmental approaches prevalent in the debates on Indian urban studies 
discussed above. Nevertheless, I stayed away from adopting any one of these 
particular approaches as my theoretical framework for analysis and hoped to 
develop conceptual directions by giving emphasis to the empirical material that 
I would come across in the field.   
 
As a consequence, the research process during the first phase was very open-
ended and explored the problem of violations from a variety of practice 
perspectives. Activities included in-depth interviews, informal conversations 
and participant observation along with witnessing the various ways in which 
urban life in Bangalore unfolded in front of me. I call this mapping the terrain of 
the problem, moving outwards from yet remaining connected to the problem.  
Bangalore appeared to me as a city where violating the rule of law was part of 
everyday life and everyday governance. I witnessed many bribe exchanges in 
public spaces as well as specific tactics to circumvent rules in the process of 
governance. Reports of murder on the streets appeared in the newspapers 
frequently. There were many instances when people were killed in random 
ways in the city: a wayside tree falling onto moving vehicles or residents being 
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sucked into storm water drains during a monsoon. 47 In one particular case, an 
eight-year-old boy drowned in the floods after a couple of hours of rain. It took 
administrators several weeks to find the body and led to the resignation of the 
BBMP commissioner.48  In another instance when I was on my way to drop a 
friend home in an auto rickshaw, I saw a huge tree that had fallen across the 
road crushing an auto rickshaw underneath and killing its driver.   
 
I observed that many pavements in Bangalore were not usable: many were 
filled with spill-over from adjacent construction sites; dug up and left open; 
riddled with broken slabs exposing the huge crater of the drain below; planted 
with tropical rain forest variety trees with huge buttresses; paved, grassed and 
planted over by the nearby properties; used by motorbikes at the traffic signals; 
or used as parking space. Crossing the road on foot is very dangerous. One has 
to move through a sea of vehicles that do not stop at the zebra crossing. Once, 
when I asked a traffic police officer to help me cross the road at a zebra 
crossing, I was told to cross when a gap appears because he said he did not 
want to cause a traffic jam.   
 
I stayed in a neighbourhood that was a revenue layout 49 and frequently moved 
through many corridors in the city where garbage filled the street edges and 
cows, dogs and humans scavenged the garbage. Whenever I travelled along 
these streets on a motorbike during the night, I used to carry a long stick with 
me to scare the pack of street dogs that used to invariably attack the bike.50 The 
public realm in Bangalore represented the state of governance in the city: 
fragmented, careless, and casual and in perpetual crisis.    
                                                     
47
 See for example “School boy washed away in Vrishabavati Canal” 14 May , The Hindu newspaper, 
available from www.hindu.com.    
48
 After he handed in his papers, the commissioner claimed in an interview that he was removed not 
because of this issue, but because he did not agree to the planning violation conducted by the relative 
of an important public official in Bangalore. The ex-commissioner repeated this in an interview given 
to me as well.  
49
 A revenue layout is an illegal conversion of farm or village lands into housing. Detailed discussions 
appear in Chapter 5. 
50
 Dogs chasing motor vehicles and pedestrians are common during the night in many parts of 
Bangalore.  One of my friends told me that he got so furious one day with these dogs that he carried 
an iron rod and battered a couple of them one night. The gory details he narrated reminded me of the 
aggressive relationship between animals, people and the city that Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu 
conveys in some of his movies. 
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Many senior public officials I met during my fieldwork sat in the middle of huge 
pile of files. I was told by at least three important senior administrators in the 
city that they have to examine anything from 100 to 300 files a day in addition 
to attending meetings with ministers, the general public, people with special 
referrals and subordinates. I frequently waited for hours to meet a planner or 
an official who sometimes never turned up, or sometimes spoke with me while 
simultaneously signing paperwork, giving orders to officials or talking with 
others. Conversations with a number of senior and junior planners and officials 
were filled with narratives of the problems they faced with their own 
administrations, political colleagues and government, which they said stopped 
them from performing their roles. Many of them sounded as though they felt 
helpless in the face of pressures from political and administrative colleagues.  
 
Bangalore came to appear to me as the geography of different forms of 
violations; in other words, different forms of social governance that followed 
very unique responses to different situations. I became aware of the usefulness 
of the term “jugaad”, which has become fashionable in some of the academic 
literature (Chattaraj 2012; Roy 2009; Tully 2012, 2013). 51 Jugaad refers to 
appropriateness or appropriation, an adjusted solution, making one’s way 
through the complexities one faces. It refers to conjuring up a unique solution 
for a unique situation. During a conversation, one of my friends was agitated 
that many academics working on urban studies in India seem to support the 
idea of the jugaad state. 52 A general dissatisfaction with the culture of 
governance was visible across the social sphere. For example, Praja.in, a social 
media platform blog where a number of people in Bangalore write, reflect, 
critique and argue about the complex problems of governance and living in 
Bangalore introduces itself in the following way:   
“Yathaa Raja thathaa Praja’, so we read in certain ancient texts.  
Times have changed. In these modern democratic days, ‘Yathaa 
Praja tatha Rajaa' is more like it. Raja only reflects Praja. The so 
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 Jugaad refers to make do- appropriation (of things or actions) to suit specific circumstance   
52
 Sudhir Krishnaswamy is an academic and a practicing lawyer based in Bangalore. Also see 
(Chattaraj 2012) 
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called politicians and everyone else we blame no end only mirror 
our society and us” (www.Praja.in, emphasis original) 53 
These words reveal the perception among a large group of people that social 
attitudes are reflected in the culture of governance.  My local paanwalla 54 
during one of our conversations told me that increasing greed is making 
Bangalore very unsafe, inhospitable and a cruel city. In fact many officials, 
activists and politicians argued that increasing greed in society is the cause of 
violations, corruption, lack of safety and the deteriorating quality of life in 
Bangalore. So, I became increasingly aware that planning could not be studied 
separately from the political and administrative and social perceptions about 
the culture of governance. Numerous such experiences convinced me to examine 
violations as a site to examine the culture of planning. It was during this phase 
that the skeletal idea of violations as planning in vernacular governance 
emerged, and this was further developed by engaging with the anthropology of 
the everyday state, the relational state and governance literature.   
  
The six-month process of reflection at the LSE after the first phase of the 
fieldwork was used to analyze the data collected and to identify specific themes 
that emerged. This period was also used to identify new literature that 
resonated with the themes that emerged out of the data; in particular, literature 
on the state as embedded in society. Moreover, specific cases were identified for 
examination in detail for the second phase of the fieldwork. The precise ways in 
which the planning and governance process operated, was subverted and 
restored were identified around these specific cases. It is in this context that the 
notions of private and public interest networks and planning power emerged as 
analytical categories. This split fieldwork method enabled breadth and depth at 
the same time, while also providing me with the opportunity to develop 
context-sensitive conceptual approaches to the research question.   
 
                                                     
53
 Means ‘as the king so the people’; A proverb that is said to appear in Kautilya’s Nitishastra-  A 
treatise on justice written around 300 BC. It says:  
“yathA bhUmis_thathA toyaM, yathA bljaM tathA’nkuraH  
yathA deshas_tathA bhAshA, yathA raja tathA prajA” 
(Translation:  “As the land so the (ground) water, as the seed so the sprout,  
as the region(country) so the language, as the king so the people”)  
http://blog.practicalsanskrit.com/2010/01/like-father-like-son-yatha-raja-tatha.html 
54
 Local shop owner 
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3.4.3 Identification of specific cases for study 
As discussed before, illegality, informality and irregularity in Indian cities have 
been framed in many different ways in academic scholarship. To remind 
ourselves again: Roy (2009) developed the ideas of state of exemption and neo-
liberalism; Benjamin (2007, 2008) developed occupancy urbanism; Holston 
(2008) argued for an understanding of insurgent citizenship; Pritchet (2009) 
developed ideas of a flailing state; Kohli ( 1990) ascribed this to the weak state; 
Chattejee (2004) argued that it is political society in operation; Gupta (1995) 
suggests that it shows blurred boundaries; Ghetner (2011) used this to theorize 
rule by aesthetics; and many others developed ideas about bourgeois 
environmentalism and so on. Even though my research engaged with these 
different theoretical understandings of illegality, informality and irregularity as 
part of the fieldwork process, during the detailed examination of the various 
instances of violations in Bangalore, my framework in due course shifted from 
subversion of the state to public and private networks in planning and 
questions of planning power in the culture of governance. 
 
One of the key debates around the case study method is the possibility to 
generalize from a single case, i.e. ‘what is the research a case of?’ It is argued by 
many that single cases are limited in their ability to develop any generalization.  
Critiquing this approach and defending the value of small N case studies to 
generate theory, Flyvbjerg (2006) states: “Predictive theories and universals 
cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context dependent 
knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search for predictive 
theories and universals” (p.  224). Similarly, Mukhija (2010), while addressing 
this question proposes what he calls N of one plus some case study method. In 
this method he proposes the detailed examination of one case while also 
following up other similar cases, albeit in lesser depth. This, he argues, could 
give more grounding to the detailed case. As an example he discusses the 
experience of studying a slum rehabilitation programme in Mumbai. Due to lack 
of time and data access issues, he decided to study one case in detail and follow 
up the other three in lesser depth. In this process, he notes that his 
understanding of the main case improved considerably due to the wider 
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understanding provided by the secondary cases. For instance, he notes that 
through this method he learned how the willingness to pay bribes impacted a 
certain programme implementation.  
 
However, the idea of a bounded primary case itself is a limited notion because 
most cases contain multiplicity and case study researchers develop their cases, 
linking manifold instances that constitute the case (Gerring 2004; Mukhija 
2010). The instances and linkages that form a case are not always very simple 
because the categorization of a case can change and evolve as the study 
proceeds (Mukhija 2010; Gerring 2004; Ragin and Becker 1992). Ragin and 
Becker (ibid) posit that the “final realization of the case’s nature may be the 
most important part of the interaction between the ideas and evidence” (p.6). 
Hence they assert that the answer to the question “what is this research a case 
of” during the process of research is that “it depends” (p.6). Mukhija (2010) 
shows how his case changed from that of resistance to that of community 
leadership during the process of research.   
 
During field research, I came across numerous cases through close observations 
of neighbourhoods and neighbourhood activism. These cases enabled me to 
examine in depth the connection between planning and violations and many 
times to discover many unknown unknowns. These include how a project 
moves from legal to illegal to legal, or how the process of violating land-use 
regulations takes place. Some of these cases were already in the public domain 
and under litigation such as the transformation of Mestripalya Lake in 
Koramangala. 55  This case helped me to understand land encroachment, as well 
as how different ownership claims on land can be related to land-use violations 
and to public and private interest networks in governance. Similarly, the close 
study of the activism of a neighbourhood collective, the Koramangala Initiative, 
and their litigation against violations revealed to me how government actors 
divide and rule, and how social actors move from rule-of-law-based activism to 
outcome-based activism. Some cases were followed in finer detail and some in 
lesser detail. A number of specific cases - Mestripalya Lake, the politics around 
                                                     
55
Detailed discussion on this case appears in Chapter 7  
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the Regularization Bill and the Masterplan 2015 process 56  - were particular 
instances of land-use violations and neighbourhood and community activism, 
and examples of planning practice narratives were connected with each other 
during the analysis and development of arguments presented in this 
dissertation. 
 
3.5 Data identification, access, collection and analysis 
The varied practices of policy, planning, resistance and subversion around the 
problem of violation meant that the constituents of my research were spread 
across a number of institutional and organizational settings in the social sphere: 
inside the government, neighbourhoods, and community and civil society 
organizations. A number of NGOs are involved in supporting various activities 
of the government while a number of others question it. Many community 
collectives and neighbourhood associations critically position themselves 
against the violations in their neighbourhoods via legal and/or informal means. 
Many formal and informal collectives work as right-to-information activists and 
as policy and planning lobbyists. The process, which I had to adopt, can be 
called ethnography of planning and violation networks. Compared to studies of 
decision-making, or even of the policy process and implementation, 
ethnography of this widely networked process demanded specific methods for 
data collection appropriate to the constituents. So instead of a conventional 
institutional ethnography where the researcher can locate him/herself within 
the setting of an organization such as a government body or a geographic 
setting such as a neighbourhood, this research had to adopt an ethnography of 
planning networks, violation networks and resistance networks that 
intersected at specific projects and practices. As Shore et al (2005) note for 
anthropologies of public policy, it is important to incorporate “the full real 
process and relations in the production of policy: from policy makers and their 
strategic initiatives to the locals who invariably shape and mediate policy while 
translating and implementing it into action” (p.34). Therefore they argue, “in an 
ultimate sense society itself is policy making” (p.15), and so,  
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 Discussed in chapter 5 and 6 
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“Studying policy requires rethinking an anthropological pillar- the 
discipline’s traditional concept of the field- as a single and (relatively) 
geographically bounded place [drawing from Gupta and Fergusson 
1997]. Today, the field often consists of loosely connected actors with 
varying degrees of institutional leverage located in multiple sites that are 
not always even geographically fixed” (p.35).  
 
The constituents of this kind of method were distributed across the city, and 
even across the globe. My research could have taken me to Manila, Paris and 
Ljubljana for interviews; however the research budget limited the scope in this 
instance. 57 
 
The specific cases identified were centred on land and land-use conflicts and 
claims, policy problems, decision-making process and litigation. These specific 
geographic cases identified were mostly in Koramangala and they helped me to 
focus the enquiry and examine how various actors, policy and administrative 
practices are related to these problems. Specific cases also helped me to 
discover many unknowns, which are frequently the fruits of such ethnography. 
In other words, from exploring the problem of violation, this research identified 
its constituents and how they are involved with the problem.   
 
I identified and met almost all of the members approached for this research in 
four ways: 1. snowball referencing; 2. conferences and workshop; 3. hanging 
around in government offices; 4. friends’ networks, community and activist 
group gatherings and being a member of email groups. As with all reference-
based snowballing, the nature of the conversation also depended on the 
reference or the green card. 58  It was important as part of the research method 
to embed myself in the context in order to achieve a thoroughly grounded 
understanding of the research question and to meet a wide range of people. I 
found myself doing a small piece of research on the plight of lakes in 
                                                     
57
 Many actors who were closely involved with planning in Bangalore have since relocated to these 
cities for various reasons. In fact I had one phone conversation with a person in Manila.  
58
 One real estate agent used this word to imply that I have access to his classified information, 
because he was a good friend of a good friend who came with me to the meeting.  He said that I 
walked in with a ‘green card’ and that he would be happy to share with me the information of many 
secret practices from his trade.  
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Bangalore59 in parallel and taking part in master classes with academics, giving 
papers in planning-related seminars and conferences, attending climate change 
workshops and conferences, participating in a communal harmony discussion 
forum, attending a seminar on World Habitat Day and Institute of Urban 
Designers meeting and visiting art exhibitions. It was in this wide range of 
forums, where I met many people with whom I later followed up to arrange 
meetings. This motley group included real estate developers, former ministers, 
officials, planners, civil society activists and residents. 
 
For example, during the first phase of my fieldwork I met a neighbourhood 
activist at a friend’s art exhibition.  After meeting with me later at her house for 
a detailed conversation about my research, she introduced me to the 
Koramangala Initiative (KI) network. In fact, my first phase of fieldwork in 
Bangalore started with this lead. The KI network members deliberated a long 
time before they decided to invite me to a community-led cleaning of a 
neighbourhood lake in Koramangala where I had the opportunity to participate 
in the event and meet a number of other group members. 60 This was later 
followed by individual and small group interviews at their homes or at various 
coffee places. Later I attended their gatherings where I sat in a corner listening 
and recording the events in my notebook. I had the opportunity to attend a 
number of KI meetings on a range of issues including the Mestripalya Lake 
restoration and the critical evaluation of the Master Plan. I was invited to join 
their email group named Save Koramangala, where I could access and examine 
all the past emails and various posted documents. This enabled me to 
understand how the organization operated and the various debates and 
concerns among its members. I continue to be a member and keep educating 
myself on the various issues and debates. I have similarly been invited to be 
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 The research was carried out with Rohan D Souza and Vidya Udayan with the aim of presenting at 
a conference in Cambridge University on natural resource management.  Two interviews used in this 
dissertation came from this research process.  Written permission from fellow researchers is taken to 
use those interviews for the purpose of this dissertation.   
60
 Agara Lake: I was a constant presence during the field work period on a number of their events 
simultaneously participating, taking and observing the process, group dynamics and talking about 
various issues.  
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part of the email groups of many an activist collectives and NGO groups after 
having attended their gatherings at various times. 
 
Many activist collectives were careful before letting me into their gatherings 
and discussions. This was also because Bangalore was becoming a hub for so-
called western researchers. Many researchers came and went without letting 
the activists know what they finally wrote about Bangalore and their practice. 
They felt that nothing had been returned to them or to the city by these 
researchers.  Such selfish acts, as one activist collective put it during our 
conversation, had been annoying and a discouraging factor for many activists - 
who were motivated by the idea of public interest - to engage with researchers. 
The political commitment and belief in public interest keeps the activists going 
in the dangerous spaces of activism in Bangalore. Almost all of them later 
opened up to me and even shared a number of documents after I assured them 
that my research outputs would be made available to them and that I would use 
the data with the utmost responsibility. 
 
I was not only interested in the particular questions of my research, but also in 
many of their activities. Therefore, I used to hang out with them during their 
various meetings. For instance, I attended a couple of right-to-information 
appeal hearings with them at the office of the Karnataka Chief Information 
Commissioner. There, I witnessed the many processes involved in local 
activism, the role of the many informal networks that they had cultivated with 
government officials, the process of negotiation and argumentation, their 
astuteness in identifying various forms of corruption and the significance of 
their activities and various collaborations.61 Along with participating, I also 
used to think aloud with them about some of the issues. This process needed 
patience and time; the data accessed through such ethnographic means are rich 
in detail and usually impervious to a research process that relies on a limited 
number of formal structured or semi-structured interviews.   
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 An appeal hearing occurs when the right-to information applicant is denied information by the 
government organization to which the RTI application was made.   
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Similarly in another instance, the initial conversation I had with the residents 
and activists of Mestripalya Village were like the ready-made stories that 
journalists usually get from conflict areas, where the activists emphasize their 
claims. However, after I was introduced again to the villagers by someone they 
respected, the nature of conversations changed fundamentally and this enabled 
me to see much deeper into the issue as well as to hang out and talk to people 
from a wide range of backgrounds. Conflict areas could be very impervious to a 
researcher without sufficient references in the Indian context. During the late 
1990s, I was questioned by the police on two different occasions, while 
conducting research on environmental conflicts and building violations. These 
experiences have taught me that many forms of geographical information are 
socially guarded and accessible only through associational access. In other 
words, it can be seen that only associational access opens up associated 
information about social geographies.   
 
This was not only the case with activists and residents, but also with the public 
officials. Even though I had obtained permission and support letters from the 
heads of the respective departments before I interviewed public officials and 
requested documents, it was the familiarity and the friendly space that had 
enabled me to access some of the most important data on the planning and 
public administration practices. On many occasions, I met them first at a 
conference, workshop and public meetings or approached them through 
references from friends before obtaining a detailed one-to-one discussion in 
their offices. 
 
However, given the nature of the research topic, access issues continued to 
appear time and again with officials.  In one instance, even after presenting all 
the documents and letters of support for my research from various officials, a 
senior officer with whom I requested an interview told me that their 
department had decided not to let foreign researchers study the lakes in 
Bangalore, because: 62  
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 I was perceived as a foreign researcher by some, and as native by others, which had a differential 
impact on access and the nature of data obtained.     
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“You guys will come here, do your research and tell us what we 
already know. You will tell us that our lakes are encroached, and 
they are in a bad shape. What is the point in you telling me things 
that I already know? Further you will write about our lakes and 
create a bad image for Bangalore around the world” (Interview 
with a Very Senior Civil Servant, GoK, June 2010, Appendix 1, 
no.107). 
 
Similarly another officer told me that I might bring into bad repute the whole of 
the city’s administration by writing about planning, because “we don’t follow 
even our own Master Plans” (Interview with a Very Senior Bureaucrat and 
Administrator, BDA, Bangalore, June 2010, Appendix 1, no.113). This concern 
about potential bad image or reputation of Bangalore outside India was one of 
the obstacles that I faced during the research, especially with many public 
officials.   
 
However, by hanging around in the offices, issuing repeated requests and 
demonstrating that even senior politicians were talking to me, I got access to 
quite a few of the initially reticent public officials. However, some refused to 
meet me on many occasions or avoided me after giving me an appointment. In 
one example, I was unsuccessful in obtaining a meeting with an ex-
commissioner of the Bangalore Development Authority even after many 
attempts during the fourteen months of fieldwork.  “Come tomorrow,” “come 
after a week or two,” or “come back later" were the usual initial responses I 
used to get from many government officials whenever I walked in without a 
proper reference (even though I should note here that quite a number of them 
adhered to the appointments they had given me, and even saw me during public 
hours without appointment). An excerpt from my field notes is provided below 
to exemplify one among the typical experiences of going to meet someone in the 
government without proper references. 
 
After repeated attempts to fix an appointment through phone and 
emails with the Mayor, Deputy Mayor and the Commissioner of 
the BBMP, today I went to the BBMP during ‘walk-in’ hours to see 
if I could meet them or their Private Secretaries in person. My 
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intention was twofold - to request a letter from the corporation 
permitting my research process and to request an interview.   
 
First, I walked into the Mayor’s Private Secretary’s (PS) office.  I 
asked the PS if I could get an appointment with the Mayor 
sometime. I was told that the Mayor was in the next room and 
that I could go in there and meet him.  Wow, I thought, if only I 
had come here earlier! 
 
I walked into a room that looked like a conference room with a 
big round table in the middle. I was asked by someone to take a 
seat among the row close to the wall along with many others who 
were sitting there. I thought this is such a friendly, democratic 
and welcoming office where meeting a politician won’t be a 
daunting experience for ordinary people.   
 
The Mayor was talking in Kannada, with some journalists, and 
many people were sitting around the table listening as well as 
conversing with him. From where I sat, he was inaudible. I 
quickly realized that it was press briefing that was being video 
recorded. The atmosphere was very ordinary and friendly, and 
very different from a typical senior civil servants office where it is 
usually silent, formal, and tense.   
 
Once the press briefing was over, he sat there talking to people 
who waited there like me. I walked up to see if I could get a 
chance to see the Mayor and request an appointment. As I walked 
towards the Mayor moving slowly along a queue that had formed 
by then, a person in a blue shirt asked me what is it that I wanted 
to talk to the Mayor about. I explained my research to him and 
said that I would like to ask for an appointment with the Mayor as 
well as request permission to interview members of the council, 
and that his PS had asked me to talk to the Mayor about it 
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directly.    
 
He told me that I should go and meet the Commissioner and that 
the Commissioner is the man responsible for the Corporation 
officials. I realized the mistake of using the word officials. The 
councilors probably aren’t considered as officials, I thought.  I 
repeated again that I wanted to get permission to seek interviews 
from the councilors and others in BBMP.   
 
The man in the blue shirt said that the Mayor was very busy, and 
that I could not meet him. When I insisted, he said, “Okay, let’s 
see”. After the press briefing and after a brief chat with a couple 
of people, some of which seemed to be private conversations, the 
Mayor stood up and started walking. This surprised me because I 
thought he would sit there and meet people including me. He 
started walking towards me where the door was. I approached 
the Mayor. The man in the blue shirt introduced me to the Mayor 
and the Mayor shook hands with me.   
 
The blue shirt man told the Mayor that I was a research student 
and I was seeking some information and that probably I should 
visit the commissioner. This irritated me. However, I managed to 
speak but it came out in English. The Mayor looked a bit 
confused. The blue shirt man translated what I said into Kannada. 
I tried to show the Mayor the letters from my LSE Department 
and from the Principal Secretary of Urban Development in 
Karnataka. While I was doing that, the Mayor without looking at 
my letters, started to walk past me. To my astonishment, without 
saying anything to me, he walked past into the anteroom where 
the other Private Secretary was sitting, and then again into 
another room further inside.   
 
My fascination with the democratic space and friendly 
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atmosphere was over in a few minutes.    
 
Later, I realized the blue shirt man is the real PS. I went up to him 
and told him that I’d like to get an appointment with the Mayor 
for an interview and that I could give a brief of my research and 
questions and that I need his help for that. He said that Mayor 
was busy that day, and too busy the following day with the 
council meetings. I was told the best thing would be to go back 
after two days, on a Thursday.   
 
After a couple of such Thursdays and Tuesdays, when I would go 
there, wait outside, and see the Mayor walk past me or never turn 
up, I decided to let go of my dreams of meeting the Mayor and 
inform him of this wonderful research on planning in Bangalore 
for which I had hoped to interview him.   
 
Later that same day,  
 
I walked into the Deputy Mayor’s office where I thought I should 
try. I had a letter to the Deputy Mayor ready with me. I went 
there and met a person who was wearing a white shirt. He asked 
me why I wanted to meet the Deputy Mayor. I told him the story 
again and showed my letters. I thought since the Deputy Mayor is 
a very young person and is an engineering graduate he might 
know the value of what I am doing and that I might be able to talk 
to him.   
 
I was told that the Deputy Mayor was too busy in meetings that 
day. But the man in white shirt looked at my letter and took me 
into a cabin that was also a large meeting room that had no one 
inside.  I guessed the Deputy Mayor might be inside his chamber 
adjacent to the anteroom. Ah! The man in the white shirt looked 
at my letters and my LSE ID card and asked me to explain what I 
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was after.  Someone came in and brought tea. I wasn’t sure if it 
was for me so I didn’t touch it. I patiently explained my research, 
where I came from, and that I would like to request for 
permission to do research from the Deputy Mayor and also 
arrange an interview appointment. He repeated that the Deputy 
Mayor was too busy. I said I would be in Bangalore for a couple of 
months and that I could come down on any appointment date.  
 
This man looked very closely at all my letters, read through it 
carefully, and also looked at the introduction letter from the LSE 
Geography Department. He spotted that the introduction letter 
was dated December 2009. I told him that this was made for the 
first phase of my fieldwork when there was neither a council nor 
Mayors to meet. He asked for my permanent address and the 
details of where I stayed. He said he would like to check with his 
officers if I was genuine because, he said, “a lot of things are 
happening”.   
 
I had not had any idea what he meant but I said, “Of course, I can 
understand”, and gave him all my details. He asked me to call him 
the following day, and gave me a card and wrote his number on 
that. He took my letter and I thanked him. Someone gave me a 
note pad in which I was asked to write my house address. I wrote 
that down and left the place to meet the commissioner.    
 
After taking a very short break to update my field notes,  
 
The same day, I walked into the Commissioner’s Private 
Secretary’s room to see if I could arrange something at least 
there.  I introduced myself and told all my stories again. I was 
asked to leave my letter with him and contact him two days later. 
These ‘two days later’ became more than a couple of weeks one 
after another and by that time the commissioner had changed, 
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and a new person had taken charge. However finally, when I met 
the new commissioner after a couple of weeks of waiting, he had 
put me in touch personally with a senior officer who helped me 
immensely during my research process.    
 
After a number of ‘Wednesday evenings’, ‘Thursday three o 
clocks’, ‘Monday mornings’ and so on, finally one day I got to 
meet the Deputy Mayor for a very quick chat which lasted no 
more than 3 minutes. This was after I became a usual face in the 
corridors of the Mayor’s Office, when the man in the white shirt 
would recognize me and started saying “hello”. He also started to 
offer me some Badam milk63 to drink.  Finally, one day he 
managed to get me a very brief meeting with the Deputy Mayor. 
 
When I walked into the Deputy Mayor’s Office, he was sitting at 
the head of his long table. He asked me in quite terse terms – “ok 
tell me”. I told him about my research very quickly and wanted to 
take an appointment for interview. He agreed, but he said it 
would take some time, and asked me to come again the following 
week. I said thanks and left. This following week really didn’t 
work for months together. However the repeated hanging around 
worked well and finally I got a good half an hour interview with 
the Deputy Mayor before I completed my fieldwork.   
 
Dismayed… how things worked- one has to pass through a lot of 
filters before meeting someone in power or office through the 
proper channel. These private secretaries and men in white and 
blue shirts seem to be enjoying that filtering process. Any place 
you go to meet someone without a reference from someone they 
care about or someone of high importance, it is more likely that 
you will be asked to come or call them again in a couple of days or 
weeks’ time. 
                                                     
63
 Almond milk 
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In Bangalore, public officials were always transferred between different posts 
after a very short time, sometimes even within weeks or months of their 
appointment. Quite a number of times I came across a different person in an 
official post, so that I had to follow-up with the previous official who by then 
would be in a different role or even a different department. Notwithstanding the 
many experiences of the kind I narrated above, a number of public officials were 
very supportive and shared many documents and sensitive stories of their 
practice with me. This was achieved through establishing very close contact and 
participating in a variety of other activities including workshops and seminars.   
 
Being a planner who has worked in both India and the United Kingdom has 
helped me to reflect comparatively on the different planning systems and 
practices during some conversations. For instance, I was invited by the planning 
department to present to them how the British planning system worked in 
practice during a small meeting convened at the Chief Town Planners Office to 
think about the future of master planning in Bangalore. On another occasion, 
discussions generated during the public presentation of the Bangalore Regional 
Plan enabled me to meet subsequently with some very senior officials.   
 
During the many hours that I had to wait or hang around offices to meet some 
official, I came across and spoke to a number of others waiting there like me and 
these conversations also provided a number of insights about the practices of 
people and government. 
 
As means of engagement, I used a mix of formal and open-ended interviews, 
formal and informal conversations and participant observation. A wide range of 
actors and spaces of data collection meant that my approach had to be 
improvised and changed continuously. The data set used in this research is 
comprised of opinions, descriptions of facts, narratives of practices and a 
history of cases, documents and reports. Upon completion of the fieldwork, I 
had 57 recorded interviews and more than 100 accounts in ethnographic notes, 
which included transcriptions of unrecorded interviews and conversations as 
112 
 
well as reflection and description of my own experiences. Policy documents, 
government reports, court case papers and various documents were obtained 
through Right to Information requests and other formal as well as informal 
means. Sometimes conversations involved interrogation and entering into 
debates if the conversation space permitted in order to reveal the deep 
ideological positions and opinion of the person with whom I spoke. For 
example, during a conversation on corruption, an activist got agitated when I 
interrogated him on whether he had ever paid a bribe. Through this 
interrogation it was revealed that the socially privileged position that this 
activist occupied enabled him to get through without paying a bribe. 
 
Land is an instrument for laundering and hiding money in Bangalore, as well as 
a domain of history, identity and belonging. Together, these have made land-use 
planning a matter of power and control and contest. A wide variety of actors are 
hence deeply interested in gaining access to the means of control to protect 
their interests. A number of stories are very politically sensitive and potentially 
damaging to the people who shared them with me. So an assurance of secrecy 
was a minimum condition for many to talk to me. How people violate planning 
regulations was only the tip of the iceberg: the networks of practice, which 
included the practice of local engineers and higher-level officials, the 
government policies that promote illegalities, the courts’ interpretations and 
judgments and local community activism constitute what I call the field of this 
research. 
 
Fieldwork on illegalities, violations and vernacular governance has been a very 
tough process, with many access and data-use issues. I have been warned more 
than once by some activists and at least one official to keep away from some 
specific projects because, in the words of the activist, “you could find yourself 
dead on the street” (Interview with a Lead Activist and Local Resident: 
Koramangala Initiative, Koramangala, Appendix 1, no.1). At least on two 
occasions I informed my family and friends about the specific details and 
location of my meeting for safety reasons. I had to meet and interview people 
against whom there were repeated allegations and sometimes even legal 
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processes underway. Many had openly spoken to me about the details of bribe 
exchanges, including the amount and going rates and the identities of those 
involved. There were instances when an interviewee exposed to me their 
specific stakes in particular illegal projects. A lot of this information had to be 
triangulated by other sources before being considered factual to use in this 
dissertation.    
 
Bangalore is also a terrain of political conflicts. I had conversations with many 
people who were very critical of each other’s worldviews and perspectives on 
public policy. I witnessed people making allegations against each other in public 
meetings. The email groups that I studied closely often had very sharp debates 
and mutual critiques. So maintaining an open mind and willingness to listen to a 
wide range of opinions and positions as well as keeping the information to 
myself, and maintaining a fresh approach while talking to people were 
important requirements. Only through such a method could the social and 
political processes influencing planning and policy be studied using a relational 
framework in a complex democracy such as the one I encountered in Bangalore.   
 
Bangalore is a cosmopolitan city with a population that speaks Tamil, English, 
Kannada, Hindi, Telugu and Malayalam. Most people were conversant in more 
than one language and this helped me to choose between languages during 
conversations. However, I am conversant in only four of these languages, so a 
paid research assistant named Manjunath helped me with two interviews in 
Kannada. 64 The help was in the form of translating each of my questions and 
the informant’s response during the conversation. Manjunath was also given the 
task of obtaining some maps and documents from the government offices by 
filling in the right-to-information forms. In one instance, after I obtained the 
required clearances and inspected the file, he helped me to copy details from 
the land-use change record folder at the Bangalore Development Authority. 
Many of these tasks required repeated visits to government offices and waiting 
until the right person was available. Most government offices in Bangalore have 
                                                     
64
 Mr Manjunath is a trained sociologist and has helped a number of researchers during fieldwork in 
Bangalore 
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daily visitors hours from 15:00 to 17:00, so chasing applications and documents 
with my assistant’s help saved me some time in order to attend meetings. 
Moreover my assistant’s tacit understanding of the local caste and class politics 
in Bangalore had also helped me to gain specific insights into many land related 
conflicts. For example, when he was copying the list of land-use change 
applications and their statuses at the Bangalore Development Authority, he 
informed me that many a celebrity and elite names had had their applications 
approved within a very short time compared to other applicants. 
 
Analysis of the data, as mentioned above, was an iterative process.  Conceptual 
approaches were developed by analytically engaging with the field material, 
which in turn identified the appropriate case studies for data collection and 
were subsequently refined at the research desk by engaging with theory. Given 
that the material that emerged from the fieldwork included opinions, factual 
statements, histories, documents, court case papers, laws and acts, methods and 
strategies, logic and rationalities of practice, practice narratives and so on, 
different material had to be approached differently. Moreover, insider 
information cannot be easily verified unless other material supports it. For 
example, the allegations of corruption about a particular actor or the precise 
nature of a practice of implementation or a historic occurrence that could not be 
verified through documents were approached with a high level of caution 
before being used analytically as evidence. Among such material only items that 
appeared frequently and in more than two places have been presented as 
evidence in this dissertation; those that appear as casual remarks have been 
omitted from the direct body of evidence. Similarly, only those specific practices 
that fit in with general practices have been relied upon during the analysis; 
these include, for example, specific practices of violating land-use regulations 
that subvert the procedures in a court of law, or the process of change of land 
use of a particular parcel of land in the Master Plan. Specific cases enabled me to 
recognize known unknowns as well as unknown unknowns such as how exactly 
an enforcement action is aborted or how precisely various groups support or 
oppose violations, or how exactly the networking for public or private interest 
outcomes is forged.  
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Given that my research process required me to look deeper into many complex 
practices in public governance, planning and social activism and since not all of 
these activities were entirely legal, ethical or official, the question of ethics 
cropped up time and again during the research process as well as during the 
writing of this dissertation. In the following section I will discuss these ethical 
issues, dilemmas and stance taken during the research and writing of this 
dissertation.  
 
3.6 Research ethics 
The key questions on ethics revolve around confidentiality, privacy and consent, 
along with ethical implications of the methods used for accessing data (Baarts 
2009; Baez 2002; Nilan 2002; Wiles 2006). For example, can one use the data 
that is obtained without the knowledge of the informant or can one pay the 
informers for information? These questions were very relevant in the case of 
this research. In my fieldwork, I decided not to pay money to my informants. 
There were a couple of occasions where I could have obtained much finer detail 
of local land politics if I were willing to pay and some of my informants 
demanded this explicitly. I decided to forego such details.   
 
The very nature of participant observation requires the researcher to be in the 
field and every moment of that engagement means conducting fieldwork. All the 
observations that emerged out of that process are part of the data set used in 
this dissertation. The various conversations that I listened to at the group 
meetings, government offices, restaurants and cafes and one-to-one meetings 
have been incorporated into my field notes and some of which has found its way 
into this dissertation. However, extra caution has been taken to ensure 
confidentiality and privacy.    
 
I took the position that researching the practices of government should be done 
only after informing the authorities concerned and obtaining the necessary 
permission. I personally requested permission from the Principal Secretary of 
Urban Development in Bangalore (under whom all the departments connected 
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with planning and urban development functioned), the Principal Secretary of 
Environment and Forests, the Commissioners of the BDA and the BBMP and the 
Police Commissioner.   
 
My research question required me to examine and understand many practices 
that are not entirely ethical or legal. These included allegations of corruption 
and narratives about illegality. A large number of people shared with me 
opinions, inside stories of practice, stories of corruption, remarks about their 
colleagues, practices of government, allowed me into their meetings and 
enabled access to their email groups and so on, all of which needed a minimum 
assurance of anonymity. Therefore, my interviews were recorded using a digital 
recorder only with the permission of the interviewee and the recorder was 
never concealed. I always reminded my interviewees that they could ask me to 
switch off the recorder whenever they wanted during the conversations; many 
asked me to do so. Quite a number of people asked me not to record the 
discussion so I took down notes that were transcribed into longer essays about 
the conversation later. In many cases I did not even request a recording and 
instead took notes that were elaborated into a fuller body of the conversation 
later. 
 
Every constituent of this research was informed of the research project before I 
requested interviews or entered into a detailed conversation. My identity as a 
researcher was made clear to all interviewees and to all group meetings that I 
attended. However, the dataset in this research also include notes from 
occasions when I was as a silent observer.    
 
In order to reduce ethical and access problems, all of the specific cases I have 
chosen to examine in detail are ones that have been or were already in the 
public domain, that is, in the media and/or before a court of law.  Since a 
number of conversations around the specific problems as well as practices of 
government, land markets, politics in master planning, implementation and 
neighbourhood activism required anonymity, direct quotes using real names 
have been avoided entirely. Many public officials asked me to keep the 
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conversation to myself and never to quote them. For instance, one senior officer 
finished our long conversation with these words: “you haven’t come here.  I 
haven’t met you.  We don’t know each other”. Similarly, another senior public 
official told me not to use the data from the conversation in any way that would 
jeopardize the various public interest activities in which s/he was involved. 
Many officials, activists and consultants have shared a lot of factual details and 
inside stories from the practices of planning, administration and activism in 
Bangalore that were to be used responsibly and not expose them to dangerous 
controversies.   
 
Therefore, a lot of the conversations presented in this dissertation are 
paraphrased in my own words, or quoted using pseudonyms. Gender, age and 
position have been changed wherever required to do so while referring to 
specific interviews. Data from the field have been used in this dissertation with 
utmost respect to the complex activism in which many in Bangalore are 
involved. 
 
Being a native researcher, the exotic voyeurism present in a lot of 
ethnographies that represent the other has been clearly avoided unless it was 
important to make an argument. Similarly, details of place names and events 
have been masked whenever required to do so. The list of interviews and 
meetings in Appendix 1 contains only the professional position or general 
identity of the individuals involved. This research and the dissertation writing 
have been undertaken with a clear position that the purpose of this work is to 
answer the research question and not to produce a piece of investigative 
journalism.   
 
3.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I discussed how this research process was designed in order to 
answer the research question. This research process studied how various actors 
and processes are involved in the production, sustenance and contestation of 
violations through the process of plan making, implementation and 
enforcement. Koramangala, as a relatively wealthy neighbourhood located in 
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southeast Bangalore was selected as the geographic field of study in order to 
move beyond the dominant trend of producing knowledge by studying the 
urban poor as a social group. A wide range of violations in Koramangala by a 
variety of actors and their contestation by local citizen collectives made this a 
suitable case study location. Within Koramangala, I identified specific projects 
and neighbourhood activism for detailed analysis.  However as a field, I moved 
beyond Koramangala in order to interconnect the locality with its wider 
geography. Further, along with the practice of production and contest of 
violations, planning policy and the planning process were also identified as the 
field to understand the various ways in which these are sustained. This enabled 
the extension of the problem of violations as an instance of how planning 
practice in Bangalore operate within the culture of governance in Bangalore. 
Such ethnography of planning and violation networks examined not only 
specific instances of violations but also neighbourhood activism, planning policy 
and planning process around the problem of violations. My prior knowledge of 
the planning system and public administration practice in India helped me 
immensely in order to comprehend in a short time the complicated planning 
system and practice in Bangalore.   
 
Data in this research is derived from 108 one to-one interviews, a number of 
group meetings and discussions, participant observation, document analysis, 
verbal/written accounts of planning policy and practice, court case documents 
and judgments and right-to-information documents obtained from the 
government and from activists. A wide range of techniques were used to collect 
data, from participant observations and semi-structured interviews and 
conversations to document analysis. A broad variety of people were 
interviewed, including planners, planning consultants, bureaucrats, local 
activists, local residents, NGO activists, journalists, advocates, lawyers, 
politicians and administrators. My informants shared with me vital and 
sensitive information from their practice, most of which is used in this 
dissertation without revealing anyone’s identity, thereby adhering to the 
chosen research ethics framework. Entirely legitimate means have been used 
while collecting the data, even though this research was mostly about illegal 
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practices and all interviewees were briefed about the research project prior to 
the interview. I accessed interviewees using a range of techniques that included 
snowball referencing and integrating into planning, activist and academic 
networks in the field.   
 
In the following chapter, I outline the architecture of the planning system in 
Bangalore, including the planning act, procedures and protocols and the 
institutional architecture. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, I will present the actual 
practice of this institutional architecture when examined from the perspective 
of violations.  
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Chapter 4 
The process architecture of land-use control in Bangalore 
 
4.1 Introduction. The land-use planning system or the planning apparatus 
of command and control in Bangalore 
Officials as well as the general public frequently told me during my fieldwork 
that there is no planning in Bangalore. Further, many argued that the rapid 
growth triggered by the success of the IT industry took the already weak 
planning system by surprise. Umpteen violations, the precarious state of the 
public realm, sky rocketing land values, traffic problems, rapidly dwindling 
ecological resources, frequent flooding and so on were frequently ascribed to 
the lack of planning. However, a close examination of the planning system and 
process in Bangalore proves the contrary i.e. there is an elaborate planning 
apparatus in Bangalore to control the land use change. Therefore, engaging with 
this paradox, I sought to explain, 
 
‘Why and how are land-use violations in non-poor neighbourhoods of Bangalore 
produced, sustained and contested despite the presence of the elaborate 
mechanisms for planning, implementation and enforcement?  
 
Firstly this task involves presenting an appropriate description of the planning 
process that controls the land use change. This task is important in the 
structure of this dissertation to demonstrate my main argument that violations 
are the outcome of the planning practice rather than its deviation. The aim of 
this chapter therefore is to outline the mechanisms that currently exist in 
Bangalore for regulating, implementing and enforcing the land use change. In 
particular, I shall map the specific process architecture that enables the control 
of land use. 65 This will contextualize the discussion about the interactions 
                                                     
65
 Refer to Appendix 2 for a very brief discussion of the evolution of urban planning and governance 
institutions in Bangalore along with the city’s trajectory of growth and transformation from a village 
hamlet through feudal, monarchical, colonial phases and post-independent phases to a significant 
economic node in the global geographies of current knowledge economy.   
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between violations and planning practice that follows in the subsequent 
chapters.  
How do we appropriately describe the planning system in a way that moves 
beyond an isolated understanding of the Plan, the Policy, its administration or 
the decision making process? As discussed in Chapter 2, a conventional analysis 
that considers the state as a monolithic actor able to govern society assumes 
that a policy taken at the top translates down to implementation through the 
structures and process of administration. To move beyond such an approach 
and to enable an empirical analysis of the politics in planning practice, I propose 
to map the wide range of activities, institutional actors and procedures that 
actually form the planning system. Even though modern Town Planning is 
widely understood as an arm of the modern nation state (Yiftahel 1998, 2002), I 
argue that it is in identifying its specific process architecture that we can get 
closer to the understanding of how the normative expectation and the rationale 
are institutionalized and operationalized through the practice of everyday 
governance. Even though land use change is a visible outcome on the urban 
geography, its control as a state practice is enabled through the interconnected 
web of official and legal processes; i.e. through the administration of 
interactions of a wide range of actors, policies, laws and acts, procedures and 
processes, organization and instruments. I argue that documenting the chain of 
events that lead to the control of land use is the primary task to undertake while 
examining how land use change is controlled through the practice of planning in 
specific contexts. To map this specific interactive architecture of land use 
control, I draw from governmentality (Foucault 1986, 2000; Rose 1999) and the 
policy process approach (Lipsky 1980; Wildavsky 1973).  
 
Even though land-use planning systems may vary in their form based on the 
administrative and governance contexts; the ability to control the land-use 
change is fundamental to the possibility of a regulatory planning practice in 
private property owning democracies. Planning for public interest is dependent 
on the ability to control the private interests on land, and develop a framework 
that would contribute towards the collective interests. The possibility of such a 
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practice is dependent on the very possibility of the operation of a legitimate 
planning authority.   
 
A legitimate planning authority is constituted of planning rationality and 
administrative technologies of its governance operating through the democratic 
structures of the state. While plan-making establishes its rationale through 
prescribing acceptable and unacceptable land uses in the private and public 
land parcels in the city, implementation frameworks forms the processes that 
ensure compliance, and the enforcement frameworks ensure penalties for 
deviance. So, land-use planning processes work as a comprehensive instrument 
to control the urban geography as governmental technologies (Rose and Miller, 
1992). Thus, planning is not only just a rationale (or ideology) of a good city 
form, but also an integrated practice deeply embedded within the political, 
bureaucratic, administrative, legal and juridical process of social control. 
Making, implementing and enforcing land-use regulations together forms one 
type of practice that Foucault calls governmentality, and represents the 
technologies for the conduct of conduct (Foucault 2000; Rose 1999). 
Administering land-use plans through the bureaucratic machinery to control 
urban local geographies is dependent on a political rationale, technologies of 
implementation, a sophisticated surveillance mechanism and the penalization 
of deviance.   
 
Performance of norm-making using expert knowledge, implementation through 
procedures of administration, and enforcement through the means of 
surveillance supported by the juridical-legal mechanisms hence is fundamental 
to the establishment of a planning authority. It is through the smooth 
functioning of this apparatus that power is accrued and concentrated in the 
authority enabling it to govern. The rationale of controlling land-use changes for 
an ordered development is enabled through application of this legitimate 
authority bestowed upon the state through the democratic political process of 
elections and the administrative structures of the legislature, executive and 
judiciary.   
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While the zoning of land use depends on the technical and political rationale, 
the plan administration process is organization dependent (institutions and 
people with authority), documentation dependent (title deeds of property and 
so on), procedure dependent (the process of planning application), and 
surveillance dependent (to ensure deviations are identified and penalized). A 
wide range of institutions and organizations and actors are involved in this 
process. Standard procedures recorded in the practice manuals are followed. 
Regulatory planning is a bureaucratic practice with a specific rationale that is 
invoked to control land use change. 
 
The main argument that structures the narrative in this chapter is that through 
analyzing this process architecture, it is clear that the construction of a planning 
authority rests upon a wide range of actors in diverse organizational settings 
supported by numerous acts and laws to enable the procedures of preparation, 
implementation and enforcement of planning instrument and process. Outcome 
of planning practice will depend on what happens during the operation of this 
apparatus.  
 
The discussion is structured in three main sections: the first outlines the 
rationale, organizational structures and practitioners; the second examines the 
planning instrument and its prescriptions; and the third outlines the 
procedures and processes that convert this process architecture into a practice 
of everyday governance. The description of this architecture presented here will 
be a reference point for the rest of this dissertation wherein I analyze how this 
system is appropriated in everyday real governance through the lens of 
violations. Even though every attempt is made to summarize succinctly the 
main points that would successfully portray the elaborate process architecture 
of land use control, the sheer scale of the land use planning system 
(organizations, practitioners, process and procedures and laws) makes the 
discussion inevitably lengthy. 
 
4.2 Urban planning and the state in Karnataka: The Karnataka Town and 
Country Planning Act 1961.  
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Urban land-use planning in Bangalore operates within the larger framework of   
urban planning in Karnataka State that owes itself to the system of modern 
urban planning practice instituted in India after Independence in 1947. Urban 
Planning is a regional state subject based on the Indian Constitutional division 
of rights and responsibilities between the Centre and the States. In accordance 
with the Government of India’s second five-year plan (1956-1961), various 
regional state governments did legislate the Town and Country Planning Acts 
that gave them the authority and the statutory responsibility to intervene in the 
process of urbanization to bring about ordered growth. The Karnataka Town 
and Country Planning Act (KTCP Act) 1961 enabled and statutorily required the 
state government to declare urban areas and prepare Master Plans in order to 
direct and regulate urbanization within its jurisdiction. 
 
The act argues that spatial planning should precede economic planning to enable 
a happier and healthier living environment. Therefore the aim of the act is to 
“provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use and development and 
for the making and execution of Town Planning schemes (TP scheme) in the 
State” (Puliani 2009, p.7). It intends to: 
1) “To create conditions favorable for planning and re-planning of the urban 
and rural areas in the state of Karnataka, with a view to providing full 
civic and social amenities for the people in the state 
2) To stop uncontrolled development of land due to land speculation and 
profiteering in land 
3) To preserve and improve existing recreational facilities and other 
amenities contributing towards balanced use of land 
4) To direct the future growth of populated areas in the state, with a view to 
ensuring desirable standards of environmental health and hygiene, and 
creating facilities for the orderly growth of industry and commerce, 
thereby promoting general standards of living in the state” (Ibid). 
 
4.3 Organizational structure and practitioners 
The Act therefore enabled the state government with powers to set up the State 
Town Planning Board and appoint a Director of Town Planning as its head, to 
declare various Local Planning Areas inside Karnataka and to appoint Local 
Planning Authorities to prepare development plans for Local Planning Areas.  
The act proposes that to ensure that the developments are well coordinated, the 
Local Planning Authority shall prepare an existing land-use plan and a 
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development plan (Master Plan) for the entire area within its jurisdiction and a 
Detailed Town Planning Schemes to aid the implementation of the Master Plan 
(Puliani 2009). Further, the state government is required to appoint a Member 
Secretary as Chief Executive and the Chief Technical Officer of the Local Planning 
Authority. S/he is not only responsible for carrying out the obligations of the 
KTCP Act but also the budgetary, planning, enforcement and supervisory 
functions of the Planning Authority as well as to submit annual reports and 
audited accounts to the government. In the paragraphs below, I show that the 
organizations are extensively staffed and legally instituted, and are well-
structured in terms of operational responsibilities. 
 
4.3.1 The Bangalore Development Authority: - the Planning and Urban 
Development Authority 
Bangalore Development Authority is the Local Planning as well as a 
Development Authority for Bangalore.66 The experience of the Delhi Master 
Plan in the 1950s and the establishment of the Delhi Development Authority 
(DDA) as a planning authority as well as a plan implementation authority in the 
form of a monopoly public sector property developer deeply influenced the 
development of planning and urban development system in post independent 
India.67 Separate authorities that existed for the planning and the development 
of infrastructure, housing and industrial areas in Bangalore before the 
formation of the DDA were joined together in BDA based on the 1976 BDA Act. 
The Act states, 
“At the conference of the Ministers for Housing and Urban Development 
held at Delhi in November 1971, it was agreed that a common Authority 
for the development of metropolitan cities should be set up. Bangalore 
City with its population (as per last census) is a Metropolitan City. 
Different Authorities like the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation, 
the City Improvement Trust Board, the Karnataka Industrial Area 
Development Board, the Housing Board and the Bangalore City Planning 
Authority are exercising jurisdiction over the area. Some of the functions 
of these bodies like development, planning, etc., are overlapping creating 
                                                     
66
 The BDA was the first urban development authority to be set up in Karnataka much earlier than the 
Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, adopted in 1987, which enabled the establishment of 
planning and development authorities for other cities.   
67
The DDA was constituted in Delhi to implement the first Master Plan of post-independent India and 
was prepared by the Ford Foundation team in 1956.  
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thereby avoidable confusion, besides hampering co-coordinated 
development. It is, therefore, considered necessary to set up a single 
authority like the Delhi Development Authority for the city areas adjacent 
to it, which in course of time will become part of the City”  (Government 
of Karnataka 1975, added emphasis). 
 
The BDA is a public sector developer corporation, functioning as a real estate 
provider, while simultaneously acting as a planning authority as well as a 
service provider. Along with preparing the Master Plan for the functional urban 
region (which is 1,306 square kilometres greater than the BBMP area of 749 
square kilometres) the BDA also builds housing layouts, civic amenities, open 
spaces, parks, playgrounds and other forms of infrastructure on the land 
acquired using the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. Section 14 of the BDA Act 1976 
states, 
“The objects of the Authority shall be to promote and secure the 
development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and for that purpose 
the Authority shall have the power to [compulsorily] acquire, hold, 
manage and dispose of moveable and immoveable property, whether 
within or outside the area under its jurisdiction, to carry out building, 
engineering and other operations and generally to do all things 
necessary or expedient for the purposes of such development and for 
purposes incidental thereto” (Government of Karnataka 1975, p.122). 
 
The BDA is governed by a board appointed by the Government of Karnataka 
(GoK). It consists of a Chairman, Finance Member, Chief Engineer, Town 
Planning Member, the Commissioner of the BBMP, a member from the Urban 
Development Department of the GoK, two MLAs, representatives of the BWSSB, 
KEB, KSTRC, two BBMP councilors, and a couple of others representing 
different social groups. These board members normally hold office for three 
years. The BDA has many departments responsible for town planning, 
engineering, legal, finance, and land acquisition, accounts, forest, police and 
revenue.  
 
The GoK appoints a Commissioner as the CEO of BDA from among the pool of 
senior civil servants for a period of three years. Similarly, a Secretary appointed 
by the GoK manages the internal administration and a Town Planning Member 
(TPM) acts as its Member Secretary and as the head of its planning functions. In 
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addition to the TPM, in BDA there are currently two Deputy Directors of 
planning who manage different zones and five Assistant Directors of planning in 
the BDA main office.68   
  
According to the KTCP and BDA acts, the BDA is the Local Planning Authority 
for Bangalore. For example, section 61 of the BDA Act states that the BDA will 
be the LPA for Bangalore and Section 71 confers it the power to make building 
by-laws and urban design regulations as well as the powers to approve layouts 
and to regulate land and building use, quality of construction (from foundations 
to materials), structural stability, ventilation, etc.69 Similarly, Section 32 of the 
BDA Act vests the BDA with the power to regulate all private layouts to be 
formed within its jurisdiction to ensure that they comply with the KTCP Act. 
Therefore, the BDA prepares the Master Plan for the 1,306 square kilometers of 
the delineated functional urban area and also regulates all major developments 
and land-use change within this boundary.   
 
To implement the plan components, BDA also acts as an infrastructure and 
property developer. Therefore it has the powers to raise resources 
independently or through government funding.  It can compulsorily acquire 
land using the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (on behalf of the BBMP). It can buy 
land from the open market or enter into various forms of leasing with private 
actors. The BDA is entrusted to build infrastructure such as housing, roads, 
drainage and sewage networks, parks and open spaces, civic amenities and 
commercial centres. They also make housing layouts by subdividing acquired 
land and later auctioning/allotting them as housing plots to residents of the 
city. The BDA proclaims that since its formation it has formed 62 housing 
layouts (with each layout being hundreds of acres in area) and distributed more 
                                                     
68
 A senior planner during an interview mentioned that out of the eight planners only four are 
qualified planners and the rest were promoted to become planners. My interviewee mentioned that 
they had requested the hiring of a Joint Director, two more directors, a Deputy Director for Traffic, 
and one more Assistant Director of Planning. 
69
 Sections 81-B, C and D of the KTCP Act inserted in 1976 to appoint the BDA as the Local 
Planning Authority for Bangalore Metropolitan Area. 
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than 200,000 housing plots to residents in Bangalore.70 Being a public sector 
corporation operating with public funds, BDA housing plots are heavily 
subsidized and auctioned far below market rates. Hence these are in very high 
demand; the allocation process is politically very sensitive and is known to be 
affected by various forms of political patronage.71   
 
The exact extent of BDA developed area in Bangalore is not available. However, 
assuming an average plot size of 240 square meters72, and that 50% of each 
layout is used for housing plots73 (the rest for roads, civic amenities and parks 
and playgrounds), one can roughly estimate that about one hundred square 
kilometres (net) of Bangalore’s housing is developed by the BDA alone. 74 If we 
include the amount of land area developed by the precursors to the BDA (the 
CITB), 75 a very large proportion of Bangalore housing and built infrastructure 
have been developed by these public sector development authorities by 
acquiring land from farmers and distributing it to the working and middle 
classes at much subsidised rates.   
 
Every BDA housing layout is developed in accordance with urban design 
standards based on the neighbourhood unit, that became enshrined in the 
Indian planning system during the first two decades after independence 
through the involvement of a number of planning consultants from around the 
world (mainly the US and the UK) in key projects such as the Master Plans for 
Delhi, Calcutta, Bhubaneswar, Faridabad urban extension and the preparation 
of the planning standards by the Indian Town Planning Institute (ITPI) 
(Banerjee 1994; Sundaram 2010; Vidyarthi 2010). 
 
                                                     
70
 (Source- www.bdabangalore.org) Last accessed 10 September 2012.  During an interview with me, 
one of the senior planners from the government used the figure of 500,000 instead of 200,000, as 
declared in the BDA website.  
71
 Multiple conflicts, court cases and long delays caused by the land acquisition process made the 
BDA close to being broke in 1991 after which until 1999 they had not undertaken any housing 
development (source: multiple interviews). 
72
 BDA housing plots are mainly of three sizes: 30X40 feet, 60X40 feet, and 80X 150 feet. 
73 According to the KTCP and BDA acts 
74
 Accurate calculations are not available and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an accurate 
analysis. However, this shows that a large portion of Bangalore built infrastructure and habitation are 
publicly provided to middle and working class residents at a highly subsidized rate. 
75
 See Appendix 2 
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Section 16 of the BDA Act specifies that every layout should reserve 15% of land 
area for parks and playgrounds and 10% for civic amenities such as schools, 
hospitals and community centres. The Act even specifies the activities that can 
be construed as civic amenity. Excluding approximately 20% of the total area 
that would go for roads and drains, a typical BDA layout then has only 55% of 
the total developed land as housing plots. A fully developed BDA layout includes 
spaces for neighbourhood-level commercial and office spaces (called BDA 
complexes) close to main transport infrastructure or commercial nodes. Such 
standards-based neighbourhood planning is very strictly enshrined in the BDA 
Act. For example, Section 38-A of the Act states, “the authority shall not have the 
power to dispose of sites reserved for parks, playgrounds and other civic 
amenities for any other purposes” (GoK 1975, p.137). To enable 
implementation, the authority can transfer land earmarked for civic amenities 
or otherwise to a range of beneficiaries such as government agencies, co-
operative housing societies, charitable organizations and registered societies.  
Section 38-C further states that the authority has the power to re-convey 
(return) the lands acquired for development to the respective individuals or 
organizations from whom the land had been acquired on the grounds that if “it 
is not practicable to include such site for the purpose of the development 
scheme”, (GoK 1975, p.137) as long as it does not exceed the land ownership 
limit posed by the Urban Land Ceiling Act.76 
  
The BDA obtains land through compulsory legal acquisition, prepares a 
development scheme, gets it approved by the state government, builds the 
scheme and its supporting infrastructure, auctions/allocates it to the applicants 
(who are residents of the city), maintains the infrastructure and levies service 
charges and taxes for maintenance until all the public infrastructure within the 
limits of the BBMP is transferred to the ownership of the BBMP. It can be seen 
that the planning and development responsibilities are extensive, very specific 
and highly prescribed in the respective acts. Further, as a body appointed 
                                                     
76
 The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 imposed ceilings on the individual ownership 
of land based on a range of categories. This act was abolished in 1999.    
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entirely by the GoK, it is one the powerful arms of the Karnataka State 
Government.  
 
 
4.3.2 Local government: The BBMP 
While the BDA has the privilege of preparing the Master plan for Bangalore and 
implementing the infrastructure through direct provision, the implementation of 
the Plan by regulating private developments is shared by the BDA and the BBMP. 
The BBMP is the elected local government of Bangalore. The Karnataka 
Municipal Corporations Act (KMC Act) of 1976 enabled the establishment of the 
Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BMP, now the BBMP) with a Mayor, Deputy 
Mayor, Commissioner and the various standing committees to carry out their 
obligatory functions. BBMP councilors are elected for a term of five years. In the 
first meeting of a new council government, the councilors elect from among 
them a Mayor and a Deputy Mayor for a term of one year and this process is 
repeated every year.    
 
Even though BBMP is the elected local government in its own right, it is the 
prerogative of the Government of Karnataka to determine the area, population, 
number of wards and number of councilors that form the city and its elected 
government. The BBMP Corporation is not only constituted by the elected 
councilors but also those members nominated by the GoK, who are “persons 
with special knowledge and experience in municipal administration or matters 
relating to health, town planning or education and social work” (Puliani 2008, 
p.76). Furthermore, it also includes the members of the Karnataka State 
Legislative Assembly (MLA) whose constituencies lie within the city and the 
members of “the council of state and state legislative council who are registered 
electors within the city” (ibid).77  
 
Currently there are 18 standing committees in the BBMP: administration, health, 
accounts, forests, revenue, engineering, horticulture, education, legal affairs, 
                                                     
77
 Section 7 of the KMC Act 1976 (Puliani 2008, p.76) 
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welfare, JnNURM,78 estate, town planning, markets, land acquisition, 
advertisement, and animal husbandry.79  Each standing committee is made up of 
seven councilors elected at the first meeting after the BBMP general elections, 
and is chaired by one of its members. The KMC Act also provides for the 
formation of a ward committee consisting of the councilors of the respective 
wards and “not more than five people having the knowledge and experience in 
municipal administration, nominated by the government” (Puliani, 2008).80  
They could be members from the various NGOs or community organizations 
working in the city. The standing committees and the ward committees follow 
the term of the corporation council. In consultation with the Mayor, the GoK, 
appoints the Commissioner of the Corporation for a term of two years as a 
salaried employee of the Corporation. 81 He/she is not a member of the 
Corporation and can be removed from office if the council resolves to do so with 
two-thirds of the majority. 
 
Everyday governing of the city is vested with the Corporation through obligatory 
functions like health and sanitation, street lighting, trade regulation and 
licensing, management of crematoria, public schools, parks and playgrounds, 
regulation of slaughter houses, maintenance of ambulance services, vegetation, 
protection of the city from birds and animals, and monitoring of births and 
deaths. There are also discretionary functions like the establishment and 
maintenance of care homes and maternity wards, art galleries, affordable 
housing and shelters for the homeless, urban forestry, urban poverty alleviation, 
etc.82   
 
                                                     
78
 Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) is a Government of India-supported 
initiative started in 2005 to improve infrastructure in select cities and towns in India. 
79
 www.bbmp.gov.in last accessed 30 August 2012. 
80
 Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, section 13-A (Puliani, 2008) 
81
 Section 14, KMC Act, 1976 (Puliani, 2008). 
82
 Even though the KMC Act stipulates a range of discretionary and obligatory functions, the 
Corporation does not perform all of these functions because, In Bangalore there are para-statal 
organizations for sanitation, sewage disposal and the provision of parks and playgrounds.  Even 
though the 74th Amendment of the Indian Constitution proposed to greater autonomy to the urban 
local bodies as the third tier of self-governing democratic institutions, this amendment has not been 
fully implemented in Karnataka. 
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According to the KMC Act, the Mayor presides over every meeting of the 
Corporation and directs the Commissioner to implement its resolutions. The 
Commissioner is the head of all the administrative departments, such as those of 
health, revenue, engineering and town planning. The power to execute the daily 
functioning of the Corporation lies with the Commissioner; however he/she is 
obliged to inform and work in concert with the standing committees that 
manage specific sectors. For example, the Town Planning standing committee 
presides over matters of town planning.83 Even though the commissioner can 
attend the meetings of the corporation and the standing committees, s/he does 
not have the right to put forward any resolution or to vote. The Commissioner as 
a GoK appointee in the Corporation is responsible for submitting an annual 
report to the GoK on the functioning of the Corporation.  
 
All the senior administrative and technical officers of the Corporation, including 
the Deputy and Additional Commissioners, Engineer-in-Chief, Town Planning 
Director and so on are appointed by the GoK from its civil service and technical 
pools respectively. For example, many engineers working in the BBMP are 
posted for a short time from the Public Works Department (PWD), the town 
planners are posted from the Karnataka Town Planning Directorate and the 
revenue officer is deputed from the Department of Revenue. BBMP postings are 
usually a short sojourn in their career because they are frequently transferred 
from one location to another within Karnataka. Moreover, under the KMC Act, 
the GoK can overrule the decisions of the Corporation to ensure the 
implementation of the provisions of the act. For example, the GoK can even 
dissolve the Corporation and appoint an administrator, if the Corporation is 
found “not competent to perform or makes [any] default in the performance of 
any of the duties imposed on it under this act”. 84 The GoK sits above the 
Corporation as its big brother. In other words, the local government of Bangalore 
can be seen as constituted by the KMC Act as a subject of the Government of 
Karnataka.   
  
                                                     
83
 Section 61-A states that it “shall deal with all matters relating to town planning and improvement” 
(Puliani, 2008) 
84
 Section 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 of the KMC Act 1976 (Puliani 2008)   
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4.3.3. Other para-statal organizations  
Activities of many para-statal organizations are interconnected in the process of 
land use plan administration directly or indirectly. For example, the Bangalore 
Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) plans, manages and runs intra-city 
public transport routes, the Traffic Police administers the rules and directions 
of road traffic, and the Karnataka Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) plans, 
manages and runs various transport routes including the intra-state transport 
network, all of which has direct or indirect influence in the land-use changes in 
the City.  
 
A new metro railway was planned and developed in Bangalore by the Bangalore 
Metro Rail Corporation (BMRC). The Bangalore Metropolitan Transport 
Authority (BMLTA) was set up in 2008 to co-ordinate between various agencies 
and to develop a comprehensive transportation strategy. Similarly, the 
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB) plans, manages and 
provide water supply infrastructure and the Bangalore Electricity Supply 
Company (BESCOM) provides electricity for the city. For infrastructure, the 
Karnataka Slum Clearance Board (KSCB) provides affordable housing and 
services for slums, the Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) acquires land and plans 
and builds housing layouts similar to the BDA in different areas in the city. The 
Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority (BIAPA) now regulates 
the planning activities of the International Airport Area after the airport and 
surrounding areas were developed through a massive land acquisition program 
by a special agency. The Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Finance Corporation 
(KUDIFC) and the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Authority (KIADB) 
develop large-scale infrastructure such as industrial and information 
technology corridors. An example of the latter is the new Bangalore Mysore 
Infrastructure Corridor (BMIC) which cuts across the Bangalore Metropolitan 
Area and is being developed under a special authority that will manage its 
affairs with its own laws and development regulations. However, none of these 
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organizations have had any direct influence in the land use plan-making process 
or in identifying the priorities of the Master Plan.85   
 
Constituting a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is a very Karnataka way of 
administering specific planning tasks.86 For example, after a report from a 
government-appointed committee (Ramaswamy 2006) revealed the scale of 
encroachment onto public lands in Bangalore, the government instituted a 
Public Lands Corporation and a Task Force under the Revenue Department to 
reclaim the encroached lands. Similarly, after a report by another government-
appointed committee to examine the state of the lakes in Bangalore (Rau 1981), 
the Lake Development Authority was established in 200287 as “an autonomous 
regulatory, planning and policy body for protection, conservation reclamation, 
restoration, regeneration and integrated development of lakes in Karnataka”. 88 
Most of these organizations are run without any direct contact with the Master 
Plan making or plan administration process. For example, based on the Indo-
Norwegian Environment Programme (INEP) and a National Lake Conservation 
Programme (NLCP), the Lake Development Authority initiated a number of 
projects on lakes in Bangalore between 2002 and 2010. It also started a pilot 
programme to lease some of the lakes in Bangalore to private bidders for 
protection, management and revenue generation, a programme that attracted 
much public dissatisfaction and was later withdrawn after the High Court of 
Karnataka declared the practice illegal (ESG 2008). In a conversation with the 
head of one of these organizations, I was surprised to note that s/he did not 
understand that the Master Plan is a legally binding Government Order from 
which s/he could draw legal powers. S/he thought that it was just a document 
with many colourful maps with no legal remit.  
 
Further, due to the presence of a large number of organizations in the city that 
engage with a range of planning related activities, in order to make the land use 
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 The BMLTA for example developed a pedestrian policy and parking policy in 2012. 
86
 Mainly post-liberalisation and the spread of Public Private Partnerships   
87
 It was registered as a society under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act 1959 but with no legal 
authority until 2010. 
88
 Until the time of fieldwork. See http://www.karunadu.gov.in/lda/  
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plan administration process more efficient, the Government of Karnataka 
established a supra-authority named the Bangalore Metropolitan Development 
Authority (BMRDA) in 1986.  
 
4.3.4. Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority  
The BMRDA was established in 1986 under the auspices of the  BMRDA Act 
1985  to “provide for the establishment of planning, coordinating and 
supervising the proper and orderly development of the area within the 
Bangalore Metropolitan Region” (GoK 1985; Puliani 2009). The area of 
development was about 8,000 square kilometres, significantly larger than the 
Bangalore Metropolitan Area of 1,306 square kilometres.  
 
The BMRDA is composed of members that make this the central authority of all 
authorities within the planning scene in Bangalore. The Chief Minister of 
Karnataka (the most powerful executive and legislator of the state) acts as its 
Chairman and the Urban Development Minister acts as its Vice-Chairman. The 
Mayor of the BBMP is a member along with the Chief Secretary to the GoK (the 
most powerful bureaucrat) and the secretaries of finance, commerce and 
industry, housing, urban development and public works. Four Members of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLA) elected from the various constituencies within the 
Bangalore Metropolitan Region are also members along with the chairpersons 
of the BWSSB, BDA, KHB, KSCB, KEC, KSRTC and BUAC. The Divisional 
Commissioner (Bangalore revenue division), Director of Town Planning GoK, 
Chief Conservator of Forests GoK, Divisional Railway Manager (Southern 
Railway Bangalore division) and the General Manager of Bangalore Telephones 
are also members. On its own discretion, the government can also appoint four 
members from various elected local authorities within the Bangalore 
Metropolitan Region but outside the BBMP, and four members representing 
labour, scheduled castes, women and scheduled tribes. Similar to the BDA 
Commissioner, a Metropolitan Commissioner appointed by the GoK acts as the 
Member-Secretary and manages the day-to-day functioning of the authority.89 
                                                     
89
 The functioning of the authority is managed by an executive committee comprising of the Urban 
Development Minister as Chairman, Metropolitan Commissioner as Vice Chairman, Mayor and 
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Even though all the members are appointed for a period of three years, the GoK 
could reappoint them and employing any senior official to the BMRDA requires 
the approval of the state government.90 The BMRDA has a Law Officer, Town 
Planning Director and Accounts Officer appointed from various departments in 
the GoK. However, unlike the BDA, the BMRDA does not build housing layouts 
and infrastructure. It is mainly a Regional Planning Authority, sanctioned to 
carry out surveys, develop structure plans, coordinate activities, execute 
projects and assist the local planning authorities within the BMRDA jurisdiction 
to implement their Detailed Town Planning Schemes and infrastructure 
projects.   
 
The act stipulates that “except with the previous permission of the Authority, no 
authority or person shall undertake any development” within the BMRDA 
jurisdiction (Section 10.1, Puliani 2009, p.340).  The BMRDA can overrule 
decisions issued by the BDA to other organizations.  The Commissioner “shall be 
entitled to attend and take part in the meetings of BBMP, BDA, BWSSB, KSRTC, 
KEC”, but will have no rights to vote (Section 19, GoK 1985; Puliani 2009, 
p.343).  Further, the act stipulates that the Master Plan of Bangalore prepared 
by the BDA should be submitted to the GoK through the BMRDA instead of via 
the Director of Town Planning. Currently, 11 LPAs function under the BMRDA 
including the BDA.91 
 
These large numbers of organizations working on separate mandates are 
coordinated through a top-down administrative process to deliver planning and 
                                                                                                                                                      
Commissioner of the BBMP, Commissioner and Chairman of the BDA, Secretary of Finance, PWD, 
Housing and Urban Development, Chairman of BWSSB, Divisional Commissioner (Revenue) and the 
Director of Town Planning. 
90
 The act states that any appointment that exceeds a salary of INR 1,500/month (approx. USD 30 per 
month) 
91
 The first Structure Plan of the BMR was led by a United Kingdom-based consultancy named GHK 
(as part of an Asian Development Bank-funded Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Improvement 
Project).  This plan was submitted to the government in 1999. A draft was released in 1995 (Heitzman 
2004) and received approval in 2005. According to my interviewees who worked as consultants, the 
first structure plan emphasized institutional reform and enhance the coordination along with emphasis 
on spatial planning (Interview- planner consultant for the Structure Plan). Preparation of the second 
structure plan is underway and is led by the French consulting group SCE who prepared the RMP 
2005-2015. 
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services. In the section below I very briefly outline this organizational structure 
and its interconnectedness.  
 
4.3.5. Structure of administration and governance 
Coordinating the activities of these numerous organizations is facilitated by a 
conjoined administrative structure at the top of the administrative bureaucracy.  
For example, the Commissioners of the BBMP, BDA, BMRDA, BWSSB, KUDIFC, 
BMTC, and BMLTA report to the Principal Secretary to the GoK Ministry of 
Urban Development. Similarly, the Commissioner of BESCOM reports to the 
Principal Secretary to the GoK Ministry for Electricity, the CEO of the Lake 
Development Authority reports to the Principal Secretary of Environment and 
Forests, the KIADB works under the Principal Secretary of Commerce and 
Industry, the KSRTC works under the Ministry of Transport and Revenue 
Commissioners, and the Director of the Public Lands Corporation and the Task 
Force report to the Principal Secretary for Revenue. All Principal Secretaries 
work under the Chief Secretary of GoK, the most powerful civil servant in the 
State of Karnataka. While technical officers such as planners and engineers are 
appointed from the respective technical verticals within the GoK (e.g. 
Directorate of Planning or Public Works Department), the technocracy reports 
to the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy reports to the cabinet and legislature, 
thus enabling a structure of top-down public administration under democratic 
governance.   
 
Co-ordination between the various organizations during a Master Plan 
preparation process for example, means coordination at the level of the higher 
level bureaucrats who are supposed to be well trained and highly capable of 
administering the wide range of complex tasks. The selection of personnel to the 
Indian Administrative Services (IAS) takes place through an extremely 
competitive selection process. Many times the discourse of weak capacity at the 
intermediate and bottom levels of public organizations (which leads to, for 
example, outsourcing the making of the master or structure plans) is 
reciprocated with the belief in strong capacity at the top level of the bureaucracy. 
For example, when I asked a consultant who worked on the BMRDA structure 
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plan - the plan that aimed to coordinate all plans and organizations - about how 
they coordinated between the various agencies while preparing the structure 
plans to identify priorities, my interviewee replied that “the project interactions 
were happening at the urban development department levels” (Interview, 
Planning consultant, Date: 01-06-2009), i.e. at the level of secretaries and 
principal secretaries. 
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Yet, one of the senior advisors who had worked closely with the government for 
many years told me that in her experience the capacity problem is more acute at 
the very top than at the intermediate level or at the bottom.  She said,  
“The civil servant is a generalist – take for example the CEO of BMTC.  She 
will not be able to get a job in any other metro company in the world.  
S/he knows nothing about metro or about transportation. Before coming 
to transport management s/he was a rural development secretary or 
something. There is a real lack of expertise right at the top” (interview 
with Senior Advisor to government on urban affairs, GoK; see Appendix 
1, no.117). 
 
4.4 The instrument: Comprehensive Master Plan 
This institutional structure is deployed in Bangalore to prepare, implement and 
enforce a Master Plan that outlines the pattern of development and 
transformation. A Comprehensive Development Plan therefore controls the logic 
of land use transformation in Bangalore.92 According to the KTCP Act, every 
Planning Authority within two years of their constitution shall prepare and 
publish an existing land-use map of their jurisdiction and a proposed Master Plan 
(or Development Plan). This is to be submitted for approval to the GoK through 
the Director of State Town Planning (in the case of Bangalore, through the 
BMRDA). The act prescribes that a copy of the Master Plan “shall be kept open for 
inspection by the public at the head office of the planning authority” (section 9.4, 
KTCP Act in Puliani 2009). Moreover, the authority shall declare its intent to 
prepare a Master Plan publicly in the official state gazette and at least in one 
newspaper and invite suggestions from the general public (Section 10, KTCP Act 
in Puliani 2009). The Planning Authority is obliged to consider all suggestions 
from the public and make any modification that it thinks is appropriate before 
sending the Master Plan to the state government for approval. 
According to the KTCP Act, a Master Plan should include: 
1. “Zoning of land use for residential, commercial, industrial 
agricultural, recreational and other purposes together with zoning 
regulations 
2. A complete street pattern indicating major and minor roads, 
national highways and state highways and traffic circulation pattern for 
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 Master Plans for Indian cities are prepared using the logic of Comprehensive Planning. In fact, the 
plan document for most cities in India is known as a Comprehensive Development Plan or CDP 
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meeting immediate and future requirements with proposals for 
improvements 
3. Areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and other recreational uses, 
public open spaces, public buildings and institutions and area reserved for 
such purposes as may be expedient for new civic developments 
4. Areas earmarked for future development and expansion 
5. Reservation of land for the purpose of central government, the 
state government, planning authority or public utility undertaking or any 
other authority established by law, and the designation of lands being 
subject to acquisition for public purpose or as specified in Master Plan or 
securing the use of the land 
6. Declaring certain areas as areas of special control and 
development in such areas being subject to such regulations as may be 
made in regard to building line, height of the building, floor area ration, 
architectural features and such other particulars as may be prescribed 
7. Stages by which the plan is to be carried out” (Section 12, KTCP Act 
in Puliani, 2009, p.24) 
 
4.4.1. BDA and Master planning 
In 1984, the BDA developed its first Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) for 
Bangalore, known as CDP1985-2001. Based on the Section 25 of the KTCP Act 
this Plan had to be revised once in every 10 years. This plan mainly consisted of 
a land-use zoning for the Bangalore functional urban region and a set of building 
regulations. The 1984 CDP was very simple and basic.93 It officially established 
zones like the greenbelt, central area, intensely developed area and other areas.  
This was revised in 1995. Even though the 1995 CDP continued the tradition of 
comprehensive planning, it was more detailed in its ambition and prescriptions. 
Introducing the rationale behind regulating the use of land through zoning, the 
1995 CDP states: 
“In order to promote public health, safety and the general social welfare 
of the community, it is necessary to apply reasonable limitation on the 
use of land and buildings. This is to ensure that the most appropriate 
economical and healthy development of the city takes place in 
accordance with the land use plan. For this purpose, the City is divided 
into a number of use Zones, such as residential, commercial, industrial, 
public and semi–public, etc. Each Zone has its own regulations, as the 
same set of regulations cannot be applied to the entire town/city. Zoning 
protects residential area [sic] from the harmful invasions of commercial 
and industrial uses and at the same time promotes the orderly 
development of industrial and commercial areas. By regulating the 
                                                     
93
 During my fieldwork, I was initially told that the BDA does not have a copy of this CDP. However, 
upon deeper search into their archives and with a BDA officer, I found a badly tattered copy.   
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spacing of buildings, adequate light, air, protection from fire etc., can be 
provided. It prevents overcrowding in buildings and land and thus 
ensures adequate facilities and services. Zoning is not retrospective. It 
does not prohibit the uses of land and buildings that are lawfully 
established prior to the coming into effect of the zoning regulations. If 
these uses are contrary to the newly proposed uses, they are termed as 
non–conforming uses and [are] gradually eliminated over years [sic] 
without inflicting unreasonable hardship upon the property owners. The 
zoning regulations and the enforcement are major tools in keeping the 
land uses pattern of the master plan”. (BDA 1995, added emphasis) 
  
Both these Master Plans presented a detailed land-use zoning map for the whole 
of the metropolitan area earmarking all land parcels in the city for the specific 
uses that are permissible. Refusing or approving any individual planning 
application is to be based on the land-use map. The 1995 CDP classified land-
uses into: 
1. Residential 
2. Commercial (retail and wholesale) 
3. Industrial (manufacturing, service, medium size, heavy) 
4. Public and semi-public 
5. Utilities and services 
6. Parks and open spaces and playgrounds (including public recreational 
areas) 
7. Transportation and communication 
8. Agricultural land, water bodies and wetlands (/greenbelt) 
 
In addition to use-based zoning, both the CDPs categorized the city into three 
areas according to the proposed development intensity. These categories are 
intensely developed area, moderately developed area and sparsely developed area 
(BDA 1985, 1995). A detailed list of uses that are permissible within each zone is 
stipulated by the zoning regulations. For example, a residential area can have 
places for workshops, hostels, public libraries, clubs, milk booths, neighbourhood 
convenience shops, medical clinic, a professional’s own office, etc., not exceeding 
20 SQ.M. It further mentions certain uses that can be permitted under special 
circumstances by the BDA, such as golf clubs, banks and nursing homes. 
Similarly, an agricultural land could be developed for a range of other uses; for 
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example farmhouses not exceeding 200 SQ.M of plinth area for 1.2 hectares of 
land under normal circumstances.  An agricultural zone could also have other 
stipulated uses such as hospitals and residential buildings not exceeding two 
floors within areas reserved for the natural expansion of villages.   
 
The regulations also prescribe a maximum floor area ratio (FAR), maximum 
ground coverage, the number of floors and minimum statutory offsets from the 
plot boundary, which are not only based on land-use zones, but also on intensity 
zoning. Given that the Bangalore Metropolitan Area is larger than the BBMP 
(formerly BMP), the CDP also specifies “regulations for rural development” for 
the villages that fall within its boundary. Accordingly it states, “Within 100m 
from the existing Gramathana94, residential developments and other uses at the 
discretion of the Authority may be permitted” (BDA 1995, p.20, emphasis added).  
 
Further, it stipulates the minimum conditions to be followed in the case of 
privately-developed group housing layouts according to their type (detached, 
semi-detached, row housing or homestead). For example, every housing plot 
subdivisions or villas development should have a minimum boundary road width 
of twelve metres. It should reserve 10% of the total land area for civic amenities 
and 15% for parks and playgrounds. Ownership of roads, land for civic amenities 
and parks and playgrounds should be handed over free of cost to the BDA through 
title deed registration after its development. Roads less than 100 metres in 
length should be at least six metres wide, those up to 200 metres should be nine 
metres wide and those more than 200 metres should be at least 12 metres wide. 
The plot subdivision regulations state that “the purpose of these regulations is to 
guide the development of new areas in accordance with the land-use plan. As 
long as this is done on sound planning principles with adequate space standards 
the future of the city is assured”. (BDA 1995, p.26)  
 
Such a standards-based approach prescribes a wide range of details maximum 
height near airport zones, specific number of parking spaces required based on 
the use and floor area, offsets according to building heights, building heights 
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 Gramathana means Village land 
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according to road widths, floor heights, balconies, gradation of ramps. The 
Master Plan even prescribes that every building should respect a building line 
that is offset from the plot boundary for more than 134 specific roads in the city.   
 
Any development intending to develop the land differently to the prescribed 
land-use (for example, to develop land earmarked for residential use in the 
Master Plan into a commercial building) should apply for and receive specific 
permission from the BDA for change of land use based on the section 14-A of the 
KTCP Act. Further, if the land is earmarked as an agricultural zone in the Master 
Plan, then those land parcels should first apply for a conversion of land use from 
the Department of Revenue before applying for a layout approval from the BDA. 
Both these procedures are discussed in detail later in this chapter in 4.5.2.  
  
The 1995 Master Plan was revised in 2005, the draft of which took another two 
years to be compiled and was finally released in 2007 as the Revised Master Plan 
(RMP 2005-2015) for an area of 1,306 square kilometres.  The RMP 2005-2015 is 
the current land-use plan that is in force in Bangalore and regulates all 
developments in the Bangalore Metropolitan Area until it is updated in 2015. By 
2005, Bangalore had changed immensely from a pensioners’ paradise, a working-
class city, an education city and an administrative capital into one of the 
economic engines and fastest growing, globally connected, ambitious 
metropolitan regions in India. The involvement of many ambitious glocal elites in 
the city’s governance, the development of GIS among the various networks in the 
city governance and the widespread disbelief in the capacity of the BDA to 
comprehend and plan for Bangalore became central aspects in the process and 
the character of the current Master Plan.   
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The process, rationale and the content of the Revised Master Plan 2005-2015 
reflects the belief in scientific, rational, comprehensive planning among the 
group who facilitated this process. While all the previous master plans were 
prepared in house by the BDA, the current plan was prepared by a French 
consortium comprised of APUR, IAURI, Université de Sorbonne, and Group Huit 
95 (multiple interviews with government planners and planning consultants; and 
Raiborde 2007) 96 working through the office of Group SCE India Private Limited 
supported by a French grant to the GoK. The French grant supported 
involvement of French consultants in Bangalore and started in 1998-99 to 
document the water distribution infrastructure aimed to aid the privatization of 
water with the help of French companies such as Vivendi and NIL (Heitzman 
2004; multiple interviews with government planners, planning advisors and 
planning consultants). Further, based on the second phase of financial and 
technical support, from June 2003 until January 2004 extensive land-use and 
institutional surveys were conducted using advanced GIS technology and 
satellite maps with ground support to prepare a spatial data infrastructure. 
 
This was one of the most ambitious technical exercises that had been carried 
out in the sixty-year planning history of Bangalore. One of the technical heads of 
the team, in an article to a GIS portal, stated that the MP Process brought 
together 110 experts “consisting of town planners, architects, economists, 
demographers, sociologists, GIS & IT specialists, geographers, cartographers, 
infrastructure and transport specialists” (Raiborde 2007) to create the 
Metropolitan Spatial Data Infrastructure (MSDI) that provided the information 
base for RMP 2015. This final MSDI layer consisted of about 80 information 
layers generated by the data collected from over thirty administrative 
organizations in Bangalore as well as surveys from many ground control points 
                                                     
95
 APUR (Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme- the City Government of Paris), IUARIF- Institute 
d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région d’Ile-de-France - Institut for urban planning and 
development of the Paris Ile-de-France Region), Group Huit is an 8 member team organization who 
work as consultants for urban development and is part of larger consulting named Group SCE.  (see 
www.creocean.fr/.../fich480102b6df1c1-Company_Profile_BD.pdf last accessed 22-10-2012) 
96
 Date unavailable -source – Vivian Raiborde systems manager group SCE india private limited, 
Metropolitan Spatial Data Infrastructure Empowering Government Authorities Through Modern 
Spatial Tools and Techniques published in 
http://www.gisdevelopment.net/application/urban/overview/ma06_83.htm last accessed 22-10-2012 
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(multiple interviews with government planners and planning consultants; 
Raiborde 2007). Subsequently, the process that cost 23 crore INR produced an 
updated and sophisticated data infrastructure, a vision document for a 
globalizing metropolis and a land-use plan that was supposed to enable that 
ambition.97 After six months of extensive documentation and 18 months of plan 
preparation, a Draft Master Plan was submitted to the government in June 
2005, and it was finally approved in April 2007 after two years. 98  
 
This RMP 2005-2015 is a very large document compared to the previous Master 
Plans; for example, separate documents outline the vision, zoning regulations 
and details of every planning district. While the previous two master plans were 
concerned about containing the spread of urbanization within the greenbelt, the 
vision document of the RMP explicitly states that it is a Master Plan with a view 
to developing the city into an international metropolis (BDA 2007, Vision 
Document, p.2). It argues that the previous Master Plans were ineffective, 
stating that urbanization in Bangalore “is directed by opportunities and land 
availability; there is neither planning nor even a large framework” (ibid, p.1). In 
contrast, the RMP 2005-2015 claims that it is more participatory, founded on 
principles of collaboration and consensus building and involved various 
stakeholders in the decision-making process; 
“The planning methodology attempts to ensure that neighbourhoods, the 
city and the region accommodate growth in ways that are economically 
sound, environmentally responsible and socially supportive of 
community livability, now and in the future...It identifies development 
patterns, infrastructure gaps and deficiencies, project and reform 
priorities and an implementation schedule that would be both fiscally 
realistic and innovative” (ibid, p.2). 
 
To achieve this purpose, the RMP claims that its main objective is sustainable 
development achieved by the integration of spatial, economic, social, and 
ecological and transportation planning. Despite such claims, the RMP 2005-15 
does not incorporate a process-oriented approach or any other type of 
                                                     
97
 23 Crore INR =Approximately 43M USD 
98
A series of later events (omitted from the discussions in this dissertation due to privacy concerns) 
that occurred in the space of governing in Bangalore culminated in the appointment of these 
consultants to prepare the Master Plan. 
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instrument; it is simply a more sophisticated version of comprehensive planning 
produced with the help of detailed GIS database. However, the RMP-2005-2015 
adopted a flexible approach towards land-use zoning which it defined as mixed 
land use. Therefore the main land-use zones have more shades and the Plan has 
introduced some new categories. The land-use categories are  
1. Residential (main and mixed),  
2. Commercial (central, business),  
3. Mutation corridors (along the main roads),  
4. Commercial axes (roads along which there are already commercial), 
5. Industrial (general and hi-tech),  
6. Public and Semi-Public,  
7. Traffic and Transportation,  
8. Public Utilities,  
9. Parks and Open Space,  
10. Agricultural, and  
11. Unclassified (for example, defence lands, notified land for acquisition, 
slums).99  
Like the previous master plans, the RMP proposes density standards, ground 
coverage, number of floors, offsets, parking standards, plot subdivision 
regulations, etc. for buildings and for private layouts within each land-use 
category. 
 
However, regarding the implementation, the RMP states that it is not 
implementable based on the current institutional architecture of planning in 
Bangalore.  The vision document in its conclusion states: 
“[This] Master plan introduces some major innovations in urban 
management. Its implementation needs a new urban regulation mode 
through an improved control of urban development process and city 
transformations. It involves operational, anticipatory, realistic and 
flexible urban planning, which entails significant modifications of city 
planning practices” (ibid, p.73, emphases added).   
 
 
                                                     
99
 Similar to the previous Master Plan documents, the RMP 2005-2015 also specifies in detail the 
various uses that can occur within each category.   
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Proposed Land Use Map 
CDP 1995 
Source: CDP 1995, BDA (1995) 
Existing Land Use in 2005  
Source: RMP 2015, BDA (2007) 
Map 3 
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Map 4 
Revised Master Plan 2005-2015: Bangalore: 
Development Strategies and Land Use plan. 
Source: BDA (2007) 
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The RMP document does not identify the significant modifications nor does it 
discuss how they are to be realized. To that extent, the planning epistemology 
seems to be located within the comprehensive planning lineage of the policy-
implementation dichotomy.   
 
4.5. The process and procedures 
Detailed procedures play an important role in operationalizing the planning 
system to control the land use change, i.e. through deploying the organizational 
structures and practitioners in preparing, implementing an enforcing the 
master plan. In the sections below I discuss the relevant processes.  
 
4.5.1 Master Plan adoption. 
 
The final adoption of the Master Plan as a legal document is not only a 
bureaucratic or technocratic exercise but it also goes through a detailed process 
of approval by democratic government. This is clearly outlined in the KTCP Act.  
Once the Master Plan is approved by the BDA, it should be submitted to the GoK. 
After its inspection, the GoK can make appropriate modifications that it deems 
fit based on the advice of the Director of Karnataka State Town Planning, and 
return it to the Planning Authority to publish for public consultation for 60 
days. Within these 60 days, the general public can communicate their 
suggestions and comments to the Planning Authority. After considering such 
comments, The Planning Authority should resubmit the plan to the GoK through 
the Director of Planning.  
“After receiving the plan and the reports and the recommendations for 
modifications from the planning authority, [The GoK], shall in 
consultation with the Director, give its final approval to the plan and the 
reports with such modifications as the Director may advice in the light of 
the comments and the recommendations of the Planning Authority or 
otherwise” (section 13.3, KTCP Act 1961 in Puliani 2009). 
 
The Planning Authority can then publish the Master Plan and the reports as 
finally approved by the GoK in the form of a Government Order (GO), a statutory 
legal document binding upon all the actors (public and private) within its 
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jurisdiction. 100 The absolute authority over controlling the land use change is 
enshrined in Section 14 of the KTCP Act as follows;  
“On and from the date on which a declaration of intention to prepare a 
Master Plan is published, every land use, every change of land use and every 
development in the area covered by the plan subject to section 14-A101 
shall conform to the provisions of this act, the Master Plan and the report 
as finally approved by the state government” (Section 14, KTCP Act, 
Puliani 2009, p.31, emphasis added).   
 
The act prohibits any development that is deviant from the land use prescribed 
in the Master Plan, except with written permission from the Planning Authority.  
 
4.5.2 Plan Implementation 
The master plan zoning regulations classify every piece of land in the functional 
urban region of Bangalore into specific permissible land use categories. 
Implementation of this regulatory component of the master plan follows 
different procedures from that of the infrastructure components. All 
development proposals should ensure that they are prepared, built and lived 
according to the regulations. Thus every development proposal has to go through 
elaborate planning permission process intended to ensure that the developments 
adhere to the regulations. In this section, I discuss the implementation procedure 
of the land use and building regulations.  
 
BDA and BBMP conjointly implement the land use and building regulations using 
the process of approving planning applications. All new developments within the 
BBMP (or any local authority) limits should obtain a building and planning 
permission from the Commissioner before executing the project.102 To obtain 
planning permission, an applicant should apply to the local zone office or head 
office of BBMP or BDA according to the scale of the project. Any development 
project exceeding a land area of two acres, change and conversion of land use, 
housing and industrial or mixed use layouts are beyond the scope of the BBMP 
                                                     
100
 The planning authority “may, and if so directed by the state government” (Section 13-D, KTCP 
Act 1961, emphasis added), update the existing Master Plan by conducting a fresh survey of its 
jurisdiction and follow the same procedure as mentioned above for its finalisation (ibid).   
101
 Section 14-A is an exemption clause added into the KTCP Act through an amendment in 1991; 
described later in this Chapter.   
102
 Section 299 of the KMC Act 1976 (Puliani 2008)  
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and should go to the BDA for planning permission. Any private developments 
involving plot subdivision, amalgamation or the layout of private streets after the 
Master Plan’s publication date should also obtain planning permission from the 
BDA. The Planning Authority may refuse or approve the application with or 
without modifications (Section 17, KTCP Act). The Planning Authority has the 
powers to prepare specific rules and by-laws (e.g. private layout design by-laws, 
building rules or open space and street standards) and to undertake specific 
improvement or urban design projects (e.g. specific housing layouts, open space 
construction, and road or traffic junction improvements) to implement the 
objectives of the act.   
 
Even though section 505 of the KMC Act 1976 states that the BBMP does not 
have any powers to take any decisions on matters that relate to the Karnataka 
Town and Country Planning Act 1961 (Puliani, 2008, p.254), the BBMP plays a 
major role in the plan implementation within its jurisdiction. One of my 
interviewees from the Town Planning Division of the BBMP noted that,  
  “Planning in the BBMP is functionally very limited.  I can’t say that 
it is a small department because there are 21 technical staff in the 
head office.  [So], including the officers at the zonal offices there 
are more than 50 technical staff, out of which only a few people in 
the head office are trained planners - about five of us - others are 
engineers deputed from the Public Works Departments for a 
couple of years appointed by promoting as planners. The other 
technical divisions in the BBMP - for example, the engineering 
wing that takes care of the roads and the waste, the horticulture 
department that takes care of the vegetation, the tree officer, the 
welfare divisions for social functions, health department, and so 
on don’t consult us on any of their schemes or project. Town 
planning in the BBMP is organized around the building permission 
and issuing of occupancy certificates. In line with the Master Plan 
prepared by the BDA, the Corporation will make the building 
regulations. The zoning regulation in the Master Plan will then be 
detailed in our building by-laws. Then we give permission. This is 
all the function of the Town Planning Department in the BBMP. 
Any development - amalgamation, bifurcation, change of land use 
etc - is always done by the BDA” (Interview with Senior Planning 
Director, UDD, GoK, who had worked previously in BBMP and 
BDA, Appendix 1, no.111). 
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The BBMP makes its own building regulations - known as building by-laws - 
based on the Master Plan for areas inside the BBMP limits and which become the 
statutory framework for assessing the planning applications. The by-laws adopt 
a standards-based approach while regulating development. Based on a variety of 
interrelated parameters like location, use and typology, buildings are thoroughly 
regulated for height and number of floors, urban design and typology, structural 
stability of the development including materials and method of construction and 
the foundation, provision of open space and adequate means of ventilation, fire 
escape routes and access to remove refuse, utility layout and services 
infrastructure, construction of wells, architectural features, and so on (Puliani 
2008, BBMP 2003). The BBMP can define and prescribe the building line and 
street alignment or acquire property for public works such as street widening or 
for a bridge or subway construction.103A revenue officer specially deputed to the 
corporation from the GoK carries out any such acquisition (source: multiple 
interviews at BBMP).   
 
Administratively, the BBMP is divided into eight geographic zones.104  Zonal 
offices are located within each zone and managed by a senior administrator in 
the rank of Joint Commissioner or Additional Commissioner. In addition to this, 
there are ward offices in each ward to manage affairs of the ward in coordination 
with the zonal and head offices.  There is a Town Planning Department within the 
BBMP that inspects and issues planning and building permissions, prepares 
building by-laws and issues the commencement, completion and occupancy 
certificates on behalf of the Commissioner. A Joint Director of Town Planning 
(JDTP) deputed from the GoK Town Planning Directorate heads the planning 
division at the central office while an Assistant Director of Town Planning 
(ADTP) heads the planning division in each of the zonal offices. The Town 
Planning Department at the head office technically works under the BBMP 
Engineer-in-Chief - head of the technical wing - usually deputed from the Public 
works Department of the GoK.  However, for all administrative purposes the 
                                                     
103 Section 265 to 272 of KMC Act 1976  
104 The zones are East, West, South, Bommanahalli, Yelahanka (Byatarayanapura), Dasarahalli, 
Mahadevapura, Rajajeshwari Nagar.  (source – www.bbmp.gov.in) Map 5, p171 
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BBMP Town Planning Department in the head office operates under the Special 
Commissioner for Projects.    
 
The planning permission process within the BBMP works at three levels. Firstly, 
Suvarna Paravanike is a self-regulation process managed at the head office by an 
Assistant Director of Town Planning (ADTP). This is a single window clearance 
facility for planning permission. This scheme is available only for residential 
buildings on land area up to 4,000 square feet and less than three floors in 
height.  According to this scheme, permission should be granted within three 
days of filing an application. As a self-regulated scheme, the project site will not 
be inspected before or during the process of construction. Instead, the project 
architect and engineer should certify that the project will be built complying with 
all the regulations. If violations are found within such schemes, then the BBMP 
has the power to withdraw the license of the architect or the engineer to engage 
in professional practice within the BBMP limits, and to take enforcement action.   
 
The second level is for all the buildings that do not go through the single window 
scheme and are up to fifteen metres in height, or have fewer levels than 
Basement + Ground + 3 floors. These applications are sanctioned by the 
respective zonal office. The third level is for buildings and projects that are 
greater than the threshold in the second level and in this case the planning 
permission is issued by the head office.    
 
 
The application procedure stipulates detailed procedures and the required 
documentation. A typical planning application should contain a range of 
documentation such as the sale deeds, ownership details, Katha details (property 
identification number), no-objection certificates (NoC) from a number of agencies 
including the fire department and airports authority and details of the proposed 
project with relevant fees to be submitted to the right level and right 
authority.105 The Commissioner is bound by the KMC Act to approve or reject the 
                                                     
105 Site plan of the land/plot, floor plans, elevations and sections of the building and area 
calculations   
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application within 30 days. If the commissioner does not take a decision within 
this time, then the standing committee has the right to take a decision regarding 
the application; if they also fail to do so, the applicant can execute the project 
without violating any rules. 
 
Once the planning application is submitted, a case officer will first inspect the 
project proposal details, make site visits to ensure that the provided details are 
correct and will start a project file.106 The project file will move through a 
number of officers and their tables for consultation. The officer’s job is to ensure 
that the project proposal adheres to the master plan zoning and building or 
layout regulations in BBMP and in BDA. For some projects even the 
commissioner or deputy commissioner (projects) will inspect the site along with 
senior engineers and planners. If there are any doubts regarding the planning 
regulations, then the projects go to the Urban Development Department of 
Karnataka State for advice.    A minister or a secretary can check a file at any 
time. Planning permission is given after the approval of the project file from a 
variety of department heads, such as engineers, planners, and revenue officers 
and so on, after which it will be presented to the committee. The committee 
approves the project and the commissioner, being head of the committee (deputy 
commissioners at the zonal offices according to the scale of the project), signs the 
file (source: multiple interviews).  
 
An application can be refused for a number of reasons. It may be refused, for 
example, if it is incomplete or if the proposed development is not compliant with 
the building by-laws, land-use zoning and site subdivision standards or if it 
encroaches on public land or if the land is earmarked for land acquisition. An 
application can also be refused if the streets that are created as a result of land 
subdivisions are not converted into public streets and aligned with the 
neighbouring pattern of public streets for full public access. However, 
appropriate reasons for refusal should to be explicitly stated in the decision 
conveyed to the applicant. Moreover, any permission granted expires in two 
years, within which time the applicant should commence their work. The 
                                                     
106
 These processes are relatively similar in BDA and in BBMP.   
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Commissioner and the officers appointed by him/her can inspect the work at any 
time during or after construction to check if the development is regulation 
compliant.   
 
After the project obtains planning permission, the applicant can begin the 
construction.  All applicants are required to inform the Commissioner of starting 
the construction work and obtain a Commencement Certificate after constructing 
the foundations and the superstructure up to the ground floor plinth. This will 
involve inspection from the surveillance system of the organization, to ensure 
that the project has been started in accordance with the plans approved. 
Similarly, within one month of completing the work, the applicant should obtain 
a Completion Certificate from the Commissioner’s office. This will again follow the 
same order of inspection after which the competent authority will issue a 
Completion Certificate. This Completion Certificate should be used to obtain the 
connections for various services (water electricity, sewage and drainage). This 
procedure ensures that a habitable building is permitted through planning and 
therefore legal. This process further integrates the planning permission process 
and making of a legal building with the activities of another set of institutional 
actors that are mainly service providers such as the Bangalore Electricity Supply 
Company (BESCOM), Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB), 
and so on. Further, once the building is ready for occupation, the applicant 
should seek the Commissioner’s permission to occupy the building. Clause (2) of 
Section 310 of the KMC Act states, 
“No person shall occupy or permit to be occupied any such building or part 
of the building or use or permit to be used the building or part thereof 
affected until,  
(a) Permission has been received from the commissioner in this behalf, or 
(b) The commissioner has failed for thirty days after receipt of the notices 
of completion to intimate his refusal of the said permission” (Puliani, 
2008 p169, emphasis added). 
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4.5.3 Flexibility in the implementation of land use regulations: change of 
land use and conversion of land use 
  
Even though the master plan prescribes land use categories in a strict manner, 
the KTCP Act allows for flexibility during the plan implementation process. I 
discuss two of them in detail (and which are particularly relevant to the analysis 
presented in the forthcoming chapters in this dissertation): those that allow for 
a change of land use from the Master Plan categories and a conversion of land use 
from agricultural land within the Master Plan boundary.  
 
Even though Section 14 of the KTCP Act 1961 establishes the ultimate authority 
of the Master plan, a subsection named Section 14-A was introduced in 1991 
amending the KTCP Act to legally enable developments that are different from 
the land use that is prescribed in the land-use plan. Section 14-A states, 
 “At any time after the date on which the Master Plan of an area comes into 
operation, the planning authority may, with previous approval of the state 
government [emphasis mine], allow such changes in the land use or 
development from the Master Plan as may be necessitated by topographical 
or cartographical [emphasis mine], or other errors and omissions, or due to 
failure to full indicate the details in the plan or changes arising out of the 
implementation of the proposals in Master plan (emphasis mine] or the 
circumstances prevailing at any particular time, by the enforcement of the 
plan [emphasis mine]. Provided that,  
a) “all changes are in public interest, [emphasis mine]  
b) the changes proposed do not contravene any of the provisions of this 
act or any other law governing planning, development or use of land 
within the local planning area and 
c) the proposal for all such changes are published in one or more daily 
newspapers, having circulation in the area, inviting objections from 
the public within a period of not less than fifteen days from the date 
of publication” (Puliani 2009, p.37).107 
                                                     
107
 Further subsection 3 of section 14-A inserted as part of amendment in 2005 reads,  
“Notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Act, if the change in land use or 
development is from commercial or industrial to residential or from industrial to commercial 
and the stipulated fee is paid and the LPA is informed prior to effecting the change, the 
permission for such change of land use or development shall be deemed to have been given” 
(ibid, p.38). 
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Based on Section 14-A, land parcels that are not reserved as agricultural or 
wetlands in the Master Plan require a change of land use permission to convert 
its use from one category to another (from industrial to residential, for 
example).  If the BDA found that the land-use change would not disturb the 
structural logic of the land-use plan and are it is in conformity with the public 
interest criteria then they will advertise it in the local newspapers to invite any 
objections from the public and the locality. Once this is settled, either through 
arbitration, or through a discretionary decision, it will recommend to the GoK 
that the land parcel can change its use. If the GoK approves it too, then the BDA 
will issue a commencement certificate after collecting the required fees. The 
process of verification of the application is normally treated as in the case of 
other planning applications, i.e. with required site visits and so on.  
 
Similarly land parcels that are reserved as agricultural or wetlands in the 
Master Plan require conversion of land use permission from the the Department 
of Revenue before an applicant can apply for planning permission for a non-
agricultural use. 108  
 
Agricultural lands are classified in two categories in the Master plan. The first 
are those highlighted in green and to be retained as agricultural land or 
wetlands.  These land parcels are protected from any development and requires 
that they obtain clearance of the authorities before any developments are built. 
The second are those agricultural land parcels that are earmarked in the Master 
Plan for residential, commercial or industrial or any other types of use and 
denoted by the respective colour in the land-use plan. These land parcels also 
need to consult the Department of Revenue to obtain a conversion of land use. 
DC Revenue would consult the BDA before issuing the conversion of land use 
permission to such applicants; to make sure that the decision is in line with the 
Master Plan zoning. Even though permitting a land-use conversion is the 
privilege of the Department of Revenue, the Act also specifies that the DC 
revenue shall not refuse the permission if “such diversion is in accordance with 
                                                     
108
 Section 95 of the Land Revenue Act 1964 
159 
 
the land use specified in the Master Plan” (Section 95 of the 1991 amendment of 
the Karnataka Land Revenue Act 1964, quoted in Puliani 2009, p.64).   
 
Once the permission is granted for change of land use or conversion of land use, 
if the land area is greater than two acres, then the applicant has to further apply 
for planning permission for the approval of the layout plan based on the 
standards prescribed by the Master Plan and KTCP Act for private layouts. If the 
land area is not smaller than 2 acres, the applicant can apply to the respective 
Local Authority (BBMP for example) for planning permission. Only this enables 
the legal completion of the planning process.  
   
4.5.4 Plan enforcement 
The KTCP Act is legally enabling as well as binding on all actors operating within 
the jurisdiction of the Local Planning Authority. Sections 17 and 73 prescribe 
various forms of sanctions - from demolition to imprisonment - for anyone acting 
in contravention to the clauses and the powers of the act. To enable this both the 
BDA and the BBMP have enormous powers conferred on them by their 
respective acts.  
 
For example, the BBMP Commissioner is conferred with extensive powers by the 
KMC Act to facilitate or intervene in the everyday life of the city, i.e. to survey, 
inspect, regulate, license, sanction, prohibit, provide, remove or alter  a wide-range 
of activities and buildings. For example s/he regulates quarrying, ensures fire 
safety, prohibits nuisance, facilitates and provides public sanitation and health, 
regulates vacant buildings, issues license for a range of trade practices from 
factories, lodges and hotels to keeping pigs and other animals, destroys stray 
animals, licenses stables and cattle sheds and slaughterhouses and the sale of fish 
and poultry, regulates cart stands in public places, laundries (washer men), and 
so on. Similarly, the Corporation has the right to control all construction and 
demolition that may obstruct the public street or public space and regulate the 
use and characteristics of all sites and buildings being built within the 
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corporation limits using building by-laws.109 If the development violates any 
clause, then the Commissioner can demand alteration or demolition in full or part 
of any unlawful building or development after issuing a Show Cause Notice.110 
Section 321 of the KMC Act 1976 states,  
 “The commissioner shall serve a copy of the provisional order 
made under subsection (1) on the owner or builder of the 
building or hut or well together with a notice requiring him to 
show cause within a reasonable time to be named in such notice 
why the order should not be confirmed” (emphasis  added). 
 
“If the owner or builder fails to show cause to the satisfaction of 
the commissioner, the commissioner may confirm the order with 
any modification he may think fit and such order shall then be 
binding on the owner” (Clause 2 and 3 respectively in Puliani 
2008, p.172). 
 
Subsection 3 of Section 321 states that if the owner of a building or development 
did not obtain permission or if the permission has expired, then the 
Commissioner can issue a notice for immediate demolition giving a minimum of 
24 hours advance notice. Unlike other notices that should allow a reasonable 
timeframe for the owner/applicant to provide an explanation, this notice of 
demolition can be “affixed on [to] some conspicuous part of the building” and 
“published by proclamation at or near such building by beat of drum” (emphasis 
mine, Puliani 2008, 172). The Bangalore Metropolitan Task force (BMTF) located 
within the BBMP (this organization works for the BBMP as well as the BDA) and 
headed by an Inspector General of Police is entrusted with the task of 
enforcement action (including demolition). 
 
Further, in order to enable efficient enforcement, the city is circumscribed into 
closely monitored geographies of surveillance and plan administration. This is 
enabled through producing detailed information of land and properties as well as 
through institutional structure.  
 
Every property within the BBMP is given a unique property identification 
number called a Katha. A Katha certificate issued to the owner of the property 
                                                     
109
 As per provision of Section 195 of the Act; the latest revision of building by-laws was in 2003. 
110
 The Act distinguishes a building, a hut and a well as three distinct legal entities. 
161 
 
contains information about the name of the owner, the size of the building, 
location of the property and the tax band. To possess a Katha is a minimum 
requirement for every legal building within the BBMP. All transactions involving 
a property require the details of its Katha: paying property tax, accessing bank 
loans and mortgages, obtaining service connections, selling, leasing or 
registering the property, agreeing rental contracts, obtaining trade licenses, and 
while applying for planning permission. A Katha register in the BBMP enables 
the state to locate a property or a building within the geography of the BBMP and 
identify its owner, use and characteristics (Source: GoK 1977; various interviews 
with planning officer, BBMP; various interviews with real estate agents). Such 
close surveillance is consistent and continuous. For instance, any transfer of 
property (sale or purchase, for instance) should be made known to the 
corporation within three months of the transfer.111 Similarly, all demolitions and 
new constructions are to be communicated to the Commissioner for the purpose 
of amending details in the property tax register. For the first time in 2009, the 
then Commissioner developed a GIS database of the entire city that locates every 
property. This process for example, enabled the identification of 410,560 
properties that had been evading tax which were subsequently brought into the 
tax net (Raju 2011; Interview with a Retired Administrator of BBMP, Bangalore; 
August 2010; see Appendix 1, no.97).  
 
Plan enforcement is also enabled by close surveillance of local geographies 
enabled by the distribution of field offices. Institutionally, the BDA and the 
BBMP head offices are led by Commissioners, the Zonal offices are headed by 
Zonal commissioners (deputy commissioners) and ward offices are headed by 
executive engineers. 112 These Zonal offices - and the local offices under them - 
are staffed mainly with engineers, whose responsibility is to oversee 
developments and ensure regulation compliance and implement development 
projects. Such an institutional system spreads the responsibility of operation  
  
                                                     
111
 Section 114 of the KMC Act 1976 (Puliani 2008) 
112
 The city is divided into administrative zones. BDA has zonal offices, while the BBMP had ward 
and zonal offices. All these offices report to the main office according to their vertical hierarchy. An 
Assistant Executive Engineer heads a ward office and an Executive Engineer heads the zonal office.   
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Organizational Chart BDA 
Organizational Chart BBMP-1 
Diagram 2 
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Organizational Chart BBMP-2 
Source: BBMP 
Diagram 3 
Organizational Chart BBMP-2 
Source: BBMP 
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Organizational Chart – BBMP-3- Individual Wards 
Source: BBMP 
Diagram 4 
165 
 
across the city, close to the geographies of governance, and this in theory, 
ensures a close surveillance through these offices.    
  
Further to these widely distributed geographies of bureaucratic surveillance, 
three levels of elected representatives constitute political geographies of 
governance in Bangalore. These include the ward councilor elected by the 
residents of a ward, a Member of Legislative Assembly, (MLA, the legislators of 
Karnataka state) elected by the voters within the Legislative constituency, and a 
member of parliament (MP) who belongs to the national parliament in Delhi. So 
the political geography of a locality involves an MP, an MLA and a local 
councilor, operating in different levels of governance, while administrative 
geography involves local engineers from BDA and BBMP local, Zonal and head 
offices along with the higher officials who work at the ministry of urban 
administration. In principle, every territory in Bangalore is embedded within 
these geographies of surveillance from bottom to top; in the words of a senior 
planner, “not even a fly can pass through without the knowledge of the local 
councilor and the local engineers” (Interview with a Very Senior Planning 
Director, UDD, GoK; see Appendix 1, no.90). Thus, officially, the land-use plan 
enforcement system operates through the involvement of these elaborated 
institutional actors supported through a number of offices, policy/acts and 
circulars.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I outlined the existing process architecture of land-use planning, 
implementation and enforcement in Bangalore. I demonstrated the presence of 
an extensive apparatus for land use control and described how the processes is 
enabled through an intricately interconnected process involving a large number 
of organizations, laws and acts, personnel and procedures. I described that in 
Bangalore, there are separate organizations for local democracy, development 
plan-making, services provision, coordination and managing specific sectors of 
urban development administration. These specific organizations are legally 
instituted by government acts with specific mandates. Organizationally, even 
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though they are interconnected to form a top-down hierarchical administrative 
bureaucracy under democratic mandate, the actual process of land use control 
depends on a range of processes that involve a range of interactions between 
many vertical and horizontal actors and procedures.  
 
The Government of Karnataka is, the sovereign authority over all these 
organizations: the administrative bureaucracy that forms a major part of the 
executive is made accountable to the legislature and legally supported by the 
judiciary. The GoK appoints the Secretaries and Commissioners, legislates 
planning and deploys the organizational capabilities to achieve various ends of 
the land-use planning. The main regulatory component of the Master Plan,- the 
land and building use regulations - that controls the behaviour of citizens and 
groups is prepared in the tradition of comprehensive planning by the BDA.  
Institutionally, the BDA and BMRDA are nested within Karnataka State’s Town 
Planning Ministry and advised by a separate technical body called the Urban 
Development Department (UDD) which functions under the Principal Secretary 
of Urban Development. The implementation and enforcement of the Master 
Plan - in particular land-use regulations and building controls - are shared 
between the BDA and BBMP through control of the planning application 
process, site-level surveillance and the demolition of violations.  
 
Furthermore, I showed that that the planning application process in Bangalore 
involves both institutional surveillance as well as self-compliance (Harris, 
2011), i.e. demonstrating to the authority that one is following the rule, and the 
authority verifying this assertion through its surveillance apparatus. 113 For 
example, it is only after the completion certificate is received that the owner 
may apply for the connection of services to ensure that the building or project is 
in compliance with the regulation before it is able to be in operation. The 
planning application procedure in Bangalore is therefore a central aspect of the 
technologies of governance.   
 
                                                     
113
 As well as in most other parts of the world. However, the rationale will differ in systems such as 
the UK’s which grant higher levels of discretion to the planning officer. 
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Land-use planning in Bangalore is designed as a hierarchical command-and-
control system of bureaucratic public administration that involves conjoining 
these various organizations under a minimum number of senior civil servants 
and ministers. Coordination between these specific actors is dependent on the 
coordination among a small number of secretaries at the top. This is quite 
evident, for example, from the structure of the executive board of the BMRDA, 
the authority of all authorities with the Chief Minister as its Chairman. This is 
also evident from the fact that the senior bureaucrats are simultaneously 
members of several working and coordination committees and sit on the boards 
of numerous organizations. 
 
So to sum up, the elaborate architecture of land-use planning process in 
Bangalore is enabled through a series of institutional actors in various forms of 
organizational and operational relations, tightly controlled by the state 
government using the instrument of rational scientific comprehensive planning 
that adopts specific land-use zoning regulations and a standards-based approach.  
In the chapters that follow I shall show how this institutional apparatus operates 
in practice from the perspective of violations. 
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Chapter 5 
Land-use planning and practice of private interest networks 
 
There is no planning in Bangalore. 
- Director of planning in Bangalore 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will draw on my fieldwork to show how violations are 
produced and sustained. The main intention here is to show how violations 
need to be understood beyond the functional understanding of them as  
deviations from a plan document or the planning process. I demonstrate here 
how examining violations reveals the appropriation of the process architecture 
of planning to produce what can be called private-interest outcomes. I do this 
by examining the connection between violations and the practice of planning.  
 
To structure this argument therefore, I propose two analytical frames called 
plan violations and planning for violations. While plan violations discuss how 
violations that deviate from the plan document, planning law and planning 
process are produced, planning for violations demonstrate how these are 
sustained through the planning process itself. Both these processes are enabled 
through the appropriation of the process architecture of the planning system 
through various means. I argue that this appropriation exemplifies the practice 
of planning as vernacular governance, demonstrated using specific cases from 
the Koramangala neighbourhood as well as drawing on the wider geography of 
Bangalore.    
 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section introduces the urban 
morphology and land-use change in Koramangala in order to contextualize 
some of the specific cases. Secondly, I analyze specific cases of plan violations. 
From interviews and field ethnography, this section discusses the various 
operational modalities that enabled the production of these violations. It is 
structured through examining three types of violations: by individual property 
owners, large private layouts and revenue layouts. Thirdly, I discuss how plan 
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violations are integrally connected to planning for violations, i.e. developing 
planning frameworks that incorporate plan violations. This is demonstrated by 
drawing on three specific examples: the practice of section 14-A of the KTCP Act; 
the current Master Plan 2005-2015 process; and the Regularization Act (which is 
an amendment to the KTCP Act regularizing illegal developments). While plan 
violations operate through the manipulation of policies, offices and procedures, 
planning for violations legalizes the illegal outcomes. The latter moves from 
outcomes to policy making and erases the line between legality and illegality. 
Plan violations and planning violations together form what I call planning for 
private-interest outcomes in vernacular governance. 
 
Drawing on interviews with a wide range of actors who participate in the 
planning network in Bangalore, I show that these processes operate through the 
various micro-political networks that inhabit the planning, political and 
administrative spheres in Bangalore. I will argue that these specific processes 
can be identified as governance processes that support private-interest 
outcomes through appropriating policies and institutional processes as well as 
devising appropriate policies and institutional processes to suit their 
requirements. Such a governance process exemplifies the idea of vernacular 
governance outlined in Chapter 2. I will show that this network amends the 
planning system in practice to suit the interests of the actors. This elaborate 
network of actors and procedures, operating at a specific cost, integrates people 
from both inside and outside the government - property owners, developers, 
intermediaries, local engineers, local councilors and planners - to work around 
the laws, procedural frameworks and institutional processes to support private-
interest outcomes. It will be evident that this network does not operate to 
exercise state power in any formal fashion; instead, the network’s actors are 
engaged in what Harris-White (2005) has called self-employment while 
exercising their governing powers. In other words, I argue that the actors in this 
network support each other’s requirements by drawing upon their position in 
the socio-political system. 
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5.2 Urban morphology and land-use change in Koramangala  
The Koramangala neighbourhood lies on the southeast Bangalore within the 
BBMP limits. Koramangala is one of Bangalore’s vibrant urban districts (Map 5, 
p172; Map 6, p173) with a varied land-use profile. The definition of 
Koramangala neighbourhood, its boundary and limits usually vary according to 
who defines it and for what purpose.114 The Koramangala Planning District 
comprises of four BBMP wards (Koramangala, Ejipura, Austin Town and 
Neelasandra) and is home to 178,784 people in 7.45 square kilometres (BDA 
2007).115   
 
The Koramangala layout was master planned in the 1960s and implemented in 
various phases by the CITB and later by the BDA by acquiring large tracts of 
farmland. Based on the KTCP Act and the Master Plan, an urban neighbourhood 
was created through engineering and transforming agrarian land to suit urban 
living conditions, i.e. to create space for varied types of employment, 
institutions, housing and entertainment. The making of the Koramangala layout 
exemplifies the state-led planning system established by the 1961 KTCP Act. 
Every parcel of land and road width has been earmarked for specific uses based 
on the planning standards and its transformation is controlled using the 
planning institutional apparatus. Over the last four decades, sites were allotted 
to various applicants after the implementation of each phase. A new social 
geography developed in the place of a rural community. 
 
                                                     
114
 Spatially the urban district can be described as enclosed by large parcels of public land to its east 
(army land uses), south (the state police) and northwest (a military school). Many significant city and 
regional transport connectors cross the wider Koramangala (refer to maps and drawings). For 
example, National Highway No. 7 (NH 7) defines the western boundary of the Koramangala Planning 
District; the intermediate ring road (or 100 Feet Road) cuts through the neighbourhood, connecting 
the NH 7 to the south with the NH 4 to the east. This road also links Koramangala with a vibrant 
residential neighbourhood called Indira Nagar to its east. Similarly, Sarjapur Road, while forming the 
southern boundary to Koramangala, connects to the NH 7 in the west and to the outer ring road in the 
east.  Moreover, an 80-foot wide road forming the spine of the planning district also links it to 
Bangalore’s central business district to the north. In short, through various local and regional 
connectors, Koramangala neighbourhood is integrated into the east, central and south of the city. 
115
 Various wards within Koramangala have different density profiles. For example the Koramangala 
Ward has 35,359 people in 3.71 square kilometres and the neighbouring Ejipura Ward, 29,105 people 
in 1.61 square kilometres.  However the gross density of 234 pph is comparable to the central BBMP 
gross density of 200 pph. 
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BBMP: Zones Map 
Source: www.bbmp.gov.in 
BBMP: 198 Wards 
Source: www.bbmp.gov.in 
Koramangala Ward  
Source: Google Maps 
Map 5 
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Source: RMP 2015, BDA (2007) 
Land Use Classification     Area         % 
  
Map 8 
Mestripalya Lake 
noted as Vacant 
Land 
Third Block Park 
175 
 
Even though Koramangala Village has been within the BDA Master Plan 
boundary since the 1960s, it was only annexed by the BBMP in the mid-1990s. 
Many older residents of Koramangala recall that until the annexation, there 
were no proper roads or drains and there were still orchards and farming on 
many parcels of land. During my discussions about the transformations in 
Koramangala, many of them remembered their days as school children when 
they picked fruits from the orchards.  
 
Rajaram, one of my interviewees, and who runs his own construction business 
in Koramangala, described the transformation of Koramangala through the 
story of his own family. He lives in the middle of one of the well laid out 
Koramangala blocks in a sprawling mansion. In 1955, his grandfather moved 
out of Koramangala Village and bought 5.5 acres of land nearby which they later 
expanded to 15 acres on which they had grape vines, guava plants, papaya and a 
dairy farm. They had 12 cows and used to supply milk to the households in 
Koramangala neighbourhood. Some other interviewees in Koramangala fondly 
remember the days when they used to buy milk from Rajaram’s family.   
 
In 1965, the CITB gave notice of its intention to acquire the land for developing 
the Koramangala layout. When the final notification came in 1969, Rajaram’s 
family objected to it and petitioned to the court against the acquisition. In order 
to avoid forcible land acquisition, the entire family moved from the village and 
settled on the farmland. Even though they fought the case until 1972, they 
eventually lost. However, with their political connections they managed to get 
the CITB to restore six acres of the acquired land to the family’s ownership 
which enabled them to retain parts of their orchards. They continued to sell 
fruits and milk to the neighbourhood until the early 1980s.  Rajaram noted that, 
“We were in the middle of a developing layout. Koramangala Village had 
no sanitation when it was handed over to the BBMP even though the tax 
structure changed after it became part of the city corporation. When 
people came to this area, there were no facilities. So, many families were 
still buying milk from us. I still remember the first man to build a house 
in this block; he is still very close to us. I got involved in construction 
activities, because when I was growing up during the late 1980s and 
1990s, construction activities were beginning in Koramangala. This was 
natural local employment for me, so I started taking up contracting” 
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(Interview with a Local resident who is also a [Material removed to 
protect privacy], Koramangala, August 2010; see Appendix 1, no. 
[Material removed to protect privacy]).   
 
If this was the perspective of very long-time residents of Koramangala, the 
perspective of those who moved to the new BDA layouts in the 1980s and 
1990s was dominated by nostalgia for the peace, tranquility and quietness of a 
suburb.  Many people who moved to the Koramangala layouts later were also 
looking for a peaceful part of Bangalore to settle down, for some to lead a 
retired life.116     Many Koramangalites remember that, until the mid-1980s, auto 
rickshaws usually would not take passengers from the central city into 
Koramangala late at night because they would not be able to attract a return 
fare. Some of the following quotes from my interviewees living in different parts 
of Koramangala demonstrate how Koramangala was a quiet and sleepy suburb 
until recently:   
“When I moved here in the 1980s the whole area was like a marshland. It 
was a tank bed. You couldn’t see much water then, but you could see 
marshes and cows grazing” (Lead Activist and Local Resident: 
Koramangala Initiative, Koramangala; see Appendix 1, no.1). 
 
“When I was allotted this site, there was nothing here. It was like things 
have been run over by a bulldozer; there were hardly any trees, bare 
land. Roads have been constructed and sites were marked, this was late 
1970s”,  (Lead Activist of Koramangala Initiative and local resident, 
Koramangala; see Appendix 1, no.20). 
 
“Koramangala then was very famous for mosquitoes from the wetlands”, 
(Local resident who is a lead activist in Koramangala and Right to 
Information Activist in Bangalore; see Appendix 1, no.23). 
 
“In 1994 there was nothing here except my house - even though this was 
a BDA layout, amenities were lacking - we didn’t have proper roads, 
drains - nothing. It was a ragi field then. 117 Only one bus used to come 
down to Koramangala - that too once in an hour - people had to walk one 
to two kilometres to get to their house from the Hosur Road, where the 
bus stopped, and water supply was a problem. [Because] the third and 
fourth blocks were VIP blocks, their roads got asphalted and their water 
supply improved much quicker” (ibid). 
 
                                                     
116
 Bangalore was also known until recently as a pensioner’s paradise.   
117
 Ragi means Millet 
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“In 1989, I bought this plot - it was 250 Rupees a square foot; now it is 
15,000”. (Local Resident Welfare Association Activist, Koramangala; see 
Appendix 1, no.12) 
 
“Fifteen years back, Koramangala had empty roads - nobody on the 
roads after 6 pm.  Hardly any traffic, hardly any street lights, it will be 
quiet - the BDA complex was there - that’s pretty much it - you wouldn’t 
like to walk alone in the evening” (Journalist and resident of 
Koramangala; February 2009; see Appendix 1, no.37).  
 
Koramangala transformed from the idyllic village of the in the 1980s and the 
quiet suburb of the mid-1990s into one of the most sought after residential and 
business locations in Bangalore by the turn of the 21st century. Currently a 
wide range of land uses can be identified in Koramangala, including a medical 
college, research and educational establishments, a police academy, a military 
school, large commercial centres, various kinds of business and industrial 
establishments, large lakes and open spaces, along with a wide range of 
residential typologies that include urban villages, revenue layouts, BDA housing 
plots, apartments and slums.  Residential land use composes about 45% of the 
Koramangala Planning District (BDA 2005). While many of the large 
institutional land uses were conceived in the main Master Plan, many 
commercial and business establishments were the result of the recent 
transformations. The planning decisions on infrastructure by a range of 
institutional actors and wider strategies on the allocation of land uses have 
played an important part in this transformation, especially in the planning of 
roads and employment land uses in Bangalore.118    
                                                     
118
 Many authors have demonstrated that the growth of the IT sector in Bangalore is the result of a 
combination of the emergence of private enterprise and massive state-led industrial promotion 
(Parthasarathy 2000; Heitzman 2004; Sotarouta and Srinivas 2006). Karnataka State Electronics 
Corporation (KEONICS) was established by the Government of Karnataka (GoK) in 1976 in order to 
encourage the electronics industry in the state. In 1977, KEONICS established Electronic City 18 km 
south of Bangalore on 136 hectares of land to attract export-oriented industries. In 1987, the 
Department of Electronics of the Government of India (GoI), established one of their initial Software 
Technology Parks within Electronic City to promote export-oriented offshore software production 
through significant government support for high-speed connectivity, reliable infrastructure, tax breaks 
and tariff-free equipment imports (Heitzman, 2004). By the late 1990s with the involvement of 
KIADB, Electronic City was further expanded by more than 200 hectares which enabled a large 
number of software companies to operate from inside. Further in the late 1990s a new joint venture 
between the GoK, GoI, Government of Singapore, and Indian (Tata Group) and Singapore private-
sector corporations established the Information Technology Park Limited (ITPL) in east Bangalore on 
about 22 hectares of land in a place called Whitefield. This project was inaugurated in 2000 (Ibid). 
These large industrial parks were connected to the city through Koramangala. The 1991 
Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) proposed to widen Hosur Road which connected 
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The IT boom in that began in Bangalore in the 1990s is widely believed to have 
triggered the transformation of Koramangala.119 A lack of required office space 
resulted in the conversion of residential buildings into workplaces. The IT 
sector enjoyed a special tax break in Karnataka irrespective of their location. 
This encouraged a number of small operators to work from within the city 
rather than only from Electronic City. Koramangala was also an attractive 
residential location for a large number of employees working in Electronic City 
and Whitefield.120 This increased the residential population density in 
Koramangala after the mid-1990s.121   
 
Subsequently, the aggregate consumer demand driven by the high-earning IT 
professionals that developed in Koramangala triggered demand for retail space. 
Forum shopping mall was inaugurated in 2004 and the properties along the 
main spine (80 and 100 Feet Road –Map 6, p173) and interior roads started 
transforming rapidly with retail superstores selling consumer durables, food 
markets, cafe, hotels, gyms and restaurants. A large number of apartments and 
serviced apartments sprang up in Koramangala during the late 1990s and 
2000s.  An estate agent who had been working in Koramangala for the last 25 
years noted that the average residential land value in Koramangala in 2000 was 
about 1,400 INR per square foot. This increased to about 10,000 INR in 2007 
and in some blocks, especially parts of the third and fourth blocks with large 
                                                                                                                                                      
Koramangala to Electronic City and to expand the intermediate ring road that linked Koramangala to 
NH 4 to the east (Map 6, p172). Koramangala, as many observers (interviews: various) have noted, 
became the first point of entry from Electronic City into the city. Therefore, many IT companies who 
wanted to retain their city offices started operating from Koramangala, alongside small IT companies 
and many start-ups that provided services and developed products,.   
119
 Almost all of my interviewees identified the IT sector as the major trigger for the transformation of 
Koramangala. For a detailed discussion of IT sector development in Bangalore and related 
transformations see Balaji (2000), Heitzman (2004), Nair (2005)  
120
 Refer to Map 6. 
121
 The RMP 2015 states that the gross density in Koramangala in 2005 was 254 persons per hectare 
(pph) compared to Bangalore’s gross residential density of 200 pph. The document further states that 
if one were to deduct large open spaces, roads and large campuses, the net density of Koramangala 
was more than 500 pph  (source). Wards and planning districts were reorganized in Bangalore 
between 2001 and 2011 which makes it difficult to identify the exact population growth rate in the 
Koramangala Planning District or even in Koramangala Ward. The reorganized Koramangala ward 
has a population of 35,354, according to BBMP data. (www.bbmp.gov.in). 
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plots, it even reached  14,000 INR (Multiple interviews; see Appendix 1, no.50, 
51, 52, 53,54). 122   
 
The urban morphology of Koramangala today is a combination of the initial BDA 
layout and its subsequent transformations. The BDA layouts are only one of the 
distinct types that constitute the varied urban morphology of Koramangala.  
There are urban villages such as Kathalipalya, Mestripalya, Agara and 
Koramangala Village that were exempted from land acquisition in the 1960s 
and 1970s because the BDA Act exempted inhabited land and village lands from 
compulsory acquisition. A large number of people live inside these village 
settlements and their extensions at present.123 
                                                     
122
 The RMP 2015 declares that it does not have information on the land value for major parts of 
Koramangala. (BDA 2005- Master Plan draft- vision document). Land value varies according to the 
plot size as well. 
123
 The CITB/BDA designed eight blocks (distinct layouts) and implemented these in different phases 
in the last 40 years (from 1970s).  The blocks are divided into residential plots of standard sizes like 
30’ X 40’, 60’ X 40’, 80’ X 120’, 50’ X 80’ and 60’ X 90’. The third block is the most expensive and 
prestigious among all the other blocks due to the presence of large plots that are favoured by the 
wealthy. As a number of my interviewees noted, the 13
th
 Main Road is locally referred to as the 
“millionaires’ road” because it houses some of the wealthiest people in Bangalore and in India 
(Multiple Interviews with Koramangala residents). All the other blocks have a range of plot sizes to 
accommodate a variety of economic categories. For example, the 8
th 
and 6
th
 blocks have a large 
number of 30’ X 40’ and 20’ X 30’ plots which are popular with the middle- and lower-middle class 
population. About 50% of the 1
st
 Block was zoned as industrial, while most of 2nd Block was 
earmarked for public institutions like colleges and schools. The rest of the blocks had predominantly 
residential plots, with parks, playgrounds and civic amenities forming the centre of the layouts. In 
keeping with the neighbourhood planning philosophy, the blocks are formed out of a rigorous 
hierarchy of roads that form a grid network of main roads for connectivity and thoroughfare and of 
cross internal roads. A small range of standard road widths and layout patterns are used to define 
internal and external connectivity. For example, most of the cross roads are conceived as internal 
roads and are usually 30 feet wide, while the main roads can vary from 60 to 80 feet wide. A number 
of plots near the main connector roads were earmarked for public functions like schools, a police 
station, a post office etc. Standards of the master plan are based on the standards prescribed in the 
Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act (KTCP) Act 1961 and the BDA Act 1976 with 
proportionate space for residential, parks and playgrounds and civic amenities and affordable housing. 
In most parts of Koramangala, BDA layouts are reasonably well implemented with tree-lined 
sidewalks, roads, drains and a sewage network.   
 
The morphology of a village settlement on the other hand is very distinct. For example, it had its own 
village lakes and sacred groves. These village settlements were trapped between the BDA layouts 
without adequate facilities for expansion and became embedded in the local transformations. The 
village settlements are now an affordable housing option for many informal service sector employees, 
such as drivers, cooks and gardeners, who support middle class living in the nearby BDA layouts.  
These areas have narrow roads, insufficient sanitation facilities and inadequate social infrastructure. 
Even though many lakes still exist, many of them have been reclaimed by the BDA or the Karnataka 
Housing Board (KHB) for residential and infrastructure development. For example, Koramangala 
Lake was reclaimed by the KHB to build the National Games Village in 1996 and the Srinivagulu 
Tank was reclaimed by the BDA for the ST Bed residential Layout. Mestripalya Tank still remains as 
vacant land, while Agara and Bellandur lakes still continue to function as lakes/tanks. The sacred 
grove lands have been used for the BDA layouts or have been encroached. The transformation of the 
180 
 
There are also developments built on agricultural lands that many landowner 
families like that of Rajaram managed to restore or exempt from forced 
acquisition. These properties were developed into residential layouts, 
apartments or commercial spaces either by a developer or through a joint 
venture between a developer and the landowner via a legal facility that allows 
the landowner to give power of attorney to the developer to build on his/her 
land. Moreover, the demand for space that descended upon Koramangala due to 
its increased connectivity and quality of infrastructure since the 1990s has 
transformed the land uses in the neighbourhood beyond the 1995 CDP’s land-
use controls (Map 6, 7 and 8; p173, 174, 175).124 The 80 Feet and 100 Feet 
roads have now become vibrant commercial and employment corridors and 
there are many large office buildings, apartments, serviced apartments, and 
commercial establishments on various plots along the corridors, contrary to 
1995 CDP land-use zoning. Many plots have been converted from residential 
and industrial land use to office spaces, gyms, call centres, coffee shops, nursery 
schools and various other activities. A large number of these conversions were 
illegal, i.e. did not follow the required planning permission process. Alongside 
individual landowners, the government has also been transforming 
Koramangala in ways that deviate from the 1995 CDP land use zoning, for 
example, the wetlands of Koramangala Lake was changed to    housing for 
National Games Village or the residential layout on Srivagulu Tank Bed. A 
                                                                                                                                                      
village lands and lakes are discussed in detail in the next chapter, exemplified by the case of 
Mestripalya Lake , Chapter 6.5.2 
 
 
124
 The Revised Master Plan (RMP) 2015 for Bangalore notes that:  “Today, Koramangala planning 
district is an established residential area, with high level commercial activity along the main streets, 
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planning district area is used for large public and semipublic infrastructure that prevail as campus 
development.  Proportionate pockets of industrial areas have contributed to a sizeable small-scale 
manufacturing and IT business.  This planning district is strategically located near the city centre; IT 
related areas and peripheral city developments” (BDA - RMP 2015, VOL5, p 63). 
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detailed documentation of illegal and legal conversion is unfeasible and beyond 
the scope of this research. In the sections below, I discuss the processes that 
were involved in these transformations through mapping specific projects and 
practice stories.    
   
5.3 Plan violations 
 
5.3.1 Violations by individual property owners.   
Many current residents in the wider Koramangala neighbourhood are 
discomforted by these transformations in Koramangala for a variety of reasons 
and this has made them into local activists.125 One of my interviewees, Mr 
Kumar, a resident of Koramangala neighbourhood since the early 1990s, took 
up local social activism in response to the state of the infrastructure in his 
neighbourhood and the extensive number of violations that he came across. He 
calls himself an RTI activist- i.e. he obtains information about projects and 
processes in his neighbourhood using provisions of the Right to Information Act 
(RTI) to challenge violations and unimplemented projects.  
 
He shared with me numerous responses that he received from the authorities 
for his RTI application about the legal status of many developments in his 
neighbourhood. 126 The information declared either that there were no plans 
available for the development (which means there was no planning application) 
or that there had not been any change of land use approved on the property 
(which means permission had not been given to convert agricultural land use 
into residential land use). Those land parcels are now commercial buildings, 
office blocks, service apartments, clinics and so on. He noted, 
“Owners of many of these cases don’t live here. So they are not affected 
by the choking of the service lines, traffic or noise or anything. Only, we 
are affected. For example, for my house here, 8KW line was sanctioned 
[granted]. For a commercial development it would be [at least] 30-40 
KW. So how is that going to affect the local transformer load? Currently 
there are more than six transformers in this small area [around his 
house]”.  (Interview with a Local resident and lead activist in 
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 The various reasons are discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
126
 Reference to RTI applications numbers are not provided here to prevent the identity of projects and 
interviewee.  
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Koramangala who is also a Right to Information Activist in Bangalore; 
see Appendix 1, no.23) 
 
This state of affairs and the scale of violations became an aspect of public debate 
when, in 2005, a group of residents from Koramangala filed a Public Interest 
Litigation in the High Court of Karnataka against the land-use violations in their 
neighbourhood after their repeated representations to the various authorities 
were ignored.127 The petitioners pointed out 87 specific cases of violation in 
Koramangala as examples to make their point and requested that the court 
intervene in the matter. Sites of violation included hotels, restaurants, coffee 
shops, a clinic, nursing homes, IT offices, call centres, retail shops, commercial 
complexes, a beauty salon, a vehicle repair shop, religious centres, educational 
institutions, nurseries, day care centres and travel agents. They also cited a 
number of cases where their objections to the change of land use public 
notifications had been ignored by the authorities while granting permission.  
 
They also highlighted cases of street and pavement encroachments. Pavement 
encroachments are common in Koramangala, even in posh residential areas and 
along the high streets. While restaurants and cafes encroach on public streets 
with kiosks and sometimes with large building extensions, some wealthy 
residential owners treat the pavements in front of their houses as their front 
gardens and place ornamental plants and lay lawns and sometimes even cordon 
off the entire pavement stretch with a chain fence.   
 
Based on this petition, the High Court directed the BBMP to conduct a detailed 
survey of the neighbourhood and report back to the court.128 A report was 
submitted to the court that was jointly prepared by the BBMP and BDA. During 
the hearing, the BBMP commissioner admitted that all the 87 cases mentioned 
in the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) were violations.129 The interim order 
states that “in some cases the zonal regulations have been violated while in 
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 W.P 13336 of 2005, in High Court of Karnataka between Vijayan Menon and others against state 
of Karnataka and others (Menon 2005) 
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 By a two-judge bench vide an interim order dated 23.06.2005.  The final report of this survey is 
missing from the BBMP office; a number of interviewees mentioned it to me. 
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 As mentioned in the Interim Order on 02/09/2005. 
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others the sanctioned plans have been violated and in some others building 
setbacks are violations of the rules” (Interim order signed by Chief Justice 
Menon 2005, p.1).  In many cases, it seems that the violators have also obtained 
retrospective change of land use from the BDA after this PIL was filed. So the 
court directed that all the change of land use applications filed before the 
government after April 1st, 2005 to be filed for the following hearing and also 
ordered the state government to refrain from approving anymore changes of 
land use within Koramangala until further orders (ibid). 
 
I asked a number of senior planners and administrators about how people 
manage to violate so openly and on such a large scale. Not surprisingly, the 
accounts given by them were similar (I attribute this to their depth of 
understanding of this process from decades of practice). One of them told me “It 
is easy, the engineers will tell you how to go about it” (Multiple interviews with 
senior planners and administrators in Government; see Appendix 1). To 
paraphrase the commonalities among these accounts, the first task is to start 
the construction work after taking care 130 of the local engineer and the local 
councilor. Then in many cases the engineer will serve a ‘show cause notice’, as 
they are supposed to do, asking the property owner to explain to the local 
authority why they should not demolish the property. This makes it official that 
the engineer has performed his/her duty as per his/her contract of 
employment. In most cases things will end there and the owners who are 
willing to take the risk (of for example a new engineer or a new councilor 
following this up later) then usually complete the construction. However, those 
who want additional assurances will go to the court, seeking a stay from the 
demolition. Usually the court will grant the stay until the hearing is complete, 
because people cannot be evicted from their abode on human rights grounds. 
The court, however, will not stall the construction work. The judicial stay will 
prohibit the demolition, while the property owner will continue with his/her 
work and complete it in whichever form they want. The legal cell in the BBMP 
has to work in tandem with other officials in the BBMP and BDA to vacate the 
judicial stay to go ahead with any action. However, no one will follow this up 
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later. Moreover, there is enough interest within the authority not to follow this 
up given that the engineers, the local politicians and other officials have been 
taken care of. So the project gets built and the owner may let it out, live there or 
sell it and move on. After the building is sold to someone else, then, even if the 
stay is vacated, the original owner would have moved on. It was pointed out to 
me that the number of such cases is very large and that any legal action at any 
time is almost impossible. When I made an RTI application to the high court 
requesting the number of cases that came before the High Court on violations 
since 2000, I received the reply that the number was too high and that there 
were not enough resources in the court to produce an account for me. 
 
In the case of those developments that do not resort to the protection of the stay 
order from the court, many forms of local negotiations prevent them from 
demolition. Mr Kumar, for example, narrated to me the story of one such a large 
commercial building in his neighbourhood.  
  
“Let me tell you the [name of the development removed] story itself. 
Earlier this was under Jakkasandra Grampanchayat [village government] 
– they got their plan sanction [permission]through the Panchayat, even 
though it was a BMP area. The owner bribed the corporator [councillor] 
to keep quiet. Even if we complain, the official has to take action, [but] 
the elected representative will ask the official to keep quiet. Both of them 
will benefit out of it.  While constructing, [the owner] told us that he was 
building an apartment complex. He knew we might create trouble for 
him [if he told us the truth]. Then he built the commercial development.  
He had also installed a cooling tower, which was [not only] spraying the 
coolant in the neighbourhood [but also] making a lot of noise. We 
complained, but nothing happened. We also showed this to the [title of 
the very high political authority figure]. However, by then they repaired 
the coolant problem. But the building is clearly one floor more than the 
sanctioned plan. The [higher political authority figure] came here for 
inspection- he asked his officers if all of it was regular [legal]. Then he 
asked if the right tax have [sic] been collected. So he asked for the file. 
[That was the end of it.] [Later,] we heard in the evening that they came 
to some agreement. Initially the [higher political authority figure] was 
like- how can all this happen- shut this, shut that and so on; but then 
things got resorted well for them. Otherwise they should have 
demolished one floor” (Interview- Local resident and lead activist in 
Koramangala; see Appendix 1, no.23) 
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Parallel governance systems established by the network of politicians, land 
owners, developers and officials as seen above is so strong that it not only 
protects the violations that are established through them, but is also the mode 
of governance through which planning permission process is practiced. Even 
the planning permission process of an entirely legal development in Bangalore 
involves incentivizing the actors in the planning network – in particular the 
officials and local power brokers such as the councilor, local politicians and the 
local engineer - as one of my interviewees put it - “to stop stopping the project” 
(Interview, property developer, August 2010, see Appendix 1, no.51).  A friend 
who runs a property development company in Bangalore told me that the last 
time (in 2010) when s/he made an enquiry at the BBMP, the going rate was 50 
INR per square feet for a normal and legal building sanction, i.e. about 5% of the 
total building cost. S/he suggested that of this, less than a third is the actual 
processing fee; the rest will is a bribe for the engineers to process the 
application in the normal time. Many developers I spoke to claimed that without 
this incentive the cost of the project would increase due to the inevitable delay 
in the planning permission process.  They note that a file does not move from 
one table to another automatically, it needs to be moved by human beings, and 
this incentive is the oil that lubricates the machine.   
 
There are specific rates (bribe) for different land uses and categories of building 
types. For residential buildings, the incentives are based on the number of 
kitchen in the scheme. For example, my friend tells me that for many parts of 
Bangalore, the rate for a normal, single family residential unit have come to 
about 35 INR per square feet. The rates include bribes to approve even a legal 
plan in the normal and legal time frame. Further, due to the multiple clearances 
required, incentives need to be given to almost all agencies: land revenue, 
BBMP, BDA, BWSSB, Fire Authority, Airport Authority and so on depending on 
the kinds of agencies that a particular project has to interact with (Multiple 
interviews: architects, planning agents and real estate agents; see Appendix 1). 
 
However, in the case of violations it was pointed out to me that there is no fixed 
price; instead it is entirely based on negotiation at different stages with a wide 
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range of actors - the middle-men, local engineers, politicians and 
administrators.  In most cases employing a well-connected and experienced 
middle-man would ensure that the client would have an easy process of 
negotiation and plan sanction in the normal timeframe. This governance 
network is so powerful that officials interested in opting out of this network 
cannot easily take enforcement action. One very senior civil servant in BBMP 
notes, 
“In a neighbourhood if two or three buildings violate then usually 
everyone builds whatever they want to build. If an officer goes there to 
ask why they have constructed violating the norms, they will be pointed 
to the neighbouring buildings and would be asked why was that 
allowed? The local politicians will argue that you didn’t stop that because 
it was your political boss’s friend- isn’t it? So the engineers take 
whatever they get and come back. They don’t want to irritate the local 
politician, because they will challenge the engineers to demolish that 
[the neighbouring building] first.  It is really difficult” (Interview-Very 
Senior Administrator: BBMP; see Appendix 1, no.101). 
 
Not all kinds of plan violations are always enabled through micro-negotiations 
with street level bureaucracy and local politicians alone. Blatant violation of 
planning laws and legal processes are employed by this planning network that 
implicates the entire institutional apparatus. The following discussion on large 
development layouts attempts to describe that. 
  
5.3.2 Private layouts  
Such mutual benefit associational networks formed among government and 
non-government actors for private benefit are exemplified in the case of illegal 
layouts and large projects.  Many different types of illegal layouts can be found 
in Bangalore. A legal layout is that which follows all the clauses in the Land 
Revenue Act, the KTPC Act, BDA Act and Master plan stipulations discussed in 
Chapter 4. Any development that violates any one of these clauses can be 
termed an illegal layout. Many types of illegal layouts in Bangalore violate all or 
some of these criteria. In the case of agricultural land parcels, some 
developments are built neither with a conversion approval nor a layout 
approval; some others obtain conversion approval but then refrain from 
applying for a layout approval.  Similarly there are layouts that neither obtains a 
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change of land use nor a layout approval, while some others would obtain a 
change of land use approval, but then would forego layout approval. Some 
would obtain all these approvals but would build in complete violation of the 
approved plans and would refrain from transferring the land for amenities and 
open spaces to the BDA ownership. A large number of properties within the 
Master Plan limit of Bangalore belong to illegal layouts. In a 2006 newspaper 
article, one of the serving planners from BDA wrote that the spatial-data 
infrastructure prepared as part of the RMP 2005 indicates that more than 
300Sq Kms of built scape within the Master Plan boundary is unauthorized 
development.131 In the following two subsections I discuss the case of two types 
of private layouts. 
 
5.3.2.1 Edwardian Estates 
Let’s take the case of a large upper middle class apartment complex in 
Koramangala along the Sarjapur Road named Edwardian Estates (EE).132  EE is 
currently one among the many expensive upper middle class residential 
properties in Bangalore. In September 2012, a 1800 square feet three bedroom 
property is offered for sale at 12,000,000 INR133, at a rate of about 6500 INR per 
square foot. Property advertisement websites about EE proclaim that  
“Edwardian Estates is a residential address that delights. The posh, 
upmarket neighbourhood of Koramangala 3rd block provides the setting.  
The apartments speak opulent detailing [sic], spaciousness and comfort.  
In fact, EE is unequalled in its exclusivity”. (Source: a popular Bangalore 
real estate property website, source not identified) 
 
Advertisements of this three-acre residential complex boast of high-end 
amenities such as a club house with card room, table tennis room, beautiful 
landscaped garden, advanced security system, continuous lift services powered 
by onsite generators, decorative main gates, round the clock water supply with 
underground storage tank and bore wells, health club, swimming pool, gym, 
children’s play area, intercom facility, and well laid out internal roads. Initially 
the site plan of this three-acre development proposed three residential blocks 
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of varying heights, between 8-10 stories, housing more than 150 residential 
apartments and supporting amenities.134 Architecturally, it is best described as 
an eclectic, post-modern kitsch providing the much sought after distinction for 
the upwardly mobile middle class in urban India that Bhatia (1994) aptly 
described as Punjabi Baroque about two decades ago. During the time of my 
fieldwork in 2010, two blocks with more than 100 apartments were completed 
and occupied, while the third building was under construction. I had to go 
through a manned security gate to meet a resident owner, Dr Raj who was one 
of my interviewees. 135 
 
EE is built on a land that was originally earmarked for a light industrial land-use 
zone in the 1991 CDP. The well-known developer group of EE entered into a 
joint venture agreement with the original landowners in the early 1990s based 
on a General Power of Attorney (GPA). GPA is one of the usual joint venture 
methods through which developers enter into agreement with landowners to 
develop the land in lieu for a share of the development that compensates for the 
land value.  Later, the developers applied to the BDA to change the land-use 
classification from industrial to residential which enabled them to build 
apartments on the land. Based on the provisions in the KTCP Act, the BDA on 
behalf of the GoK approved this request by issuing a commencement certificate 
dated 14/09/1994.136  This change of land use to residential from industrial 
however was based on the condition that “the development plan [the layout 
design] of the intended group housing residential scheme has to be approved by 
the authority” (source: see footnote 24). 
However, the developers of EE started marketing the scheme based on a master 
plan that promised three large blocks of residential buildings with open spaces 
and amenities without obtaining any layout approval from the BDA. Dr Raj tells 
me,  
“When we booked the flat in 1999 we were showed [sic] basic project 
Brochure with three blocks, and landscapes and tennis courts and so on, 
with two entries [sic] into the building complex and we entered into an 
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agreement in 2001 that said that we will also have a share of the 
undivided land” (interview, August 2010, see Appendix 1, no.17).   
 
The first block was completed and handed over to the residents in 2004 and the 
subsequently the second one also was completed and handed over to the 
buyers, however, without obtaining any layout approval from the BDA (thus 
making the project an illegal layout).  In spite of this, the BBMP issued planning 
permission for the first phase of the project in 2001by violating the planning 
law. 137  Furthermore in 2004, the BBMP issued an Occupation Certificate for 
more than seventy completed apartments in the development after regularizing 
the deviations, which the BBMP noted was less than 5% of the total floor area. 
Even though it was in violation, the building had also obtained water, sewerage 
and electricity connections from the respective departments that enabled the 
residents to occupy their apartments.   
 
Dr Raj notes that when he purchased the property he did not know about the 
illegal status of the project. The only vague hint that he can remember now in 
hindsight was that when he initially approached his regular Bank – Bank of 
Baroda - the bank was not very keen to offer him a mortgage for an apartment 
inside this scheme. However, when he mentioned this to the developer, the 
developer’s group arranged him to speak to another Bank (ICICI bank) which 
very willingly approved his mortgage application. Dr Raj argues that, the 
residents knew about the complexities of the project only when they 
investigated a rumour that commercial units were to be built in the complex. 
Worried at the impact that this could have on their rights to undivided share of 
land and the amenities, Dr Raj along with a couple of other residents in the 
complex approached the authorities for the details.  Dr Raj notes,    
“One fine day, the developer’s engineers covered the portion in front 
with temporary walls and put up a notice saying that they are covering 
the area for the safety of our children, because they were prefabricating 
some building elements on that site. But then we heard that some 
commercial complex is going to come up here, on our land. So we wrote 
to the BBMP and BDA in October 2005 itself. None of them replied” 
(interview, August 2010, see Appendix 1, no.17) 
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However, when they replied much later in 2006, they found out that,  
“The developer had sub-divided the land, didn’t intend to build the third 
block, and started building a commercial complex in its place and where 
the park was supposed to be. I filed an RTI petition to the revenue officer 
for the Katha of the whole property. Files from the revenue department 
shows that the plot has been subdivided, however, without BDA 
permission, in violation of the 17A of the KTCP Act” (ibid) 
 
In September 2005, before even completing all the residential buildings that 
were promised in the marketing brochure, the developers subdivided the land 
where the third block was originally supposed to be. The developers neither 
took permission from the BDA nor informed the residents about the change to 
the project. Furthermore, the developers obtained planning permission from 
the BBMP to build a five-storied commercial complex on this portion of the land 
that fronts the Sarjapur Road. However, the BBMP did not have the required 
authority either to approve a plan for a commercial building on land designated 
as residential or to grant the land subdivision. Section 17A of the KTCP Act 1961 
vests such authority with the BDA. According to the copy of the planning 
application for the commercial building submitted by the developer to the 
BBMP (obtained by my interviewee through the RTI Act), it was evident that the 
developer had not mentioned anything about the residential development 
behind. The drawing clearly masks many details about the context. For example, 
the vehicular entry for the proposed commercial building is the original exit and 
entry for the residential buildings, where the drinking water sump for the 
residential blocks is located. The developer even obtained clearance from other 
departments such as BESCOM. When Dr Raj and the other residents petitioned 
the BDA and BBMP about the situation, they received contrary information from 
these agencies. While, the BBMP held that the building is legal, the BDA 
maintained that the project had not completed its land-use change clearance. It 
was then that the residents realized that development could be illegal.   
 
At a hearing in front of the State Information Commissioner about this 
contradiction in plan approvals, the BBMP Planner who had approved the plans 
in the first place, claimed that, based on a circular issued in 1996 by the BBMP 
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commissioner, the BBMP have the right to permit commercial buildings in a 
light industrial zone. 138 The Information Commissioner, after careful 
consideration of the KTCP Act, KMC Act, and BDA Act, however, ruled that the 
circular that the BBMP planner had mentioned only authorizes the BBMP to 
permit ancillary activities to support industrial workers and that it clearly does 
not include commercial buildings. The commissioner ruled that “the circular is 
misconceived and not in accordance with either the letter or the spirit of both 
the KTCP Act and the byelaws of BBMP”, and declared that the BBMP has 
violated the planning law.139 After this order, the residents appealed to the 
BBMP to cancel the planning approval for the commercial building but the 
BBMP took no further action. On December 2006, Dr Raj filed a petition at the 
High Court of Karnataka in which he argued that the proposed commercial 
development was a violation of his rights as a resident in the development and 
that the plan and the license were illegally issued and granted without 
jurisdiction, ignoring the statutory provisions.140   
 
During the course of the hearing in August 2008, the developer decided to 
withdraw from litigation and hastily submitted an affidavit in the court 
declaring that he would not pursue the commercial complex project. Dr Raj 
argues that this sudden withdrawal was perhaps instigated by the High Court 
direction to implead the planner who originally approved the plan as a party to 
the case. Since this sort of action can be very damaging to a planner’s career, Dr 
Raj thought that the planner might have persuaded the developers to withdraw 
from the litigation. Subsequently, this affidavit put the litigation to rest, 
primarily because Dr Raj went to court to stop the construction of the 
commercial building. However, the illegal status of the building remained 
unchanged and unquestioned by anyone at the time my fieldwork in Bangalore 
ended in September 2010. After stopping the construction of the commercial 
building, Dr Raj was unclear abouts the implication of initiating a new Public 
Interest Litigation on the illegal status of the building given that hundreds of 
                                                     
138
 BBMP letter No.JDTP.Tech:405:96-97 dated 16.12.1996 
139
 Order issued by the Karnataka Information Commission, no.KIC358 COM2006. 
140
 Petition no 8396/2006 - High Court of Karnataka. 
192 
 
resident owners had also now become indirectly involved in this complex 
situation. 
 
Dr Raj tells me that when all of this was going on, he obtained a copy of another 
planning application which had been submitted to the BBMP for a ten-storied 
commercial building on the same plot (where the commercial building was to 
be built) of land. This application, filed in 2010, however, was in the name of 
another company, which seems to have entered into a joint venture with an 
employee of the original developer. This employee seems to have been the GPA 
holder for this land at the time of the new planning application. Dr Raj was 
aghast at the fact that the developer signed an affidavit to the court in 2009 that 
he is the competent authority for this plot of land and then later transferred his 
GPA to his employee who in turn applied for a planning permission in 2010.  Mr 
Raj remarks,  
“See how much they can make a Jilebi141 out of the situation.  When we 
were writing these letters to the developer and authorities, we also used 
to forward it [sic] to the original landowner with whom the developers 
entered into an agreement at the beginning. The original landowners of 
the property told us that they had withdrawn the power of attorney 
many years back and that there is already a court case on that from 
1998.142  This is on-going, and the court had asked the developers not to 
alienate the property from the original owner till the hearing is [sic] 
complete. Then we realized that all of us are now squatting on [someone 
else’s] property”. 143 (Interview, August 2010, see Appendix 1, no.17) 
 
Even though the developers maintained that legally they did not in any way 
breach an agreement with Dr Raj in their reply to the legal notice issued by Dr 
Raj’s lawyer, he was informally offered the opportunity to be rehoused in one of 
their newer and more valuable properties, in return for withdrawing the 
litigation. He politely declined the offer. Dr Raj told me,  
“You know, when we were filing the legal notices- the chief engineer – or 
marketing executive- will call me and say, ‘Sir, the new Master plan is 
coming- it is being printed- in it everything commercial can be built here.’ 
This was after our legal notice.  He said ‘neighbouring property is going to 
be commercial, what will you do then?’ Finally he said, ‘I am only an 
employee…but we don’t want our Doctor to be unhappy- so we will find 
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another place for you in our project as you want. And we will give very 
good value for your property.’  I said, no – ‘Mr Ramanna - Let me tell you – 
money is only for what is does- otherwise it is just paper- I have spent a lot 
of time and energy for this- I am not going to negotiate’” (ibid). 
 
Even though the preliminary draft of the new Master Plan was only being 
printed the developers had already started their construction, probably with the 
knowledge that the Sarjapur road was going to be a mutation corridor and that 
this proposal of the Master plan 2005-2015 would be approved by the 
government. The irony is that the planning permission for the commercial 
complex was issued by the BBMP much before the RMP 2015 was approved by 
the GoK in 2007.   
 
The many levels of violation in the case of EE are very obvious: violation of the 
land-use plan, of the planning law and the planning process and so on. A wide 
range of actors were involved in making this illegal project a reality in which 
hundreds of property owners have become stake holders leading to a very 
complicated situation. It is not just an unscrupulous developer who deceived 
the buyers. The planner in the BBMP issued planning permission interpreting a 
circular in a way that was clearly a violation of the KTCP Act. Further planning 
permission on the site was approved for a commercial building on an 
application that masked the details of the site and the respective banks 
approved mortgages to the property buyers after due diligence. Companies like 
the BWSSB, BESCOM provided utility connections and many property owners 
were able to purchase and register their property. Unlike Dr Raj and his small 
group, not many of the residents actually bothered to challenge the legality of 
the project. Everyone in this network seems to have benefitted from the deal. 
Such a tacit consensus was blatant and on a very high scale when I researched 
the private layouts on agricultural land, locally termed as revenue layouts.  
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5.3.2.2 Revenue layouts 
Revenue layouts are the developments on agricultural land parcels within the 
Master Plan boundary that have not obtained permission for non-agricultural 
use from the Revenue Department and the BDA.144 A large number of housing 
layouts in Bangalore including very prestigious high end residential layouts, 
middle class residential areas and public sector employee cooperative housing 
belong to the category of the revenue layouts. For example, one specific high-
end 100-acre residential layout in South East Bangalore did not obtain all 
required clearances before it was built and the initial process of sale.  This 
layout accommodates 600 villas and has palm tree-lined pavements and high-
end infrastructure and amenities; a four-bedroom villa of 4250 square feet was 
advertised for sale at 80,000,000 INR in 2012.145 One of my interviewees, a 
lawyer who carried out due diligence for one of his clients to purchase a 
property within this layout told me how surprised she was when she 
discovered that this development did not have all the required permissions 
(interview- Lawyer activist, see Appendix 1, no.32). Similarly, Ejipura, one of 
the main wards in Koramangala of middle class as well as lower middle class 
residential areas is dominated by revenue layouts. This is the case with 
extensions of the Koramangala, Kathalipalaya, and Mestripalya villages (Map 6 
p 173). A local engineer noted that revenue layouts can also be found within the 
broader boundary of the BDA blocks: for example, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th Block and ST 
Bed layout (interview, local engineer, August 2010; see Appendix 1, no.79). 
These are developments built on land parcels within the BDA layouts which 
were village sites or those that the BDA had not acquired or have been de-
notified during the acquisition process.146 
 
In 2008, while disposing of a writ petition on an illegal layout, the High Court of 
Karnataka directed the GoK to hold an enquiry into the formation of 
unauthorized layouts in Bangalore and submit a detailed report to the court 
within seven months (Reddy 2008). Subsequently, a task force was set up at the 
level of the Karnataka State Urban Development Department to document the 
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illegal layouts. Even though there was no specific documentation available from 
which illegal layouts could be identified, the task force within the time available 
identified 127 illegal layouts within the Bangalore Master Plan boundary.147 
These layouts ranged from a couple of acres to hundreds of acres. For example, 
the Bangalore Electronics Limited Employees House building Cooperative 
society (BEL HBCS number 27 in the BDA’s the list) is about 108 acres and 
Karnataka State Judicial Employees House Building Society layout is 193 acres 
in area. Hundreds of housing and various other forms of land uses have been 
built in this manner all across Bangalore. Even though some of these are vacant 
to enable land speculation, most of these developments have been occupied for 
a very long time, with roads, infrastructure and services connections. The list, 
not surprisingly, included a wide range of actors including many public sector 
employees’ cooperative housing, Karnataka Legislators (elected MLA) 
society148, small and large developers, individuals and even an Ex-Mayor of the 
BBMP. 149 The UDD directed the BDA, BBMP, and various other TMC, CMC and 
Village Panchayats to take stock of the situation and report to the government. 
One of my interviewees, a high-ranking bureaucrat who was closely involved in 
this process in the UDD told me,  
“When the UDD sent notices and letters to the local authorities, only the 
BDA cooperated. The CMCs, TMCs were not even replying to our letter. 
So we decided to send some task force in search of illegal layouts. BDA 
took stock of their limits and reported to us a list of 127 illegal layouts. 
BDA served action notices to 63 out of this 127, but to no response. The 
BDA tells us that when they serve notice, many times there is no 
addressee.  The builder says that he had sold everything to people [sic]. 
People say that they don’t know anything about it, since they have just 
brought [sic] the property and are now living in it”.  (Interview, Very 
Senior Administrator, UDD, GoK, August 2010; see Appendix 1, no.99) 
 
Revenue layouts are not only illegal from the perspective of land-use change, 
but also from the perspective of land ownership.150 Before selling agricultural 
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land to a developer, the agriculturist has to obtain a conversion of land use in 
order to enable a legal purchase. So how are these layouts formed? An estate 
agent tells me,  
“These developers buy the farmland sometimes even for a higher price 
and build whatever they want. They leave only small ten feet for roads.  
There will be no drains or open spaces. They manage to sell about 80% 
of the layout. There is a market for this because these properties are 
cheaper, sometimes 30% or even 50% [cheaper] than the legal 
properties. Look at the math- if you are doing an acre of land (43560 
square feet) in a recognized layout, you will get 25,000 square feet. In an 
unrecognized layout, you get 36,000 square feet. They take care of the 
officials and the politicians”. (Interview, Real Estate consultant, August 
2010; see Appendix 1, no.54)   
 
In almost all cases, people buy these knowing that the property does not have 
the required clearances. The process that makes these properties legal or semi 
legal for transaction is very complicated to describe here in its entirety.  
However, to simplify the point, the respective officials from local authorities like 
BBMP, TMCs, CMCs, or Village Panchayat issues layout and building permission 
even when they lack authority in these matters. As one of the Koramangala 
politicians told me,  
“Mestripalya extension is a revenue pocket. It was formed around 1988-
90. Village Panchayat gave permission to build in [sic] agricultural land.  
Village Panchayat secretary signed the documents. BDA gave a land 
acquisition notification soon after, but before the procedures could take 
hold; the people built it and finished the project in record time, so that 
BDA couldn’t do any action. Demolition is not easy once people build”.  
(Interview, Local politician, Koramangala, August 2010; Appendix 1, 
no.124) 
 
Many people during the interviews told me that this was and is a very lucrative 
business for the government employees, right from the office peon to the 
Panchayat Secretary and Chairman.  Usually the developer and their middle-
men sort things out for a buyer.  After the purchase, a buyer goes to the revenue 
sub-registrar and registers their property and obtains a provisional property 
identity number based on the village survey numbers and sometimes even pays 
the required property tax to claim legal status in the case of any litigation or to 
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legitimize the property for market transaction. Once the property has a tax 
receipt and a provisional number, the officials and engineers from the water 
and electricity providers give service connections. Providing water and 
electricity connections are a local business in itself for the engineers, so there is 
no incentive for them not to provide connections. Moreover, politicians also 
play a significant role in bringing services to these properties.  Around election 
time, a BBMP councillor, MLA or MP plays an instrumental role in bringing 
services to these properties, service which mainly include road tarring, water 
and electricity. Furthermore, according to a government circular, water and 
electricity are fundamental rights and people cannot be denied them (Multiple 
interviews).   
 
During the initial sale, a large number of these layouts - except the very 
prestigious ones - won’t even have wide enough tarred roads and legal 
connections to drains, sewage or water network. In Bangalore, one can identify 
the lower middle class revenue layout areas easily: usually the roads are 
narrow and are just stabilized with rammed earth. These roads are not public 
transport friendly because there is not enough road width. I stayed in one such 
revenue layout during my fieldwork in Bangalore, where the main road was 
crowded with all forms of vehicles. Since many layouts don’t even bother to 
bring in BWSSB connections, the residents in these layouts draw water from 
individual deep bore wells and drain their waste on to the main street drain 
network. A large number of these properties were not even paying property tax 
regularly because they did not have a proper Katha number.151 A previous 
Commissioner of the BBMP reflected on the situation during an interview with 
me: “There are 2,200,000 dwellings in Bangalore (BBMP) – and in assessment 
only 800,000 people have paid property tax. With this kind of a city what do you 
expect?” (Interview, retired senior administrator of BBMP, August 2010; 
Appendix 1, no.97) To address this situation, in 2010 the BBMP introduced a 
different coloured tax form (named as B-Katha) for property tax collection from 
the illegal layouts.   
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This is a business in itself. The government officials and politicians have very 
little incentive to change the nature of the process. One civil servant remarked 
to me when discussing the violations and public land encroachments, that the 
BBMP has even provided Katha for properties that are an encroachment of 
government land; she remarked, “Is there anything more ridiculous than that?” 
(Interview of a senior civil servant, GoK, August 2010; Appendix 1, no.75) The 
various actors in this network include farmland owners, local politicians, 
developers, administrative officials, planners, engineers and property buyers. 
What is striking in this business, is that everyone involved benefits from the 
mutual support in this network: the landowner sells his/her land for a higher 
rate than normal (Normal means -if the land is developed based on floor area 
regulations of the Master Plan); the Engineer and the councilor and planners 
who are part of the regulating, surveying and service-providing apparatus get 
their share; the developer gains more land to sell; and the buyers get cheaper 
properties. An estate agent who had obtained a number of land-use conversion 
for his clients told me that the,  
“Cost of getting the conversion could be anything from 25 lakhs to 50 
lakhs per acre, i.e., about 1% of the value of land per acre. This is if you 
are politically connected, otherwise this rate could go up. For example, in 
the DC Revenue’s office you will have to see [emphasis mine] a number of 
people. This could include right from the DC Revenue, Thasildhar152, 
Revenue Officer, and Revenue Inspector to the Caseworker.  However, if 
a top politician is involved then these actors will act as order-taking 
people.  The top politician will tell you to give everyone some money. 
That’s all.  Most money in that case will go to the top politician. That’s a 
top down approach one can take. Otherwise you go through a tout and 
this involves negotiation. The rates could go from 1 Crore153 per acre to 
25 lakhs per acre. Most touts operate with the link to politicians. So there 
is some cut going there anyway”. (Interview, Real Estate Agent, 
Appendix 1, no.54) 
 
Many such property developers and agents note that the rates are even linked 
to the rate of inflation in the economy.  
 
Violations are pervasive and blatant in Bangalore. Speaking about the blatancy 
of violations, an NGO activist notes,  
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“After the [plan] approval, some fellow will take it up and run a bottling 
unit, or a mutton shop or a milk distribution unit etc., for which they 
have to seek a health licence. The health department of the BBMP know 
that some commercial [activity] is going on- they won’t do anything.  
They will issue the trading licence. Then comes the property tax assessor 
from the revenue department of the BBMP– he will also say- okay you 
are running commercial enterprise- You just give me the commercial tax 
– in a residential zone.  None of these guys – the engineering department 
which sanctions the plan, the health department which issues the trading 
license, the revenue department which takes the revenue-property tax 
value - none of them are questioning how can you violate the land use? 
That’s how blatant these violations are.  That’s how the violations begin”.  
(Interview, NGO activist; Appendix 1, no.34)   
 
Such tacit as well as active co-operation from the wide range of actors involved 
in the land use control process emerges also from the fact that there are a 
sufficient number of buyers for such properties. A high-ranking senior 
administrator observes there is a specific consumer demand for this kind of 
property because it is cheaper than legal and regular properties. Sometimes 
even MLAs will buy property in such developments, which usually improves 
consumer confidence in the scheme (Interview, Senior Administrator, BBMP; 
Appendix 1, no.72).  An estate agent noted that “people have confidence about 
these schemes when they purchase property, otherwise how can an average 
middle class [person] invest their biggest investment in illegal buildings? They 
are confident that nothing will happen”. (Interview, Property Consultant, 
Appendix 1, no.54)  As another estate agent puts it,  
“There is no risk in violation. Only thing is that there is a cost that has to 
be borne. One cannot now easily take action against violation in 
Bangalore. It’s past that point. You can’t take action against 5 million 
people. Everyone is part of it” (interview, developer; August 2010, 
Appendix 1, no.54).  
 
I asked a politician what makes violations so pervasive in Bangalore.  He told 
me,  
“Bangalore has 198 wards now out of which 121 are inside the main city, 
where you need to spend at least 2-3 Crores154  to win a local councillor 
election. How do you make this? Only through black money and 
corruption” (Interview of a Senior Politician, Bangalore, July 2010; 
Appendix 1, no.124) 
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In other words violations are integrally connected to the local economy. It 
seems to provide business for the developers and banks, cheaper assets for the 
resident owners and revenue for the officers and politicians. It seems to be 
personally benefitting a large number of actors. In the case of plan violations 
discussed above, it can be seen that this is enabled through the operation of a 
parallel governance mechanism involving a network of middle-men, politicians, 
engineers and planners, developers and resident owners that appropriate the 
official process architecture of planning bureaucracy and administration to suit 
their interests. In the next section I shall discuss how violations are sustained 
and how this is connected to the planning process itself. 
 
5.4 Planning for violation 
I argue that Plan violations are sustained in Bangalore through what I would 
refer to as Planning for violations i.e., developing planning frameworks that are 
specifically designed to incorporate plan violations. I argue that plan violations 
and planning for violation are two sides of the same coin and are integral to the 
practice of planning in Bangalore.   
I will demonstrate this using the analysis of three specific cases,  
1.  Section 14-A Change of land use  
2.  Master Plan 2015  
3.  Regularization act  
 
I wish to argue here that the plan violations and planning for violations are 
processes that support each other. Specifically, I will propose that while the 
land-use zoning as a planning instrument categorizes land uses and establishes 
a framework of legality, the three processes that I shall discuss blur that legality 
through generating exemptions. In other words, planning for violations are legal 
practices of planning that are exemptions to the planning itself. I argue that this 
encourages us to move beyond the binary construction of the plan and its 
violation and examine violations and planning as integrated in practice in the 
case of Bangalore.   
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5.4.1 Section 14-A Change of Land use 155 
When I asked many planners in the state government why 14-A was introduced 
in 1991 they noted that some land parcels could be erroneolsly represented in 
the survey document due to the error of the survey equipment or oversight and 
that the 14-A clause was intended to enable a legal framework to change the 
land-use classification that had been arrived at based on erroneous 
cartography. For example, if a land parcel earmarked as residential in the land-
use plan has a steeper slope or a geological condition not suited for residential, 
it would invariably restrict the owner (public or private) of the land to exercise 
development rights. It was argued that Exemption Clauses were introduced for 
such exceptional situations. The presence of a clause does not necessarily dilute 
the ability to control land use, because it is in the discretion of the competent 
authority to practice in ways that would suit the spirit of the KTCP Act and the 
planning system. Moreover, even though the reason to exercise exemption 
varies from cartographic errors to issues in implementation, the purpose of a 
change as articulated in the Act is that it is in the public interest.  
 
However, I argue in the following paragraphs that that the way this clause was 
deployed in practice demonstrates that it was neither used for exceptional 
situations nor exclusively for any public interest criteria. Data collated by me 
from the BDA shows that between 01-01-2000 and 31-12-2006, BDA allowed 
land-use change for 925 applications on a range of land parcels ranging from 
tens of acres to a couple of thousands of square feet and a majority of it was 
residential and commercial. Among this data set, there are about 100 
applications for the land parcels in Koramangala neighbourhood alone. 
Applicants included institutional actors like BDA, other public sector 
enterprises, individuals and private developers. Furthermore, from the data 
collated from the BDA records, from September 2006 to September 2010 close 
to 650 applications were approved by the BDA, again with land area ranging 
from many acres to a couple of thousands square feet.. On a simple calculation 
the rough frequency of change of land-use approval is two approvals for every 
three working days of the BDA in the past ten years. The sheer number of 
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applications and its consistency proves that this is a very popular method of 
land-use planning in Bangalore, compared to the regulatory method as used in 
the land-use plan.   
 
My interviewees say that even though the BDA is the ultimate authority on 
approval of change of land use,156 without exercising adequate discretion at the 
scrutiny stage, almost all applications are forwarded to the government for 
approval. So, rather than to achieve any public interest outcomes, 14-A is 
deployed indiscriminately to support private interests. This is also evident from 
the logic used in some of the approval letters. For example, one of the letters of 
approval states that,  
“In the said site, construction of commercial building has already 
commenced, and presently the work is stopped. This service road 
appears to be a residential area. But, in the opposite side commercial 
activities have come up. Hence the proposal for change of land use….  has 
been recommended to the government.”157 (Kumar, PIL query in 
Appendix of the W.P)  
 
While this was a case of retrospective application after a violation, the logic of 
transforming context, as a reason for approval is very clear in the case of 
another approval letter as well.   
“Both sides of [name of road] consist of commercial buildings causing 
huge traffic. This road has already lost the appearance of residential 
area. Hence, the proposal for change of land use of the [address]… is 
approved” (ibid).   
 
Both the letters of approval quoted above and the many advertisements that 
notify the proposed change of land use to invite objections from the public, do 
not present any analysis of impacts; even an examination of the legality of the 
land-use transformation of the broader context is absent. So a residential land 
parcel next to a series of illegal commercial buildings can get approval for 
change of land-use based on the fact that the neighbourhood is turning into 
commercial (even if it is through violations). So the change of land use process 
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can itself become a catalyst for land-use change in any neighbourhood.   
 
What is proved in the statistics and in the logic provided in the approval letters 
-  i.e. active use of section 14-A to further private interest rather than public 
interest -  is also supported by my research on the way in which Section 14-A 
approval is practiced. One of my interviewees, a Public Interest Litigant 
currently appealing in the High Court against the indiscriminate application of 
Section 14-A, notes that the authorities normally advertise/notify only in some 
obscure newspaper to guarantee minimum public attention. This has been 
validated in the PIL document by presenting the adverts in newspapers that 
have very low circulation in relevant neighbourhoods. Further, he argues that 
even if objections are raised, it is unlikely that the objector would receive a 
hearing or any favourable response from the BDA (interview, Planning activist, 
Appendix 1, no.7). The active involvement of the officials in this process is 
further substantiated by my interviewee drawing from his experience of raising 
objections. I was told by an activist that sometimes objections from the general 
public are even used by the administrators to increase their stakes to approve 
the scheme because that would enable them to negotiate more with the 
applicant (ibid).158   
 
The logic presented in the approval letters quoted above reveals that there is 
neither any public interest justification nor an analysis of the contextual 
impacts.  Any land parcel could be converted from any land use to any other 
land use in Bangalore if approached through the right channel. This was quite 
obvious when I asked a well-known developer in Bangalore with a reputation 
for converting wetlands into developable land if the land-use planning system 
and the zoning regime present any obstacle for his business. He looked at me 
for a moment before answering - probably due to the silliness of my question -  
and told me that it does not pose any difficulty because they can usually get the 
land category use changed with ease (interview: developer, July 2010, 
Appendix 1, no.56).   
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While the practice of Section 14-A transforms the land-use distribution and 
complicates the understanding of violations as merely a deviation from a plan 
document, instances from the present Master Plan process challenges that 
conceptualization further.  
 
5.4.2 Master plan 2015 process 
While Section 14-A enabled a statutory framework for exemptions from any 
adopted Master plan land-use regulations, the Master plan 2015 process was 
marked by a flexible approach towards land-use zoning itself. There are at least 
three ways in which the RMP 2015 process can be understood as planning for 
violations. The first one can be identified in RMP 2015‘s adopted mixed use 
policy, that legalized the land-use deviations from the 1991 CDP.  The second 
and third can be identified in the many informal unofficial processes that 
enabled enough access to many developers and land owners to exercise their 
wish during the preparation of the plan itself, even saving the trouble of going 
through the 14-A route.  These processes are briefly discussed below.   
 
First, among the various new approaches that the Master Plan 2005- 2015 
proposed was a mixed land-use policy corresponding with the current 
discourses fashionable in Transport Oriented Developments, Compact City and 
Sustainable City. The RMP document argues that the mixed land-use strategy of 
permitting commercial uses in residential areas, 
“Aims to balance the socio economic needs for such activity and balance 
the environmental impact of the said activity in such areas. The mixed  
use policy follows a differentiated approach based on the character of 
the identified regions – subject to the socio economic character of the 
neighbourhoods and their preference [emphasis mine] to have 
commercial activities within the neighbourhood” (BDA 2007, vision 
document , p.30)   
 
It was argued by many of my interviewees who worked closely with the master 
planning process that the mixed use policy was nothing but recognizing the 
ground reality. When the master planning team documented the existing land 
use, they found that the ground reality had only a very remote relationship to 
the 1991 CDP. One of the planners - a key member in the master planning team 
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– notes that the genesis of the mixed land-use policy is nothing but, “mapping of 
ground reality as is, because the ground displayed mixed use” (interview, 
Planning Consultant, see Appendix 1, no.59). Another said that if they came 
across a street with a large amount of commercial activities in a residential 
zone, then the whole street was reclassified into mixed use. This was what was 
presented as preference of the neighbourhood in the quote above. The planning 
process did not have any consultation process with any neighbourhoods to 
arrive at local preference of the land-use priorities. Moreover, there are no 
specific discussions in the Master Plan document as to whether this mixed use 
policy is to be implemented retrospectively or not. However, this enabled the 
legalization of a large number of plan violations in a variety of neighbourhoods 
overnight. This also enabled many developers to convert their residential 
projects into commercial projects – like the case of Edwardian Estates discussed 
above - anticipating the mutation corridors and various other specific 
instruments of the mixed use policy.   
 
Second, even though the Master Plan draft was prepared by private consultants 
inside their own offices, they could not contain the decision-making process 
from external influences. Keeping external influences at bay was one of the 
factors that encouraged the elite clique around the Chief Minister during 2000-
2004 to appoint the French Master Planners along with their belief that the 
French would introduce cutting-edge technology and state-of-the-art thinking 
for master planning Bangalore into a world class city.   
 
Colouring a land green or red or yellow in the land-use plan can move millions 
overnight because of land speculation. Hence it was definitely of interest to 
many people that their land didn’t fall under the zone of development 
restriction.159 Many of my interviewees who had worked in the master plan 
process told me that they were constantly approached by different government 
departments and estate agents for information on the zoning of specific land 
parcels. For example, one interviewee, a planner who worked with the 
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consultants, remembers that, one morning during the plan preparation process, 
he arrived at the office, to find someone in his chair looking at the land-use plan 
document on the office computer.  At that point, one of his colleagues 
apologized and told him that it was the colleague’s uncle and that they were 
checking the land-use category of their property. A couple of weeks later my 
interviewee, however discovered that the visitor was in fact an employee of the 
BDA (interview, planning consultant, July 2010, see Appendix 1, no.62). 
 
One of the most significant of these network stories that I came across very 
frequently during my interviews was about the land-use changes that were 
happening at the level of the [Material removed to protect privacy].160  I 
happened to interview an estate agent who admitted that his client had saved a 
couple of acres of their land from the green belt with the help of a middle-man 
for a cost of 5,000,000 INR.161  It was pointed out that the middleman managed 
this through his contacts using some [Material removed to protect identity] 
much lower in the office hierarchy. Many planners who worked closely with the 
RMP 2015 process – both as consultants and as clients (with government) 
shared with me many stories about their frustration and amazement when they 
confronted land uses that kept on changing in the office computers. For 
example, a number of planners shared with me the shock they felt when they 
discovered that the use category of many land parcels appeared entirely 
different during the day of public consultation compared to that which they 
finalized on the previous night inside the office. They realized that something 
happened before the printing. Many of those land parcels, even if they were 
reverted back to their original proposal for the following day’s public 
consultation, changed again without their knowledge (multiple interviews).   
 
This epitomizes the robustness of the informal networks’ access to the [Material 
removed to protect identity] and the loyalty with which this network operates. 
This access seems to have enabled a number of concerned actors in the city to 
achieve the appropriate land-use categories that they wanted in the Master 
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Plan. This is one form of master planning – the ability to regulate the use 
category for one’s own property - perhaps proved to be the safest and the 
cheapest route for many interested parties since it is the plan document that 
defines the planning law. During an interview, one estate agent who claimed 
that he knew many such cases very closely remarked,  
“The future of this city is in the hands of the [Material removed to protect 
identity] of a private company.  What is more ridiculous than that? How 
are we going to plan this city?” (Interview, Property Consultant, August 
2010; Appendix 1, no.54)  
 
A large number of people were concerned about the legal use category of their 
land and were eager to exercise their will on the land-use plan. Master plan 
2015 was the most sought after Master Plan document ever made in Bangalore. 
Within a couple of weeks, the draft copy of the Master Plan that was printed 
initially for the BDA was sold out; later copies were sold on the streets of 
Bangalore for 5000 INR. (Multiple interviews) 
 
The impact of this informal access to master planning one’s own land uses was 
significant in the case of valley zones. One of the important outcomes of the RMP 
process has been the successful mapping of what the draft Master Plan called 
valley zones. Situated at about 3000 feet elevation, Bangalore is located within 
three natural valleys (Map 9 p 253).  These valleys link the hundreds of lakes in 
the city through man made canals known as Raj Kalve. During the last six 
decades of development both public and private actors have encroached upon 
the lakes, canals and valleys with scant regard to the ecological impact. Even 
though the existence of these natural valleys and canal networked lake system 
was known to the decision makers and planners, it was not until this master 
planning process that it has been mapped and the extent of damage to the 
network identified. For example the entire National Games Village in 
Koramangala had been built by the KHB reclaiming the Koramangala Lake; the 
BDA built the Srinivagulu Tank Bed housing layout by reclaiming the 
Srinivagulu Lake. There are developers in Bangalore who are nicknamed tank 
men, specialists in reclaiming lakes through engineering legal and illegal means. 
During the field work, I documented that houses, apartment complexes, play 
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schools, front garden; parking lots and so on are built on top of the Raj Kalve 
within the neighbourhood of Koramangala. 
 
Using satellite imagery and GIS, the 2015 Master Planning process mapped 
these valley zones, and earmarked them as no-development zones. However as 
soon as this information became public through informal networks and the 
public consultation in 2005, the number of planning applications for land 
parcels earmarked as valley zones increased at a higher than normal rate 
(interviews with Senior Government Planners, Appendix 1, no.90, 102,111). 
Many landowners who owned a piece of land in the earmarked valley zones 
wanted to develop their land before the Master Plan was officially adopted. To 
curb this trend, the Town Planning Member at the BDA then introduced a 
temporary freeze on developments in the valley zones until the Master Plan was 
officially adopted.  He argued that permitting such a development rush would 
irreversibly transform the ecological balance of the city and would make it 
impossible to do anything about the newly discovered ecological logic of 
Bangalore’s urban pattern, even after the plan’s official adoption. (Interviews 
with Senor Government Planners, Appendix 1, no.90, 102, 111; Padmaraj and 
Jagannathan 2006) 
 
What happened to this litigation is revealing of strength of the vernacular 
networks of governance. A group of developers and individual landowners 
petitioned against this decision at the High Court arguing that their planning 
application was entitled to be evaluated against the then-existing development 
rules and not based on any anticipated Master Plan.  The development rules 
that existed then were based on the 1991 CDP under which their land parcels 
do not appear under any valley zone (ibid).  After hearing Counsel from both 
sides, the High Court supported the logic of a development freeze. The judgment 
(ibid), noted that since the new technology enabled the identification of 
ecologically fragile regions, permitting development would amount to violation 
of environmental law, and that the BDA had the right to exercise their discretion 
in foreseeing future of the city for public interest. The refusal of planning 
permission was upheld. So far so good for the structure of the official state 
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apparatus of planning. So what happened to such a magnificent display of 
planning power and state’s will to protect public interest?  
 
When I asked a senior planner in Bangalore if the TPM’s withstanding of the 
pressures to achieve a favourable court ruling had helped to eventually save the 
valley zones , I got the following reply, 
“When developers realized that he [TPM] will not budge, they managed 
to transfer him from the BDA to [one of the usual punishment transfer 
locations].  There were other planners in queue to take over.  They were 
willing to pay the minister to get the posting because they knew that 
they would make money from the developers. This would make all the 
parties win what they want. Only he was in their middle, so he had to be 
removed. After transferring him, the developers appealed to the 
Supreme Court against the High Court ruling.  By then BDA had a new 
TPM and the government did not file their written statement in the 
Supreme Court.  So the judgement went in favour of the petitioners (the 
developers). They got their right to develop wherever they want to 
develop” (Interview with Senior Government Planners and bureaucrats, 
specific source not identified here). 
 
By transferring the planning or government official who did not consent to the 
vernacular governance networks’ ambitions and ensuring that the official 
apparatus did not file the written statements in court is one of the ways in 
which many court cases gets ruled in favour of the privatizing networks in 
Bangalore. During my research process I came across many instance of such a 
practice. In this case it happens to be the developers who wanted to develop the 
watershed network in the city. 
  
Third, after the consultants submitted the draft Master Plan document, it took 
two years for the government to adopt and release the final Master Plan 
officially. In these two years numerous change of land use, valley zone planning 
applications, as well as changing land-use categories of numerous land parcels 
have been made inside the BDA office (multiple interviews).  A senior planner 
and a very senior bureaucrat as well as many others told me during interviews 
that the BDA hired a GIS consultant and made many changes on demand to the 
plan in-house. A senior planner in government when asked about this 
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accusation tells me that this was done because the SCE didn’t get it right.  He 
argued that the,  
“SCE had all kinds of names for land use reservations - mutation 
corridors, valley zones - valley zone is not a legal land use category.  
Show me that in KTCP act.  Their plan was itself illegal”.  (Interview, Very 
Senior Planner, September 2010; Appendix 1, no.105) 
 
The SCE was a consultant after all and the BDA was their client; what should go 
in the Master Plan is indeed the privilege of the BDA.  The senior planner argued 
that the changes were made to make the plan more legal and practical. He 
suggested that it was not possible to reserve large tracts of private land because 
they occur in valley zones. In order to solve this problem, he argued that the 
valley zone protections had to be relaxed and changed before the finalization of 
the Master Plan. When I asked one of the consultants who had helped the BDA 
to finalize the Master Plan, he denied that any outside influences or specific 
demands were entertained while the Plan was with the BDA; instead, he argued 
that in fact many on demand land-use changes were entertained while the plan 
was being prepared originally at the SCE. (Interview, Planning Consultant, 
August 2010; Appendix 1, no.58)  
 
It is argued by many in the city that the scale of the transactions (bribes) was 
very large that it even attracted the income tax department’s attention. One of 
the high-level bureaucrats with the government shared with me a copy of a 
newspaper cutting that reported an income tax raid on the premises of a 
number of people involved in the preparation of the Master Plan.162 It backed 
his claim about the level of informal networks and the scale of transactions that 
had taken place during the master planning process. When I requested an 
interview with the officer who had conducted the income tax raid, I was 
informed that the Income Tax Investigation Department does not give public 
interviews; however, the officer did not deny the fact that a raid had been 
conducted. He agreed to give me a written statement on this matter if I 
contacted him a couple of weeks after I had first met him. Despite this 
assurance, my repeated attempts to meet him failed.   
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 I lost the copy of this from my archives so it is not referenced here.   
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Discussing with me details of the changes that was being made during the 
master planning process, one of my interviewees, a planner who had worked as 
a consultant to the plan preparation process, told me that the BDA planners 
after a point didn’t really bother with what the SCE were doing. They always 
said, “ok- do it-ok do it”. Only much later did my interviewee realize that the 
BDA planners, administrators and the politicians knew the worth of ‘unpopular 
colours’ in the Master Plan draft. He remarked, “It eventually ended up to their 
benefit that we reserved a lot of land in green and red, because they made a lot 
of money changing it”. Similarly, another planner who worked throughout the 
Master Planning process notes the casual attitude that was prevalent among the 
government authorities:  
“The act says once in ten years we need to update the plan- so maddu 
bekku.163  The government even didn’t have the capacity to write a 
proper RFP [request for proposal], and then there are ministers’ 
influence, addendums, corrigendum, etc.  Communication gap existed 
between black and white in the team. I was asked in fact to join these 
guys by [name] and [name] to have some communication space. Neither 
the government, the BDA, the BATF understood much of what the French 
said, nor did the French understand the government actors well. When 
you give a Master Plan document, they comment on the formatting of the 
report and comments on elevation. However sexy the plan might look, it 
is rubbish at the end of the day. The final presentation was 1 hour 15 
minutes and 165 slides. The board was bored. They started yawning and 
looking here and there, and playing with their handhelds or mobiles. It is 
no surprise that at the end, this became a Plan that was organized for the 
demand side and imposed on the supply side”. (Interview, Planning 
Consultant; Appendix 1, no.60) 
 
Many officials in the board perhaps knew too well that the life of the plan will 
begin inside the planning office before its adoption and that the draft Master 
Plan was only a canvas for the vernacular networks to draw the city’s future. 
While the Master Plan process discussed above was about legalizing specific 
illegalities through mixed use policy and access to the planning process that 
enabled the colouring of one’s own land use, in the next section I discuss the 
Regularization Act that eventually enabled the legalization of a very large 
number of plan violations in Bangalore. 
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 In Kannada means - Get it done 
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5.4.3 Regularization Act 
While section 14-A and the Master Plan process challenged the very idea of 
land-use control in Bangalore enabled by the KTCP Act, a new amendment to 
the KTCP act inserted in 2007 proposed to legalize most forms of land-use (and 
many other forms of) plan violations. The Karnataka Town and Country 
Planning and Certain Other Laws Amendment Bill was first proposed in 2004 
and later inserted in the KTCP Act in 2007 amending the KTCP Act 1961, 
Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act 1976, and the Karnataka Municipalities 
Act 1964 and Karnataka Land Revenue Act 1961 to enable a legal provision for 
the government to regularize most forms of unauthorized and illegal 
violations.164 Inserted as section 76 FF in 2007 in the KTCP Act 1961, it reads, 
“notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where any land had 
been developed or change in land use made in contravention of Section 
14,14-A,15, 17 or the regulations or in contravention of commencement 
certificate granted under section 15, the planning authority may 
regularize such development and change of land use made prior to the 
date of commencement of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning 
and certain other laws (amendment Act 2004, subject to such rules as 
may be prescribed and on payment of the prescribed amount, which may 
be different for different purpose, but not exceeding the estimated cost 
of the development.” (Puliani 2009, p.78)  
 
To put it simply, the amendment proposed to regularize illegal buildings and 
developments up to a cut-off date by accepting a penalty, with the exception of 
public land encroachments and urban open space and wetlands conversions. A 
limit was proposed on the amount of development that is entitled for 
regularization: 50% (of the floor area) violations for residential buildings and 
25% of violations of commercial buildings.165   
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 This act will be referred to here as the Regularization Act. 
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 The 2007 act stipulated the following conditions: Irregularities at any public infrastructure and 
amenity provision, public land and public buildings, squatting on private property, environmentally 
damaging high-category polluting industries in environmentally sensitive areas, Coastal Zone 
Regulation Act violations, and developments in agricultural zones or in the green belt zone of master 
plan and illegal basements cannot apply for regularization. All other industries can only apply for 
regularization with approval of the pollution control board.  Buildings with setback violations of 25% 
for residential and 50% for non-residential and changes in land use are the first to be regularized. 
Buildings with a floor area ratio (FAR) in excess of 50% for residential or 25% for non-residential 
and with proven structural stability had three months from the date of commencement of the act for 
regularization.  
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The Regularization Bill was rationalised as a general one-time relief for the 
general public who had been “cheated by the unscrupulous developers”166, who 
had built and sold unauthorised developments. Initially it was proposed as a 
measure to regularize the revenue layouts in the State of Karnataka but in the 
process of the evolution of the bill, a wide range of plan violations were 
included, somehow excluding the encroachment of government land.167 It was 
known as the Akrama-Sakrama Bill168- Akrama – being an illegal act- Sakrama 
being a legal and benevolent act.  Akrama-Sakrama was one of the nodes of 
political, legal and administrative conflict in Karnataka for eight years from 
2004, given that the scheme became very popular as well as contested 
simultaneously. Initially the bill was passed in both houses of the legislature of 
Karnataka on 24, 02, 2004, however the Governor of the Karnataka did not give 
assent to the bill and asked the government to review the bill.  The Governor’s 
objection notes that, 
 “The bill portends far reaching and irreversible changes in the planning 
profiles of the urban or semi-urban centres in the State, drastically 
affecting the environment and the existing living conditions.  It has the 
potential to perpetuate the worsening of living conditions in the already 
fragile urban centres, impose unbearable strain on the civic services, 
tolerate and encourage violations of law and discriminate against the law 
abiding in favour of the law breakers”. (Letter by Governor T N 
Chaturvedi available from Section 19 of Kothari 2007) 
 
Even though this proposal was first initiated in 2004 by the Janata Dal 
government, when the opposition BJP party came to power in 2007 they 
adopted the same bill as a law with some minor amendments. Given the 
popularity of the bill, the amendments specifically included the reduction of the 
penalty. Even though to this date, the Governor has not approved the scheme 
and the High Court has instructed the government to review the proposal in the 
context of a number of Public Interest Litigations, the relevant Acts (KTCP Act, 
KMC Act, KLR Act) have been amended and are awaiting implementation. The 
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 Source- cabinet note on regularization bill- no-UDD 366 GEL 2005, appended in the Public 
Interest Litigation - Kothari (2007) 
167
 A new bill is currently being proposed by the Government of Karnataka to regularize the 
residential encroachments on government lands. (See “Karnataka plans to regularize unauthorised 
buildings in government Land” The Hindu 2013 July 08, www.thehindu.com) 
168
 Akrama = violation/bad act; Sakrama = good act 
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point I want to make here is about the popularity of the scheme, i.e., successive 
governments and ministers have pushed for the adoption of the scheme rather 
than oppose it.169 I also documented that any neighbourhood activist collective 
that raises their voice against this bill develops internal conflicts due to the fact 
that a large number of people within the respective neighbourhoods support 
the bill.   
 
The Regularization Bill is a very complex and contested piece of legislation in 
the context of land-use planning with its own staunch supporters and critics. 
However, the promise of regularization always drove very high levels of plan 
violations. When I asked about Akrama-Sakrama, a very senior political 
administrator in Bangalore remarks that, 
 “Everyone in Bangalore goes for deviance. If the deviance is lower, then 
some kind of penalty can be put. But in Bangalore it’s more than 50% 
deviance. Can we demolish all these?”  (Interview, Senior Politician in 
Bangalore, Appendix 1, no.121)  
 
This sense of helplessness that there is no alternative is the usual response that I 
got from most politicians, administrators and people in Bangalore. Another 
senior politician during my interview argued that 50% and 25% regularization 
are not enough; instead violations should be regularized 100% (Interview, 
Senior Politician, Appendix 1, no.122). He noted that people are just making 
some extra money by extending their properties, or renting them out for 
commercial use or selling their properties for better returns. He argued that “[it 
may be plan violation, but] if you don’t want them to do that, then give them a 
government job, where they will have a stable income” (ibid).   
 
On the contrary, a senior administrator who was very closely involved with the 
scheme remarked to me during an interview that every violation affects the 
violator’s neighbour in many ways.   
“How can the government regularize this? Who is going to pay for the 
disturbance? How will the disturbance be solved? The violator is locking 
                                                     
169
 The Secretary who wrote the cabinet note on one of the meetings about this bill even notes that the 
Deputy Chief Minister is very upset that finalization of this scheme is taking too long. (Cabinet Note- 
note number 61in Kothari 2007) 
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my light and fresh air. It’s a criminal act”. (Interview, Senior 
Administrator, BBMP; Appendix 1, no.72) 
 
During an initial implementation of this act in 2007 (which was later hastily 
withdrawn) he noticed that the very act of bringing in the Regularization Bill 
created more violation and cases for regularization. In most cases, he noted that 
violations were more than double and not just 50% of the floor area. However, 
he remarks that this gave the engineers who evaluated schemes a chance to 
make more money by certifying that the violations were within the 50% mark. 
Furthermore, it seems that whenever the BBMP gave letters for demolition of 
violations, the owners of the respective properties replied that they were going 
to apply for regularization (Ibid). So regularization sustains and produces plan 
violations. In the words of an estate agent,  
“Regularization is a back door entry into conversion and change of land 
use. Akrama-Sakrama is giving you license to do whatever you want.  
This is a money spinner for the politicians”. (Interview, Estate Agent; 
Appendix 1, no.57) 
 
Indeed, the Regularization Act do complete the violation of land-use planning in 
Bangalore through planning for violations. While section 14-A provided 
exemptions to land-use controls, master planning mixed use policy legalized a 
large amount of plan violations, and the informal process of accessing the draft 
plan document enabled a number of interested parties to change the plan itself 
to suit their own land-use requirements, the Regularization Act finalized the 
circle providing a process for legalizing most plan violations in Bangalore. In 
other words the instruments and practices of planning for violations enable the 
complete exemption of the land-use plan.   
 
5.5 Conclusion: Violations of planning through its practice 
The aim of this chapter was to answer the first part of the research question of 
this thesis: how are violations produced and sustained in Bangalore. In Chapter 2, 
I critiqued the approaches that conceive violations as deviation from a Plan 
arguing that such conclusions emerge from the conceptualization of the state as 
a monolithic and powerful entity that can rule a society through establishing 
formal rules of conduct and governing, for example in the form of a land use 
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plan. From this perspective many scholars adopted frameworks like 
informal/formal dualism, implementation failure and corruption or society and 
the state against each other (for example, subversion by the poor or sovereignty 
of the state) while explaining violations. Instead I proposed that a conceptual 
language of vernacular governance would enable the examination of a range of 
actors and processes in specific places to help identify the practices of 
governing that result into specific outcomes, in this case land use violations. 
Using many examples from the wealthy neighbourhood of Koramangala and 
wider geography of Bangalore, in this chapter, I demonstrated that violations 
are very integrally connected to the practice of planning and urban governance 
in Bangalore.   
 
Using violations as a geographic site to understand planning in practice, I 
showed how plan violations and planning for violations support each other. For 
this purpose I drew from many examples of plan violations and planning for 
violations from Koramangala and wider Bangalore. I argued that plan violations 
and planning for violations together exemplify the vernacular governance 
practices that produce private interest outcomes. Plan violation and planning 
for violations as practices complete the circle of violations of the process 
architecture of planning system in Bangalore through its own practice. As a very 
senior bureaucrat noted: “Master planning in Bangalore [only] gives general 
guidance. But enforcement is weak -you might have heard about Akrama-
Sakrama. That’s how we do it”.  (Interview, Very Senior Government 
Administrator; Appendix 1, no.96) 
 
Through the interviews and specific cases I demonstrated how the apparatus of 
the state that controls the urban land-use change to produce public interest 
outcomes is occupied by a wide range of actors forming a network that 
produces private interest outcomes. This process not only acts in contravention 
to the law, but also produces law that legalizes illegality. These networks 
construct a parallel practice of governing that support the interest of the actors 
involved in the network. Both the production of plan violations and its 
sustenance through planning for violations are enabled by the operation of 
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these governing networks. Many of the operational modalities of this network 
are public information in Bangalore among the people, politicians, decision 
makers and administrators. For example, in a letter to the Commissioner of BDA 
dated 09/07/2010, the Principal Secretary to the State Department of Public 
Enterprises noted, 
 “You may kindly recall my discussion I had with you in the past about 
the encroachments in 2nd block Koramangala with the connivance of 
lower level officials. I think you may agree with me that the lower level 
officials are always biased towards the encroachers and the contractors 
for their own personal agenda. As a result taxpayers, law-abiding citizens 
are put to embarrassment and trouble”.   
 
He continued,  
“Usually the encroachers manipulate records and get their plans 
sanctioned with the connivance of lower level officials….In fact my 
several complaints to lower level officials have yielded no results”  (PS-
DPE 2010). 
 
Similarly Justice Ram Mohan Reddy while directing the government to form a 
task force to identify the illegal layouts in Bangalore notes that,  
“…before parting with this case, the state government needs to be 
cautioned over the dubious methods adopted by unscrupulous 
colonizing elements in forming layouts of residential sits over 
agricultural lands without obtaining an order to divert the use of the 
land”,  
 
He wonders why the number of government officials and departments fail to 
“stem the rot”.  He continues,  
“all this in the name of lethargy and inaction on the part of the State, its 
instrumentalities, departments and offices.  Apparently, no officer is held 
responsible or accountable for allowing the illegalities to be 
perpetuated”. 170  (Reddy 2008)  
 
During my interviews many administrators noted that not only are lower 
officials involved in this, but higher level officials and various politicians are 
also closely involved in this practice. Many admitted that even the big man171    
had called them on more than one occasion directly to approve files and oblige 
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 Page-4, This order led to the formation of a task force under the UD secretary to enquire and 
submit a report to the court in 7 months.  
171
 The word a Government Planner used for the Chief Minister 
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in various forms. Many of my interviewees argue that it is the general greed of 
the people that works behind the violations. Violations have become a public 
debate in Bangalore with its own supporters and critics. The planning process 
in Bangalore is implicated in a number of court cases, suffers from too frequent 
transfer of officials and is occupied by a number of private interest networks 
that inhabit the sphere of governance. Adopting a relational approach to 
governance studies, Healy (2009) argues that “governments do not act, but 
actors in positions in government act”. The governance network is inhabited by 
actors from inside and outside the government including politicians, 
contractors, developers, administrators, residents, middle-men, planners etc., 
making markets for each other using all resources at their disposal including 
the structures and processes of the state. Though a detailed network mapping is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it can be seen that for every situation 
described in the empirical examples, the outcome owes itself to the various 
connections between the local councilors, engineers, politicians, officials, 
planners developers, land owners, middle-men etc., that challenge the dualist 
conceptualization of the state and society. I argue that the resultant outcome 
should be understood as an outcome of the operation of these networks. 
Adopting this line, I argued that violations are not a deviation from any norm or 
a plan but are instead the product of planning practice.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Planning in Vernacular Governance 
Planning, public interest networks and emerging activist planning 
collective 
 
“In Bangalore nowadays, everybody is a planner” 
(Director of planning)   
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed how a range of actors who occupy the 
planning network transform the planning system into governance practices that 
produce private interest outcomes. Drawing on my fieldwork in Bangalore to 
substantiate that claim, I demonstrated how practices of plan violations and 
planning for violations together produce and sustain violations.   
 
In this chapter, I examine the other side of the coin, i.e., the formation and 
operational mechanisms of the public interest networks. To do this I use a fine-
grained analysis of the transformation of neighbourhood activism in 
Koramangala. In the analysis the idea of public interest is conceptually based on 
outcomes rather than the interest of a consolidated public authority. Therefore, 
I show how local activists organize and cooperate to contest the private interest 
outcome oriented planning practice to produce public interest outcomes 
through forging many forms of alliances. Through learning about production of 
violations, law and governance processes, they contest the practices of plan 
violations and planning for violations and proactively engage with the planning 
process as a new form of activist planning collective. One of the broad 
arguments of this thesis that this chapter aims to contribute to alongside the 
previous chapter is that both private and public interest outcome oriented 
practices are embedded within the culture of vernacular governance and 
operate using networks and the state system simultaneously. I argue that the 
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planning process in Bangalore is best understood as occupied by governance 
networks that produce private interest and public interest outcomes. 
 
By examining this process, I will show not only how the situations that they 
confront transform their activism, but also their subjectivity. I argue that these 
collectives through a process of continued learning are significantly 
transforming the planning practice in Bangalore. The collectives are contingent, 
quite unstructured in their form and processes, and are in the early stages of 
formation. Such networked practices operating through complex negotiations 
and collaborations call for a renewed understanding of the planning process in 
Bangalore beyond a state-centred administrative enterprise.   
 
I discuss this in three main sections. In the first part, I will show how plan 
violations resulted in the formation of a loose collective that I call a society of 
mutual surveillance. This is a fundamental shift in neighbourhood relationships 
and departs from the partners in crime networks discussed in Chapter 5 that 
produce and sustains the violations. In this section, I will also draw examples 
from wider Bangalore in addition to those from Koramangala,. Secondly, I will 
show how and why the mutual surveillance networks moved to a critical 
engagement with planning and governance i.e., from a call for an enforcement of 
the law to a critical reflection on the law itself.   
 
The second part is discussed in two subsections. In the first, I discuss the 
casualties from mutual surveillance that resulted in neighbourhood conflicts. In 
the second, I show how the activists transformed the engagement after realising 
that the violations were not a simple issue of black and white legality and 
illegality. These actors then engage in the reverse surveillance of governance 
process and develop a deep mistrust about governance and legal practice. This 
makes them move on from implementation and enforcement of the law to a 
critical engagement with law making and governing practices. This move 
involves learning about the complex planning epistemology and system, 
neighbourhood mobilization, education, campaigns for responsible citizenship 
and challenging the particular framework of the rule of law itself using 
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administrative (negotiating with administrators), political, (using political 
capital), and legal (using law courts) mechanisms simultaneously. Thirdly, I 
show how these activist planning collectives move towards a particular 
outcome based activism i.e. a proactive engagement with the planning process 
and projects to ensure specific outcomes on the ground. A closer look at this 
activism demonstrates the formation of a public interest network involving a 
number of actors both from within and outside the government and the 
neighbourhood, using a variety of strategies that are civil, legal and political in 
nature.  
 
Using the analysis of these stages of the activism, I will argue that a new form of 
activist planning collective for public interest outcomes is forming in Bangalore, 
and this can be understood as an urban social movement with implications for 
the transformation of the planning process in Bangalore. By tracking how they 
operate, their internal conflicts, and their wide range of motivations, I argue 
that these do not represent a consolidated middle class interest and propose to 
rethink the homogeneity and strategic alignments of the middle class often 
represented in the studies of urban community activism in India. Further, I 
show how a large number of both upper and lower level government actors are 
against this sort of activism while some others support it. During the process of 
activism, it can be seen that the actors move in and out of a confrontational and 
collaborative mode simultaneously enabled by the culture of vernacular 
governance. In conclusion, I propose that participation and collaboration in 
planning can be thought of as a continuous process that emerges based on 
negotiation. I propose that one should move beyond imagining planning 
practice in Bangalore from a state led top-down practice to a socially 
constructed domain of engagement.   
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6.2. Beyond the representations of the state, the middle class and 
bourgeois environmentalism.   
 
Ted Rutland in an impressive critical review of the main debates on urban social 
movements (Rutland 2013) highlights the question of theorizing the activist 
subject implicit in Castells (1983). He argues that the question of the activist 
subject needs to be understood as a work in progress – as “contingently made 
and remade in particular historical and geographic context”, and that it is 
important to examine “how the making of the subjects is involved in on-going 
contentious urban politics” (Rutland 2013, p.2, emphasis in original).   
 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine in-depth the theory of the 
subject(s). However, the transformation of the activist also means the 
transformations in their activism and subsequently the outcome. The analysis of 
contestation of violations therefore involves exploring the problem of the 
transforming activists in order to analyze the problem of activism and its 
outcomes. This reflection is also important given that the academic claims on 
urban social activism in Indian cities adopt a preconceived notion of the activist 
as either middle class, elitist or part of the urban poor.172(Arabindoo 2005; 
Baviskar 2002,2003; Benjamin 2010, Chatterjee 2004; Ghetner 2011a, 2011c; 
Kundoo 2011) 
 
All these authors begin with a presumed identity about the actors using 
categories of the state, the middle class or elite and the urban poor- and they 
attempt to elaborate how the state and middle class works together against the 
politics of the poor motivated by the same desire to improve the aesthetics of 
the city. This work suggests that the state is now in collaboration with the 
middle class to sanitize the city of the urban poor and the porous bureaucracy. 
The middle class is often represented in this work through the study of Resident 
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Welfare Associations (RWA)173 engagement with the process of local 
governance.   
 
Such a presumed generalized activist - for example the middle class - is evident 
from the scholars’ refusal to track how the activists first of all group together to 
form coalitions larger than the RWA, or how certain activist programmes 
transform in the context, or even how the activist themselves get transformed 
in the process of activism. Furthermore, almost none of their work looks at 
instances where the government actors fight against the middle class actors to 
achieve private interest outcomes that suit the privatizing networks within the 
sphere of governance which include actors across class categories. Due to the 
lack of a micro-process examination, these frameworks are also blind to the 
many internal conflicts and possibilities of any form of political consciousness 
among the so-called middle class. The notion of the middle class enters into their 
work as a preconceived idea, justified later by examining the nature of services, 
streets, urban and civic spaces and the notion of rule of law categorized as only 
of middle class interest.   
 
In addition, their analysis does not take into consideration how actors in the 
higher-level administration also enact and practice governance in vernacular 
terms. As I have argued before, it is not just that the state has vernacular feet of 
clay (mostly caste and clan based relationships) (Kaviraj 1999) but governance 
itself is performed in vernacular terms, even beyond the caste and community 
based coalitions. When activist collectives or neighbourhood actors react to 
these privatizing networks in the planning sphere, it can be seen that the 
conventional idea of civil society and making the state accountable etc., are not 
always the ways in which public interest outcomes are achieved. 
 
Even though my dissertation does not engage with the different threats that de-
stabilize the private capabilities of the urban poor in the city (presence or 
absence of state or middle class), I will propose that it is important to re-
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examine the various alliances that the scholarship on urban activism as middle 
class often presents. However laudable the intention of that scholarship is, I 
argue that such theorization presents an inadequate picture of governance and 
local activism in Indian cities.   
 
A finer analysis of land-use violations in Bangalore that I presented in the 
previous chapter challenges the idea that the middle class and the state are in 
any collusion. Some parts of the state and a large section of middle class 
themselves can be seen questioning the activisms of the middle class actors 
against violations while others involved in the state and part of the so-called 
middle class can be seen supporting it. For instance, governance actors, who can 
be categorized as middle class, as described in the previous chapter, work 
against the neighbourhood middle class actors to achieve private interest 
outcomes out of planning and governance process. Middle class residents in 
middle class neighbourhoods work against each other when it comes to notions 
of rule of law, and benefits from land value or neighbourhood imaginations and 
self-interest.  In the sections below I demonstrate these arguments using 
analysis of local neighbourhood collectives.  
 
6.3. From partners in crime to mutual surveillance  
For decades, Koramangala had different forms of local neighbourhood activism 
in the form of low-key local neighbourhood collectives and, more recently, as 
more organized and officially registered Resident Welfare Associations (RWA). 
The RWAs organize themselves in the neighbourhood to engage with issues 
internal to their residential neighbourhood: awareness on waste recycling, 
improving services delivery, getting a road built that leads to their residential 
block, or protecting a park inside their residential block, etc. RWAs focus mainly 
on micro issues and most of the times limit their activities to issues that impact 
their spatially defined residential neighbourhood.  174 
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A new trend in such activism in Bangalore is the increase in the number of 
neighbourhood groups that organize themselves as vigilante groups as a result 
of the impact of the violations and the private outcome based governance. This 
became significant after many parts of Bangalore, particularly Koramangala, 
experienced severe floods in early parts of the last decade. 175 Today a couple of 
hours of rain can arrest normal life in Bangalore. Its killer drains have 
developed a reputation for sucking people to their death during flooding.176  
  
When their neighbourhood flooded, a number of residents got together. Some of 
them were even meeting each other for the first time. Their initial conversations 
encouraged then to look at and share with each other what was happening 
around them.  They took notice of the encroachments, blocked drainage 
systems, filled up lakes, the large number of buildings that were violating land-
use and building regulations, un-built roads, drains, pavements, land-use 
violations, encroachments and politics in institutional governance and so on. 
They realized that floodwaters coming out of their own toilets due to rising 
water level during the floods have local, regional and citywide causes. Some of 
them realized that their own housing was built on top of a wetland. They found 
out that Bangalore has a planning system, and that the planning system was 
more interested in making layouts out of existing open spaces and lakes and 
approving planning permissions violating the laws, and busy making and 
ignoring plans at the same time in a way that suited the communities of interest 
within the planning system.  They found that their neighbourhood had grown 
too big and too fast while all of them were too busy putting together their lives.  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
and the engineers were initially non-cooperating, but now they usually call and let us know when a 
particular work will be done in our neighbourhood”. (multiple interviews) I have met many activists 
during my fieldwork who were taking turns to supervise the improvements on roads, drains and parks 
in their neighbourhood. 
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 Koramangala takes the brunt http://bangalorebuzz.blogspot.co.uk/2006/06/koramangala-takes-
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After flooding, BMP wakes up to de-silt Koramangala Valley, 
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176
 1.  This drain remains a death trap. The Hindu - March 07 2011.  2.  Eight die in rain-related 
incidents. The Hindu - April 24, 2011.  3. School boy washed away in Canal. The Hindu- May 14, 
2011. In 2009 even the body of a young child who drowned to death in the drains of Bangalore 
couldn’t be found. A couple of people lose their lives every year due to the flooding and drainage.   
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As a member of a community planning activist group puts it: 
“We started with issues immediate to us - getting a drain built, a road 
tarred, trees planted etc. But, soon we realized, even if we get a drain 
built in our neighbourhood, what is the use? Flooding is also caused due 
to the problems elsewhere. We realized we have to engage with larger 
issues as well if we wanted to sort out our local issues”. (Interview, local 
activist, Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.22) 
 
One of the active members of Koramangala Initiative (KI), a local community 
planning activist group described the formation of KI:  
“About 7-8 years ago we started because of the 80 feet road; the entire 
road was a huge minefield. Minefield in the sense that there were no 
road basically, and they177 were building a sewage line in the middle of 
the road.  They maintained that only when the sewage line is built, that 
the road would happen. And the sewage line, because of the contours of 
this place and so on, was a real chaos. There happen to be a lot of people 
who wanted the road [to be in operation] there, walking up and down, 
meeting engineers, talking to people, and figuring out what is going on. 
There was huge angst about why is this not done yet - you know, the 
entire flooding issue was also linked up with this. In fact many of us met 
for the first time on this issue - at the road - and thought if we could do 
something. We understand that RWAs and enough and more people are 
there at the micro level - to look at this roads, drains, trees, garbage and 
such micro issues - we thought there are issues that are more than that 
specific that can save Koramangala.  So that’s how it started.  
Koramangala Initiative is not a classical Residents’ Welfare Association. 
We wanted to save Koramangala; we came from not knowing each other 
to acquaintances to colleagues”.  (Interview, KI activist, Koramangala; 
Appendix 1, no.1) 
 
It began with a small number of concerned people who had diverse professional 
and personal backgrounds coming together as a neighbourhood collective. 
There were natural leaders, entrepreneurs, IT professionals, and environmental 
consultants.  As one of the members put it: “None of us were social workers or 
anything- it began with saving Koramangala- It was just five-six individuals who 
met and said- ok, we could do something here” (ibid).  One of them started an e-
group called Save Koramangala, which attracted about 300 members of which 
50 were very active.  This e-group became the forum where the wider group 
shared each other’s concerns. Some members realized that complaining was not 
enough and that they had to do something about it, so they formed what they 
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called a Working Group [SKWG], which would take up the issues with the 
authorities and bring about some change.  So organizationally, they became 
multi-layered – the e-group shared concerns, debates and ideas about the 
neighbourhood; the working group took up particular issues and represented 
through the banner of a registered trust. Even though only a core group of 
people usually took initiatives and the lead, the wider members provided 
different form of support: contacts, funding, signature campaigns, and ideas and 
so on.   
As Mr Revi puts it,  
“When we started going about it, we needed some kind of identity 
because there are so many welfare associations. When we go to the 
authorities first thing was about who are we? So we needed a card with 
us. So we registered an association- Koramangala Initiative.  Actually 
every issue rose [sic] on the e-group becomes an issue for the SKWG and 
then KI will take up some issues [for action].  There were diverse views, 
issues of contest etc., [but] we selected issues that are common to 
people.  Roads, protection of trees, how the area gets developed etc., are 
common to everyone”. (Interview, KI Activist; Appendix 1, no.20) 
 
Along the way, the group decided to take up the issue of commercialization178 of 
their neighbourhood- i.e., the plan violations. I met quite a number of people in 
Koramangala and wider Bangalore who described to me how they were 
personally affected by the land-use violations on their street: a call centre, a 
commercial complex, a marriage hall, shops and restaurants, offices, 
kindergartens, and so on that made them feel unsafe, estranged, conflicting with 
their neighbours and harassed by the increased noise. Along with such 
functional issues, some of them also raised their moral concern with the 
implementation of the rule of law. Even though many individuals and groups 
have been complaining about the land-use violations in Koramangala to the 
relevant authorities for a long time, they did not seem to get any response. The 
convener of the Neighbourhood Civic Movement Koramangala complained to the 
BBMP and BDA commissioners about a multi-storied office complex in their 
neighbourhood. In a letter dated 6th September 2004 he   wrote that, “in spite of 
our request nothing seems of have been done and the multi storey office 
complex has already been completed and seems to have been even rented out to 
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the software firm NESS” (Menon 2005). Similarly Mr Sathish, one of the 
members associated with the wider group tells me, that he realized that every 
letter of complaint that they wrote about plan violations in their neighbourhood 
to the authorities was an opportunity for the local engineers to make more 
money by negotiating with the violators. He realized that through this form of 
complaint process, he was not making the situation any better; on the contrary, 
he was making his neighbours unhappy and they began to perceive him as their 
enemy (Interview, Local Activist, Koramangala, July 2010; Appendix 1, no.2). 
 
Realizing that the relevant planning authorities were not going to respond to 
individual concerns, some members from the Save Koramangala group decided 
to file a Public Interest Litigation at the High Court of Karnataka against the 
illegal violation of residential land use.   
 
As Mr.  Krishan describes it, 
“No RWA was taking up commercialization. Commercialization of the 
neighbourhood was a big problem. Our objective was to stop the 
commercialization of the neighbourhood. As an example we listed 
commercial illegal buildings, and buildings with building violations- 
[Even though] our [main] concern was land-use violation, we also had 
building violations in the list – the idea was to bring to the attention of 
the court- that the big building violators are the same commercial 
interests. That was the logic”. (Interview, KI Activist, Koramangala; 
Appendix 1, no.1) 
 
This PIL was a major deviation from the order of neighbourhood relations that 
existed and represented a shift from partners in crime network where the 
neighbours thrived on each other’s violations for legitimation and safety of their 
violation to that of mutual surveillance and the call for the enforcement of the 
rule of law. The residents petitioned the court to intervene in the matter as their 
repeated representations had “fallen on deaf ears…and that the authorities have 
failed to take any action against the erring residents of the locality”. (Menon 
2005, p.4)   
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The petition specifically described the activities of about 87 properties in 
Koramangala that were violations in the residential land-use zone.179 It is to be 
noted that these violations were conducted by wealthy residents and 
landowners in Koramangala. The petition also listed encroachments of 
pavements and buildings that had did not have planning permission. According 
to the petitioners, the violations caused them various forms of hardships: 
overcrowded parking, very high noise impact from the diesel-run electricity 
generators and the air conditioning units, over-burdened water and electricity 
network, and limited parking space and traffic congestion.   
 
They argued that their fundamental rights to life and livelihood guaranteed 
under the Constitution of India Article 21 was “being seriously impaired by the 
wanton, callous, indifferent, illegal and arbitrary actions of the respondents” 
(ibid, Section 4, p.3). 180 Their petition noted that, “While the need for urban 
development is not in dispute, petitioners [sic] are complaining about the lack 
of planning vis-vis their fundamental right to life” (ibid). Hardship in their 
everyday life, they argued, was the “result of callousness on the part of the 
authorities in exercising their powers and failing to protect and preserve the 
fundamental rights of citizens” (ibid). The PIL asked the court to direct the 
authorities to conduct a survey of the neighbourhood and identify the scale and 
nature of violations. Furthermore, they demanded that the court direct the 
authorities to take measures to restrict the properties to their permitted use; 
enforce the provisions of the KTCP and KMC Acts; take appropriate action 
against the officers who were guilty of dereliction of duty; and direct the 
government not to grant change of land use indiscriminately until guidelines for 
such powers are agreed in the court.   
 
6.3.1 Privatizing governance and Divide and rule 
During the hearing of this PIL, the High Court ordered the BBMP to survey the 
area and report the actual extent of violations. After the survey, the BBMP 
Commissioner admitted in the court that all of the examples mentioned in the 
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petition were violations.181 In the words of an activist, this PIL “opened up a can 
of worms” (Interview, neighbourhood activist, Appendix 1, no.1). He suspected 
that the judge wanted to use this opportunity to clean up Bangalore, so asked 
some very delicate questions of the Commissioner in court, which irritated the 
Commissioner. The activist notes,  
“The government or the BBMP or whatever you want to call it turned it 
around and did not look at the zonal violations at all and went hammer 
[sic] on building violations- about which every house have a building 
violation- including ours. The day the judgment happened, when the 
judge was taking out his guns and firing at the BBMP commissioner 
saying, do this, do that etc., by the time I reached home from the court 
the BBMP had already been at my house and the engineers have [sic] 
already surveyed my place”.  (ibid) 
 
The engineers from BBMP were at the petitioners’ houses by the time the 
petitioners arrived at their respective houses from the court after the hearing.  
One of the petitioners said that he realized that the engineers were instructed to 
find some form of violation in the petitioners’ houses. As one of them described 
his experience,  
“We know all of them – it was the local engineers. They were told that 
you have to go and find some fault [sic]. The engineer [who came to 
inspect] had the decency to ask me- Sir there is 6 inches extra here – can 
I put it” (interview, Neighbourhood Activist; Koramangala, Appendix 1, 
no.13 )”.   
 
In the case of another petitioner: 
“In my case this was different. My father built the house in 1976. We 
couldn’t find the plan. But we could find a letter that the BDA has written 
to us granting the permission. So we took the letter to the BDA and told 
them, ‘you are the custodians of our plans, this is the letter, now please 
find the plan for yourself.’ They couldn’t find it. But one fine morning 
comes the demolition order. That our entire building is illegal, and [that] 
they will demolish that.” (Interview, KI Activist, Koramangala; Appendix 
1, no.20) 
 
Mr Revi’s case was also not very different:   
“By the time I got home from court there were four of them in front of 
my house. They were so apologetic- the engineers- they said we know 
what they are doing is very unfair [sic], so please give your sanction plan 
[plan that was sanctioned by the authorities]. Next morning, I went and 
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gave them the plan. When we purchased the house; we purchased[sic] it 
from someone who had already built a house with a sanctioned plan. 
This was a revenue site the, and they got [the] conversion. When my 
house was made, this was part of Jakasandra village. The BBMP said that 
the sanctioned plan itself was a fake. They said [that] this was not 
Jakkasandra and it was part of Koramangala. The thing is, they had to get 
some reason –no? They asked me ‘who was this person you purchased it 
from?’, ‘what relationship you had with him?’ and all that. They gave me 
notices- three ones [sic]- the last one was the demolition order. The first 
one was like a show cause notice or so….So I gave replies.  Then they said 
they have to come and measure it. I said ‘okay- do it’. After that, in the 
demolition order they said that that this is the portion of the building 
that is not conforming [sic] with the plan. He had marked it. The portion 
they wanted to demolish happens to be my kitchen. I went to the court-
to stay the demolition. In the last hearing the judges asked, ‘what sort of 
an order is this’? The BBMP didn’t even come to court. The order was 
written by the Deputy Commissioner” (ibid). 
 
After surveying the neighbourhood, the Commissioner started strategic 
demolitions to divide the community in order to pressurize the petitioners into 
withdraw the PIL. Even the survey of the neighbourhood by the BBMP created 
unrest in the neighbourhood. As soon as the BBMP started sending notices, the 
people in the neighbourhood blamed the petitioners for creating such a major 
issue of violations. The petitioners told me that they got threatening phone calls 
and were even summoned by big developers and issued with warnings like “we 
will take care of you” and “ you have children” etc. (ibid). After the survey the 
Commissioner demolished three or four buildings including a small shed; an act 
that divided the community. This strategy of dividing the community worked 
very well for the Commissioner. One NGO activist in Bangalore notes that there 
were even demonstrations in the streets led by a local councilor against the 
enforcement actions based on the petition (Interview- Senior NGO Activist; 
Appendix 1, no.34).   
 
One day during this process, the BBMP bulldozers rolled into Koramangala and 
demolished parts of the petitioners’ houses. This was widely publicized in the 
front page of the local edition of major newspapers in Bangalore highlighting 
that the petitioners themselves were violators. The petitioners were personally 
named in the newspaper articles to shame them in public. As one activist 
narrates it,  
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“The funny thing was this guy [name removed] called me one evening 
and he said something terrible is going to come in tomorrow’s paper and 
if I want, I could go and see it. So I went to his office in MG road,[and] he 
took me into that room where they layout the paper etc. He showed me 
the next day’s paper headline, and said, ‘sorry this is what will come in 
tomorrow’s paper’, and ‘this is what the editor wants to print.’ And he 
showed it to me. All of our names were there. I said ‘that’s not true’- he 
said- ‘I know, that’s why I called you guys. Tell your people so that they are 
not in shock’”.  (Interview, KI Activist, Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.20)    
 
 
These events not only made the petitioners’ life difficult in the neighbourhood, 
but also caused divisions among them. The strategy of divide and rule, turning 
the neighbourhood residents against each other, threatening the activists with 
personal harm of demolition and publicly shaming using local media worked 
very well in favour of the Commissioner. The petitioners decided to withdraw 
from the PIL.182   
 
So the neighbourhood collectives’ first serious attempt to be a neighbourhood 
community monitor and act as a catalyst for plan implementation 
boomeranged.  As Mr Krishnan puts it,  
“We got screwed by this PIL. We were ten people on one side and there 
were 10 million people on the other side. BBMP came in front of house 
with the bulldozer. We were under threat. There were [sic] building 
lobby threatening us, there were people under threat about their lives 
[sic]. The BBMP changed the game- they said everybody violated and 
they will come and demolish buildings. From the zonal violations they 
shifted to building violations and this took the local population by anger 
and they turned against us. Our lawyer was not able to bring it under 
control. So we told the court that, look, we want to withdraw. The entire 
government machinery turned the PIL on its head and fished us out of 
this PIL.” (Interview, KI Activist, Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.1) 
  
6.3.2 Impact of mutual surveillance. 
Even though some of them withdrew from such kind of activism after this 
experience, others continued. However, their modus operandi changed, after 
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what they learned from this experience. This public interest litigation was the 
beginning of a formal process of a declared and publicly enacted mutual 
surveillance, reverse surveillance and pro-active engagement with the planning 
process in Koramangala. Even though they realized they were a bit naive about 
the PIL and that it boomeranged so badly183, active members of this PIL group 
thought that this was a beginning of change in attitude in Bangalore.   
According to Mr Krishnan,   
“It was a landmark case- my judgment on this, is that the word 
demolition is not a bad word anymore. Otherwise it was a bad word. 
After this, demolition became part of the lexicon of urban management 
in Bangalore.  I think a lot of planning that has happened after that [has 
taken this into consideration], that this Koramangala PIL kind of thing 
can come up again.”(ibid) 
 
They feel that the mixed use zoning in the RMP 2015 and the Regularization bill 
are also a result of this PIL. It was also reflected in the comment that a very 
senior urban administrator made during an interview with me, that 
regularization was the only way to solve the legal problems that the ground 
reality posed. He asked me, “What else can you do with it?”(Interview, Retired 
Senior Civil Servant; Appendix 1, no.118)  
 
Implementation of the law became an impossible project for the actors in 
government given the scale and complexity of the problem. Such abruptly 
introduced mutual surveillance network can be a menace to the governing 
authorities and to the privatizing tendencies of the government; it seems, 
however, to have had an impact. When I asked a local engineer if violations still 
continue in Koramangala, he replied, “Now people are aware of things. It is not 
easy to violate now, mainly land-use regulations. Now everyone knows that 
people are watching.” 184(Interview, Ward Engineer, BBMP, August 2010; 
Appendix 1, no.79) 
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Mutual surveillance is about outsourcing the governmental surveillance 
apparatus to more micro operatives, mainly among neighbours and citizens 
who go about their ordinary lives. The neighbourhood as a geography of mutual 
surveillance was forming through such active engagements of citizens. In one of 
the negotiations that I witnessed in a planners office in Bangalore, a public 
sector employees’ cooperative housing society was trying to convince the 
planner to approve their change of land use application without a public 
notification process. The group believed that the local neighbourhood would 
certainly object to the plans to build a marriage hall in the residential area. Even 
though this group came to the planner with a recommendation from a very high 
level government official, the planner refused to accede to their request arguing 
that concerned people from the neighbourhood might request documents using 
RTI and that if planning permission were given without the due change of land 
use process, he would be in trouble. At that phase in his career, when he was 
about to retire from service, he said, he didn’t want to invite trouble. I heard 
him say, “Till now I have a clean record and I don’t want to spoil it now”. 
(Interview, Senior Government Planner; Appendix 1, no.114)  
 
This conversation not only exemplifies the impact of mutual surveillance but 
also the impact of reverse surveillance of the state that is now enabled through 
the RTI. Many planning activists in Bangalore use the Right To Information Act 
and request documents to expose various violations in their neighbourhood and 
the private governance networks. These include infrastructure works that have 
been approved and implemented in documents but which are invisible in the 
neighbourhoods, and buildings and projects that do not have any planning 
permission at all. One activist told me that he frequently gets phone calls from 
landowners in his extended neighbourhood requesting him not to oppose 
projects that are a deviation. Some are even willing to offer many forms of 
incentives. He told me that one developer even offered him an apartment in one 
of the schemes that he was instrumental in getting declared as illegal. He said 
that he doesn’t entertain these requests and I was driven around the 
neighbourhood and shown a couple of half-built and even completed projects 
and empty plots that he managed to challenge successfully. He tells me that 
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many of those landowners purchased their property at higher prices expecting 
that they would be able to make a profit by building higher than permitted 
density or by violating land-use zoning. (Interview, Local Activist, Bangalore; 
Appendix 1, no.7) 
 
However, such activism can also be very dangerous. One local activist told me 
that “sometimes the engineers will come to you, knowing that you got this 
information, and will request you to not to publicize the information185” 
(Interview, RTI activist, Bangalore, Appendix 1, no.23); He said that in most of 
these cases, the engineers and contractors “will implement the projects for you 
if you won’t make problems” (ibid). These activists understand that a lot of 
information that they obtain is very dangerous to them unless they know how 
to use it. Given the number of RTI activists killed in India and in Bangalore in 
the last couple of years, such reverse surveillance of the state and mutual 
surveillance in the neighbourhood is indeed a very dangerous job. 186 I was 
cautioned a couple of times by the activists to be careful and perhaps it is better 
for me if I avoid some specific projects from my case studies altogether.  As one 
of my informants told me when I enquired about the encroachment of a lake, “it 
is four figure Crores187  - serious money. You better keep out of it. You might 
find yourself dead on the road”. (Interview, Planning Activist; Appendix 1, 
no.1) 
 
6.4. Law as an ass  
From mutual surveillance to critical engagement with rule of law and 
governance 
In this section I will show how the Koramangala activists moved from a 
confrontational mode against the local plan violators by demanding 
enforcement of the law towards a critical engagement with law making. They 
came to the conclusion that the law [planning law] itself was an ass - as one of 
my interviewee remarked.  Activism that demands implementation of law alone, 
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they figured out, could even jeopardize their cause.  As Mr Revi remarks about 
the lessons they learned from   their experience of the commercialization PIL,  
“I don’t think when we come to a wall, it is the end of the road; there are 
other ways.  Public has to be aggressive - not abusive - but consistent. 
When you get to such a limit- then you need to know that there is 
something wrong in your approach you need to change your approach.  
But you must get going. You must sustain your interest. We have been 
targeted but the guy will not stop me from going on. I might change my 
strategy. We are fighting a war- you might lose a battle- but you need to 
keep on fighting, till you finish and win the war. You must not feel 
frustrated.” (Interview, KI Activist, Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.20) 
 
While a number of individual activists still engage with different forms of 
mutual surveillance confronting their neighbours, the members from KI moved 
on to working on law-making itself. The outcome of their PIL against violations 
taught them that they were politically naïve because instead of solving the 
problem of plan violation they made a number of enemies in their 
neighbourhood and had their own safety and reputation at stake. Moreover, the 
mixed-use zoning and the regularization act that followed enabled a route to the 
legalization of many violations. In the meantime, the members also started to 
appreciate the complexity of the problem. This enabled them to move beyond 
simple calls for enforcement of the rule of law to critically engage with the rule 
of law itself. For instance, critically reflecting on the substantive content of the 
planning law, Mr Krishnan distinguishes land-use violations and building 
violations based on relationship between law and justice as follows.   
“A person who had constructed an extra room for his grandmother has 
constructed so, because the law didn’t allow him to do anything within 
the law to accommodate his legitimate needs, [portrayed as the problem 
with the building byelaw]. By doing this he is affecting himself, and may 
be his neighbour. But the land-use violation- the guy who is building a 
commercial land use inside a residential plot is affecting a whole 
neighbourhood. Water, sewage, sanitation etc., things which he was not 
supposed to consume, he is consuming in a manner that affects everyone 
in the network. One is for profit and one is for survival, let us say. So the 
justice as opposed to law is different. We have archaic building law – and 
the price of land has gone through the roof. So the law is an ass in many 
of these cases. The zonal planning was an ass. In the whole Indian 
scenario- it is due to this kind of law and bureaucracy that people make 
money.  Nobody can follow them- because it is such nonsense. So I 
understand all these -[and still] within that one has to separate the 
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lollipop stealer from the murderer”.  (Interview, KI Activist, 
Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.1) 
 
This approach was reflected in their later decisions to engage with the law and 
planning frameworks itself. Explaining their rationale in continuing with their 
activism- Mr Revi argues,  
“What we try to do in KI is to bring some sort of rationale in 
development.  We are not experts in development, but we are taking 
these issues from the view point of a resident- this is my place- I have 
retired here, and probably I am going to die here- when I chose this place 
there was some rationale- about the quality of life. There was an 
expectation. If that is taken away then what good is living here? But why 
that should happen in the first place – it was promised and now it is 
suddenly changed. It was changed - because there is a need to develop - 
but it cannot happen in the middle of the road. You have to take the 
residents and citizens’ interest into account. Personal interest must get 
lower priority - common interest should get priority. Development has 
to be inclusive. Environment for example is very important. Making 
roads where pedestrians can’t walk is of no use. The [existing] 
infrastructure cannot take the increase of the population density here; 
[so they] widen the roads, cut the trees, hence, no footpaths etc. 
Commercialization, because some one’s commercial needs have to be 
met. Land value goes up. So people move out, making the neighbourhood 
more inhospitable. So KI take up issue that are of commons interest. 
When we go to the authorities, we are not approaching them in 
opposition. We are saying them the problem is as follows…” (Interview, 
KI Activist, Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.20) 
 
So when the new master plan draft was released in 2005, they (the activists) 
took a very proactive approach to understand the impact for Koramangala.  
When the core group enquired about the vision that the Master Plan had for 
Koramangala, they argued that neither the authorities nor the consultants gave 
them any satisfactory answers. When they attempted to discuss the draft 
Master Plan with the officials at the BDA, they were asked to contact the French 
consultants. So they started to interact with the SCE. They argued that that the 
French company did not understand the realities about living in Bangalore. Mr 
Revi said,  
“How can they give the Plan [making] to a French company? Because you 
took Paris as an example; Paris is Paris, yaarr;188 Bangalore is Bangalore- 
two different sets of people and situations. They didn’t even know basic 
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things. Their facts were totally wrong. [Later], somebody very 
responsible from the SCE - after we were asking a lot of questions - told 
us – ‘gentlemen, please don’t ask me questions - I was asked to do this. I 
was told it will be done like this.’ He said – ‘please excuse me - this is the 
most dishonest job I have done- I was asked to do it’”.  (ibid)  
 
When they did not get satisfactory answers, they designed a questionnaire and 
went to different residential blocks and explained the Master Plan and asked 
the residents to fill in their views. They collected more than 372 feedback forms 
from Koramangala residents. They also employed paid consultants to prepare 
the potential impact of the draft Master Plan proposals on the traffic and 
environmental assets in Koramangala. They compiled the feedback and made a 
presentation to the committee set up by the government to review the large 
amount of responses elicited by the Master Plan draft189.  Mr Revi remembers,  
“Except for Thomas, everybody was there - even the French gentleman 
was there, who got really upset because the committee said what we 
made in our presentation was correct and they started asking him 
questions. This gentleman from Delhi [name removed- a renowned 
planner and an academic] was so impressed with our presentation and 
report that he asked us if he could take it to Delhi to show his students.  
This French gentleman [the consultant] was very upset; he asked- what 
can I do? Then [name removed] told him ‘if that’s your view then you 
should resign- why are you continuing to make money out of this?’ Then he 
started disagreeing with us on things.  [Name removed] said that ‘it’s 
very well to say I am helpless about this, but if you are really conscientious 
about this, then please leave.  Don’t do this.’” (ibid) 
 
The group argued that even though the studies recognize that Koramangala is 
one of the most congested and crowded parts of Bangalore, the MP proposed 
more densification and a wide range of land uses in Koramangala. They 
questioned the rationale of the environmental plans, land-use zoning strategy 
and the traffic plans. For example, they pointed out to me that one of the 
massive mass transit hubs proposed along one of the high streets in 
Koramangala form the basis for the many land-use changes proposed. However, 
given the fact that this transit hub is not there yet and since there is no proposal 
for its implementation, the group argued that the land-use and densification 
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proposals in the Master Plan for Koramangala were irrational. Mr Arumukan 
argues,  
“The way they justified this huge commercialization in Koramangala is 
by saying this area [will be] a traffic interchange. There was a big plan of 
four stories underground, where the buses will arrive, and this will 
arrive, and that will arrive, and everybody changes, and there is multi-
story car parking and you can go home. None of that is there. They have 
actually shown on the CDP, the roads that really don’t exist.” (Interview, 
KI Activist, Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.20) 
 
They pointed out in the discussions that various road proposals in the draft 
Master Plan cannot be implemented because the land on which it was proposed 
belongs to the Defense establishment. Further, they argue that the Master Plan 
draft neither had any proposals for augmenting the services and infrastructure, 
nor any investment plan or budget allocation required to support the 
densification and mixed land use.  The group argues that they conducted 
extensive discussions with the BBMP, fire and traffic police who claimed that 
they had nothing to do with the plan. Mr Arumugan continues,  
“60% of the water pumped out in Koramangala goes to commercial.  
There is no increase in the input into the system. So we get water only 
once in two days. Many houses have serious water problem, especially 
further down. The entry point for water is concerned is HSR layout. 
Apartments depend on tankers - it cost less also. While we were 
negotiating - everyone changes – the Principal Secretary and all- and 
within 3 days the MP gets sanctioned. The BBMP says ‘this Master Plan is 
not implementable. Transportation hub, increase the water and so on - 
how can we increase the water sir?’ If we go to the police, they say, ‘we 
have nothing to do with the plan’ and this traffic is all on our head- ‘so 
don’t talk to us…[about] that- we are so busy managing this mad traffic- 
we don’t have anything to do with this’ [Master plan].” (ibid) 
  
When I pointed out that the mixed land-use proposal would help to increase the 
land value and that a number of people in Koramangala would benefit from 
that, Mr Arumugan replies,  
“It is difficult to address. It’s a very direct capital access. My neighbour –
his house has become a service apartment. We are friends…like good 
buddies…there are clashes of interest. Hence you need to have some law 
and order and some planning.  You can’t say anybody [can] do anything 
for their personal benefit. Then it will be like jungle.” (ibid) 
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Even though traces of NIMBY-ism can be visible in some of their remarks, 
largely their concern could be identified as the result of a perception of lack of 
planning and a framework to negotiate between contesting interests in the city. 
They felt a void in the space of the state when they went around representing 
their concerns. For example, among the various officials to whom they 
represented their version of the shortcomings and inappropriateness of the 
Master Plan were the Principal Secretary, the Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary 
and the Development Authority officials. Between 2005 and 2007, since 
Karnataka was in Governors rule, they met the Governor of the State. According 
to them, the governor’s advisor on urban development despite earlier promises 
“could do nothing.” (ibid) 
 
So not only that they did not get any relief but one by one most of the officials 
they were engaging with also got transferred during the period of two years 
before the state government released the final Revised Master Plan (RMP2015) 
in 2007.  Within these two years the plan had a full life transforming itself inside 
the closed doors of the BDA, that which the KI members thought were worse for 
their neighbourhood and for the city in general.   
 
These experiences led them to develop the impression that plan-making itself in 
Bangalore is corrupt. Many activists in Koramangala developed a fundamental 
mistrust about the planning system in Bangalore, especially after their 
experiences of the PIL and their engagement with the planning authorities in 
the case of the Master plan. For example, when I asked them why it is that no 
one in a powerful position and sympathetic to the residents case was able to do 
anything, I got the following reply,  
Mr Revi - “It is all about money. Which political party doesn’t take 
money now? So everyone is involved. Look at their assets- 5 years ago 
and now. It has increased enormously. Look at the property boom that 
took place.  If you go outside my house, it was a wetland. The water from 
the ST Bed and the city market area came through this wetland before it 
drained into the Bellandur Lake. Aswhini layout [next to Koramangala 
Layout] floods because there is no drainage. There is no planning. If you 
have 20 Crore190 rupees and if you want something, it can be made in the 
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Plan. They took out large chunks of green belt. People went and paid 
money to remove their land out of greenbelt. (ibid) 
 
Mr Arumugan - Citizens can get involved and make things work better 
and effective if the government wants it. But in this case the government 
wants in different ways - it is [a case of the] fence eating the crop. So you 
can’t fight the government. So whatever you do, finally the government 
does whatever they want and they don’t want to be part of what you are 
doing. I will tell you a personal story. The outer ring road was supposed 
to continue to meet the Hosur road191. There is a big [name taken away], 
apartment near this area. We went to look at a flat here and that’s how I 
know the story. I asked this guy, ‘somewhere here is supposed to be a ring 
road, do you know where it is?’ He very proudly told me that the ring road 
was supposed to be there where that apartment was standing – [exactly] 
where we were sitting then. But, he said, ‘we managed to block it for 
three years and finally, we paid the money and took it out of the map.’ So 
this is what is happening. Nobody is interested in development”.  (Ibid) 
  
Their mistrust about the political administrative system was exemplified in the 
comment one of the activists made about a senior politician in Bangalore. He 
said to me, “[name removed] said, ‘I am the son of the soil’. He is, yes, but 
unfortunately he is the son of the night soil”. (ibid) This deep mistrust that 
developed as a result of their engagement with the government encouraged 
them to move beyond negotiating with administrative channels to work using 
legal channels.   
 
6.4.1. From administrative negotiation to legal activism 
The activists filed a PIL against the Master Plan at the High Court of Karnataka 
using the banner of Citizens Action Forum, a large citizens’ collective in 
Bangalore that include a large number of RWAs as well as citizens as its 
members. The petitioner list included the Citizens Action Forum, resident 
welfare associations, and many individual residents of Bangalore (including 
some RTI activists, retired army personnel and ex-corporate employees). This 
banner not only enabled them the invisibility192, but also allowed them to stir 
up a debate that was wider in geographic scope than restricting it to their 
neighbourhood. This PIL questions the RMP 2015 from a variety of angles, 
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much beyond the normal rhetoric presented by the literature on middle class 
activism on Indian cities. Their petition argued that the Master Plan is 
unscientific, haphazard, and illegally made without any application of the mind 
and to appease the property and construction lobby. For example, section 33 of 
their petition states that, 
“The Revised Master Plan, 2015 formulated by the… [BDA] and the 
approval granted by the…State Government…are illegal, without 
jurisdiction, arbitrary, mala fide, unconstitutional and ultra vires.” (CAF 
2008) 
 
They argued that the plan not only did not consider any citizen’s response to the 
public consultation draft but also did not take into consideration the 
recommendations by the expert committee and did not consider the 
suggestions and objections from the BMRDA. 193 They argued that the plan was 
illegal because the BDA did not have the powers to make and approve the plan 
without the approval of the BMRDA and hence it violated many sections of the 
Town and Country Planning Act and the BMRDA Act. The petition argued that 
that the plan violates Article 21 of the Indian Constitution that ensures safe and 
healthy life for its citizens as well as the 73rd constitutional amendment which 
stipulates decentralization of planning responsibilities to elected local 
governments. They questioned the fact that a foreign consultant who did not 
have any ground knowledge was awarded the preparation of the master plan 
without inviting proposals through a wider tendering process. The petition also 
questioned various substantive proposals in the Plan. For example, section 30 
from their petition states,  
“Further, large scale conversions and illegal usage of land use violate 
the Right to Life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 
inter alia, by causing pollution, threat to ecology and environment, 
stress and public inconvenience and lack of peace and comfort. The 
Revised Master Plan 2015 seeks to give credence to these very illegal 
actions through its proposal of Mixed Zones, commercial axes, 
mutation corridors etc.  Further, the readiness with which the third 
respondent has sought to introduce mixed land use in pure 
residential areas is merely an attempt to disguise its inability to 
check the illegal change in land use, rampant in the city.” (ibid) 
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They also challenged the RMP on the grounds that it not take into consideration 
the recommendations made by the government-appointed committee on lakes 
and tanks in Bangalore.194  This committee stipulated that lakes, tanks, natural 
valleys, canal network and wetlands in Bangalore should not be converted into 
housing layouts and proposed to declare them as protected zones. However, 
some of the wetland areas appear as built up and earmarked for residential land 
use in the final RMP 2015.  So they argued that the operation of the RMP be 
stayed till the issues raised were cleared. 
  
These issues of environment and ecology called for local government to be part 
of the planning process, and questioned the highhandedness of the BDA in 
rejecting the suggestions made by other government institutions and expert 
committees etc. It can hardly be understood as pushing the poor out of the city 
through collusion with the state or as being only of middle class interest. What 
is evident here is a confrontation with the privatizing networks in Bangalore’s 
planning and governance system that has exerted enormous influence on the 
Master Plan. The point I wish to make here is that the experience of the 
commercialization PIL and the activists’ engagement with the master planning 
process gave them an impressions about the nature of the law, the plan, 
planning and governance and transformed the nature of their activism itself. 
This move beyond neighbourhood surveillance to challenging the Town and 
Country Planning Act, the Master plan etc., I argue, is to be understood as an 
emergent and new kind of neighbourhood activism in Bangalore. In the next 
section I show how this planning collaborative emerged and operate in 
Koramangala. 
 
6.5. From a confrontational legal activism to an activism of politics and 
networks:  an emerging Activist Planning Collaborative. 
Even though the group moved on from working with the administrative route to 
using the legal route, they became more aware that legal activism had found 
limited success in Bangalore. The group came to believe that one needed to be 
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more hands on in order to get outcomes on the ground. A court order was not 
even the beginning of a solution to a problem. So, I will show in this section how 
this group moves from a litigation process to a more hands on engagement with 
the planning process using diverse means - in particular, political means -
involving more complex collaborations. For this I will discuss how this 
collective worked to restore two open spaces in Koramangala: a park and a lake. 
Through this, I will show how the collective adopted more pro-active and 
complex forms of collaborative activism that involved legal, confrontational and 
various means of political networking as a means to achieve favourable 
planning outcomes.   
 
6.5.1. The legal, administrative and the political in the Third Block Park. 
Urban open space is one of the most important sites of contest in Bangalore, 
especially in Koramangala. Parks and space for neighbourhood amenities 
earmarked in the BDA layouts usually disappear through various allocations by 
the government which has attracted a lot of local activism in Bangalore in the 
last decade. One of the landmark judgments as far as Koramangala is concerned 
was the prolonged litigation about the so-called Third Block Park. (Map 6, 
p173) 
 
This litigation began in 1992 and ended in 2001, resulting in a High Court 
judgment that directed the BDA to conserve all available open space in 
Koramangala as open space and not to allot any more open space or sites 
reserved for Civic Amenities in Koramangala for any activities other than parks 
and play grounds (Judgement in Heble 1992 by Khurana and Manjunath 2001).  
The judgment directed that,  
“In the interest of general public, in order to see that the residents get a 
minimum area of lung space in the Koramangala layout, we are of the 
firm opinion that all civic amenity sites though earmarked for different 
purposes shall not be allotted in future and the same are to be 
maintained either as park or playground in order to raise the lungs space 
of 3.97% to 6.7%” (ibid). 
 
This judgment was the result of a petition to the High Court when the residents 
of Koramangala challenged the BDA’s decision of allotting existing open space 
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for an eye hospital, a Kannada-medium school195, and a community hall. The 
residents argued that this allotment was just smoke screen for land grabbing 196 
designed by highly placed politicians and their networks. As evidence, they 
pointed out that the trust that wanted to promote the Kannada-medium school 
was connected to a prominent politician in Karnataka. Of all the places 
available, they asked me, why did the promoters want land in the Third Block 
(one of the richest neighbourhoods in Bangalore), from where children are 
unlikely to join a Kannada-medium school? They also pointed out that the 
letters sent to the eye hospital group by the High Court returned because the 
addressee could not be found. Therefore, they argued that this proposal was a 
clear case of grabbing public land in the name of non-existent charitable 
entities. In their petition, operating through a local activist lawyer, the residents 
argued that according to the original CITB Act (based on which Koramangala 
was developed) residential areas should have 15% open space for parks and 
playgrounds. Further, according to the BDA Act that came after the CITB, there 
should be at least 9.8%.  Instead, during the hearing of the petition, the open 
space ratio in Koramangala was just 3.97% (Heble 1992). They argued that 
even if all the existing open spaces in Koramangala were preserved as open 
spaces, still the proportion could only go up to 6.7%.  Therefore, they argued 
that the land parcels reserved as a Civic Amenity site should not be allotted 
further but rather should be preserved as open space. They argued that not only 
this site but also every other open space in Koramangala – parks, playgrounds, 
and Civic Amenity sites - should be preserved as open space to reach this 6.7%.   
 
The court negotiated a deal between the residents, the allotees and the BDA 
Commissioner, and reached the above-mentioned final order to restore all Civic 
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Amenity sites in Koramangala as open space. However, the judge allowed some 
space for the Kannada medium school as part of Civic Amenity site 39a and 
some parts of CA site no 42.197 The residents think that this court order has put 
the Ananda Education trust198 in a tight corner and that they are unlikely to 
build anything there; if the trust wants to keep the site, they will be compelled 
to build a Kannada-medium school which is unlikely to attract any students 
from the surrounding area.   
 
During the hearing of this petition, the BDA commissioner personally agreed to 
this deal in the court. My research into the detailed process of arriving at this 
deal suggests that this deal was made possible because of the many forms of 
informal collaborations between the BDA administration at that point in time 
and the appellants even before the case came for hearing. The fact that the 
Commissioner personally committed in the court that 6.7% open space could be 
achieved in Koramangala if all available Civic Amenity sites and non-residential 
open spaces in Koramangala were reserved made this deal a very important one 
for the residents. This judgment became a central reference point for the other 
struggles for open space in Koramangala. 
 
Even though through this judgment the open space was reserved, it took many 
more years and a complex level of activism to convert it into a park. I asked the 
group of third block RWA activists during my interviews in 2010 why nothing 
happened between 2001 and 2009. One prominent activist, who has also been 
part of the Koramangala commercialization PIL replied,  
“Today people think that just because they got a court order, the 
problem will be solved. Yes- you have the right. But in many cases this 
right will not get converted into reality. Court is not an implementer”. 
(Interview, Neighbourhood Activist, Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.13) 
 
So they decided to take the role of local implementers. When the judgment 
came out in 2001, the playground had a temporary cricket coaching academy 
operating inside. Over the years from 2001 to 2009, it seems this academy grew 
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from 3 pitches to 9 pitches and the person running the academy started taking 
over most of the playground. They noted that hard-ball cricket (as opposed to 
soft tennis ball) progressively made the environment inside the park unsafe, 
especially for the children and the elderly. The residents argued that even 
though the person running the academy had only a letter from the BBMP which 
merely stated that he could use it without disturbing others; he denied entry to 
local residents. He also seems to have used government money to build a small 
building inside the park to store the equipment.199 The activists realized that 
they had to confront this person if they wanted to realize the park. When they 
found out that this person was politically well-connected, they decided to move 
differently.  As one activist put it, 
“A few of us came to the conclusion that you have to get the support of 
political people and local people [simultaneously]. We realized that we 
have to move in all fronts. We met the MLA- he kept nodding his head- he 
was like- who are you representing- you know, the number game was 
going on in his head. We have about 400 households in the Third Block 
Association- about 700 members now. We have a loyal group of about 
150 households who always support us. The cricketer was like- I am 
giving free coaching here. Even though he was giving free coaching, [to 
some] he was charging a lot of money- I used to send my boy- I used to 
pay 5000 rupees. Basically it was greed. Even the MLA looked at its 
social cost. We wanted a park - and people here didn’t have a 
playground. Only because of [name of the litigant of 1991 case] that this 
place remained open till now- so a lot of people were coming here to 
play. So the MLA also got interested in this. The MLA said, ‘let him 
continue his coaching’; we said ‘no’.  So during the Independence Day, 
(August 15th), we put our flagpole here, in the middle of his pitches. 
Actually we wanted to prove a point. Then the MLA advised us to shift 
the pole to some other place and not to get into controversy. We said, ‘he 
is encroaching, Sir’.  His [the cricketer’s] aim was to get the whole place 
as cricket academy. This complexity happened 2 years back [2008] on 15 
August. Usually the MLA comes and mediates the conflict, [because] he 
[the cricketer] also had good contacts with the Commissioner of Police, 
BBMP and so on. So [for example], the demolition guys will come here 
and then go back without demolishing anything. But then on 16th August, 
he [the cricketer] got a bulldozer to level the place to make concrete 
pitches. So [name removed] called up the MLA. He didn’t pick up but 
then morning at 8 o clock, he [MLA] returned the call. When we 
explained [to] him that there are this [sic] heavy equipment here etc.; 
within couple of hours he [MLA] turned up with about 30 people. This 
fellow [the cricketer] is also not an angel- he had about 60 people here 
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too from the locality- he was also local. We [the residents] were only 3 of 
us. The MLA got furious. He called up the local engineers and said ‘I’ll 
pack all of you guys, if you don’t do anything- this fellow is encroaching the 
place- how come you are not doing anything about it.’” (ibid) 
 
This, my interviewee notes, was the end of the cricket academy.200 It can be 
seen that the residents combined administrative, legal as well as political means 
in order to get the outcome that they wanted. This becomes clearer in the 
following examination of what happened afterwards in the case of the park. 
Once the cricket academy was pushed out, the residents started working 
towards getting the park in place. This involved negotiations about the 
boundaries of the park and playground, and to ensure their involvement in the 
design of the park and the playground. The activists themselves told me that the 
division of the open space as a park and a playground was carried out by the 
MLA in the presence of the residents who were negotiating with him. The main 
point that the activist wanted to communicate to me in narrating the story was 
that,  
“The judgment did not give us a park. It only said that this couldn’t be 
used for other purposes. The park doesn’t happen through such 
judgments. All of these got done due to the active participation of the 
residents.  So after this experience a few of us decided that now, we have 
to matter. In the last corporation election, a few of us got together and 
got 700 winning vote for the local corporator [councilor of the same 
party as that of the MLA]. A few of us openly campaigned- we knew that 
this man was openly supporting us. And it is our way of telling thanks. At 
the end of the day a politician needs recognition and votes.” (ibid) 
 
Parts of this conversation happened inside the Third Block Park. I found that 
the park was very well used for evening walks, jogging and socializing by 
different age groups. During the conversation, I met a number of people who 
were directly or indirectly involved in various stages of this activism, who took 
time to say hello to me and gave their version of the story too. At that time, the 
residents were supervising construction activities inside the park, for example 
the laying of the lawn and tiles for the walks, masonry and conversion of the 
building inside the park as a library. The residents seem to have taken up 
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different responsibilities. I also saw that some of the residents were distributing 
pamphlets to the walkers about responsible waste management.   
 
Trusteeship of the locality was evident in the way these resident activists 
engaged in the neighbourhood. For example, after one of my discussions I went 
with them for a meeting at the local police station for a workshop on 
neighbourhood security, convened by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. 
Another example: during my conversation with a local activist, a couple of 
young men who were playing cricket in the nearby playground accosted the 
local resident activist I was talking to and asked if they could conduct a cricket 
tournament in the playground the following Sunday. The resident activist 
replied,  
“We don’t own this place, we are only caretakers. You have to go to the 
local BBMP office and fill a form, pay the money and then, for that day 
you can have the place. But please make sure that you don’t get loud 
speakers that will disturb the neighbours and you don’t play hard ball 
cricket.” (During a meeting in the park, Appendix 1, no.9)  
  
This example shows how the neighbourhood activists moved on from a 
confrontational legal fight to more collaborative and politically savvy methods 
of neighbourhood activism and planning engagement. This moving in all fronts 
meant negotiating with the local engineers and contractors, higher officials and 
bureaucrats in a variety of government organizations like BBMP, BDA, BESCOM, 
and the police; raising money from the local residents; networking with local 
political brokers for right contacts and introductions and senior politicians and 
elected representatives; and hands on engagement with a view to implementing 
projects.   
 
Such a transformation in their activism can be understood to have emerged 
after the bitter experience of the Commercialization PIL. When I asked the 
activists about the major lesson that they learned from the Commercialization 
PIL experience, I was told that they realized that they, “were politically naïve”  
(multiple interviews with Local Activists). They discovered that using political 
connections worked much better than resorting only to legal and 
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administration routes. Emphasizing this point about the efficiency of the 
political route, an activist remarked,  
“He [politician] has his means of getting things done, and if he needs our 
help in something we do that for him. He is able to move things because 
he has authority over these people. So he gets it done. That is a better 
route now.  Some of the things are being done unofficially because he is 
an MLA, so he can get things done unofficially, i.e., not using the official 
machinery, and paper work and so on… some of it he can bypass…how 
the hell [can] people do otherwise?” (Interview, Local Activists, 
Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.19) 
 
The activists behind the Third Block Park perceive that multiple forms of 
engagement were crucial in achieving their outcome. This included using 
personal networks, legal representation, invoking the relevant sections in the 
planning law, local confrontation and negotiation, forging political affiliations, 
invoking electoral implications, pro-active engagement with administrative 
apparatus, neighbourhood mobilization for support and funding, leadership and 
even engaging in project design strategies. In the case of the Third Block Park 
discussed above, the activist group included those who had learned a lot of 
lessons from the commercialization PIL, lesson which were successfully 
deployed in the Park activism. The open space thus reclaimed is currently a 
playground where a motley crowd plays tennis ball cricket (and not wealthy 
kids engaged in net practice), where the residents socialize and walk, and the 
open space contribute to the city’s [green] lung space. This definitely has 
citywide implications. Furthermore, such strategies of working with 
government and non-government actors as a negotiating planning collective 
against the privatizing governance networks was being deployed on projects 
that have Koramangala- and Bangalore-wide implications. I shall demonstrate 
this in the following case study.   
 
6.5.2. Emerging neighbourhood planning collaborative: Mestripalya 
Lake201 
By examining details of the activism that attempted to restore a local Lake, I 
demonstrate in this section how local neighbourhood activism in Koramangala 
                                                     
201
 Parts of this section are taken from my paper, Sundaresan (2011). Many sentences appear as they 
are in the paper.  
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has transformed into a pro-active planning collaborative that works towards 
particular public interest outcomes by moving in all fronts.   
 
Mestripalya Lake (Map 6, p173) in the middle of the wealthy Koramangala 
neighbourhood derives its name from the adjacent Mestripalya village.  
Currently it is a disused wasteland used for dumping the waste   infested with 
poisonous snakes and sewage. Furthermore, about fifteen families who claim to 
be poor people from the Mestripalya village live in 8’ x 10’ pucca (concrete 
structure) cement block single room structures scattered in the lakebed. Like 
any other water body in Bangalore, Mestripalya Lake can be understood only 
within the context of the intricately interlinked wetlands network in Bangalore. 
The human settlements ecology in Bangalore, many studies note (Nagendra, 
2010; Gowda and Sridhara 2007), is integrally related to its hydrological profile, 
i.e., its drainage valleys and the topography. Hundreds of lakes dotted the 
regional geography of Bangalore once of which only a small number survive 
now.202 Initially, many of these tanks were built to irrigate the surrounding 
farmland and as source of water for the adjacent villages. Many lakes in the 
Bangalore region were hence integrally linked to the village settlements next to 
them; some of them are even named after the villages. These lakes are 
intricately linked through man-made drainage canals and the three natural 
valleys of Bangalore203. (D’Souza, 2006; D’Souza and Nagendra 2011; Gowda 
and Sridhara 2007; Nagendra 2010; Sudhira et al 2007). Hence lakes in 
Bangalore are both local and regional entities at the same time and as a 
resource on which the regional drainage system and the microclimate of the city 
depends. The lakes play an important role in the social and community life of 
neighbourhoods as well as the ecological life of the region. Located within the 
regional drainage system, every lake is integrally connected to its inlet and 
outlet, catchment area, edges, socio-cultural and ritualistic elements and the 
village settlements associated with it.   
 
                                                     
202
(Nagendra, 2010) note that there are about 210 lakes located within the administrative boundary of 
greater Bengaluru and Gowda and Sridhara, (2007) notes 262 lakes within the Bangalore metropolitan 
region. 
203
Lakes vary in area from less than an acre to hundreds of acres.   
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Regional Drainage Valleys and Water 
systems network:  Bangalore 
Source: RMP 2015, BDA (2007) 
Map 9 
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Many studies note that the lake system in Bangalore has been damaged in the 
recent decades and that it has impacted the urban socio-ecology, (D’Souza 
2006; D’Souza and Nagendra 2011; Gowda 2007; Nagendra 2010; Sudhira et al 
2007).  The lakes have been filled up both by private landowners and the 
government organizations that are its custodians, or encroached on by 
developers. Both government- and private-built housing layouts, bus stands, 
commercial complexes and offices, public halls, markets and so on, have 
reclaimed the lakes.  Lakes are also used for the disposal of untreated and 
partially treated sewage due to lack of network capacity. Traditionally, lakes are 
maintained by community groups from the villages; after the formation of 
Karnataka State, these lakes were embedded administratively within a maze of 
institutions: the Minor Irrigation Department, Karnataka Pollution Control 
Board, Karnataka Forest Department, Bhruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, 
Bangalore Development Authority, Department of Revenue, Lake Development 
Authority and so on.204  
 
CITB developed many residential blocks of Koramangala housing layout by 
acquiring hundreds of acres of agricultural land in 1963 from Mr Rameshaiah205   
who used to be the Jodidhar of Mestripalya village (Bhan 2005; Raveendran 
2010). 206 Mestripalya Lake acted as one of the irrigation tanks for the 
surrounding agricultural lands until then. The villagers used to work for 
Rameshaiah’s family as agricultural labourers.207  The lake not only acted as a 
water source for the Mestripalya village and Rameshaiah’s agricultural lands, 
but also was integral to the socio-economic, political and cultural life of the 
people.  For example, on the banks of the lake were the village’s sacred groves 
(Gunduthoppu) and AshwatKatte where the village Panchayat were held under 
                                                     
204
While the Minor Irrigation Department took care of the lakes used for irrigation, the BDA and 
BBMP developed and managed the so-called urban lakes.  The Lake Development Authority was 
formed by government in 2005 as a society [Indian term] without executive powers to take care of 
lakes in Karnataka. Forest departments developed some lakes and handed it over to the BBMP or 
BDA. The Department of Revenue owns the land in which lakes are located. See D’Souza and 
Nagendra, 2011 for a detailed discussion. 
205
 Name changed 
206
 Tax collector 
207
 Source –interviews with villagers. 
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the banyan tree in front of their gods, and the Achkat areas208 were villagers 
used to farm, sustained cattle and fishing.  
 
Land acquisition for Koramangala layout not only transformed the livelihood of 
Rameshaiah and the Mestripalya village but also their relationship with the 
lake.  Most people living in the village now work in the informal service sectors 
as informal traders, household helpers, gardeners, construction labour, drivers 
and so on. While some villagers claim that the lake is an integral part of the 
Mestripalya village, Rameshaiah claimed that it was his ancestral property, and 
the government maintained that it has always been a government property.  
 
A long legal battle between Rameshaiah and the Karnataka State government 
regarding the ownership of this 18 acres of land ended in 2010 when the 
Supreme Court declared that the land was government property. Two separate 
yet connected litigations need to be understood in this case.  
 
In the first litigation that concerns the water body, the judge ruled that Mr 
Rameshaiah could not prove beyond doubt that this was his ancestral property 
(Raveendran 2010). Even though one of the documents presented as evidence 
by Rameshaiah during the trial mentions the word private along with the name 
of the tank, the judge ruled that it was insufficient to prove the ownership of the 
land. The judgment notes that this could have been a case of a private party 
building and maintaining the tank (water body) for irrigation purposes on  
government land, a practice of the kind prevalent during that time. The 
government lawyer argued that the land was always government property and 
so was never acquired during the acquisition process in 1960s.  The judge ruled 
that building or maintaining a tank (water body) does not give the right of 
ownership to the land, and that any land that is not private belongs to the 
government. 
 
The second litigation concerns the land along the lake edge that the villagers 
claimed was part of the village Gunduthoppu. 209 Rameshaiah argued that the 
                                                     
208
Agricultural areas irrigated by the Tanks. 
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CITB had promised that this land parcel would be re-conveyed to him as a 
compensation for the land that he lost for Koramangala layout. In his High Court 
petition, Rameshaiah argued that he should be given a possession certificate for 
this land based on the promise made by the CITB. In the 1974 layout plan for 
Koramangala approved by the CITB, this particular land, in fact, was shown (as) 
separately reserved for re-conveyance.210 However, the Bangalore Development 
Authority, who took over the planning responsibilities from CITB in 1976, did 
not give effect to this promise. Based on a series of high court judgments 
delivered around that time, they argued that “land acquired for a development 
scheme could not be returned or re-conveyed to the owner, and that it must be 
applied for the purpose for which it was acquired” (Bhan 2005). The High Court 
and subsequently the Supreme Court upheld this view.  
 
Many of my interviewees pointed out to me how in the last four decades of this 
litigation the successive governments were not consistent in pursuing this 
litigation; they argued that it depended on the political equation between the 
litigants and the government actors at any point in time. It was widely believed 
in Bangalore and in Koramangala that these litigations were driven from the 
backseat by developers who had entered into agreements with Rameshaiah. 
During my fieldwork, I met developers who admitted that they had entered into 
a General Power of Attorney211 with Rameshaiah to develop these properties. 
This meant that once the land became Rameshaiah’s after the litigation, then the 
developers could build on it.   
 
When the local activists came to know that the land adjacent to the Lake was 
likely to be allotted as residential plots after being restored to government 
ownership - and in particular to the Members of the Legislative Assembly (to be 
known as the MLA Layout) - they filed a Public Interest Litigation at the High 
Court of Karnataka (CAG 2005) under the name of the Citizens Action Group. In 
the petition they argued that on 11.10.2005, the Koramangala Initiative had 
                                                                                                                                                      
209
Sacred grooves. 
210
As mentioned in the judgment 
211
 General Power of Attorney (GPA) given by a landowner on his or her land to a second party 
allows the second party to develop the property (or engage with the property as allowed in the GPA . 
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made a representation to the BDA requesting the Commissioner not to allot the 
said lands measuring 6.21 acres to any housing developments. In their letter 
they argue that they brought the attention of the commissioner to the already 
existing High Court judgment (judgment on Heble 1992) to keep all Civic 
Amenity sites and open spaces available in Koramangala as open space to bring 
up the percentage of open space in Koramangala to 6.9%. Irrespective of the 
already existing commitment made by the BDA commissioner in court and the 
court directive not to convert any more CA sites in Koramangala for residential 
or other purposes, they pointed out that BDA’s RMP 2015 earmarked both the 
land parcels – the tank and the adjacent land - for residential development. 
Drawing on the Third Block Park case, and the Lakshman Rau (Rau 1983) 
Committee report on lakes and wetlands, the petitioners asked that the Court 
issue a directive to the BDA not to allot the land for any private parties, and that 
it should be kept as open space and restored as a lake.   
 
They argued that lakes are of high importance for the eco system of Bangalore, 
and quality of life in the city and their neighbourhood beyond just their 
aesthetic value.  They pointed out the impact of floods in Bangalore in general 
and in their neighbourhood in particular as the result of damage to the 
wetlands. They argued that together, these two land parcels were part of what 
was called the Jakasandra tank which “helped to check rain water flow and 
maintain adequate ground water levels in the city”. 212 (CAG 2005) Their 
petition sought the court’s directive to prevent any allotments of this land for 
housing and to preserve both as a water body. After the hearing, the court 
ordered that BDA should not allot any portion of this site to any parties.   
 
When I asked a local activist lawyer who has been spearheading this case right 
from the beginning how she decided to get involved in this case, she told me 
that her contacts in government informed her that this 6.21 acres of land has 
                                                     
212
 Section 2 in application for direction at the Supreme Court of India- in the civil appeal in the case 
of no 1588-89 of 2008, in the matter of Hanumaiah and others vs the Secretary to GoK and others, 
and in the matter of citizens action group as applicant for directions. And Section 13 in the Writ 
Petition.no.24768 of 2005- in the High Court of Karnataka- between Citizens Action Group and 
others and Bangalore development authority and others. 
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been restored to government ownership as a result of the litigation between Mr 
Rameshaiah and the State of Karnataka. Her contact informed her that the only 
way to prevent this lake from being allotted as developable land to private 
bidders was if the local residents acted quickly with the help of the High Court. 
Otherwise, it seems there was pressure to allot this piece of land as residential 
plots.213 With this information, the lawyer-activist then approached the other 
activists in the locality asking if they could act as clients in the case. Even though 
the case was filed in the name of the Citizens Action Group, the Koramangala 
Initiatives activists got involved in the litigation. As one of the members of the 
Koramangala Initiative said, “This was a parentless baby. So when we were 
asked if we could take it up as a client we readily agreed” (interview, Local 
Activist, Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.38). When they were working on this 
case, (Land adjacent to the water body), they said that they stumbled upon 214 
the litigation about the Mestripalya Tank. So they decided to get closely 
involved and observe the Mestripalya Tank ownership litigation in the Supreme 
Court.  , Through KI, this collective appealed to become a third party in the 
Mestripalya Tank case. Even though the court declined this request, their 
lawyer was allowed to sit as an observer.   
 
A wide range of complex micro-negotiations and alliances and networking 
emerged in the process. To be brief, in that process they found out that a small 
number of frustrated government officers were also interested in saving the 
lake.  They networked with these government officers and worked as an 
informal team to save the lake. With the network’s contacts in Delhi they found 
out that the case was coming up for final hearing at the Supreme Court, and that 
the government lawyers were not representing the case strongly. They found 
                                                     
213
 Such informal alliances between the government officials and local activists to save public 
commons are not only specific to this case. Another activist told me, for example, that a number of 
changes of land use cases that he appeals against are also enabled through the tips that he receives 
from the officials and planners in government. He was not sure, however, how many of these 
government officials genuinely meant public interest and how many of them are using him to gain 
more value in negotiations, or to settle their past scores.  Nevertheless, he finds these collaborations 
very useful because they enable him to get insider access that improves the efficiency of his activism. 
For example, through his networks inside the government, he finds out the existence of and the exact 
location of a specific file which then he can request through the RTI act. This can then significantly 
contribute to the litigation that he or his friends may be involved with. With his network he usually 
helps many of his activist friends to access specific files through the RTI process. 
214
 This was the word used to keep the source of their information anonymous 
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out that the legal department of BDA was under-resourced and probably also 
under pressure not to pursue this. So they worked closely with the concerned 
officials from various departments of government to put pressure on the BDA 
and other relaxing networks within the government. Lawyers in this network 
took the lead and put together a case file and organized a private lawyer to fight 
this case in the Supreme Court on behalf of the government. Government 
officials took the lead in writing official letters and pressurizing BDA, 
Department of Revenue and other departments to put together case files, facts 
and court representations.  Those who had money funded this process; others 
who could spare the time did the running around. To sum up, a variety of such 
actions led to the judgment that helped to restore the public ownership of the 
lake. From previous experience of the Third Block Park discussed above, this 
informal network knew well that a court order was only a document in the case 
of Bangalore and that it did not ensure anything; they would have to work on 
this more directly and in a hands-on way especially because this land had been 
earmarked as residential land-use zone in the current Master Plan.215   
 
Armed with a previous court order that instructed the government to reserve 
all available open space in Koramangala as open space (Kurana and Manjunath 
2001), they worked towards restoring this as an open space. Drawing on 
various studies and articles, they argued that restoring this lake was important 
for the socio-ecology of the neighbourhood and for the ecological stability of 
Bangalore.  Using their social and political capital they managed to get the 
commissioner of Bangalore Development Authority and politicians to visit the 
place, commit to the project and instruct their officials. They managed to get the 
BDA commissioner to commit to reversing the land-use category in the Master 
Plan from residential to that of a lake and published it widely with the help of 
blogs and newspapers. For this they engaged very closely with one of their 
friends in the locality who is a politician and also with the many officials in 
government sympathetic to their cause. Using this social and political capital 
they negotiated with the administrators, planners, engineers and officials. 
                                                     
215
 Recall the discussion in Chapter 5 on the politics of the classification of lakes, wetlands and valley 
cones into buildable areas. During my fieldwork I tried to find out the specific negotiations behind 
this parcel of land that enabled the zoning of this into developable land. However, I was unsuccessful.  
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They organized together as a technical team, which included ecologists, 
landscape architects and met frequently to develop a concept plan for the lake 
restoration. This concept plan was later handed over to the decision-makers. 
After accepting their concept plan, the BBMP awarded the preparation of a 
Detailed Project Report (DPR) through a tendering process to a non-Bangalore 
based private consultancy. The group accepted that they had to work with the 
administrative bureaucratic process of governance but kept close surveillance 
on the process. For example, even after they had meetings with the consultant 
and government engineers to communicate their concerns, they found that the 
final DPR submitted by the consultant had completely ignored their concerns. 
They argued that the DPR document even got the survey details of the lake 
incorrect. They raised this issue with the authorities and argued that the DPR 
adopted a grossly inappropriate approach towards the restoration of the lake. 
The restoration of Mestripalya Lake is currently a project under such 
negotiations between activists and government officials. 
 
I argue that what is evident in Koramangala is a neighbourhood activist 
planning collaborative in its emergent form with its own complex problems of 
consensus building and conflicts. For instance, while some individuals did not 
want the villagers to use the lake to wash buffaloes, others challenged this 
notion and reminded them that this was a village lake and they could not and 
should not exclude such activities. One of the activists who challenges such 
imaginations about the Lake within his own group told me,  
“[The] wealthy are blocking out uncomfortable images… and unwanted 
things and letting only the disinfected view into their world… I don’t 
believe that is the way to go about it … A water body by definition - first 
of all government property, not an individual property, it has to 
understand the definition of community. There have been many cases of 
water bodies where people have been excluded. And a lot of people on 
this board are very aware of that… This is an urban lake… [so] there is a 
limit to bio-diversity. However to me [the] definition of bio-diversity 
with cattle has to co-exist.” (Interview, KI Activist; Appendix 1, no.1) 
  
When my fieldwork ended in Bangalore in late 2010, the activists were trying to 
reach out to the people in the village and bridge the gap along with arguing 
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among themselves about the nature of the water body. Some members 
recognize that there is a social divide among the villagers and solving it is 
fundamental for this project. The problem of identifying a common interest has 
raised new challenges of participation. In the words of one of the leading 
members from the collective,  
“It is difficult for us to reach out [to the village] without some kind of 
suspicion being involved. And even if we have to reach out, we don’t 
know whom to reach out to, (in the village)…There is a divide. It is a 
societal divide. A lot of Koramangala’s drivers and maids will be staying 
there.  But when you come into the social space, the peon is equivalent to 
you- he has his rights- by being a citizen- constitutionally. So we are 
trying now with the help of someone who works closely with the 
villagers. Where we are right now is with a new set of challenges. These 
ones are very different from the ones we have ever faced. The way we 
looked at it till now is US versus THEM. US mean the community and 
THEM being the government/ land mafia, BDA etc. So the contours of 
that challenge can be straightforward: it is legal on one side, pressures 
and lobbying on the other side, and so on. So where the situation right 
now is an admission by the government: yes, we will do a lake. Now 
comes the fundamental concept of participatory democracy or 
community participation- whatever you want to call it, that it is not an 
individual or a group of individuals who can decide what this will be like. 
It has to be now inclusive, especially now that you are talking about the 
water body. A water body by definition is classically for the people by the 
people kind of thing. It is not anyone individual’s domain” (ibid).   
 
Even though this was primarily a movement led by middle class residents from 
Koramangala housing layouts, diverse perspectives about the nature of public 
space and the commons and the subsequent conflicts were visible. A variety of 
motivations could be identified through my interviews and closer engagement 
with this loose collective. For some old residents of Koramangala, it is about 
nostalgia; while to some others it was about the rule of law. For those living 
adjacent to the lake, this is a way to find a solution to the many functional issues 
like flooding, mosquitoes and snakes. A number of them came from a ecological 
perspective about wetlands, while for others, it was about open space and 
quality of living in their neighbourhood. To some it was also about public 
activism to make the planning and governance in Bangalore work, and some 
used this was an opportunity to gain political popularity. The problem of the 
lake can be seen as a domain of multiple motives. This was evident from their 
meetings. The meetings were not only occasions where strategies were 
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developed but also where the internal conflicts of the group were confronted. 
However, in saving the lake as a public commons from privatization, either by 
the private developer or by the state or privatizing networks, they adopted a 
wide range of tactics, drew from wide range of resources, formed many forms of 
coalitions and transformed their activism as they went along.   
 
6.6. Conclusion 
The second part of my research question proposed to examine how and why 
violations are contested in Bangalore rather than it being a space of plan 
enforcement. Through my research on how a neighbourhood activist 
collaborative works against plan violations and planning for violations in 
Koramangala, I showed here how they contest violations using a range of tactics 
that move beyond a simple call for the enforcement of the law to forging 
complex coalitions for public interest outcomes. I also demonstrated how this 
process transforms their activism.   
 
In the first stage of their activism, they engaged in mutual surveillance and 
called for the implementation and enforcement of the rule of law. This resulted 
in adverse outcomes that pushed them to reflect on the nature of the rule of law 
itself. When they found out that the plan and law itself occupied by the 
privatising networks within the planning system, they questioned the law and 
became mistrustful about the governmental mechanism itself. This led them to 
identify themselves as the victims of the corrupt government. This had led them 
to conclude that neither neighbourhood surveillance nor legal activism was 
sufficient as a means to enable public interest outcomes. As a result, they 
developed mixed methods – moving in all fronts – the most significant of which 
was working with political and administrative networks, forging alliances with 
those who supported their cause for whatever reason, whether these were vote 
bank politics, ideals of public interest, or community networks. Such strategies 
enabled the formation of a network that included people working inside the 
government, politicians, administrators, professionals, and residents etc., and 
worked towards public interest outcomes using all channels available. These 
are necessarily not the means that strengthen the planning system or the state; 
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perhaps they could even weaken it further. Such outcome-based activism does 
not operate entirely through the planning system outlined in Chapter 4. Instead, 
it uses parts of it - sometimes the planning law, or the administrative procedure 
- to get the outcomes implemented.   
 
I argue that even though the contestation of violations challenges the private 
interest networks inhabiting the planning practice in Bangalore, the process 
demonstrates that they work with informal affiliations, pressures, vote bank 
politics, influences, and various forms of incentives. For example, urban design 
decisions of how the park and the lake should look are decisions made through 
negotiations of the local level actors, similar to the various negotiations that 
produced both the plan violations and planning for violations. Litigation 
concerning the Mestripalya Lake was made successful through a wide range of 
collaborations that even included hiring a private lawyer using the collective’s 
contacts. Collaboration within this network through information exchange, 
drawing from the capabilities of the position of each actor, and devising 
strategies sitting in places that are not necessarily government offices  
exemplifies the culture of vernacular governance even though their activities 
aim to challenge and weaken the capabilities of privatizing networks. 
  
Further, I argue that this form of activism cannot be understood simply as 
middle class and elite activism as much of the current scholarship on urban 
social movements on Indian cities argues. I proposed instead that this is an 
emergent planning collaborative and that they are transforming the practice of 
planning in Bangalore. Closely examining many project processes, I argue that 
such a classification of the activist is at best a misrepresentation of emergent 
local activism in Bangalore. I proposed that the network should be understood 
as an emergent local planning collaborative working through negotiation, 
confrontation, and various forms of affiliations for matters of public interest 
outcome. It is indeed true that a number of the lead activists in Koramangala 
were from the middle and upper middle class background, some retired, some 
working from home, and some who could afford to spend time on these issues.  
With their time, resources and education, they tried to grasp the complex 
263 
 
mechanisms of urban governance. They studied KTCP Act, Land Revenue Act, 
BDA Act, BBMP Act, Master Plan process, public administration protocols, what 
kind of documents exist and how to get them, how to approach local and higher 
officials, how to write official letters to government, and so on. They organized 
among themselves special teams with responsibilities for lake, waste, roads, 
violations, parks etc. They used their social capital - golf and professional 
networks, personal and club friends, etc. - to obtain information, enable access, 
and raise resources. Their online forums are a platform for information 
exchange and critical debates on city planning, urban governance, as much as 
learning about each other. They worked through the legal system (Public 
Interest Litigation) and political networks to get a park in place, violations 
removed, or the Master Plan re-examined. They networked politically to get 
insider information, identify and network with conscientious public servants 
and explored ways to work together for matters of public concern. This was not 
a very homogenous group as other studies on the urban middle class in 
Bangalore have also pointed out (Kamath, 2009). They had their conflicts and 
fundamental disagreements and split-ups; they grouped and regrouped for 
matters of some common concern.   
 
Indeed, the projects presented here of course are not those that directly 
improve the private capabilities of the urban poor. However, it can be seen that 
some members in this collaborative network recognize the need for inclusivity 
in the imagination of public space to incorporate diverse needs in the 
neighbourhood; and yet, some others are exclusive about it. This is not a 
homogenous collective when it comes to their ideologies or political affiliations. 
Different members support different political parties and political causes. From 
their experience of confronting the privatizing governance networks, some 
members have argued to me that the left-wing extremism in parts of India is 
entirely justifiable in the context of the exclusion and exploitation of various 
social groups. Some others would not accept a barber shop next to their 
residence while others argued that lake restoration should include the 
rehabilitation of the squatters inside the lake. Some use political affiliations for 
instrumental reasons to improve their local activism, while others demonstrate 
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clear political consciousness and a wider involvement with different grass roots 
and institutionalized political movements currently going on in India. However, 
the point that I want to make here is that the activism that they were involved 
in over the last decade has transformed the activist him/herself and that a 
presumed construction of these networks as middle class without political 
consciousness is challengeable.   
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Chapter 7 
Authority and Anarchy 
Examining planning power in vernacular governance 
 
“If planning is to be seen as something that is overarching above all this - then it 
must be like a lion in the jungle - not like a lion in the cage.  In Bangalore, 
currently, it is like a lion in the cage”.   
- Planner of Master Plan 2015 
 
“We really don’t know how to take things forward” 
- Senior Planning Director 
 
7.1 Introduction: Violations and planning power 
One afternoon, early in my fieldwork in Bangalore, I happened to talk to a well-
known activist lawyer and public intellectual about the state of planning and 
violations in Bangalore. He narrated to me his childhood experience of growing 
up in his parents’ house in the city. He remembered how he and his siblings, as 
children, helped his parents to run a small food-processing business from their 
one-room house. The small space inside the house was continually transformed 
each day of the year to accommodate the business as well as domestic chores: 
preparing and packaging the food, children’s study, sleeping, celebration of 
annual festivals, entertaining guests, conducting family functions and so on. He 
noted that they managed to live and work comfortably within the small space 
that they had and that any form of rigid classification of land-use planning 
system would have excluded families such as his from the city. So he argued 
against a planning system that interfered with the everyday life in the city. The 
activist proposed to me that it was important to take an explicit political 
position about planning and violation; in particular, who is violating and for 
what. He suggested that, “there is a lot of sovereign authority here. Planning in 
India is a kind of sovereign practice. Hence law is [as] central to planning as 
[the] planner is central to the law”. (Interview, Lawyer and Activist, Bangalore; 
Appendix 1, no.30) 
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It was indeed surprising for me to hear such an opinion - that the practice of 
planning in India occurs as the exercise of state sovereignty - from this activist 
intellectual whose organization is one of the most grounded organizations that 
engage with the complex everyday realities of Bangalore. But then given that 
such a discourse is fashionable in the academic scholarship about planning in 
India, the background influence of this view was understandable. Recall the 
discussion in Chapter 2.6.2: drawing from Roy (2009), many scholars theorize 
that planning practice in India can be understood as the practice of an all-
powerful sovereign state when they explained the various forms of informality, 
flexibility and the arbitrariness that they came across in the field. These 
scholars take the position that the informality, flexibility and arbitrariness, is 
designed to enable the state to become more powerful.  
 
My friend’s implied proposal that planning in practice should have different 
regulations for different social and economic groups in the city can be well 
taken as a normative moral and political stand even though it raises complex 
questions about boundaries of defining groups and the role of regulatory 
planning itself in saving the publics as well as the commons. However, when I 
revisited the statement during the writing of this dissertation, what was more 
interesting to me was how it conformed to the analysis I presented in the 
previous two chapters, i.e, how different social and political groups want to and 
have been appropriating the practice of planning to further their benefits. 
Perhaps for more than a couple of generations the families like that of my friend 
had successfully run their businesses from their homes. Roughly one third to 
one half of Bangalore   has been living in illegal and informal settlements for 
decades and generations together. So what happened to the sovereign state 
power here all these years? I argue that there is an urgent need to comprehend 
the real practice of regulatory planning in Bangalore beyond the portrayal of it 
as an exercise of sovereign state power through producing flexibilities and 
informalities.   
 
Such explanations, to recall my critique in chapter 2, come forth from a belief in 
the existence of an abstract, macro concept of the state that scholars attempt to 
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theorize about. The relationship between planning and violations in Bangalore 
that I analyzed in chapter 5 and 6 hardly conform to this representation. On the 
contrary, instead of a powerful sovereign state in the form of planning, I 
encountered a vernacular governance system that is inhabited by public and 
private interest networks that through appropriation renders the formal 
structures, processes and the capability of the state apparatus powerless.  
Through the analysis of production, sustenance and contestation of violations, I 
showed in the previous two chapters how this process operates through 
various forms of alliance that use the planning apparatus, policies, laws, 
procedures and protocols. 
  
In this chapter I attempt to theoretically account for the analysis presented in 
Chapter 5 and 6 in order to answer the ‘why’ part of my research question. 
Conceptually and theoretically it is commonplace to argue that the problem of 
land use control and its violation is about how the control process works in the 
everyday social governance and that it is a question of planning power. Taking 
that as a given, instead, what I do in this chapter is to propose a way to theorize 
planning power in Bangalore when land-use planning system becomes 
embedded within the various networks and dependencies within which urban 
planning bureaucracy operates. Using relational notions of power discussed in 
chapter 2, which can also be seen in the analysis of power in governance 
network studies, I sympathize with Sami (2012) rather than Roy (2009) and 
company. I suggest that what is seen in Calcutta, Gurgaon and Ahmedabad 
(discussed in chapter 2.6.2) is indeed the establishment of power of the 
governance networks that capture the power from the apparatus of the state.  
This is about how the ideal typical state apparatus is rendered powerless rather 
than the reverse. Furthermore, I move beyond simple observations that Sami 
(2012) tend to resort to about fragmented power structures and show how it is 
that powerlessness is constructed in the domain of Bangalore’s planning.   
 
I argue that in Bangalore the formation of a legitimate planning authority is 
constantly challenged and deferred during the processes of plan making, 
implementation and enforcement. In other words, I argue that in Bangalore the 
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planning system is abandoned, the relationship between the institutions and its 
practitioners are challenged, the rationality of planning is contested, and that 
the actors assume their power from the associations that they forge rather than 
by occupying the legitimate location that they occupy within the planning 
system. This is enabled by my conceptual approach towards the analysis of 
power as a consequence rather than a cause, discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
Through the analysis of processes that lead to outcomes, I examine how power 
is distributed based on the various associations that the actors forge rather than 
assuming who is more powerful based on the positions that actors occupy in the 
formal administrative and institutional hierarchy.  
 
This will be done in three main sections. In the first section, drawing from the 
materials discussed in Chapter 4, I show the key ingredients of the construction 
of a planning authority within the ideal typical state apparatus. In the second 
section, I show the widespread experience of powerlessness in Bangalore 
among the practitioners. Drawing from conceptualizations of power in Foucault 
(2000), Latour (1986) and governance network studies, I propose that an 
approach that considers an analysis of power as a consequence of a chain of 
actions not only in policy making but also during implementation and 
enforcement, can account for the experience of powerlessness. In the third 
section, I will show two specific analytical frames to explain how the normative 
legitimate planning authority is de-constructed by the private and public 
interest networks. The first one is termed as the contest of rationality, and the 
second as the contest of technologies of governance.216   
  
 
7.2 The planning apparatus of command and control 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the planning system in Bangalore is designed to 
function through the integration of a certain rationality of land-use 
classification, its logic of spatial organization and the structures and processes 
                                                     
216
 The word Technologies is used here to denote the organizational structures, process and protocols 
that on which the specific form of distribution of power depends on. Borrowing from Foucault, Latour 
(1986) also uses this word (techniques) to argue that “the only way to understand how power is 
locally exerted is thus to take into account …[the] techniques. (p.277) 
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of planning administration. This process should operate as an administrative 
bureaucratic system of policymaking, implementation and enforcement, as a set 
of linear processes based on the KTCP Act, BDA Act, BBMP Act etc., and the 
everyday administrative practices and protocols of a range of institutions. 217 
The protocols take for granted that a powerful planning authority that can 
control land use change will form automatically if structures and processes are 
put in place and assume that power will operate hierarchically to be exercised 
the by state on society through the administrative structures of the planning 
bureaucracy and enable a command and control organizational system. The 
diagram of power in this idea is a top-down capability i.e. command taken at the 
top can be transferred to the bottom through the use of technologies of 
governance and through the co-option of various actors responsible for the job.    
 
Understanding power based on various forms of consensus and negotiation 
discussed in Chapter 2, propose that this top-down conceptualization of power 
is a fiction and the exercise of power is dependent on many forms of negotiation 
and consent. For example, along with the administrative surveillance apparatus 
of the state, planning studies (Harris, 2011; Rose, 1999) note that regulatory 
planning is also supported by a mutual surveillance mechanism widely 
distributed in the society. Since the state cannot always see deeper into the 
daily life of its citizens’ behaviour, planning regulations cannot work without 
some form of consent from the social actors. For example, enforcement 
mechanisms that operate based on a complaints procedure from the citizens 
(regarding changes in their neighbourhood) represents such a mutual 
surveillance technology of rule. Mutual surveillance is about people watching 
each other’s behaviour to ensure that they live according to the rules, that they 
follow the policy or the planning norm. Such deeper surveillance mechanisms 
are fundamental to the operation of land-use regulation.   
 
Furthermore, the operation of power in public administration conceptualized as 
a top-down possibility assumes that the practitioner will act according to the 
law in letter and spirit by keeping the required distance from his or her identity 
                                                     
217
 The system is the ideal structure waiting to be practised, or apparatus to be put in practice. 
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as a member of everyday society. Moreover it also assumes that people will 
keep that distance from each other and engage in mutual surveillance and report 
their neighbours’ deviant behaviours;218 and that both these actors will stay 
distant from their personal interests, social identities, commitments and 
networks. It also assumes that they will stay close to the state idea (Abrams 
1988), its normative principles, the rule of law and notions of public interest. 
Putting the land-use planning apparatus in operation thus depends on the 
notion of the distant practitioner as a cog in the bureaucratic apparatus, and a 
distant people as a part of a mutual surveillance society.   
 
Through the successful rolling out of this apparatus on society, facilitated 
through the political legitimizing of the plan at the state legislative, it is 
expected that power will concentrate at the hierarchies of the planning system 
and enable the construction of a planning authority. Thus, the KTCP Act bestows 
that authority upon the BDA, outlining the detailed procedures of making the 
planning process legitimate. The diagram of power in this idea is a top-down 
capability; i.e. command taken at the top can be transferred to the bottom, 
through the use of technologies of governance and through the various actors 
responsible for the job.   
 
However, throughout my fieldwork I encountered many versions of 
powerlessness from practitioners at various levels. In the paragraph below, I 
quote from them and propose two analytical frames to explain this 
powerlessness.  
 
7.3 Planning and powerlessness: conceptualizing power and social 
relations 
During an interview, I asked a very high level political authority of the BBMP 
why there were so many violations in Bangalore. After a pause, he replied that a 
solution to the land-use planning problems could only be found if people 
stopped coming to Bangalore. He said, “more than 100 lakes disappeared in 
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 It could be either due to principled outlook on notions of rule of law, self interest in the impact of 
one’s own amenities, or awareness about participation in governance, or neighbour rage etc . 
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Bangalore. It is not easy to deal [with] all this. There are limitations to 
authority” (Interview, BBMP Politician, Appendix 1, no.121). Such remarks 
about the collective powerlessness and limits to authority were pervasive 
during my fieldwork from across the spectrum of activists, government officials, 
politicians and planners.  Many senior planners noted their frustrations and 
their anxiety about the lack of authority. Some of the quotes below exemplify 
this.  
“Then [about four decades ago] technology and knowhow were very 
little.  But there was enough respect for planners. But now technology 
and knowledge is high- but there is no respect for planners in the 
system” (interview, Senior Planning Director, Appendix 1, no.102). 
     
“In Bangalore, politicians become planners, senior bureaucrats become 
planners, developers become planners, the planners become draftsmen” 
(interview, Senior Government Planner, May 2009; Appendix 1, no.85). 
     
“[The] chief planner has only advisory capacity. Beyond taking advice 
and opinions, nothing really happens with the planner’s involvement 
here.  Then there are these transfers etc. - life is tough at senior level- if 
you don’t stand with politicians or big bosses, then you will be 
transferred to some remote place and they will replace [you with] 
someone of their choice in your place. There is no respect for planning in 
this city –there is no respect for the planning department in 
government” (interview, one of the senior Planning Directors, Appendix 
1, no.111). 
     
“We are working in democratic politics.  We work with politicians. They 
are the decision makers. We are working with people above us. We have 
masters. We do what they want us to do. (Interview, Senior Government 
Planner, September 2010; Appendix 1, no.105) 
 
While the planners complained about the involvement of politicians and various 
political networks in reconfiguring the authority bestowed upon planning 
institutions and practitioners, many senior civil servants and bureaucrats were 
more diplomatic and ascribed the lack of powerlessness to a wider culture of a 
democratic setup. One of the secretaries to the government noted that,  
“There are so many illegal buildings and layouts. We cannot break it all 
down. It’s all a disaster. We have a very immature democracy. You can’t 
say no to things here, can’t say no to anybody. Our sense of following 
laws is poor. We can’t take strict action against anybody”. (Interview, 
Very Senior Bureaucrat; Appendix 1, no.96) 
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Similarly a senior official from the lake development authority noted that,       
“[The] Lake Development Authority is toothless. All big developers 
connect sewer into the lakes. Are our people ready to tolerate power?  
Tolerate powerful authorities?” (Interview, Senior Official, LDA, May 
2009; Appendix 1, no.91) 
    
An ex-senior forest conservator narrated to me how during many occasions he 
had to put his life at risk while he attempted to evict encroachments on the 
lakes and wetlands in Bangalore. He noted that he had to confront gangs who 
wielded dangerous weapons and he always lacked sufficient support from the 
government. He argued that, “Government is [just] a risk-cooling kind of 
mechanism” (interview, Very Senior Bureaucrat; Appendix, 1, no.119), and that 
he could not really protect the wetlands from a wide range of private interests 
as a government officer with the powers bestowed on his position.  
      
Similarly an ex-secretary to the government noted that,  
“Theoretically Bangalore is supposed to have a beautiful planning law.  
[But in practice], I am sorry to say Bangalore represents a very sad and 
sorry picture on the whole concept of planning.  [Planning in Bangalore] 
is in the statue books only; something to be read, appreciated, 
commented and forgotten. 75% percentage is in breach of planning law 
rather than in consonance of planning law. The whole system fails, right 
from the lowermost officer to the higher level”.  (Interview, Retired 
Senior Civil Servant, June 2009; Appendix 1, no.80) 
 
Many NGO activists that attempt to make the government more accountable 
also reflected on the helplessness of the government mechanisms in the face of 
powerful private interest networks. A lawyer activist noted, 
“You know groups like [name removed] have the arrogance that nothing 
will be done against them because of how much they are paying people 
off.  Small time house owners are also doing this. They know they can get 
away with this”. (Interview, Lawyer and Activist, Bangalore; Appendix 
1, no.32) 
 
This collective powerlessness of the planning system implied in these 
conversations definitely calls for a re-conceptualization of flexible planning and 
governance as a strategy of a powerful sovereign state operating through de-
regulation, exceptions and exemptions (Desai 2012, Gururani 2013, Roy 2009). 
Latour (1986) notes that since social scientists have convinced the people in 
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power that they actually have power, people in power make orders that no-one 
obeys. The powerlessness expressed above can only be explained from the 
point of an expectation about their power because of the positions that they 
occupy in the government. Latour argues,  
“The problem of power may be encapsulated in the following paradox: 
when you simply have power- in potentia - nothing happens and you are 
powerless; when you exert power- in actu- others are performing the 
action and not you. To take an example, Amin Gemayel in his palace 
officially has power over the Lebanon, but since very few people act 
when he orders things, he is powerless in practice. Power is not 
something that you may possesses and hoard. Either you have it in 
practice and [in that case] you don’t have - others have- or simply have it 
in theory and you do not have it what makes the difference between 
power in potential and power in actu? The actions of others. Power over 
something or someone is a composition made by many people”. (ibid, 
p.265, original emphasis) 
I propose that central to the problem of explaining planning power in Bangalore 
is the question of its conceptualization to enable an analysis of the everyday 
practice of planning across various actors involved in its performance. 
Furthermore, in the case of planning practice in Bangalore profiled in this 
dissertation, it can be seen that power relations beg to be understood beyond 
decision-making to arenas of a planning-implementation continuum. Actors 
involved in a range of associational relations at different levels can be seen 
involved in exercising their influence over the arena of planning practice 
directly or indirectly.  
 
Foucault’s proposition discussed in Chapter 2 that power and knowledge is 
deeply interconnected, that power is widely circulated in society, that 
individuals are constituted by it, and that the analysis of power should involve 
cutting the head of the King (Foucault 2000) is also a very helpful point of 
reference in the analysis of the powerlessness in the planning system profiled 
above. This can then be combined with Latour’s (1986) conception of power as 
the consequence of a chain of actions of others mentioned above - in this case, 
those that happen through the daily operations of the apparatus of 
administrative bureaucracy). Even though these government officials have the 
legitimate power to rule, they don’t seem to have actual power over the land-use 
planning arena because others who actually perform the actions expected in the 
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land use planning system - residents, officials, politicians, and developers and so 
on - do not translate this notional power into actual power through their 
actions. To demonstrate this point, I analyze two aspects of construction of 
power in governance below. In the first I examine if there is a single rationality 
of planning in Bangalore; in the second I examine the technologies of 
governance and more specifically, how the daily functioning of the 
administrative bureaucratic apparatus prevents the concentration of power at 
the planning authority.   
 
7.4. Contesting and competing rationalities  
In a very important study of planning practice in Aalborg in Denmark that has 
contributed to the analysis of planning power within the complex field of 
political and economic forces, Flybjerg (1998, 2002) attempts to move beyond 
the normative analysis of power pervasive in planning studies towards 
theorizing power through empirical studies of what he calls the realpolitik 
within which planning operates. He argues through his analysis that instead of 
rationality defining power to legitimize the public interest notion of planning, in 
Aalborg power seems to define rationality. In the case of Bangalore, I argue that 
the various associational networks define their own rationality about the logic 
of land-use distribution and regulation and render the legitimate planning 
authority powerless. This then leads to a plural epistemology of contesting and 
competing rationalities. There is no one particular rationality of planning 
adopted by its own practitioners, people involved in government on various 
capacities, general society, and even within the planning law.219 I show this 
below. 
 
I asked a very senior level administrator of the BDA why the planning system 
worked so poorly in Bangalore. He replied that the very model of regulating 
private property was not a feasible idea.  He said,   
“We are not being able to do justice to the plan. Actual development is 
not in conformation with the plan. There are a lot of variations. Now we 
are beginning to take it up. People own different parcels of land. They 
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 In Chapter 4 and 5, I discussed how the KTCP Act is a collection of its own exceptions amended in 
the last two decades to accommodate a range of interests. 
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want to develop it the way they want to develop it. If they get more value 
out of commercial, they would like to develop it to commercial, and if for 
housing they want to do that. When we zone something as transport 
zone, the fellow is not interested. Market is like that. If we zone 
someone’s land as green zone, he will not be happy and he wants to 
persist to make his money out of it. He will find means and ways to do it. 
You can’t take somebody’s land and zone it into green or housing and so 
on. It doesn’t work (interview, Senior Official at the BDA; Appendix 1, 
no.113).   
 
This denial of planning rationale was further supported in the words of an 
estate agent and planning consultant: “if the principle followed here in 
Bangalore is any land can be converted, then why provide (something like) 
land-use zoning?” (Interview, Property Consultant, Bangalore; Appendix 1, 
no.57) 
  
Similarly a very senior planner at the BBMP questions the logic of planning as a 
means of providing social need and argues that violations are a natural 
phenomenon of growth. In his words,  
“There are lots of things that government cannot do. People need to be 
housed, so there is a demand. Can the government stop immigration into 
the city? There is population growth in the city. Can the government stop 
that? So when the demand goes up, automatically unauthorized 
buildings come up” (interview, Senior Planner, BBMP; Appendix 1, 
no.108).  
 
Another planner confessed to me that when she joined the organization many 
years ago, she was a socialist who believed in government control and central 
planning and such. But having worked inside for a few years, she notes that she 
has become, 
 “A major fan of democracy, planning as a technical thing has not made 
life heaven for ordinary people. It’s only the social dimension that is 
important. Engineers have not made the life any heaven for people. 
Technical dimension of planning is not going to bring much help to 
people’s lives” (interview, Senior Planning Director, UDD, GoK; 
Appendix 1, no.111). 
 
Even though still a believer on the possibility of some kind of planning, the 
shape and form of which she did not know, she implies that violations indeed 
have taken care of the housing needs in Bangalore. Such a rationalization of the 
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violations of planning as the demand-supply equation could be seen across the 
spectrum of policy and planning practitioners. A very senior judge in Bangalore 
argued that violations are to be understood as phenomena of demand and 
supply and that planning cannot do much about it. Close to the opinion of the 
senior politician that I quoted above, he also argued that the only way to stop 
violations is to stop migration into the city (interview, Senior Judge, GoK, June 
2009; Appendix 1, no.104). However, he did not reflect on the role of land-use 
planning in influencing the population and the spatial growth. Similarly, during 
an informal conversation between a group of right to information activists and a 
senior judge at which I was present, the judge remarked that “small violations 
in individual buildings are not a problem; people need more space, or make 
some extra money by renting out. The real problem is the big violations of large 
developers” (interview, Senior Judge, GoK, March 2009; Appendix 1, no.125). I 
don’t know if the judge was aware of the fact that he was redefining the 
rationality of planning law by categorizing some violations as less of a problem 
compared to others. I did not question him further on what he meant by the 
word problem. If planning as an enterprise in general was questioned as 
mentioned above, the logic of the specific plans were also questioned by many 
of its own practitioners. As mentioned before in chapter 5, one of the directors 
of planning who was involved very closely with the preparation of the RMP 
2015 argued that the SCE Master Plan itself was irrational and did not adhere to 
the planning law. (Interview, Senior Planner, GoK, September 2010; Appendix 
1, no.105) 
 
This crisis of rationality was not only visible in the way different actors 
contested the rationality of the planning system but also in the anxieties about 
the role of knowledge about the city that the government seem to hold. A 
planner notes that there is no convergence of anything about planning in 
Bangalore.   
“The DULT is making a parking policy and a pedestrian policy. The 
BWSSB is preparing a Master Plan for a water supply. BBMP has a Master 
Plan for the waste management. There are a lot of reports. There are no 
common meeting points. There is the CDP for JnNURM, the RMP 2015. 
The IDFC has an infrastructure report and a traffic and transportation 
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policy. Lots of reports. It is all over the place yaar.220 (Interview, Senior 
Planning director, UDD, GoK; Appendix 1, no.111)  
 
Similarly another senior administrator remarked, “There are no common 
platforms to overlay the different infrastructure requirements. For example, 
someone [who] starts digging the road [will be] surprised to find pipes 
underneath; no one knows where the pipes are located. Data for simple 
restructuring is not available (interview, Senior Advisor to Government; 
Appendix 1, no.117). A senior planner who had worked with the BBMP for 
many years noted that even though there is a standing committee for planning 
in the corporation, “they have no idea what is planning”. (Interview, Senior 
Planner, BBMP; Appendix 1, no.111)   
 
A senior advisor to the government on urban affairs remarks that the civil 
service is a generalist organization and has no expertise in anything. He 
suggested, for example, that the Chief Administrator of [name removed] would 
not be able to get a job in any other [name of a services provision organization] 
in the world: “He knows nothing of [the services mentioned]. Before coming to 
[this job] he was rural development secretary or something.  When I asked him 
what he thinks of the land-use planning system, he argued that it is not even 
worth taking a serious look at it, because “it is so crap and that it needs to be 
thrown away completely and new ones are to be developed.” (Interview, 
[Material removed to protect identity]; Appendix 1, no. [Material Removed]) 
 
Similarly, another senior administrator argued that the Master Plan in 
Bangalore does not take into consideration the demographic profile and the 
culture of habitation in Bangalore. He argued that,  
“We in India have large families and need more space. How can three 
children, grandparents and parents, and sometimes aunts and uncles or 
even some relatives live in a house that can be designed in a 30’ x 40’ 
land and following all the building regulations?” (Interview, Very Senior 
Bureaucrat, BBMP; Appendix 1, no.72) 
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This logic of contesting the planning rationality was reflected more forcefully in 
an interview I had with a prominent politician in Bangalore. He argued that all 
violations should be regularized 100% because people are trying to make the 
most of their investment on land. He argued that “if you don’t want violations, 
give everyone a stable government job”. (Interview, Senior Politician, 
Bangalore, Appendix 1, no.122)   
 
If this was the perspective of planners and government officials, violators and 
contesters of violations also question the planning rationality. Violators justify 
their actions against the inefficiency of the planning system itself. When I asked 
a resident owner why he built a parking lot encroaching a rajkalve (a section of 
the Grand Canal network that drained surface runoff into Mestripalya Lake), he 
replied that by building over it he was taking care of the canal that was in a 
state of disuse. He argued that he removed the debris and even repaired it. He 
argued that by doing so he is not only preventing people from throwing debris 
into it but also enabling a free flow of water, putting to use an abandoned public 
resource and helping the planning system. Similarly another resident owner 
who had encroached on the canal told me that he had obtained written 
permission from the authorities to build his lawn over it, and that a local 
engineer was even present when he laid the lawn. He told me that he had to 
build over it because his neighbours were pressurizing him to construct over 
the canal and align his property boundary with theirs; to reduce the 
conspicuousness of their encroachments. Furthermore, he also argued that he 
was taking care of an abandoned public resource through his actions and that 
he was willing to remove his encroachment if the authorities suggested it. All 
across Bangalore and specifically in Koramangala, one could notice that the 
residents decorate the pavements with their special ornament trees, lawns and 
sculptures, even by chain fencing them and excluding the pedestrian. It was not 
only the practitioners and residents who questioned the rationality of planning 
but so too did the public interest oriented activists. To recall the words of the 
activist from the local planning collective that I quoted in chapter 6, they 
changed their mode of activism from law implementation to outcome based 
activism when they felt that the planning “law is an ass”. (Chapter 6, title page)  
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This challenge to the rationality of the planning system, the plan and the 
institutional process fragments the foundations of the planning enterprise in its 
entirety from within. To represent it here in words of a retired civil servant:  
“Once you regularize, how do you justify planning on the theoretical 
level?  On the practical side look at the misery that it is causes to others?  
Roads get narrower, water supply gets overburdened, drains get clogged 
and there is no electricity and there are so many externalities” 
(interview, Retired Senior Civil Servant to GoK, June 2009; Appendix 1, 
no.80). 
 
An analysis of the rationality behind the practice of planning in Bangalore 
demonstrates a wide range of interest groups: top-down; bottom-up; those who 
believe in the rule of law; those who subscribe to specific notions of public 
interest; and those who justify private interest; NIMBYism; and so on. No single 
rationality in practice seems to dominate over all others. Without a consensus 
on what planning is and what plans are about, planning enterprise does not find 
a ground in Bangalore. Such contested rationality fragments the original 
planning system into a complex network of decision nodes, producing and 
sustaining various forms vernacular-planning practices. The extent of the crisis 
of the authority was represented, for example, in the fact that the BDA didn’t 
even have their 1981 Master Plan document when I requested a copy. A senior 
planner advised me that I could purchase it from a private company near the 
Richmond Circle in Bangalore rather than wasting my time at the BDA archives. 
He remembered that when he was at the BBMP many years ago, a copy of 
the1981 plan document was requested by the BDA from the BBMP because the 
BDA could not locate it inside their office. During this conversation someone 
corrected him that what is available at the private company is not the 1981 
Master Plan but the 2005-2015 Master Plan.  
 
These contesting rationalities made a very senior planner in charge of the 
planning system in Bangalore remark to me candidly; “we really don’t know 
how to take things forward” (interview, Senior Planner, UDD, GoK; Appendix 1, 
no.111). While this crisis in rationality made the planning process directionless, 
people involved in the various networks took their own decisions at various 
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levels and stages and pulverized the structure of administrative process. This is 
examined below.   
 
7.5 Associational networks and the technologies of governance  
In Chapter 4, I argued that the planning process in Bangalore is foundationally 
dependent on the process of bureaucratic administration in order to enable the 
accrual of power to the planning authority. In this section, I will discuss how the 
actors in the various associational networks prevent the formation of command 
and control planning authority.  
 
Frustrated about the political interference that defines most of the planning 
outcomes in Bangalore, one of the senior advisors to the government on urban 
affairs notes that even though an MLA has no executive authority in the 
Legislative Assembly, he or she still gives oral executive orders to the local 
engineer and the local engineer invariably obeys. A retired senior administrator 
who was present during this discussion remarked that the commissioner has no 
authority over things that will really happen in the city (interview, Retired 
Senior Civil Servant to GoK; Appendix 1, no.118). They were making the point 
that there is no convergence between the executive authority and political 
authority in Bangalore. This prevents the commissioner from getting things 
done as he or she wants.  The retired bureaucrat remarked,  
“Why can’t you do it, is the tone of politicians. This is also because everyone 
works with a political boss. There are godfathers and saviours. You are 
generally there with the legislator’s’   support. Hence this relationship 
between secretary and legislator is an important thing. This will manifest 
into every single thing, even little jobs like site allocation in BDA to 
everything”, (interview, Retired Senior Civil Servant, GoK; Appendix 1, 
no.118). 
 
This direct relationship between the local politician and the local engineer, 
bypassing the command chain of the executive authority in practice, is only one 
of the many vernacular practices of governance that prevent the formation of a 
command and control planning system. The economic interests of a large 
number of politicians and their business networks are always reflected in the 
planning outcomes discussed in various parts of this chapter. An ex-chief of a 
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public authority who was demoted and transferred due to the land politics in 
Bangalore notes that “many ministers and MLA s are involved with real estate 
business in Bangalore. Many are themselves real estate developers, or run some 
kind of real estate business. That’s the big money in Bangalore now and politics 
in Bangalore is funded by Real Estate (interview, Senior Administrator, GoK; 
Appendix 1, no.75).  He continues,  
 
“Village accountants kept the book. So if you paid them enough, they will 
round off the ownership details of one person and insert another. One 
would never know anything until the original owner goes to sell the 
property or so. When the fabrication is very much in detail, then the 
government cannot cancel it automatically. One has to give notice to the 
owner and hear him and decide. This could lead to litigation. 
Government has to initiate action Sue Moto. So what if government 
doesn’t initiate Sue Moto action? The land is gone to the encroacher. The 
encroachers are so well-connected that they will ensure that the suit is 
not litigated properly or that the government is not represented or no 
written statement is filed etc.  When such a weak face is presented, the 
suit will be decreed in the name of the petitioner and also a permanent 
injunction. This is the modus operandi in Bangalore” (ibid). 
 
The frustration created by the role of the uncontrollable lower-level officials is 
represented in the words of a very senior level civic administrator as follows, 
“Violation starts with offices at the ground level. One cannot do much of 
anything because who is working for you? They work for their bosses 
and their needs. If you want to find violations you need their help. They 
won’t locate it because they are involved in it as well. So much money 
needs to be paid to get the post. Hence they remain connected to these 
political networks. They have to make money for their political bosses. 
The local level officials are the key in both running the system legally and 
running the system illegally. They have lot of power that they hold tight. 
At the end of the day you are dependent on that hierarchy to function. 
And the sabotage could happen half-way down for other purposes. 
(Interview, Senior Administrator, GoK; Appendix 1, no.96) 
 
Officers at various levels frequently expressed this frustration about their lack 
of control on the administrative process. One local activist involved in wider 
planning activism in Bangalore reported to me that a BBMP commissioner once 
told him: “90% of the BBMP engineers are involved in this racket. What do you 
want me to do? Chuck all of them? I can’t”, (interview, Local Activist, 
Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.20). 
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A large number of officers at higher level and at the lower level realign their 
practices many times to suit the networks of association that they are part of 
rather than to adhere to their role and responsibility ascribed by the planning 
bureaucracy. Such associational networks disrupt the command chain on which 
the technology of governance for planning depends on. Accrual of power to the 
Planning Authority and to the people in power is dependent on the collective 
actions of all the members in the administrative authority. Most local engineers, 
village accountants, local councilors, secretaries and so on, further the interests 
of the networks that they are a part of rather than contribute to the 
construction of a planning authority. Furthermore, there is also an informal 
disciplinary regime in operation that makes sure this associational network 
governance is not disrupted. In the words of an activist who constantly interacts 
with a range of local level and higher level officials: “The politicians always will 
have his own persons at the positions in his ward – the engineer, and officers. 
Everyone have [sic] domestic problems as well, family, children etc., they don’t 
want transfers etc., so they are also compliant. (Interview, Local Activist, 
Koramangala; Appendix 1, no.23) 
 
An ex-member of an advisory body for the government on urban affairs puts the 
resultant irrelevance of the plan due to this scattered administrative authority 
in the following words:   
“Everything that happens on the ground is through challenging the plan. 
Nobody cares. If my doctor advises a diet and my cook says ‘let me see 
how you follow the diet’ and puts the ghee, how will I follow the diet 
yarr? The person who is serving me food is putting ghee. So either I 
change my cook, or..., So the point I say is, planning is not central to day-
to-day life; it is peripheral, it is a document that lies somewhere. 
(Interview, Ex-advisor to GoK on Urban Affairs, February 2009; 
Appendix 1, no.67) 
 
The extent of this networked system and its impact on the executive authority 
was evident in the words of a local activist who follows up local information and 
challenges violations. Being one of the members of the mutual surveillance 
society, he seemed to have figured out the intricate ways in which the 
networked vernacular governance system works; he said,  
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“It is in fact the sweepers who are the first point of information. The 
sweepers will inform the relevant engineer and get their share from the 
process. Then the engineer will approach the owner for their share for 
any legal or illegal construction”. (Interview, Planning Activist; 
Appendix 1, no.7) 
 
The discussions from the fieldwork were presented above to argue how the 
structures of the executive administration are fragmented through the practices 
of its own employees involved in various forms of networks that produce 
private interest outcomes. Right from the sweepers to local engineers, 
contractors, local councilors, ward engineers, village accountants, engineers 
from the services connection agencies, planners, middle and higher level 
officials, local and state level politicians, ministers and so on exercise their 
powers to further the needs of their networks rather than contribute to the 
formation of a planning authority.  
 
This capture of legitimate authority not only occurs in private interest 
networks, but also in the public interest networks, contributing to the crisis and 
preventing the formation of any legitimate planning authority. The process of 
the preparation of the RMP 2015 itself is a very good instance to recall. As 
discussed in Chapter 4.4.1, raising resources from an Indo-French protocol to 
circumvent the statutorily-required tendering process, the GoK in 2003 
entrusted a French consortium with the task of preparing the Bangalore Master 
Plan. It was pointed out by a number of my interviewees that the elite group 
called Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF)221 , which was formed in 2000 by 
the then newly elected Chief Minister of Karnataka comprised of elite 
administrators who had the Chief Ministers confidence and many influential 
corporate elites, believed that BDA was incapable of preparing a Master Plan for 
the rapidly globalizing Bangalore. This group believed that entrusting the BDA 
to prepare the Master Plan was like entrusting it with the with the Bangalore 
real estate lobby (multiple interviews with Planning Consultants, Ex-advisor to 
GoK, Government Planners). So, it was argued by many of my interviewees that 
                                                     
221
 Chief Minister’s advisory body for putting the city in order, which functioned 2000-2006/7 and 
consisted of elite corporate members, ex-corporate members and business leaders. Interviews show 
that during the process of preparation of the MP 2005-2015, BATF members regularly attended the 
meetings. 
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this ambitious clique lobbied for outsourcing the Master Plan. The smart 
administrators present in the clique in collaboration with some smart 
consultancy executives managed to invoke an Indo French Protocol to 
circumvent the tendering process and award the project to a group that would 
protect the Master Plan process from local influences and introduce some 
cutting-edge technology, GIS and planning knowledge in Bangalore.222   
 
Setting up such parallel advisory organizations with a lot of symbolic power is 
one of the practices that demonstrate the crisis of planning power in Bangalore 
in the last decade. This strategy involves key political and administrative 
functionaries working through parallel administrative mechanisms for strategic 
projects than strengthening the existing planning system. Bangalore Agenda 
Task Force (BATF), set up as an advisory body and headed by the then 
chairman of a successful IT company consisted of many well knows successful 
individuals from the industry in Bangalore. Along with the Master Plan, this 
group has been influential in initiating a number of projects, in the city. Even 
though BATF was abolished after the term of the then government had ended, a 
new institution was set up in the similar fashion by the new government and 
called it Agenda for Bangalore Infrastructure and Development (ABIDe). The 
CEO of another successful business venture who also happens to be a political 
peer chaired this organization. One of my interviewees, a close associate of one 
of these organizations, argues that it doesn’t matter who the official members 
                                                     
222
 It should also be noted here that not all members of this clique agreed to outsource the Master Plan 
process to SCE. Some of them thought that SCE did not have enough experience in master planning 
and that they were mainly GIS consultants. Subsequently the relationship between the clique and the 
master planners became ambiguous. One of my interviewees who was a member of the BATF noted,  
“…when the map [spatial data infrastructure project] was coming to an end- [I suggested] 
let’s call international competition tender for a vision document. I suggested let’s do a 
Master Plan  having 10 year vision and do technical plans having one year programmes etc. 
The government didn’t agree. At that point things went a little out of hand. End of 2004, 
monsoons had failed, Krishna [Chief Minister] panicked and called elections and at that 
exact point the APUR went and told the BDA that they will do the CDP. I wanted a world-
class international competition – all sorts of list of guys I had made – but they did a quick 
backdoor entry. The French was paying [sic]- I met them- the French planners who had no 
idea they said we [Indians] all live on top of the shop and this is the way to do it. Initially 
they knew that I was the guy who did the whole thing. They used to call me and so on for 
meetings and all. It was during the time of the guy called [name removed]. He got transferred 
back to France. Then there was this guy [name and some quotes removed] and that guy 
turned out to be a very political guy, trying to make the company better and so on”. 
(Interview, Ex-Advisor to GoK on Urban Affairs, August 2010; Appendix 1, no.65)   
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are or whatever government is in power. He argues that this is a “permanent 
Establishment” in Bangalore. (Interviews, [Material removed to protect identity]; 
Appendix 1, no. [Material removed])  Using these organizations, these 
individuals are interested in “fixing” Bangalore. 223 Due to their irreverence 
towards the planning system, one of them noted that researching the existing 
planning system in Bangalore was worthless and that it needed to be 
dismantled and a wholly new one developed from scratch. Their projects have 
included accounting reform, master planning, transport strategies, healthcare 
and governance reform. However, they could hardly bring about any systemic 
planning reform in Bangalore. Many people, including many senior government 
officers, perceived that this network was there to further its own interest. One 
very senior officer in government remarked, 
“They are all there for narrow self-interest.  [name of the organization 
and name of the person] wants his road to [place name] and airport to be 
made well, [name of person] wants some land deals… At time of [name of 
person], [name of person] made a lot of money through [name of 
business], [name of organization] has a huge land bank of [amount] 
acres, they got all the information to buy this through their involvement 
with the Master Plan and governance process. We are all fools to sit here 
and work like donkeys’ (interview, Senior Administrator, BBMP; 
Appendix 1, no.72). 
 
When I asked one of the members of one of these organizations about their 
motivations and operational strategies, he candidly remarked that they do 
specific things that would further the various motivations within the group. For 
some it is political; for others it could be specific public interest projects in 
areas of their interest. Some believed in fixing the state and others wanted to 
make themselves generally useful in a spirit of civic participation. Not 
surprisingly therefore, their symbolic power hardly transferred into actual 
power when it comes to achieving outcomes. For example, their accounting 
reform of the BBMP was subverted, the Bangalore governance reform bill was 
voted against in the Legislative Assembly and progressively the group became 
more and more unpopular among a wide range of politicians, people, activists 
and residents. It was not hence surprising that most of their endeavors were 
project-based: to get a specific transport route, signal free traffic corridors, and 
                                                     
223
 Term often used by the reformists. 
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so on. Furthermore, it is worth recalling here how even the private limited 
company (SCE) entrusted with the MP preparation could not secure all the land-
use decisions in the Master Plan from external influences even within their 
office premises.   
 
In Chapter 6, I described in detail how the local planning collectives operate, to 
save a lake or to challenge a local violation or to enable specific public interest 
outcomes using associational networks. I provoked a local activist on this, 
pointing out that the processes that they adopt are not very dissimilar from that 
of the violation networks. He agreed that this was true. However, he suggested 
that one difference is that the activists don’t adopt any methods that are under 
the burqua (he meant corrupt and concealed practice). 224  Instead they work 
upfront only for the purpose of the public interest. He argued that until the 
problems of accountability of governance structure and process are sorted out, 
civil society should have to work with the formal and the informal route 
simultaneously to achieve outcomes. As long as the government, the land mafia 
and the politicians use their own convenient routes - for example de-
notification, special category allocation, regularization, changing land uses, 
strategies for plan violations and planning for violations - activists interested in 
public interest outcomes should also use similar methods. He believes that 
depending solely on formal routes of administration is insufficient. However, he 
agreed that from a certain perspective,  
“We are all the same. However, hardly any purist would say that in my 
fight for the lake, process is more important than the end result. As long 
as you understand that there is an imperfect world out there and you 
have to gravitate to a certain extent, then your moral has to decide on 
how to go about it yarr. So if the society is weak on moral fibre, this is 
how things happen” (interview, Planning Activist, Bangalore; Appendix 
1, no.1)   
 
This collective powerlessness was widely perceived in most quarters as a 
question of social morality and a culture of violation present in Bangalore 
among the people in general. A minority believed that fixing the regulatory 
planning was about finding the right techno-managerial solution, and 
                                                     
224
 Face veil 
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compliance could be achieved through the right forms of incentives, coercions 
and sanctions. A large number of my interviewees, especially the practitioners 
of planning, argued that planning is not possible without a general consensus of 
the people. The idea of a culture of moral corruption in society as the 
fundamental constituent ingredient that causes violation was a very consistent 
discourse during my fieldwork. An activist argued, “Violation is in our blood. I 
suppose we are not ready for democracy. We think we have high morals; we are 
anything but that” (interview, RTI activist, Bangalore; Appendix 1, no.23).  
 
A retired senior civil servant agreed with this opinion- 
“People also don’t care. They spoil the government. They are too equally 
to blame. They don’t mind digging the road and put up a tent for their 
son’s wedding. If that is the approach of the people, then no government 
will be able to stop this (interview, Retired Civil Servant, GoK; Appendix 
1, no.80). 
 
An estate agent who admitted to me that he could fabricate any government 
document to enable land deals and land-use changes also said, “the problem is 
not the government. Government is innocent in this. But it’s the people. [The] 
rich are the most dishonest people I had seen [sic]” (interview, Real Estate 
Consultant and Broker, August 2010; Appendix 1, no.54). 
 
Similarly an ex commissioner of the BBMP argued that,  
“Everywhere there is dishonesty and we don’t follow the law. This 
dishonesty is Akrama.  It’s like the [story of the] women [sic] whose kid 
was dying who asked the Buddha to revive her. Buddha asked her to 
bring some mustard from a house where nobody ever died. As we know, 
she fails. Violation in Bangalore is like that. Every house has a violation. 
In general what I will say is: what is law? Law is the command of the 
sovereign. Who is sovereign in a democracy? It is the people. So if the 
sovereign itself is corrupt to the core, how can you expect the periphery 
to be clean? [it is] impossible”. (Interview, Retied Senior Administrator, 
BBMP, August 2010; Appendix 1, no.97) 
 
Such perceptions that everyday society is the ultimate sovereign rather than the 
macro abstract state when it comes to planning in Bangalore encouraged a 
planner and advisor to the government to argue that,  
288 
 
“We need a community based enforcement model- rather than the danda 
(stick) based enforcement. There is no one to monitor. Social prohibition 
models are the only one[s] that would work”. (Interview, Ex-Advisor to 
GoK on Urban Affairs, August 2010; Appendix 1, no.65) 
 
He pointed out the case of social prohibition of alcohol in the holy mountain 
ranges above the holy city of Haridwar in North India. He notes, “If you are 
caught with alcohol there, you will be lynched by the people” (ibid).   
 
The dependence on the actions of a wide range of people in the everyday social 
world in order to enable the formation of a planning authority was expressed in 
the words of an activist from the local planning collective I interviewed. When I 
asked him if their form of activism - which relies on challenging planning 
practices in Bangalore to enable public interest outcomes through forging 
various networks - was sustainable when it comes to making Bangalore more 
livable, he admitted that it was not and that it could not ensure a successful and 
functioning regulatory planning system. From his experience, he argued that the 
local collectives would have to work as a Janus-faced organization, which not 
only questions the government and other private interest networks but also 
faces towards their own people: 
“Civic activism in Bangalore has come a long way in the last couple of 
years. There are specific task-based organizations. However democratic 
behaviour of citizens is an important aspect. It should be not only an 
external fighting body with the government but it should also be an 
internal facing body saying our [own] behaviour should be civic” 
(interview, Local Planning Collective Activist; Appendix 1, no.1)   
  
7.6 Conclusion. 
The institutional design of the planning system in Bangalore depends on a 
hierarchical distribution of power and an idea of a ‘competent authority’. A 
functioning ‘sovereign’ state is central to the working of that system. 
Furthermore, the planning system assumes that actors in and outside 
government on whom the possibility of a regulatory planning regime depends, 
would act like strangers allying with the state idea (Abrams, 1988) and would 
keep a calculated distance from others in the society whose behaviour they are 
289 
 
supposed to regulate. And mutual surveillance in society would complement 
this process.   
 
In this chapter, in conceptualizing power relations in society as the 
consequence of the actions of many, I argued that power does not accumulate   
in the hierarchies of governmental administration. Instead, it gets distributed 
widely within the associational networks of governance. Consequently, the 
sovereign state does not get constructed in the practice of regulatory planning 
in Bangalore. I argued that in the command and control planning system in 
Bangalore, the planning command system seems to be operating without 
control because the actors within the broad network of governance and social 
world adhere to their own associational sympathies than to the logic of a 
command system. The vernacular planning practice does not contribute to the 
construction of any sovereignty to the state; it produces exactly the opposite. 
Planning authority in Bangalore becomes an authority without power. 
Multitudes of institutionalized informal negotiations pulverize the supposed 
structure of authority. No one person or institution is in control. Planning 
power is captured at many levels using different kinds of political negotiations. 
Through micro-negotiations of power, power seeps through holes, like in a 
colander, and is not concentrated at the peak of the organizational structure. I 
showed that various actors ‘work the system’ for their own benefit thereby 
distributing the planning power widely Who becomes powerful in the planning 
process in Bangalore has to do with which part of the planning process we look 
at. In one practice, the Chief Minister could be powerful than others; in another 
the local engineer or a local councilor could be more powerful than others; or in 
yet another, it could be the residents or the developer or the local councilor. In 
fact, the political processes operating through these networks are planning 
Bangalore at a distance (Rose 1999). It was to reflect this idea that this chapter 
was titled Authority and Anarchy. 
 
Furthermore, I showed that neither the practitioners nor the people engage in 
surveillance.   The various complex associational dependencies bring them 
closer to each other and convert the distant practitioner or stranger 
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administrator in the city into a friendly and familiar one.225 Transfer and 
appointment procedures are facilitated through this complex associational 
closeness. Rather than engaging in mutual surveillance they form a mutual-
benefit network. Their social and personal identities and interests appear more 
important than those of identities they possess as government officers; or 
sometimes they act in collaboration. A local engineer is closer to his councilor, 
who is a permanent fixture in his career; closer to a local politician, who is more 
able to arrange for valued postings than the engineer’s immediate superior. 
During my interviews, government officials from the lowest level to the highest 
bureaucrat use the word government in a very detached way as if they are not 
part of it. They used to say, “We advised against this, but the government 
wanted it” (multiple interviews). For instance, a higher government official told 
me that, “apart from making money, the other task that the government 
[emphasis mine] is busy with, is transferring officials who doesn’t [sic] agree 
with their agenda” (interview, Senior Administrator, GoK; Appendix 1, no.96). 
 
Since power is not concentrated in the hierarchical structures of the 
administration, many government officials interested in public interest 
outcomes often have to collaborate with non-governmental actors, forge a 
network to enable public interest outcomes rather than derive power from their 
position within the legitimate structure of public administration. The case 
studies presented in Chapter 5 and 6 make this point. In the public 
administrative apparatus of vernacular governance every agent in that network 
exercises their own freedoms to steer the course of a process to suit their 
associational networks, ideologies, motivations and agenda. This process has its 
own operational procedures, implementation frameworks, and rules of 
engagement.  For instance, the way power is acquired within this practice is not 
by penalizing illegalities but by regularizing them. There are set costs 
associated with the particular outcomes desired. There are procedural 
regularities and there are system of practices and practitioners. There are 
language codes for communication. Practices through these associational 
networks are deeply institutionalized. They have their own modes of exercising 
                                                     
225 Middle men, protocols, and so on exist. 
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discipline and penalties. Politics seem to transform governmentality beyond 
recognition. 
 
From a distance the categories of state and planning may seem to possess 
solidity, uniqueness, homogeneity and capacity. However, when examined at 
close quarters, telescoping in at the state in practice, the state seems to break 
down into different forms of institutions, processes, affiliations, governance 
networks etc., that operate based on various forms of associational sympathies 
and dependencies in any context. I argue that planning power in any context is 
based on how these different forms of networks operate. Regulatory planning, it 
seems to me, can operate only with the broad consent of the governed. As Rose 
and Miller remind us, “most individuals are not merely the subjects of power, 
but play a part in its operations”. (Rose and Miller 1999) 
 
In this chapter, I showed the pervasive experience of powerlessness among the 
planning practitioners in Bangalore when it comes to regulating land-use 
change and violations. I argued that this powerlessness can be explained based 
on a re-conceptualization of power as a consequence of actions of many rather 
than as something that is automatically present in the ‘sovereign state’ and with 
the governing officials. Furthermore, I showed how people who form part of the 
various public and private interest networks, and who possess their own 
definitions of planning rationality and active decision-making capacity, define 
and implement whatever suits their networks rather than the planning law in 
letter and spirit during plan-making, implementation and enforcement. This, I 
argued, can account for the widespread powerlessness experienced in the 
planning system in Bangalore. I propose that violations should be understood as 
a consequence of this practice.   
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
8.1Introduction and research question 
This dissertation started with a vignette about a tragic fire accident in a posh 
office building named Carlton Towers in Bangalore that led to the loss of many 
lives. Carlton Towers was built and occupied in violation of the planning 
regulations, in particular, building and fire regulations. Following the public 
discourse and the government action especially of the city police commissioner 
that followed this incident, I proposed that this incident is compellingly 
provoking enough to reflect on the processes that produced the violations, the 
powerlessness that the police commissioner faced and his call for self-
regulation.  
 
Violations are norm than an exception in Bangalore. In Chapter 1, I introduced 
the pervasive geography of planning violations in Bangalore and the 
contestations against violations, in spite of the existence of elaborate planning, 
implementation and enforcement apparatus: the law, institutional system, 
policies, protocols and practitioners. Academic discussions about violations and 
illegalities in Indian cities have been dominated by the planning violations of 
the urban poor: slum-dwellers, squatters and street traders. However, I argued 
that everyday life in Bangalore is conducted among the geography of planning 
violations. It is impossible not to notice the buildings that violate the building 
rules regarding setback, density and ground coverage during a casual walk 
along residential areas, commercial high streets, and urban centres. Several 
buildings in the city are in multiple forms of violation than of any single 
planning rule. Many of these violations can be identified only upon close 
inspection and with reference to the planning laws and the Master Plan 
regulations. These are the projects that did not even obtain planning permission 
or are built in violation of the land use regulations, residential layout standards 
and planning procedures.  
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This could sound as if there is no planning and urban governance apparatus in 
Bangalore. However, the institutional ecosystem, instruments and its 
substantive content discussed in Chapter 4 prove that this is entirely untrue. 
The planning system in Bangalore has a deep history of more than five decades. 
The Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act 1961 forms the statutory and 
legal foundation for planning in Bangalore. Furthermore, a large number of laws 
and institutions govern land development in Bangalore. These include the 
Karnataka Revenue Act, the Karnataka Municipal corporations Act, the 
Bangalore Development Authority Act, and so on. Many institutions like the 
BBMP, the BDA, and the para-statals like the BWSSB, BESCOM etc. are entrusted 
with preparing, implementing and enforcing planning regulations. Many 
qualified practitioners work in these organizations from various offices in 
Bangalore. For the last three decades a comprehensive development plan has 
been prepared and updated once in every ten years. These planning and 
development control organizations form the executive of the state government 
that supports the democratically-elected state legislature to rule and assisted by 
the judiciary to execute their powers.  
 
Even though the impacts of these violations on everyday urban life in Bangalore 
are not yet scientifically correlated by anyone and though it is beyond the scope 
of this research, many functional impacts do not require a complicated analysis 
in order to identify the correlation. For example, several lakes, wetlands and 
agricultural lands that stabilize the regional drainage ecology and hydrology of 
Bangalore have been reclaimed without adequate drainage infrastructure. This 
has contributed to severe flooding and casualties. Many roads are not wide 
enough to accommodate the increasing traffic or even the public transport 
system. A lack of control on the change of land-use and density regime also 
leads to inadequate infrastructure provision. One consequence for example, is 
that bore well-based water extraction has greatly increased. Inadequate 
sewerage network capacity has resulted in the conversion of the lakes and 
drainage networks into sewage pools. Further, there are neighbourhood 
conflicts and inadequate information for transportation planning and so on. 
Many such functional impediments to their daily life have drawn many 
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residents in the last two decades to collective activism in order to contest these 
violations using various legal and extra-legal means. They organize in various 
forms of collectives and question many forms of violations in their 
neighbourhoods and even engage critically with the planning frameworks. The 
scale of continuing violations and contestations in spite of the presence of an 
elaborate planning apparatus that has the power to make laws and policies, and 
plan, implement and enforces them is indeed a paradox. In the context of this 
paradox, I proposed to examine the research question;  
Why and how are land-use violations in the non-poor neighbourhoods of 
Bangalore produced, sustained and contested despite the presence of the 
elaborate planning implementation and enforcement mechanism? 
 
 
8.2Conceptual framing and research method 
For the purpose of this research and given the scale of violations in Bangalore, I 
set out to examine the violation of land use regulations. Further, given that the 
discourse on planning violations in academic scholarship is mostly about the 
urban poor neighbourhoods, I specifically chose to study a rich and middle class 
neighbourhood in Bangalore named Koramangala to move beyond a social 
group based analysis of the problem that had often theorized violations and 
illegalities as the subversion of the elitist state apparatus by the urban poor.  
 
Conceptual directions that helped answer the research questions emerged 
during the fourteen-month long ethnography of planning networks. The method 
not only involved identifying the processes of violating the plan but also 
researching the relationship between planning practice, the violations and its 
contestations. I found that violations and its contestations are in fact intricately 
connected with the practice of planning and violating a regulation is only a 
small part of this richer ethnographic problem. This research process moved 
inwards and outwards from specific projects towards discussions with 
practitioners, analysis of planning documents, court cases, and study of local 
contestations and neighbourhood mobilizations.  
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In this dissertation, I argue that violations provide us with a rich ethnographic 
site to understand the culture of planning practice in Bangalore. Developing this 
further I critique the approaches taken by various authors who conceptualize 
violations as a deviation from the plan and planning. Specifically, I draw on 
three broad approaches within which this scholarship appears: informality, 
implementation failure and corruption. I argue that all these approaches work 
with a notion of state-society dualism and that is insufficient to understand the 
pervasive violations in Bangalore. Even though violations represent informality, 
implementation failure, and corruption all at the same time, I argue that this 
dualism emerges out of the normative theory of the state that these authors 
work with and that compels them to simplify these processes as specific social 
groups subverting the state and international capitalism (Benjamin 2008; 
Chatterjee 2004); as the state exercising its sovereign power (Roy 2009); as 
technical problems in the institutional design of the state apparatus (ITPI 2004, 
UN-Habitat 2009; UNDP 2005); or as expectations about the operation of public 
administration (Williams 1999).  
 
Drawing from political systems approach, anthropologies of the everyday state 
and governance network studies that examine political processes at the spaces 
of state-society interaction, and policy-implementation continuum beyond the 
decision-making arena, I propose that violations in Bangalore should be 
understood not just as a deviation from the plan and planning but instead as an 
outcome of it. In other words, I argue that examining violations is a window into 
understanding the culture of planning as practiced in Bangalore and in 
particular how urban politics operates through planning and how different 
actors within and outside the state apparatus associate as a network and enact 
the process of governance. Methodologically, during the fieldwork this was 
further sharpened through examination of plan-making, implementation and 
enforcement along with the role of various actors, planning and litigation 
documentation and court cases. The land-use planning system in Bangalore is 
foundationally embedded in the process of liberal democracy of the modern 
nation-state in order to enable public interest outcomes. This is expressed in 
the planning act as ordered growth of the city. Using the analysis of violations 
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and its relationship with planning as actually practiced, I attempt to theorize 
how planning system is practiced Bangalore.  
 
I proposed two analytical frameworks for this purpose.   
 
Applying interactive frameworks of social governance, firstly I argued that 
private and public interest networks inhabit the space of governance and 
produce private and public interest outcomes through engaging in various 
forms of associational relations. Given that the foundational epistemology of 
planning is safeguarding public interest from private interests through planning 
laws, institutions, instruments policies and operational protocols, I proposed in 
the first framework to examine the planning practice in Bangalore through this 
lens, using the case of violations.  
 
In the second framework, which follows from that analysis, I attempt to account 
for the question of power and powerlessness, i.e. how power relations operate 
in particular cultures of social governance where various forms of networks 
inhabit the space of governance. Here I apply the approaches from a range of 
authors (Dunsire 1978; Foucault 2000; Kooiman 2003; Law 1986; Latour 1986; 
Stoker 1998) who recognize the role of the consensus of the individuals and 
groups that enable institutions of governance to have power over them. In other 
words, I apply the conceptual approaches that understand power as the 
consequence of actions of many (Latour 1986), and where individuals in the 
chain are constitutive of power. Given that the very possibility of controlling 
land-use change is fundamentally dependent on ensuring compliance with a 
particular rationality of planning through the operations of organizational 
technologies of governance, I account for the production of powerlessness by 
examining multiple rationalities and the fragmented technologies of governance 
in the domain of planning practice in Bangalore. 
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8.3Research findings 
8.3.1Planning system and governance networks 
In this research process I found that the actual practice of land-use planning in 
Bangalore is characterized by private and public interest networks producing 
private and public interest outcomes respectively. The private interest 
networks consisted of local and higher-level politicians, real estate developers, 
land owners, local and higher level government officials and planners, and 
middlemen, supporting each other’s private interests by simultaneously using 
and by-passing the planning system in ways that would suit their interests. 
Given that the networks include actors from inside and outside the state 
apparatus, I argue that explaining violations using a state-society dualist 
framework presents a grossly insufficient and an erroneous analysis. 
 
To answer the first part of the research question regarding the production and 
sustenance of violations in Bangalore, I argued that one has to understand the 
relationship between what I call plan violations and planning for violations. Plan 
violations are about violating the land-use plan through various complex 
processes that range from not applying for planning permission to the use of 
implementation and enforcement processes for the benefit of the networks. 
Planning for violation regularizes these violations through a variety of means 
that range from changing the law (change of land-use, de-notification, 
regularization act etc.) to changing the land-use category in the Master Plan 
through overt and covert procedures. I argued that plan violations and planning 
for violations support each other and form an integrated system that produces 
and sustains violations. Using specific case studies, I demonstrated the complex 
processes through which these two mechanisms operate in Bangalore. For plan 
violations, I demonstrated how individual buildings, revenue layouts, and a 
prestigious residential complex in Koramangala were established. To describe 
planning for violations, I showed how the planning law has been amended and 
practiced in the case of change of land-use, Master Plan process and 
regularization act.  
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Further, I showed how various forms of public interest networks that are 
emerging in Bangalore challenge the private interest networks. Using the case 
of the Koramangala Initiative and various other local initiatives, I showed how 
plan violations are contested through forms of mutual surveillance. In these 
processes, planning for violations are contested through challenging the 
planning framework itself - the planning law, Master Plan and planning process. 
Rather than strengthening the planning system, these networks work towards 
specific public interest outcomes forging various forms of alliances among each 
other to strengthen the networks’ bargaining position. I argued that a wide 
range of motivations is identifiable among the networks. These include belief in 
the rule of law, utilitarian benefits, emotional neighbourhood belonging, public 
activism, political consciousness, ecological idealism and so on. Moreover, the 
outcomes that these collectives seek are those that contribute to the larger 
public good of the city – stabilizing hydrology and drainage ecology in the case 
of lakes, for example. I showed how the social actors who form these collectives 
learn from the various experiences they confront during their activism and 
emerge as a social movement. I argued that theorizing this activism should 
move beyond the portrayal of middle class resident welfare associational-ism. I 
argued that these movements should be understood as local planning 
collectives and they transform planning practice in Bangalore into a negotiated 
and contested practice reclaiming it from the private interest networks. In this 
process many things happen: empowering the public interest planning network, 
governing each other, increasing social capital and networks, social learning, 
commitment to public action and so on. Though the outcomes at the moment 
consist of common minimum programmes such as putting a tree here, a park 
there, a footpath here, saving a lake and public land, discourse on violations, 
litigation on property tax, on regularization act, on the master plan rationale, 
this movement, I argue, can be seen as a harbinger for a collaborative planning 
practice in Bangalore that works through contestation and negotiation. 
 
8.3.2 Planning power in vernacular governance 
My explanation as to why violations are produced, sustained and contested in 
spite of the elaborate planning apparatus in Bangalore is that the planning 
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apparatus is rendered powerless to control land-use change by the various 
associational networks that inhabit the sphere of governance. This is a specific 
type of governance in which the network devises specific objectives and means 
for its activities beyond the structured institutionalized rationale and processes 
that are executed in the political democratic state. I term this vernacular 
governance. In vernacular governance, planning power is distributed among the 
network and prevents the formation of a planning authority that is able to 
control land-use change. Vernacular governance adopts specific governance 
tactics to achieve specific outcomes rather than follow any structured 
institutionalized rationale and process of the administrative bureaucracy. To 
argue this I showed how in Bangalore there is no single rationality regarding 
planning and that the organizational technologies of governance are pulverized. 
Furthermore, I showed how this powerlessness was perceived as a result of 
social attitudes that refuse to tolerate planning power and that this experience 
compels us to reflect on the role of wider social consensus for the operation of 
regulatory planning as compared to coercion.  
 
8.4 Contribution 
Governance and everyday life in India are based on a variety of intricate social 
networks. Everyday living is enabled and governed through these various social 
and political networks, whether it is about obtaining a driver’s license or 
squatting in cities or even obtaining funding for official programmes of state 
governments by the officials, or getting school admission for children. What is 
important, I argue, is to figure out how different governance networks influence 
particular arenas of policy practice and produce certain policy outcomes and 
how they operate and transform the ideal typical state apparatus. In the case of 
this PhD, I demonstrated how the land-use planning system is transformed in 
practice by multiple actors engaging in a range of complex associations. By 
doing so, I have demonstrated the importance of empirical research on planning 
based on locally relevant questions and concerns rather than developing a 
universal normative theory of planning, or resorting to dominant trends in 
academic theorizations based on decision-making, or using assumptions about a 
powerful state and planning system. How the modernist planning enterprise 
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works in specific governance cultures is an important and useful window into 
transforming practice for the social good or even providing a real 
understanding of what happens to planning in specific contexts.  
 
Planning theories that have developed out of in-depth case studies of planning 
as practiced in Indian context are scarce, or they work within the dominant 
trajectories of scholarship. In the last few decades these dominant trajectories 
have been preoccupied with how the operations of government agencies can 
deliver good governance (World bank 2006, UNDP 2005), or how certain middle 
class (Arabindoo 2005; Ghertner 2011; Kundu 2011) actors dominate public 
activism for their narrow benefits, or how a certain macro-category of the 
neoliberal state emerged and displaced the urban poor (Benjamin 2011, Roy 
2009), or how subaltern groups subvert the macro category of state and its 
programmes (Chatterjee 2004) and so on. Even though I went into the field with 
theoretical sensitivity about political society (ibid), occupancy urbanism 
(Benjamin 2007, 2008), middle class urbanism (Arabindoo 2005; Baviskar 
2002, 2003), elite politics (Kundu 2011), political machines (judge et al 1995; 
Davies and Imbroscio 2009) and regime theoretical approaches (Stone 1989, 
1998), I found that planning as practiced in Bangalore from the lens of 
violations could not be theorized entirely by only using these frameworks. For 
example, after studying the neighbourhood activism, I did not find that a clear 
distinction could be made between the operational modes of so-called middle 
class activists and the urban poor. First of all, so-called middle class activists 
were not a homogenous group. They fought against many middle class interests 
and many forms of internal conflicts characterize their activism. Secondly, their 
modes of activism involved vote bank politics, social and political networking 
like that of the urban poor. Thirdly, many outcomes that they achieved or 
strived to achieve could not be categorized as only of middle class interest. 
Similarly, occupancy urbanism was not only about how poor people operate but 
looked at the ways in which the private interest networks occupied urban space 
as well as the governing process. Similarly, a porous bureaucracy was enabled 
through the active participation of public officials not only at the lowest level 
but also at the highest level. Further, while caste and class are not clearly 
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defining factors in all urban planning transactions, there were more complex 
associations based on bribe, political party networks, middle-men based 
coalitions and so on.  
 
Empirical studies of planning processes, policies, and its interaction with the 
social and political sphere are essential to understand why urban governance in 
India is an extremely difficult affair. My thesis locates how social and political 
processes operate through planning. This thesis is a contribution to the 
empirical studies of planning in the South and a potential window into 
comparative studies about how specific forms of social relations influence the 
specific form of planning cultures. What happened to the elaborate state 
apparatus of urban planning institutionalized during the Neheruvian phase of 
state building in India is an academic blind spot. This research attempts to fill 
that gap in a very modest way.  
 
Planning violations are a problem not only in Bangalore but also across all large 
cities in India. By developing a framework that attempts to connect planning 
violations with planning practice and reactive and pro-active local social 
movements, this research hopes to open up a new window for studying 
planning practice. This current phase of urbanization in various parts of India is 
enabled through the de-construction of the modernist planning apparatus. 
These include the setting up of special planning authorities to build large scale 
private cities, the abolition of the Land Ceiling Act that restrained speculative 
land investment, and also the micro-processes of plan violation and planning for 
violation. Even though not within the scope of this research, it is relevant to 
think about the connections between violations and the explosive growth of 
Bangalore in recent decades. A plausible hypothesis is that the growth in 
Bangalore (and the subsequent property boom and high and exclusionary land 
values) is achieved through transgressing the planning system that was initially 
designed to control the growth.  
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8.5 Planning networks, collaboration and negotiation: Implications for 
planning reform. 
To provide inputs into the 12th national five-year plan process, the Indian 
government appointed a working group to review planning in the country and 
to propose reforms to be made in urban strategic planning. This committee 
identified ten issues on urban planning in India.226 The political processes that 
operate through planning and their implications have been completely omitted 
from any detailed discussion in this report; consequently, the effect of these 
processes on the planning reform has been largely ignored. The only form in 
which it appears in the report is, 
“The plan sanctioning and building approvals process is obscure, 
elaborate and held hostage to repeated instances of politics and rents 
seeking. A single window system will go a long way in addressing these 
issues. Call centres, electronic kiosks, web based services and other tools 
of modern technology should be used by all municipalities to bring 
speed, transparency and accountability into delivery of approvals and 
services to the citizens” (MoHUPA 2011, p.65). 
 
A technical fix to improve accountability is being proposed to deal with the 
politics in planning. The possibility of planning by a powerful working state is 
seldom doubted in these versions of planning reform. Using the case of 
Bangalore discussed in this dissertation, I want to suggest that it is important to 
move beyond frameworks that may separate government actors from non-
government ones or locals from non-locals to help us understand planning 
processes in general. Planning should be conceived beyond an abstract state 
practice. Instead, it should be seen as dependent on the socio-political relations 
within any context. I demonstrated that in Bangalore, the domain of practice 
appears to be a contest between the privatizing networks and the emergent 
public interest networks. Violations emerge as a site where these two networks 
meet. I argued that the outcomes that emerge from planning practice represent 
                                                     
226
 1. Lack of integration between spatial and sectoral planning 2. Lack of regional approach 3. Rigid 
and deterministic plans 4. Congestion and long commutes 5. Slums and squatter settlements around 
industrial estates 6. Randomly located new developments such as SEZs and Townships 7. Lack of 
Plan-Finance Linkage 8. Lack of institutional clarity 9. Lack of Capacity building and the enabling 
tools 10. Social exclusion. To address these issues, the report argues that three key approaches should 
be incorporated. Planning has to 1. Be vision-led incorporating participatory process; 2. Integrate 
spatial and development planning; 3. Integrate the urban and rural integration   in a regional 
framework starting from larger regional level to the local level. 
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the interests of the networks that inhabit the sphere of governance. Planning 
was one of the main domains of populist and patronage politics in Bangalore as 
well as a public sphere for political negotiation. Planning process in vernacular 
governance is characterized by participation through negotiation and contest. 
Even though it is not the kind of participation where communities participate in 
arriving at a plan that is then implemented smoothly through the administrative 
process, I propose that these processes of negotiation and contest should also 
be understood as participatory where politics is active.  
 
I propose that planning practice does not automatically operate as the welfare-
producing, technocratic enterprise of the state, capable of achieving any 
common good and public interest. Instead it is a socially constructed sphere of 
governing urban space production and reproduction. Both public interest 
planning and private interest planning are to be understood as a result of 
continuous negotiation. I argue that an empirical study of planning practice, i.e. 
study of how the planning process is actually enacted and performed and how it 
is connected to outcomes provides us with a new window of opportunity to 
understand the societal frameworks on which planning depends. This would 
take us beyond the knowledge made through theorizing cultures of planning 
based on ideology and discourse and beyond conceptualizing it as a technical 
enterprise that an all-powerful state can roll out onto the society. For example, 
the public interest networks, discussed in Chapter 6, uses Right To Information 
Act (RTI Act), Public Interest Litigation (PIL), political pressures, 
neighbourhood campaigns, advocacy, public debates, multiple media 
negotiations, educating themselves about planning, law, administrative 
bureaucracy etc., to demand for outcomes of public interest. These constitute an 
integral part of the current planning practice in Bangalore. This compels us to 
have a plural understanding of planning practice than categorically 
conceptualize planning as a top down governmentality devoid of politics. 
 
I argued here that that the institutional surveillance of planning system depends 
on many forms of micro-surveillance in society and in neighbourhoods. Further, 
I showed how regulatory control of land-use change in Bangalore and public 
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interest outcomes are dependent on confrontation, negotiation and various 
forms of political mobilization. In a complex democratic structure like that of 
vernacular governance in India, planning practice is influenced by the 
communities of interest that inhabit the planning sphere. Multiple forms of 
planning practices present in Bangalore compel us to locate an understanding 
of planning within the socio-cultural context of its practice. 
 
8.6 Conclusion: scope and limitations and directions for further 
research 
Clearly, the scope of this research and the dissertation was limited to answering 
the research question posed within the short time frame within which the 
fieldwork and this research were conducted. First of all, the arguments posed 
about planning power in the context of local social and political networks are 
developed in the context of studying land-use planning and violations in 
Bangalore. So I cannot claim that all planning and politics in Bangalore operate 
in the form presented in this thesis.227 This is because planning represents a 
wide range of practices (such as infrastructure projects, regulations of diverse 
kind, services provision, master plan making, political decisions on the 
allocation of resources, etc.) and these practices are particular to their location 
and to the actors involved. There are many instances where the planning 
process operates as per the institutional design in Bangalore. It successfully 
controls urban change and social behaviour in many situations while it is 
controlled in many other situations. Further, I do not claim that the research 
findings can be applied to other cities in India. However, by researching the 
specific social, political and administrative relations that define governance 
outcomes, I also imply that one should examine the specific conditions through 
which a particular planning process results in outcomes that might or might not 
conform to institutional design and normative expectations. Moreover, 
defending the conceptual framework that I proposed while examining planning 
and politics in Bangalore, I would propose that scholars working on such areas 
                                                     
227
 For example, the increasing number of slum evictions or the increasing judicial interpretation of 
land-use planning. 
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should examine the underlying micro-political context that produce specific 
outcomes. 228 
 
Koramangala as a case study also has its own limitations due to its unique 
location in Bangalore. Moreover the KI activists’ engagement with the planning 
system also owes, in part, to the type of people living there: middle class, mostly 
retired, resourceful and informed and willing to fight. Can I claim that the 
production of violations as well as the specific mode of activism is common in 
Bangalore? The answer is a yes and no.  It is a yes because violations are a 
general phenomenon in Bangalore; not many people reflect on it as much as 
they worry about the consequences such as flooding, traffic problems, land 
value and so on. In their everyday life most people do not necessarily connect 
these disparate events. I do imply in this thesis that violations of planning made 
possible a large part of Bangalore’s growth as well as the emergence of 
neighbourhood and environment activism. However, it is also a no because my 
data is confined to specific geographies and to specific people and groups. 
However, I do draw from a wide range of studies on governance both in India 
and elsewhere while developing such conceptual arguments. Nevertheless it is 
left to future research to examine how these processes transpire in different 
social and economic geographies of Bangalore. 
 
A detailed study of the networks and their relationship was beyond scope of 
this dissertation. Moving beyond the recognition that certain specific networks 
inhabit the land-use planning arena, it is useful to ask if there are any macro 
structures that can be identified among the networks that dominate specific 
planning policy arena, such as caste, class, political party affiliation, ideologies 
and other social group dynamics. Therefore more research is required to 
understand the exact nature of the networks and, in particular, the role of 
various structures that may define a number of social relations in Bangalore 
and how they operate when it comes to planning outcomes. For example, in the 
case of Agenda for Bangalore Infrastructure and Development 
                                                     
228
 When certain slums are evicted while retaining others.   
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(Abide)/Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), the people involved in the 
network were different from the ones involved in the case of Mestripalya Lake. 
In the case of Mestripalya Lake, a wide range of social actors across social, 
economic and political affiliations were involved. This is not always necessarily 
the case everywhere in Bangalore. Further research with such specific foci may 
be able to identify the specific structural content of the networks that can relate 
to specific spatio-temporal outcomes. The ways in which planning networks 
operate among different social groups is a topic not attempted here due to the 
limited scope of this work. However, through proposing networks as a frame of 
analysis this thesis lays out a conceptual direction to examine such empirical 
problems in detail in the future.   
 
The ways in which the relationship between violations and planning practice 
changed over time is not included in the scope of this research. This research 
can rather be seen as a history of the present. Bangalore has had different 
economic drivers and political cultures at different points in time. The ways in 
which planning and violations related to each other during the industrial 
growth of the city, farmers political movement or the liberalization phase and at 
what point in time violations increased or decreased etc., are beyond the scope 
of this research. These issues are of course important but are left to further 
research using archival material on land-use transformations, planning 
notifications and extensive court case analysis.   
 
Furthermore a number of questions emerge out of my research that requires 
further validation as well as opens up windows for future research. The first 
relates to the nature of political authority and planning, i.e., under what 
conditions of political authority do planning systems work closer to the 
executive state apparatus? The nature of political authority and therefore its 
relationship with the executive authority varies within the Indian context 
spatially and temporally. For example, does the presence of a powerful and 
charismatic chief minister in Gujarat (a state in north western India) mean a 
more powerful planning authority in the city of Ahmedabad compared to 
Bangalore? Or does a more participatory approach that include a wide range of 
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political, economic and cultural requirements to plan making facilitate the 
construction of a civic governance and a realistic planning authority?  
 
A second question might ask how social attitudes and economic conditions 
influence the conditions under which a planning authority can regulate urban 
transformation for public interest outcomes. For example, if enough private 
capabilities have been achieved, then would private property owners adhere to 
the regulations as a means of protecting their own freedoms? Even though the 
case of Koramangala discussed in this dissertation was about violations by the 
rich and it challenges this notion, it is useful to explore further the socio-
economic conditions under which planning power is consented to. Are there 
certain planning instruments and planning process that would enable better 
compliance in certain contexts?  
 
What enables planning power to be consented to?  To counter many forms of 
public space violating behaviors (like waste dumping on street corners or 
urinating on public spaces), many vernacular instruments can be seen in the 
public spaces of India. Pictures of gods and goddesses can be seen painted on 
walls to prevent public urination on boundary walls; this is widely held to be an 
effective method. Similarly there is a massive inscription on the main gateway 
of the imposing state secretariat building in Karnataka that reads Government 
work is God’s work. Does this mean that there is higher tolerance and 
willingness to consent to public interest, mediated through sacred forms of 
authority or communal forms of authority than to civic forms of authority in 
India? Currently there is definitely a crisis of the commons in Indian cities, 
especially in Bangalore, that seem to have generated a perception of collective 
helplessness. Therefore it seems important to ask how different forms of 
regulation - self-regulation, communal forms of mutual regulation and civic 
frameworks of public regulation - enable the commons and the liberal public 
sphere in India. What is the role of an ideology of the rule of law, welfare utility 
maximization and various other forms of social and political attitudes? This is 
better undertaken through comparing different planning regimes across diverse 
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political geographies such as a comparative study of planning in London and 
Bangalore.  
 
Thirdly, one could consider whether the violations and the emerging 
governance networks are connected to the macro forces that are restructuring a 
welfare state that once not only built cities and urban spaces but also controlled 
urban growth and transformation through planning law? Within that context 
what kind of planning institutional reforms are more urgent to ensure 
production of a liberal public sphere and commons? This would require a 
detailed study on the history of transformation of every day planning practice in 
the last five decades in Bangalore and other parts of the world where large-
scale violations are present. 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of specific one to one interviews and specific meetings from the field 
work used in the dissertation. Original names and titles have been 
removed and referred to by the type of their engagement in the city. 
1 Multiple interviews 
between May 2009 and July 
2009; Jan  
2010 and September 2010 
Names 
Removed 
Lead Activist and Local 
Resident: Koramangala 
Initiative, Koramangala 
2 July 2010  Local Activist and resident, 
Koramangala 
3 August 2010  Resident in a revenue 
layout and a local activist, 
Koramangala 
4 Multiple interviews 
between Feb 2010 and Sep 
2010 
 Local activists, community 
leaders and residents in the 
Mestripalya village 
5 July 2010  School teachers at the 
Mestripalya village Primary 
school 
6 Multiple discussion 
between February 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Squatters at the 
Mestripalya Lake Bed 
7 April 2010; May 2010  Planning Activist, RTI 
Activist and Business 
consultant, Bangalore 
8 March 2010  Local activist: Koramangala 
Initiative and entrepreneur, 
Koramangala  
9 August 2010  Local residents, activists 
and users of the Third Block 
Park, Koramangala 
10 August 2010  Local resident who is a 
Resident Welfare 
Association Activist, local 
politician and a property 
developer, Koramangala 
11 Multiple interviews 
between January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Local residents living 
around the Mestripalya 
Lake 
12 Multiple interviews 
between January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Local Resident Welfare 
Association Activist, 
Koramangala 
13 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
 Lead activist and 
Programme Coordinator, 
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July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
Resident Welfare 
Association and 
Koramangala Initiative, 
Koramangala 
14 August 2010  Local resident and lead 
activist, Koramangala 
15 March 2010  Local resident and activist, 
Koramangala and 
campaigner for Primary 
Education 
16 February 2 
2009 
 Local residents and Lead 
activists, Koramangala 
Initiative, Koramangala 
17 August 2010 
 
 Local resident and litigant, 
Koramangala 
18 April 2009; June 2010  Lead Activist, Citizens 
Action Forum, Bangalore 
19 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Lead activists and residents: 
Koramangala Initiative and 
Resident Welfare 
Association, Koramangala 
20 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Group of Lead Activists 
Koramangala Initiative who 
are also local residents in 
Koramangala 
21 February 2009  Local activist and resident, 
Koramangala 
22 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Lead Activist Koramangala 
Initiative and local resident, 
Koramangala 
23 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009 
 Local resident and lead 
activist, Koramangala and 
Right to Information 
Activist, Bangalore 
24 May 2009  Lead activist, Citizens 
Action Forum, Bangalore 
25 February 2009  Local lead activist and local 
resident, Koramangala 
26 June 2009  Local resident and 
petitioner, Koramangala  
27 February 2009; March 2009  Resident Welfare Activist 
and Right to Information 
Activist, Bangalore 
28 July 2009  Resident Welfare 
Association Activist, 
Sadhashiv Nagar, 
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Bangalore. 
29 February 2009  Retired business man and 
activist, Indiranagar, 
Bangalore  
30 February 2009  Lawyer, Public Intellectual 
and Activist, Bangalore 
31 February 2009  Lawyer and Human rights 
Activist, Bangalore 
32 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Lawyer and Activist, 
Bangalore 
33 March 2010  NGO Activists, Bangalore 
34 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 NGO activist and 
Campaigner, Bangalore 
35 March 2009  Group of Academics 
Bangalore 
36 March 2009  Academic and Bangalore 
Resident 
37 February 2009  Journalists, Koramangala 
38 Multiple interviews 
between January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Koramangala Resident and 
Lawyer. 
39 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Academic and Bangalore 
Resident 
40 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Researcher, and 
Environmental activist 
41 May 2009  Researcher in a local think 
tank and advocacy 
organization 
42 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Activist and researcher, 
Bangalore 
43 March  2009  Retired Academic and 
Planning theorist, 
Bangalore 
44 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Academic and 
Environmental Campaigner, 
Bangalore 
45 March 2009  Local Architect, Bangalore 
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46 May 2009; August 2010  Lawyer, Bangalore. 
47 May 2009  Academic on Public Policy, 
Bangalore. 
48  May 2009  Academic, Bangalore 
49 February 2009  Local Architect and Ex-
Advisor to government on 
urban affairs, Bangalore 
50 June 2010  Real Estate Consultant, 
Agent and Broker, 
Bangalore 
51 August 2010  Property Developer, 
Bangalore 
52 June 2009  Real Estate consultant and 
Broker, Koramangala and 
Bangalore South 
53 August 2010  Local Architect and  
Developer, Koramangala 
54 August 2010  Real Estate Consultant, 
Broker and Agent, 
Bangalore. 
55 April 2009  Architects and Property 
Developers, Bangalore 
56 July 2010  Real Estate Developer, 
Bangalore 
57 May 2009 and July 2010  Real Estate Broker and 
Agent, Koramangala 
58 August 2010  Planning consultant, 
Bangalore 
59 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Planning consultant- and 
Member of the RMP 2015 
team. 
60 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Planning consultant- and  
Member of the RMP 2015 
team, Bangalore 
61 August  2010  Planning consultant- and  
Member of the RMP 2015 
team, Bangalore 
62 July-2010  Planning consultant- and  
Member of the RMP 2015 
team, Bangalore 
63 June 2009  Planning consultant- and  
Member of the RMP 2015 
team, Bangalore 
64 July 2010  Members from City 
Connect –Janaagraha, 
313 
 
Bangalore 
65 August 2010  Planning consultant and Ex 
BATF member, Bangalore 
66 May 2009  Ex- Senior advisor to 
government and Ex-BATF 
member 
67 February 2009  Business man and Ex 
government advisor, Ex  
BATF member 
68 February 2009  Planning director, BMRDA, 
Bangalore 
69 Multiple interviews 
between January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Very Senior Administrator, 
BBMP, Bangalore 
70 May 2009  Senior Planner, BMRDA, 
Bangalore 
71 May 2009  Very Senior Politician and 
Ex-Legislator: Bangalore 
72 June 2009; August 2010  Very Senior Administrator, 
BBMP, Bangalore 
73 August 2010; September 
2010  
 Special investigative Officer 
at the Income Tax 
Department, Bangalore 
74    
75 August 2010  Very Senior Administrator, 
GoK  
76 July 2010  Chair Person, BDA 
77 July 2010  Very Senior Administrator, 
BDA  
78 March  2009  Local BBMP Engineer, 
Koramangala  
79 August 2010  Local Ward Engineers, 
BBMP  
80 June 2009  Bangalore Resident and 
Retired Senior Civil Servant, 
GoK 
81 March 2010  Senior Planner BMRDA, 
Bangalore 
82 June 2009  Very Senior planner, 
BMRDA, Bangalore 
83 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Very Senior Planner, BDA, 
Bangalore 
84 78  Senior Planner, BDA, 
Bangalore 
85 May 2009  Senior Planner, BMRDA, 
314 
 
Bangalore 
86 August 2010  Director, Town and Country 
Planning Organization, New 
Delhi, India. 
87 July 2010  Very Senior Administrator, 
LDA, Bangalore. 
88 February 2010  Very Senior administrator, 
Revenue Department, GoK. 
89 March 2010  Very senior administrator, 
LDA, Bangalore 
90 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Very Senior Planning 
Director, UDD, GoK 
91 May 2009  Very Senior administrator , 
LDA, Bangalore 
92 May 2009  Senior Engineer, BBMP, 
Bangalore 
93 August 2010  Senior Planner, UDD, GoK 
94 August 2010  Senior Planner, UDD, GoK 
95 July 2010  Senior Administrator, 
Forest Department 
96 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Very Senior Bureaucrat, 
Ministry of Urban 
Development, GoK 
97 August 2010  Retired Very Senior 
Administrator, BBMP, 
Bangalore.  
98 June- Sep 2010  Senior Planner, UDD, GoK 
99 August 2010  Very Senior Administrator, 
UDD, GoK  
100 August 2010  Multiple discussions with 
various very senior, senior 
and Junior officials in 
Revenue Department, GoK 
101 Multiple interviews 
between  January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Very Senior Administrator, 
BBMP, Bangalore 
102 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Very Senior Planning 
director, UDD, GoK. 
103    
104 June 2009  Very Senior Judges, GoK 
105 September 2010  Meeting with Very Senior 
Planning Director, GoK and 
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Very Senior Administrator, 
GoK  
106    
107 June 2010  Very Senior Civil Servant, 
GoK 
108 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 
 Senior Planner,  BBMP, 
Bangalore 
109 27- march 2010  Very Senior Administrator 
and Politian, BBMP, 
Bangalore 
110 July 2010  Senior Official, Forest 
Department, GoK  
111 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Senior Planning Director, 
UDD, GoK who had worked 
previously in BBMP and 
BDA. 
112 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Discussions with Senior 
Engineers and Planners 
BBMP, Bangalore 
113 June 2010; August 2010  Very Senior Bureaucrat and 
Administrator, BDA, 
Bangalore 
114 Multiple interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Very Senior Planning 
Director who was at BBMP 
and BDA, Bangalore 
115 May 2009  Planner, Karnataka Housing 
Board, GoK 
116 August 2010  Retired planner and 
currently very senior 
advisor on Planning 
matters, GoK 
117 Multiple interviews- 
between February 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Senior Advisor to 
government on urban 
affairs, GoK  
118 Multiple Interviews 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010. 
 Retired senior government 
official and advisor to 
government, GoK 
119 March 2009 and June 2010   Very Senior Official, GoK 
120 March 2010  Meetings with Senior 
Planning directors, Institute 
of Town Planners, India and 
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Delhi Development 
Authority, and National 
Insitute of Urban Affairs, 
New Delhi, India 
121 June 2010; August 2010  High Level Public 
Administrator and 
Politician, BBMP, Bangalore  
122 June-2009; August 2010  MLA and Politician, 
Bangalore 
123 July 2010  MLA and Politician, 
Bangalore 
124 July 2010  Local Politician, Bangalore 
125 March 2009  Various discussions at 
Multiple Information 
commission case hearings, 
and at the Ombudsman, 
Bangalore 
126 September 2010  Various discussions with 
organizers of a Public 
Sector Employees 
Cooperative Society, 
Bangalore   
127 Multiple attendance 
between February 2009 and 
July 2009; January 2010 and 
September 2010 
 Multiple discussions at 
various meetings of 
Koramangala Initiative and 
Citizens Action forum.  
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Emergence of Urban Bangalore – the political and economic geography 
 
Bangalore is the largest city of the Karnataka State in Southern India. It is also 
one of the five largest cities in India and one among the fastest growing 
metropolitan regions.  According to the 2011 Census of Population, about 8.45 
million people lives within the BBMP limit of 741 square kilometers (in 198 
wards).  Bangalore urban settlement dates from the 1500’s when a fort (kotte) 
and a city (pette) were first established as part of the sprawling Vijayanagara 
Empire in South India (Heitzman2004, Srinivas 2004, Nair 2005).  Heitzman 
(2004) notes that,  
“the historic opportunity for Bangalore came with the military defeat of 
Vijayanagara Empire in 1565 and the destruction of its capital (Hampi) 
by  a coalition of Muslim Sultans, [because it shifted economic trade 
routes towards Bangalore and it attracted artisans, merchants and] 
inherited the role of Vijayanagara as an economic centre” (p.26).   
Since then, the political command of Bangalore passed through the Sultanate of 
Bijapur, the Mughals, various rulers of Mysore State and the British until the 
Indian independence in 1947 after which it became the capital of Mysore State 
until 1956.  After the formation of the independent State of Karnataka in the 
1956 linguistic reorganization of states, Mysore was annexed as administrative 
district within Karnataka, and Bangalore became the capital of Karnataka.  
 
The economic geography of Bangalore reflects this History.  When the British 
took over, Bangalore was not only a well-known centre for craft and textiles but 
also the regional agricultural hub.  Many village networks formed the regional 
urban agglomeration.  Heitzman (ibid, p.24) notes, “the topography of 
Bangalore makes it unlikely spot for a metropolis, since it lies on a semi-arid 
plateau between 900 and 1000 meters above sea level, with no major rivers 
running near the city”.  However the various rulers, community leaders and 
farmers converted this topographical disadvantage into an advantage by 
building interconnected lakes and tanks that enabled the region to be a rich 
Appendix 2: Bangalore; Urbanization and Planning: A short note on 
history 
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agricultural economy; the consequent salubrious microclimate that emerged 
earned the city its popular title - the garden city - as well as attracted settlers 
from various parts of India to lead a peaceful retired life.  Successive leaders 
also made their marks through building various water tanks and gardens in the 
city.   
 
In 1807, the British East India Company established an administrative and 
military base for their cavalry and infantry with administrative offices inside 
the fort (Heitzman 2004).  Many historians argue that this was a defining 
moment and that the “existence of this cantonment led to a bi-polar growth 
during the 19th and 20th centuries” (ibid), when the life in the colonial enclave 
was separated from that of the natives, both   physically and socially (ibid, Nair 
2005).   
 
By the 20th century, Bangalore grew from the “air conditioned city for the 
British” (as Heitzman puts it) into a regional centre in South India.  The 
economy that was once dominated by agriculture and small-scale textile and 
craft production slowly diversified, with the introduction of many educational 
and research institutions and centres of administration, production and trade.  
During the late 1800’s, many large textile mills started to function on the 
western side of the city.  From 1940 through to the 1970’s, Bangalore many 
public sector units for production of capital and consumer goods were 
established in the north and north east.  Around these developed many clusters 
of technology, space research, science and defense research and educational 
institutions.   
 
As the capital of the erstwhile Mysore State and subsequently of Karnataka 
State, Bangalore was also home to many administrative institutions. During the 
early decades of independence, India’s political leaders conceived Bangalore as 
the city of the future.  This vision provided impetus to the efforts from the 
central as well as regional governments which made institutional and 
infrastructure investment in the following decades.  
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These, along with the recently emergent dynamic private enterprise in the 
1990s contributed to the emergence and stabilization of the Information 
Technology industry.  The city now occupies a prominent position in the 
current phase of economic growth and urbanization in India (Parthasarathy 
2000, Nair 2005, Heitzman 2004, Srinivas 2004).  It is a city of education, 
manufacturing, administration, information technology and enabled services 
and biotechnology.  It has a varied employment sector profile.  With a US$47.2 
billion economy including its US$3.7 billion of foreign direct investment (11% 
of India’s total FDI), Bangalore is one of the most significantly globalizing urban 
regions in the country (BDA: 2007).  From 2001 to 2011 the population of 
Bangalore increased from 5.7 million to 8.45 million (48% decadal growth) and 
the area increased from 225 square kilometers to 741 square kilometers.  
Discounting the impact of change in area, the city’s population grows annually 
at the rate of above 3%, its employment at 6% and average incomes at 9% 
(RMP 2007).  Manufacturing (43.36 %), banking and insurance (11.07%) and 
services (31.51%) dominate its employment profile (RMP 2005, p 7). 
 
Increased economic opportunity attracted immigrants from different parts of 
the country as well as from different parts of the world.  The annual population 
growth rate is about 3.5% for the last two decades (RMP 2007, CDP 2006). 
Currently Bangalore has a floating population of about a million (ibid).  In the 
past two decades, about 45% of the population growth rate is the result of in-
migration (ibid).  Bangalore is probably one of the most multicultural cities in 
India; only about one third of the population registered Kannada (the official 
language of Karnataka) as their first tongue.  
 
The demand for infrastructure to support this rate of growth far outweighs the 
existing supply. This rate of growth has its impact on the civic infrastructure 
and challenges on urban governance.  Even though Bangalore has a diversified 
employment sector, growth in the last two decades was mainly triggered by the 
Information Technology and Information Technology Enables Services (ITES) 
industries and the subsequent spillover effects had created a large number of 
high earners.  This obviously added more pressure on the land, labor and 
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infrastructure.  These pressures were unprecedented and perhaps unexpected; 
a common notion expressed by administrators and planners was that “the 
growth in Bangalore took everyone by surprise” and “no one expected this kind 
of growth”.   Another comment one often hear is that “Bangalore is unplanned”; 
obviously an impressionist response to that experience of daily living.  
 
Emergence of modern administration and planning 
 
After the defeat of Tipu Sultan by the British in 1799 through capturing 
Bangalore and Srirangapatinam (the then capital of Mysore State), they 
reinstated a five-year-old child as the king of Mysore with Mysore as its capital.  
The British established a military base (cantonment) in Bangalore with a 
resident in charge.  Later, due to a rebellion against the king, the British took 
over the administration of Bangalore and appointed a commissioner, relegating 
the king to a ritual position in Mysore.  Bangalore became the administrative 
capital and Mysore was retained as the seat of the King (Heitzman 2004).  
 
James Heitzman (2004) argues that, “the commissioners oversaw a variety of 
organizational and technological changes that streamlined administration and 
transformed Bangalore into a node within the colonial information network.”  
From 1840’s until the end of the century, a series of administrative reforms and 
infrastructure works established the city as an important node.  Administrative 
languages were limited to Kannada and English; English middle schools were 
established, telegraph lines were put in place in 1854, the first railway line was 
opened in 1864, various parks, parades and administrative buildings water 
reservoirs and distribution systems were constructed, postal systems were 
linked in 1889, a civil service examination was set up in 1891 which helped to 
form a modern state bureaucracy and the city was electrified in 1900  (ibid).  
 
In 1881, the British returned the state to the rule of the Mysore king after 
abolishing the system of commissioners- instead put a Resident in control.  The 
king appointed prime ministers to rule on his behalf.  The king did not maintain 
absolute sovereignty due to challenges posed by two large land-owning groups 
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– the Vokalingas and Lingayats.  Even today, the democratic politics and 
government formation in Karnataka are characterized by the political equations 
defined by these two community groups.  In 1881, a representative assembly 
was set up in the state, the members of which was initially nominated by the 
state, but later were elected from a small group of property owning elites (ibid). 
 
A town planning committee was set up in 1889 to create new residential 
layouts for the city by expanding its suburbs.  The committee built the first 
layouts in the city by 1894.  Many versions of such committees till the 1920’s 
developed many urban layouts.  By chance, 1894 also marks the start of an 
important 118-year era in the history of urbanization and development in India 
with the passage of Land Acquisition Act.  Since then, Land Acquisition Act had 
become the tool of the state and any forces in the name of the state to forcibly 
acquire land through the invocation of the law of eminent domain in the name of 
public interest. The Act not only enabled the establishment of large 
infrastructure projects that required land, but also resulted in massive 
dislocations and dispossessions in the last century.  .  
 
The Land Acquisition Act enabled the British to intervene during the plague 
epidemic that swept through Bangalore in 1890’s. Crowded neighbourhoods 
were demolished, roads and sewage systems were expanded and 
communication lines were established (Heitzman 2004).  The state and elite-
induced transformation of Bangalore into a modern industrial society began 
around this time and reached its first peak during the time of Mr Visvesvaraya 
as first the Chief Engineer of Mysore State and later as the Dewan (Prime 
Minister) during the early decades of the 1900’s (Ibid).  Heitzman described 
him as a man who was “scrupulously honest and dedicated to modernization, 
who had travelled Japan, Europe and United States” (Ibid, p.36).  A series of 
infrastructure and administrative reforms followed, including massive state-led 
industrialization and an increase in science and technology education.  He 
became one of the main influences of Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision of 
modernization. Even though Visvesvaraya’s industrialise or perish approach 
(Heitzman 2004) came in conflict with Gandhi’s imagination of India as a land of 
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villages and bottom-up self-governance, the state-led planning and 
modernization model defined the post-independence trajectory under Nehru’s 
leadership.  This model was rolled out across India in the form of dams, new 
cities, technology institutions, planning commissions, infrastructure projects, 
large industrial establishments, public sector manufacturing and so on 
(Heitzman 2004, Guha 2010).   
 
Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (Bangalore City Corporation- BMP) was formed 
in 1949 after Indian Independence by combining the cantonment and the city 
(Heitzman 2004, Nair 2005).  The population of Bangalore then was 70,000 
(ibid).  The council of the corporation was elected from selected geographic 
divisions in the city and was headed by a ceremonial mayor whose term was 
one year as elected by the council.  A Commissioner, appointed by the state 
government (then Mysore State), wielded the executive authority.  This 
structure of local government administration continues until today, except that 
the council is formed of ward councilors elected from their respective wards 
(now 198 after successive stages of expansion) and the Karnataka State 
Government (GoK) appoints the Executive Commissioner who manages the day-
to-day running of the Corporation. 
 
The local government is administratively nested within the GoK, which in turn 
is nested within the GoI.  Even though the Indian Federal system is 
characterized by a complex Centre-State relationship about privileges, 
responsibilities and authority in public administration, Urban Planning and 
Local Administration are predominantly Regional State subjects.  Therefore the 
Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act of 1976 expanded the Bangalore City 
Corporation into the Bangalore Municipal Corporation (Bangalore Mahanagara 
Palike - BMP).  In 2006, the BMP was expanded to include neighboring city 
municipal councils to form the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bangalore 
(Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike – BBMP) which today administrates an 
area of 742 square kilometers.  
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National background of Urban Planning 
 
As any national regime, the policy and institutional infrastructure that manages 
the urban areas have developed in various stages after the Indian 
Independence.  The National Planning Commission developed successive Five-
Year Plans, which established the conceptual and institutional foundations for 
the national government’s development programmes as well as established the 
required institutions and provided frameworks for financial allocation.  Most 
importantly, it also laid the foundations that enabled the preparation of various 
acts at a national level that required the respective state governments to 
organize themselves to manage their urban growth.  Urban planning was 
designated as the Regional State government’s domain and responsibility.  The 
first two five-year plans stressed the importance of housing and the preparation 
of master plans by introducing the Town and Country Planning Act.  Even 
though the first five-year plan (1951-56) recognized the need for planned 
development of urban areas, emphasis was on urban housing to address rural–
to-urban migration and refugee problems caused by the partition of India .  
Most of the national institutions involved in urban planning were established 
during this period.  The Second Plan (1956-61) initiated urban development act 
legislation for land-use planning. This Plan had also set up the Delhi 
Development Authority and put into motion the master planning process of 
Delhi led by the Ford Foundation.  However, it was not until the Third Plan 
(1961-66) that actual funds for master planning and new town developments 
were allocated to state governments, thus putting into motion the urban 
development ambitions (Ganeswar: 1995, Routray: 1993, Mahadevia: 2003, 
Shaw: 1999).  
 
The Delhi Master Plan became the main reference for subsequent master plans 
of other cities in India, in terms of the instruments and institutional architecture 
of plan-making and implementation.   The Third Five-Year Plan period also saw 
the creation of a national urban land policy and planning legislation as well as 
the development of planning institutions by various state governments.  Central 
assistance was given to the state governments to prepare master plans for their 
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respective urban regions (NIUA 97).  Preparation of the land-use plans for 
urban areas became a statutory requirement for state governments, thereby 
making planning the urban areas to promote and accommodate the growth and 
development of urban regions their responsibility. 
 
Legal and institutional context of planning in Bangalore 
 
Unlike many other states in India, the Urban Planning institutional architecture 
in Bangalore was more of a continuum from the 1890’s through 1920’s and 
1940’s rather than a starting anew in the 1960’s after the call for statutory 
planning by the central government.  There were organizations for 
development (i.e., the outward expansion of the city to accommodate new 
settlements) as mentioned above in the form of Town Improvement 
Committees and for maintenance (i.e. the maintenance of the existing areas).  
For example, Heitzman (2004), note that Vivesvaraya had an Urban Planning 
division inside his office during the 1917-1918.  The State of Mysore passed the 
City of Bangalore Improvement act in 1945 and set up City Improvement Trust 
Board (CITB), which was to handle the development of planning layouts and 
infrastructure improvement for almost the next three decades until the 1970’s.  
Heitzman (ibid) notes that the  
“CITB was the first permanent incarnation of a state-mandated planning 
authority; at its peak in 1961 it was directing development schemes for 
the city and surrounding 171 villages.  During the 30 years of its 
existence, CITB acquired 3411 hectares [34.11 square kilometers], and 
notified a total of 2279 hectares.  It distributed 68,300 sites for 
residential, commercial industrial and institutional purpose, including 
40% allocated to the economically weaker section of the population 
(ibid, p.44).  
 
The mandate of the CITB included “drawing up improvement schemes, 
notification of its intentions to do so, inform the owners of the affected 
properties (of whose lands were being acquired), forward the schemes for 
government sanction, acquire land, execute the schemes, and transfer new 
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properties to the new buyers” (ibid).  The CITB had even powers to take over 
the functions of the City Corporation after issuing a public gazette notification.  
Moreover, anyone who intended to form a layout in Bangalore had to obtain 
legal permission from the CITB (ibid).  It can be seen that the planning 
institutional system that developed in Bangalore in recent years continue the 
same procedural and institutional architecture.  
 
The first Master Plan for Bangalore was prepared by a committee named the 
Bangalore Development Committee, which was constituted by the state 
government under a former Dewan (Prime Minister of Mysore State), Mr 
Madhav Rau.  This Plan was submitted to the state government in 1952, but as 
Heitzman (2004) notes, it could not be accepted legally due to a lack of 
necessary legal foundations for planning in Karnataka.  Even though it was not 
adopted officially, this Master Plan (along with the Delhi Master Plan of the mid-
1956) formed the basic epistemological framework that influences the master 
planning process in Bangalore until today.   The plan, Heitzman (2004), argues 
had many elements of the then British planning thinking: “removal of factories 
from residential areas, establishment of the green belt around suburban 
extensions, creation of satellite towns outside the green belt, and a proposed 
arterial road that would channel the long distance traffic around the city” (p 
44).  
 
However, based on the second national Five-Year Plan, the Karnataka Town and 
Country Planning Act was passed in 1961. This enabled a comprehensive legal 
framework for Urban Planning in the Karnataka State.  This not only enabled 
but also statutorily required the state government to prepare Master Plans and 
regulate the land use and control the urban form through the instrument of 
building regulations and other means.  Objectives of the act specify that the  
“physical planning with co-ordinated effort on a large scale” is necessary 
for a happier and healthier living environment.  The act sets out 
responsibilities to “preserve and improve existing recreational facilities 
and other amenities, contributing towards balanced use of land [and] to 
direct the future growth of populated areas in the state with the view to 
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ensuring desirable standards of environmental health and hygiene and 
creating facilities for orderly growth of industries and commerce thereby 
promoting general standards of living in the state” (Karnataka: 2002 
page numbers ????).   
The act’s main objectives include: “co-ordinated effort on large scale”, “balanced 
use of land”, “preserve and improve assets” and “direct future growth”.  
 
The act enabled the state to prepare a three tier planning system: 
1. An outline development plan for the “Local Planning Area” (LPA) for 
setting out broad proposals;  
2. A comprehensive development plan which is an in-depth regulating 
document; and 
3. Detailed town planning schemes for the implementation of the 
comprehensive plan proposals.  
 
Subsequently the City Improvement Trust, which existed since 1945, produced 
an outline development plan (1961-76) for 500 square kilometers 
encompassing the central city agglomeration of 220 square kilometers.  It 
defined the planning morphology of Bangalore based on three concentric rings: 
a central urban area, a peri-suburban area with factories and industry and an 
outer rural tract, which remains as a green belt (Heitzman: 1999, 2004).  It can 
be seen that such conceptualization of urban morphology for planning, based on 
urban containment and decentralized growth models influence the master 
planning efforts in Bangalore even now.  Even though this plan was submitted 
to the government in 1967, the government seems to have accepted it only in 
1972 (ibid). 
 
Based on the recommendation of the group that made this Outline Development 
Plan, the Bangalore Development Authority Act of 1976 enabled the formation 
of the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) by merging the Metropolitan 
Planning Board and the City Improvement Trust Board (CITB).  The planning 
and development of Bangalore, with this move, for the first time was brought 
under one organization and under the authority of the Karnataka State 
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government.  The BDA is primarily responsible for Planning and Development 
(i.e. implementation of projects) within the functional urban region of 
Bangalore.  In 1986, this organization produced the first Comprehensive 
Development Plan for Bangalore - CDP1986-2001.  This plan mainly consisted 
of a land-use plan for Bangalore’s functional urban region and building 
regulations.  This was revised in 1994 and then again in 2004 – the draft of 
which took another three years to be released as the Revised Master Plan in 
2007 (known as RMP 2015) for an area of about 1,300 square kilometers.  The 
BDA prepares Master Plans for the functional urban region that is much bigger 
than the Municipal Corporation limits.  The Bangalore Metropolitan Area 
(BMA), as it is called, includes the entire BBMP area of 742 square kilometers 
and numerous villages that surround the BBMP with a population of about 8.5 
million.   Since the BDA’s formation, it has worked under the control of 
Karnataka State government’s Ministry for Urban Development and is overseen 
by the latter’s Secretariat and the Directorate of Town Planning.  
 
Even though thoughts about Regional Planning had been around since the 
1960’s, among the members the Metropolitan Planning Board (the planning 
committee) under Mr Madhav Rau, only the 1985 Bangalore Metropolitan 
Regional Development Authority Act enabled the establishment of BMRDA to 
plan for the larger region of Bangalore - including urban and rural revenue 
districts - covering an area of about 8,000 square kilometers.   
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